Friedrich Engels

The German Resources for the War

Written on 10 February 1859.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 5582 of 12 March 1859]

The recent boastings of Louis-Napoleon about the strength of the troops he is capable of leading against Austria have given rise to similar investigations in the German newspapers, dealing with the military resources that could presumably be combined in the event of a war against him. These statements, however, generally make little claim to accuracy or thoroughness of detail, and we have therefore found it necessary to have recourse to authentic and official documents for the facts and figures which we now propose to lay before our readers.

The Austrian army is of course by far the strongest among the armies that would be employed in such a war against France. Its infantry consists of 62 line regiments (each composed of 1 grenadier battalion, 4 line battalions, and 1 depot battalion) with 310 active and 62 depot battalions; 14 frontier regiments (each 2 field battalions and 1 replacement battalion) with 28 active and 14 replacement battalions (besides a battalion placed at disposal); and 32 rifle battalions. The strength of the Austrian battalions varies between four and six companies. At full complement the infantry reaches the following total strength:

Line

370,000 men

Frontier regiments

55,000 men

Rifles

32,000 men

Total, including depots

470,000 men

The line and frontier regiments are armed with smooth-bore percussion muskets, the locks of which present a peculiar, not much admired construction; but they are nevertheless quite serviceable muskets. In the frontier regiments, each company has twenty rifled guns. The 32 rifle battalions are entirely equipped with rifled guns, but their range is much inferior to that of the French Minié or the English Enfield rifle. The infantry is throughout first-rate, and the men can stand comparison with any others in Europe, although when compared with the English or Prussian infantry, where every soldier carries a rifled musket of great range, the inferiority of armament must have a disadvantageous effect. Against French or Russian troops this disadvantage would not exist, if we except the 20 battalions of French chasseurs, and as long as the armament of the French line infantry is not altered.

The Austrian cavalry counts 10 heavy and 24 light regiments, the former with 6, the latter with 8 squadrons, besides 1 depot squadron per regiment. A heavy squadron has 194, a light one 227 men. At this complement an Austrian cavalry regiment is stronger than a French cavalry brigade. The whole force is 67,000 men strong, extraordinarily well mounted, and the greater part of the light cavalry is recruited from two equestrian nations, the Hungarians and the Poles. There is no doubt that these 67,000 men would be more than a match for the 81,000 French cavalrymen Louis-Napoleon proposes to raise. The Austrian cavalry is at present unquestionably without any competition.

The artillery consists of 12 field regiments, each with 13 batteries of 8 guns, 1 coast regiment, and 1 rocket regiment with 20 batteries, making a total of 1,248 guns, 240 rocket carriages, and 50,000 men. The pioneers, medical troops, etc., amount to a further 20,000 men.

The peace strength of the entire army, including train, etc., would amount to 580,000 to 600,000 men. Of these, nearly 200,000 men are usually — and this holds good up to the present moment — on furlough; hence, at present, 400,000 are under the colours. But not only these, but also another 120,000 men of the reserve (discharged after eight years’ service and liable to service for two further years) can be called up in the event of war; and if we may believe the assertions of Austrian newspaper writers, the whole army can be under arms in 14 days. Yet the resources of the Empire are not thereby exhausted. The frontier district is excepted from reserve duty, but there every man up to his 60th year is a soldier and ready at any time to be called to his regiment. This district supplied, in 1848, the troops that saved Radetzky in Italy, and with him the Austrian monarchy.

It is not yet forgotten how battalion upon battalion of these tough Slavonians was formed and sent to Italy, while the army which, at the same time, wrested Vienna from the insurgents was recruited from the same race of men. This district, whose contingent for ordinary purposes is limited to 55,000 men, can send into the field, in case of necessity, 200,000 soldiers. Thus the Austrian army, with the reserves and with only 80,000 men additional from the frontier district, would number in all 800,000 men, to which more than 100,000 frontier soldiers can be added as fast as the battalions can be organised. Assuming Austria had the necessary money, she would be fully capable, by herself, of defending her Italian possessions against united France and Piedmont.

Next comes Prussia. The infantry of this kingdom consists of 36 line and guards regiments with 108 battalions, 9 reserve regiments with 18 battalions, 8 reserve battalions, and 10 rifle battalions, in all 144 battalions, whose war strength is about 150,000 men. To this must be added the first levy of the Landwehr, 116 battalions with about 120,000 men, together 270,000 men. In time of war the 8 reserve battalions are expanded into 36 depot battalions for the 36 line regiments, and the 9 reserve regiments with their corresponding 9 Landwehr battalions are destined for garrison duty, so that an active field force remains of 228 battalions with about 230,000 men.

The cavalry consists of 38 line regiments, each of 4 squadrons, thus 152 squadrons, and 34 regiments with 136 squadrons of the first levy of the Landwehr, together about 49,000 men.

Artillery: 9 regiments, each with 11 batteries of 8 guns and 4 companies for fortress service — in all 792 field guns and 20,000 men.

