Like the boy who cried wolf, the Italians have so often asserted that “Italy is in ferment and on the eve of revolution”, and the crowned heads of Europe have so often prated about the “settlement of the Italian question”, that it would be no wonder if the actual appearance of the wolf passed unnoticed, if a real revolution and a general European war were to break out and find us unprepared! Europe in 1859 presents a decidedly warlike aspect, and should the hostile demeanour, the patent preparations of France and Piedmont for a war with Austria dissolve into nothing, it is not improbable that the burning hatred of the Italians for their oppressors, combined with their ever-increasing sufferings, will vent itself in a general revolution. We confine ourselves to saying: not improbable—for, if a hope long unfulfilled torments the heart, a prediction long unfulfilled renders the mind sceptical. If, however, we are to believe the reports of the English, Italian and French newspapers, the moral condition of Naples is a facsimile of its physical structure, and a stream of revolutionary lava would cause no more astonishment than a fresh eruption of old Vesuvius. Correspondents from the States of the Church report at great length on the growing encroachments of the clerical rule and the deep-rooted conviction of the Roman population that reform or improvement is inconceivable and that only a complete overthrow of the said government is the sole remedy, that this remedy would long since have been applied were it not for the presence of Swiss, French and Austrian troops, and that, despite these substantial obstacles, such an attempt may be made at any day and at any hour.

The news from Venice and Lombardy is more precise and forcibly reminds us of the symptoms which characterised these provinces at the end of 1847 and the beginning of 1848. Austrian tobacco and Austrian manufactures are nowhere bought; equally general are proclamations to the population to keep away from public places of amusement. These studied demonstrations of hatred against the Archduke <Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph> and all Austrian officials went so far that Prince Alfonso Parcia, an Italian nobleman devoted to the House of Habsburg, did not dare to raise his hat in the open street when he met the Archduchess <Charlotte>, and the penalty for his bad behaviour—in the form of an order from the Archduke for the Prince’s immediate departure from Milan—acted on his class as a spur to join the popular cry: fuori i Tedeschi! <out with the Germans!>. If to these mute demonstrations of popular feeling we add the daily quarrels between the people and the soldiery, invariably provoked by the former, the riot of the students of Pavia and the consequent closing of the university, we behold a new edition of the prelude to the five days of Milan in 1848.

But, although we believe that Italy cannot always remain in its present condition, since even the longest road must have a bend, although we know that an effective organisation is going on throughout the peninsula, we cannot say whether these manifestations represent exclusively the spontaneous outburst of the popular will or whether they have been instigated by the agents of Louis Napoleon and his ally Count Cavour. To judge by appearances, Piedmont, with the support of France and perhaps Russia, intends to attack Austria in the spring. From the reception the Emperor gave to the Austrian envoy in Paris, it seems that he entertains no friendly feelings towards the government represented by Herr Hübner. It is not far-fetched, with the concentration of so powerful a military force in Algeria, to assume that hostilities against Austria would begin with an attack on her Italian provinces. The warlike preparations of Piedmont, the reports bordering on declarations of war against Austria daily emanating from the official and officious Piedmontese press, strengthen our surmise that the King will avail himself of the first pretext to cross the Ticino. Moreover, the news that Garibaldi, the hero of Montevideo and Rome, has been summoned to Turin is confirmed by private and reliable sources. Cavour had an interview with Garibaldi, informed him that a war was soon to be expected, and suggested that it would be wise to collect and organise volunteers. Austria, one of the chief parties concerned, furnishes clear proof that it gives credence to the rumours. It reinforces, by all means, a force of 120,000 men concentrated in its Italian provinces, and has just now hastily sent off a reinforcement of 30,000 men. The fortifications of Venice, Trieste, etc., are being extended and strengthened, and in all other Austrian provinces landowners and horse breeders are called upon to bring in their horses, as mounts are needed for the cavalry and the pioneers. While Austria, on the one hand, neglects no preparation for resistance, according to “prudent Austrian fashion” precautions are also taken for the event of a defeat. From Prussia, the Piedmont of Germany, whose interests are diametrically opposed to its own, it can at best hope for neutrality. The mission of the Austrian emissary Baron Seebach to obtain the prospect of support from St. Petersburg in the event of an attack seems to have failed completely. The plans of the Tsar coincide on more than one point, and not least in the question of the Mediterranean, where he also has cast anchor, too closely with those of his former opponent and now firm ally in Paris for him to allow himself to defend “grateful” Austria. The well-known sympathy of the English people for the Italians and their hatred of the giogo tedesco <German yoke> make it very doubtful whether any British ministry would dare to support Austria, however gladly they would all like to do so. Moreover, Austria shares with many others the well-founded suspicion that the would-be “Avenger of Waterloo” <Napoleon III> has by no means lost sight of his desire to humiliate “perfidious Albion”, that, although he might not wish to risk challenging the lion in his den, he will not shrink from defying him in the East and, together with Russia, attacking the Turkish Empire (despite his oaths to leave that empire untouched) and thus bringing half the British forces into action on the Eastern battlefield, while he holds the other half in forced inactivity from Cherbourg, as it must protect the British coasts. Therefore, Austria has the uncomfortable feeling that, in the actual event of war, it can rely only on itself. One of its many means of suffering as little damage as possible in case of defeat is noteworthy for its impudent cunning. The barracks, palaces, arsenals and other public buildings throughout the Venetian Lombardy, whose construction and maintenance have burdened the Italians with excessive taxes, are nevertheless regarded by Austria as its property. At this moment the government is forcing the various municipalities to purchase all these buildings at fantastical prices. The reason given is that it intends in future to lease the buildings and not to own them. Whether the municipalities will ever see a farthing of the rent, even if Austria retains power, is at best doubtful. But should Austria be driven out of the whole or a part of its Italian territory, it will congratulate itself on its cunning plan, because it has converted a large part of its lost treasure into cash that can easily be carried away. It is further asserted that Austria is making extreme efforts to transfer its own determination to offer the utmost resistance to all attempts by the people or the crowned heads to change the existing state of things in Italy to the Pope, the King of Naples and the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma and Modena. Yet nobody knows better than Austria itself how unsuccessful the best efforts of these wretched tools would be in resisting the tide of a popular uprising or a foreign intervention.

