Friedrich Engels

The Prospects of Success of the Impending War

Written at the end of February 1859.

From the English.

[New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5586, March 17, 1859, leading article]

The most ardent friends of peace in Europe are beginning to abandon the last faint hope of the preservation of peace, and instead of discussing the possibility of a peaceful settlement, they now discuss the prospects of success of the prospective belligerent parties. Allow us, therefore, to continue our observations on the military significance of the Po valley and on the chances it offers for the manoeuvres of the opposing Franco-Sardinian and Austrian armies.

We have already described the strong position of the Austrians on the Mincio and the Adige.

Let us now turn to the other side. The Po, which mainly flows from west to east, makes a considerable bend and flows for a length of about sixteen miles from north-west to south-east, after which it resumes its eastern direction. This bend lies on Sardinian territory, about 25 miles from the Austrian frontier. On the northern curve of the Po the Sesia, which flows southwards from the Alps, empties into it, and on the southern curve the Tanaro, which flows northwards from the Apennines. Into both these rivers, shortly before their junction with the main stream, numerous smaller rivers in turn flow, so that the country situated to the west of them presents on the map the spectacle of an extensive system of river lines all converging from the amphitheatre of mountains that surround Piedmont on three sides toward a common centre, resembling the radii drawn from the circumference of a circle to its centre. This is the strong defensive position of Piedmont and was recognised as such by Napoleon with exactitude, but was neglected both by him and by the Sardinian government that succeeded French rule; only

after the defeats of 1849 was it developed for defence. But even then the defensive works were constructed so slowly and sparingly that at present they are incomplete, and fortifications that should have a masonry escarp and counterscarp are now being erected as simple field redoubts, in order to be ready for defence in the spring.

On the Po, about four miles above the mouth of the Sesia, lies the town of Casale, which has been and is being fortified to form a support for the northern or left wing of the position. At the confluence of the Tanaro and the Bormida, eight miles above the junction of the former with the Po, lies Alessandria, the strongest fortress of Piedmont, which is now being made the centre of a large entrenched camp, securing the southern or right wing of the position. The distance between the two towns is sixteen miles, and the Po flows in front of the road connecting them at a distance of about five to six miles. The left wing of an army occupying this position is covered firstly by the Sesia and secondly by Casale and the Po. The right wing is covered by Alessandria and the rivers Orba, Bormida, Belbo and Tanaro, all of which converge close to Alessandria. The front is covered by the bend of the Po.

If Sardinia concentrates its army, 80,000 to 90,000 strong, in this position, it will have about 50,000 men available for active operations, ready also to fall upon the flanks of any army that should attempt to turn the position via Novi and Acqui in the south or via Vercelli in the north. Turin may therefore be considered well covered by this position, especially as this capital possesses a citadel requiring a regular siege before it can be taken, and no army turning such a position could carry out a siege without first having driven the Piedmontese army from its entrenched camp. The position of Casale and Alessandria, however, has a weak point: it has no depth and its rear is completely uncovered. The Austrians have between Mincio and Adige a quadrilateral covered by four fortresses, one at each corner. The Piedmontese have on the Po and Bormida a line with two fortresses, one on each flank, and a front that can be well defended, but their rear is entirely open. While it would be daring and comparatively pointless to turn Alessandria in the south, Casale can be turned in the north, if not via Vercelli, at least via Sesto Calende, Novara, Biella, Santhià and Crescentino; and if a superior army crosses the Po above Casale and attacks the Piedmontese from the rear,

they are immediately forced to abandon the advantages of a strongly entrenched position and fight in the open field. It would be the counterpart of Marengo, only on the other side of the Bormida.

Having described the two operational bases in the Po basin, that of the Austrians in an earlier article, that of the French and Piedmontese in the foregoing remarks, let us now discuss what use can be made of them. A glance at the map shows that the whole north-eastern part of the Alpine chain belonging to Switzerland, from Geneva to about a mile before the Stelvio Pass, is for the time being neutral territory until one or other of the belligerent parties finds it suitable to violate that neutrality. Since the Swiss nowadays have a rather strong force for defensive purposes, it is not probable that this would happen right at the beginning of the war. We will therefore, for the present, consider Switzerland as truly neutral and inaccessible to either party. In that case the French have four routes for reaching Piedmont. The army of Lyons will have to pass through Savoy and over the Mont Cenis. A smaller corps can advance via Briançon and the Mont Genèvre. Both, descending from the mountains, will unite near Turin. The army concentrated in Provence can partly march from Toulon via Nice and Col di Tenda, the other part can be embarked at Toulon and transported by steamers in a much shorter time to Genoa. Both parts have their point of concentration at Alessandria. There are still a few other roads leading to the same points of concentration, but they are either unsuitable for the passage of large bodies of troops or not as advantageous as those mentioned.