The engineers, train, etc., have a total strength of 40,000 men.

Taking everything together, Prussia possesses an army of 380,000 men of the line and of the first levy of the Landwehr, of whom at least 340,000 are fit for field service. The second levy of the Landwehr is not organised and is solely intended for garrison duty. In the event of a war, however, the second levy, as far as the infantry and artillery are concerned, could be brought to a tolerable standard of efficiency in about four months; the cavalry will hardly ever be fit for active service. At all events, 100,000 to 120,000 men from this source may be safely counted upon, who would in turn release an equal number of line soldiers from garrison duty. The Prussian army can therefore put 500,000 men on foot, besides a number of trained men for whom there was no room in the first levy of the Landwehr, and who could be used for new formations.

Owing to the short period of service (three years) and the fact that the whole first levy of the Landwehr has, on an average, been four to five years (with few and short interruptions) out of army service, the Prussian army, as regards the men, is not equal to the Austrian at the outbreak of a war. The Prussians, however, have a special bent for military matters, and a few weeks of active field service will always make good soldiers of them. Prussia has above all to fear the first month or the first two months of a war. More than half the army consists of a militia force; it is therefore little suited for an aggressive war, but it will hold its own all the better in a defensive war, for, Switzerland excepted, nowhere is the army so truly a national institution as in Prussia. As to armament, the whole of the guards and one battalion of each line regiment are armed with the new needle-guns, which have a range of 1,000 yards and, with the exception of the English Enfield, carry farther than all other muskets in use. The remaining line troops are armed with the common musket, the barrel of which, however, has been rifled on the Minié principle by a very simple process, and which in range and accuracy is little inferior to the genuine Minié rifle. When the first levy of the Landwehr is called up, it will also receive the needle-gun. The Prussian infantry is thus, with the exception of the British, the best armed of all infantry troops in Europe.

For the army of the German Confederation, Austria furnishes the first, second, and third, Prussia the fourth, fifth, and sixth army corps. The seventh corps is furnished by Bavaria. Bavaria is bound to provide a simple contingent of 36,500 men and 17,800 men reserve, in all 54,300 men. But the Bavarian army is considerably stronger, viz., 54 battalions of infantry with 54,000 men, 56 squadrons of cavalry with 9,000 men, 224 guns and 5,600 men of artillery, besides engineers, etc., together more than 72,000 men; to this must be added the reserve, which includes all discharged soldiers from the 27th to the 40th year, and which can be used for the formation of new bodies.

The eighth corps comprises in contingent and reserve:

Men

Men

Württemberg

21,000

Actual army

19,000

Baden

15,000

Actual army

15,000

Hesse-Darmstadt

9,300

Actual army

10,500

Required strength

45,300

Actual strength

44,500

The ninth corps (contingent and reserve) is supposed to number 36,000 men; the armies of which it is composed actually comprise 44,000 men.

The tenth corps is supposed to comprise 42,000 men, and we assume that the armies belonging to it will about reach this strength. The reserve division (contingents of the small states) is about 17,000 strong.

A general summary thus gives:

Men

Austria

800,000

Prussia

400,000

Bavaria

70,000

Eighth Corps

45,000

Ninth Corps

44,000

Tenth Corps

42,000

Reserve Division

17,000

Total

1,418,000

Of this colossal force, the 213,000 men of the last five groups are constantly in readiness and constitute only the regular peace strength of the respective states after the calling in of all men on furlough. These states could therefore easily put 100,000 to 150,000 more men into the field, but since no formations exist for them, we have not counted them at all, any more than the second levy of the Prussian Landwehr. Austria can with certainty have 700,000 men under arms within fourteen days. In Prussia it would require even less time, by calling up the war reserve (soldiers on furlough), to bring the line troops to their full strength of 225,000 men. Germany can therefore bring about 1,150,000 men into the field within fourteen days, a month later a further 270,000, and then the whole of the Prussian second levy, the whole of the Bavarian reserve, and about 100,000 Austrian frontier soldiers are still available. And only when these reserves are exhausted, then and only then, will extraordinary exertions become necessary.

The armed forces at Germany’s disposal are therefore so formidable that, if they stand under a single and firm command, they need fear no attack conducted by France, Italy, and Russia simultaneously. Whether they will have such a command is, of course, doubtful; but if, in a general war, petty jealousies, irresolution, and routine should impair the actions of these armies and bring about defeats, then the present governments of Germany can pack their bags, then they will have to clear out in a hurry. The Germany of 1859 differs from the Germany of the Peace of Basel and of the defeats of Jena, Austerlitz, and Wagram as the France of today differs from the revolutionary France of 1793; and if the year 1848 achieved nothing further, it has nevertheless generated a German national feeling in every part of the country, even in those that were previously accused of French sympathies. Louis-Napoleon may try to play the liberator in Italy, but he dare not venture this game on the Rhine; and even if he should achieve partial successes in a war, he would only provoke a revolution in Germany, one that would secure his final defeat and, by the force of its example, endanger his own, already tottering throne.