While a war with Austria is the fervent wish of every honest Italian heart, we doubt not that the great majority of Italians regard the prospects of a war begun by France and Piedmont as at least questionable in respect of its results. Although no one seriously supposes that the murderer of Rome can be transformed by any process within the range of human possibility into the saviour of Lombardy, a small clique favours Louis Napoleon’s plans to place Murat on the throne of Naples, believes his assurances to remove the Pope from Italy or to restrict his power to the city and the Campagna di Roma, and to help Piedmont incorporate the whole of Upper Italy into its dominions. Then there is a party, small but honest, which imagines that the thought of an Italian crown dazzles Victor Emmanuel as much as it would have dazzled his father <Charles Albert>. It is convinced that he is eagerly awaiting the first opportunity to draw his sword from the scabbard to gain this crown, and that the King, with this sole aim in view, will avail himself of the help of France or any other help to obtain the coveted treasure. A considerably larger group, which counts adherents in all the oppressed provinces of Italy, especially in Lombardy and among the Lombard emigration, and which has no particular confidence in the Piedmontese King or the Piedmontese monarchy, says, however: “Let Piedmont’s aims be what they may, it has an army of 100,000 men, a fleet, arsenals and treasures; let it throw down the gauntlet to Austria, we shall follow it onto the battlefield; if it is sincere, let it have its reward; if it does not fulfil its mission, the nation will be strong enough to carry on the struggle once begun and lead it to victory.”

The Italian national party, on the other hand, denounces the unleashing of an Italian war of independence under the auspices of France and Piedmont as a national calamity. For this party, as is often erroneously assumed, the question is not whether Italy, once freed from the foreigner, is to be united under a republican or a monarchist form of government, but that the proposed means are unsuited to winning Italy for the Italians, and that at best only one foreign yoke is exchanged for another, equally oppressive one. It believes that the man of 2 December will never wage war at all unless the growing impatience of his army or the threatening countenance of the French people forces him to do so; that, driven into war in this way, he will make Italy the theatre of war with the aim of carrying out his uncle’s <Napoleon I.> plan – to make a “French lake” of the Mediterranean – by placing Murat on the throne of Naples; that he will seek to complete the revenge begun in the Crimea for the treaties of 1815 by dictating conditions to Austria, which was then one of the parties that dictated extremely humiliating conditions for the Bonaparte family to France. It sees in Piedmont a mere tool of France; it is convinced that Napoleon III, once he has achieved his own aims, will not dare to support Italy in attaining the freedom he denies to France, and that he will conclude a peace with Austria and stifle all the efforts of the Italians to carry on the war. Should Austria assert its territory, Piedmont would have to content itself with adding the Duchies of Parma and Modena to its present territory. Should Austria be defeated in the struggle, however, the peace would be concluded on the Adige and all of Venetia and a part of Lombardy would remain in the hands of the hated Austrians. This Peace of the Adige, it claims, has already been tacitly agreed between Piedmont and France. As confidently as this party predicts the victory of the people in the event of a national war against Austria, so firmly is its conviction that, if this war is begun with Napoleon as inspirer and the King of Sardinia as dictator, the Italians will find themselves incapable of taking a single step against the leaders they themselves accepted and of preventing in any way the resulting diplomatic intrigues, capitulations, treaties and the re-forging of their chains. It points to Piedmont’s conduct towards Venice and Milan in 1848 and at Novara in 1849, and urges its compatriots to draw lessons from the bitter experience they have gained through their fatal trust in princes. All its efforts are directed towards completing the organisation of the peninsula, inducing the people to unite in their lofty aspirations and to begin the struggle only when they feel capable of waging the great national insurrection that will dethrone the Pope, Bomba <Pius IX., Ferdinand II.> & Co. and place in their hands the armies, fleets and war matériel of the respective provinces for the destruction of the foreign enemy. Since they regard the Piedmontese army and population as ardent champions of Italian freedom, the adherents of the national party believe that the King of Piedmont, should he so desire, will in this way have ample opportunity to promote Italy’s freedom and independence. Should he prove reactionary, they know that the army and the people will defend the national cause; should he justify the trust placed in him by his adherents, the Italians will not withhold tangible proofs of their gratitude. In any case, the people will be in a position to determine its own destiny, and since the national party feels that a successful revolution in Italy will be the signal for a general struggle of the oppressed nationalities for liberation from their oppressors, it fears no intervention by France, because Napoleon III will have too much to do in his own country to be able to meddle in the affairs of other nations, not even for the furtherance of his own ambitious ends. A chi tocca-tocca? <Who begins?> – as the Italians say. We shall not attempt to predetermine whether the revolutionaries or the regular armies will appear first in the field. What seems fairly certain is that a war, begun in any part of Europe, will not end where it began, and if this war is really inevitable, it is our sincere and heartfelt wish that it will bring a true and just settlement of the Italian and various other questions which, as long as they remain unsettled, will continue from time to time to disturb the peace of Europe and thereby hinder the progress and prosperity of the entire civilised world.