The disposition of the French Army of Italy—we may now venture to call it so—has already been made in conformity with this state of things. The two main points of concentration are Lyons and Toulon, between them a smaller corps in the Rhône valley, ready to advance via Briançon. In order rapidly to concentrate a strong French army in the Po valley behind Alessandria and Casale, it is indeed necessary to use all the aforesaid routes; the strongest corps comes via Lyons and the Mont Cenis, the weakest via Briançon and the Mont Genèvre, and the greatest possible part of the army of Provence is forwarded by water to Genoa; for while a corps marching from the Var over the Col di Tenda requires more than ten days to Alessandria, it can, by water, reach Genoa from Toulon in 24 hours, and from there Alessandria in three forced or four ordinary marches.

But suppose, as is likely, that Austria declares war as soon as a French battalion arrives in Piedmont, what course can its Army of Italy take? It can remain in Lombardy and, standing at ease, await the concentration of 200,000 French and 50,000 Piedmontese, and then fall back upon its operational base on the Mincio, abandoning the whole of Lombardy. Such a course of action would discourage the Austrian troops and encourage their opponents by an unexpectedly easy success. It can also await the attack of the French and Piedmontese in the open plain of Lombardy. In this case it would be defeated by superior numbers, since it can oppose only 120,000 men to double that number, and would moreover be hampered by the Italian uprising which would break out in the entire country. It could certainly reach its fortresses, but this brilliant operational basis would be reduced to a barren defensive, after the offensive power of the field army has been lost. The grand design for which this system of fortresses was created—namely, to serve a weaker army as a basis for a successful and protected attack upon a stronger one—would be entirely nullified unless support came from the interior of Austria. In the meantime, Peschiera and Legnago might fall, and communications through the Venetian territory would certainly be lost. Each of the courses here contemplated would be disadvantageous and indeed inadmissible, unless dictated by compelling necessity. But there remains another possibility.

The Austrians can throw at least 120,000 men into the field. If they choose the right moment, they will face only 90,000 Piedmontese, of whom only 50,000 can take part in the fight. The French are arriving by four roads, all leading to Alessandria. The angles between these four routes, that is, between the lines Mont Cenis - Alessandria and Genoa - Alessandria, amount in total to about 140°; thus, any co-operation between the various French corps before their concentration is entirely out of the question. Now if the Austrians choose a favourable moment—we saw in 1848 and 1849 that they can—and march on the Piedmontese operational base, either attacking it frontally or turning it in the north, we venture to assert, with all respect for the bravery of the Piedmontese army, that the Sardinians would have only a slender chance against the superior numbers of the Austrians. As soon as the Piedmontese were defeated in the field and confined to a passive defence of their fortresses, the Austrians could attack each

French corps separately, as it comes down from the Alps or Apennines, with superior strength. Even if they were compelled to retreat, this retreat would be secured as long as the neutrality of Switzerland covered their northern flank, and the army, upon its arrival at Mantua, would still be capable of an active offensive defence of its operational base.

Another chance for the Austrians would be to take up a position at Tortona and await the French column which, on its march from Genoa to Alessandria, must there offer its flank to the Austrians. This, however, would be only a lame offensive, for the French could calmly remain at Genoa until the other columns were concentrated at Alessandria; in that case the Austrians would not only be completely outmanoeuvred, but would even run the risk of being cut off from the Mincio and Adige.

Let us assume the Austrians were defeated and obliged to fall back on their base of operations; the French would then, as soon as they advanced beyond Milan, run the risk of being outflanked. The Stelvio road leads from Tyrol through the valley of the Adda straight to Milan. The Tonale road through the valley of the Oglio and the Giudicarie road through the valley of the Chiese both lead into the heart of Lombardy and into the rear of any army attacking the Mincio from the west. By way of Tyrol, Austria outflanks the whole of Lombardy-Venetia, and when the necessary preparations have been made, it can at any time prepare a Marengo for its enemy on the plain of Lombardy. On the other hand, so long as Switzerland remains neutral, no such stratagem can be employed against Austria while it attacks Piedmont.

In the present state of things in Italy, then, the offensive would be the most suitable course for Austria. To march straight into an army while it is still concentrating is one of the grandest of those great manoeuvres of the modern art of war which Napoleon was so superbly able to execute. No one has felt this more keenly than the Austrians themselves; witness Montenotte, Millesimo, Mondovi and Dego, Abensberg and Eggmühl. That the Austrians learned from Napoleon they proved magnificently at Sommacampagna and Custozza, and above all at Novara. The same manoeuvre, therefore, seems at present the most advantageous for the Austrian conduct of the war. Although it requires great vigilance and the seizing of the right moment, the Austrians would let slip immeasurable prospects of success if they confined themselves to a mere defence of their territories.