At the time when England was generally congratulated upon the 
extortion from the Celestials of the treaty of Tien-tsin,*” I tried to 
show that, Russia being in point of fact the only power benefited 
by the piratical Anglo-Chinese war, the commercial advantages 
accruing from the treaty to England were rather nugatory, while, 
in a political point of view, so far from establishing peace, that 
treaty, on the contrary, rendered resumption of war unavoidable.* 
The march of events has fully confirmed these views. The treaty 
of Tien-tsin has become a thing of the past, and the semblance of 
peace has vanished before the stern realities of war.*”? 

Let me first state the facts as reported by the last Overland Mail. 

The Hon. Mr. Bruce, accompanied by M. de Bourboulon, the 
French Plenipotentiary, set out with a British expedition destined 
to ascend the Peiho, and to accompany the two embassadors on 
their message to Pekin. The expedition, under the orders of 
Admiral Hope, consisted of seven steamships, ten gun-boats, two 
troop and storeships, and several hundred marines and royal 
engineers. The Chinese, on their part, had objected to the mission 
taking that particular route. Admiral Hope, consequently, found 
the entrance of the Peiho barred by booms and stakes, and having 
stayed for nine days, from the 17th till the 25th June, at the 
mouth of that river, attempted its forcible passage, the Plenipoten- 
tiaries having joined the squadron on the 20th of June. On his 

a See this volume, pp. 46-50 and 82-86.— Ed. 

The New Chinese War 509 

arrival off the Peiho River, Admiral Hope had made sure of the 
Taku forts, razed during the last war, having been rebuilt—a fact 
which, be it said en passant, he ought to have known before, since 
it had been officially announced in the Pekin Gazette.’ 

On the 25th of June, while the British attempted to force the 
Peiho passage, the Taku batteries, supported by a Mongol force of 
apparently 20,000 men, were unmasked, and opened a destructive 
fire on the British vessels. An engagement on land and water took 
place, resulting in the utter discomfiture of the aggressors. The 
expedition had to withdraw, after the loss of three English vessels 
of war, the Cormorant, the Lee, and Plover, and with a loss of 464 
killed and wounded on the part of the British, while of the 60 
Frenchmen present 14 were killed or wounded. Five English 
officers were killed and 23 wounded, the Admiral himself 
escaping not unhurt. After this defeat, Mr. Bruce and M. de 
Bourboulon returned to Shanghai, while the British squadron was 
to station off Chin-hae, Ningpo.° 

On the receipt in England of these unpleasant tidings, the 
Palmerstonian press at once bestrode the British hon, and 
unanimously roared for wholesale revenge. The London Times, of 
course, affected some dignity in its appeals to the bloody instincts 
of its countrymen; but the lower class of Palmerstonian organs 
were quite grotesque in acting the part of Orlando Furioso. Listen, 
for instance, to the London Daily Telegraph: 

“Great Britain must attack the seaboard of China throughout its whole extent, 
invade the capital, expel the Emperor from his palace, and possess herself of a 
material guaranty against future aggression... We must cat-o’-nine-tail any 
dragon-decorated official who presumes to treat our national symbols with 
contumely.... Every one of them (the Chinese Generals) must be hanged as a pirate 
and a homicide to the yard-arms of a British man-of-war. It would be a refreshing 
and salutary spectacle—that of a dozen bebuttoned villains, with the countenances 
of ogres, and the apparel of buffoons, swinging in the sight of the population. 
Terror must be struck, by one means or the other; and we have already had more 
than enough of leniency.... The Chinese must now be taught to value the English, 
who are their superiors, and ought to be their masters... The least that can be 
attempted is to capture Pekin; while, if a bold policy were adopted, the confiscation 
in perpetuity of Canton would follow. We might retain Canton as we held Calcutta, 
make it the center of our ultra Eastern trade, compensate ourselves for the 
influence of Russia on the Tartar frontiers of the Empire, and lay the basis of a 
new dominion.” 

a On this fact see D. Macgowan, “To the Editor of The Times”, The Times, 
No. 23410, September 13, 1859.— Ed. 

b These data are taken from Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin’s Special 
Missions to China and Japan.—Ed. 

Now, from these ravings of Palmerston’s penmen, let me return 
to the facts and, as far as it is possible with the present meager 
information, try to unravel the true bearings of the untoward 
event. 

The first question to be answered is, whether, on the 
supposition that the treaty of Tien-tsin stipulates for the im- 
mediate access to Pekin of the British Embassador, the Chinese 
Government have committed an infraction of that treaty, wrung 
from them by a piratical war, in withstanding the forcible passage 
by a British squadron of the Peiho River? As will be seen from the 
news conveyed by the Overland Mail, the Chinese authorities had 
objected, not to the British mission to Pekin, but to the British 
armament ascending the Peiho. They had proposed that Mr. 
Bruce should travel by land, divested of an armament which, with 
a fresh recollection of the Canton bombardment,*” the Celestials 
could but consider the instrument of invasion. Does the right of 
the French Embassador to reside at London, involve the right of 
forcing the river Thames at the head of an armed French 
expedition? It must certainly be allowed that this interpretation 
put by the British on the admission to Pekin of their Embassador, 
sounds at least as strange as the discovery made by them during 
the last Chinese war, that in bombarding the town of an Empire, 
you are not waging war upon that Empire itself, but only 
exchanging local hostilities with one of its dependencies. In answer 
to the reclamations of the Celestials, the British had “taken,” 
according to their own statement, “every precaution to force, if 
necessary, admission to Pekin,” by ascending the Peiho with a 
rather formidable squadron. Even if bound to admit their pacific 
Embassador, the Chinese were certainly warranted in resisting 
their armed expedition. In thus acting they did not infringe a 
treaty, but baffled an encroachment. 

In the second instance, it may be questioned whether, although 
the abstract right of legation had been accorded to the British by 
the treaty of Tien-tsin, the actual enjoyment of that right had, for 
the present, at least, not been waived by Lord Elgin? A reference 
to “the correspondence relating to the Earl of Elgin’s special mission to 
China, printed by command of her Majesty,” will convince every 
impartial inquirer that, first, the admission to Pekin of the English 
Embassador was to take place not now, but at a more remote period; 
secondly, that his right of residence at Pekin was qualified by 
various clauses; and, finally, that the peremptory article III in the 
English text of the treaty, relating to the Embassador’s admission, 
was, on the request of the Chinese envoys, altered in the Chinese 

The New Chinese War 511 

text of the treaty. This discrepancy between the two versions of 
the treaty is admitted by Lord Elgin himself, who, however, was, 
as he says, 

“compelled by his instructions to require the Chinese to accept, as the 

authoritative version of an international agreement, a text of which they did not 
understand a syllable.” 

Can the Chinese be impeached for acting on the Chinese text of 
the treaty, instead of the English one, which, according to Lord 
Elgin’s admission, somewhat diverges from “the correct sense of 
the stipulation”? 

In conclusion, I will state that Mr. T. Chisholm Anstey, the late 
British Attorney-General at Hong Kong, formally declares in a 
letter addressed by him to the editor of the London Morning Star: 

“The treaty itself, be it what it may, has been long since abrogated by the 
violent acts of the British Government and its subordinates, to the extent at least of 

depriving the Crown of Great Britain of every advantage or privilege conferred by 
the treaty.” 

Being on the one hand harassed by the Indian difficulties, and 
on the other hand arming for the eventuality of a European war, 
England is likely to incur great dangers from this new Chinese 
catastrophe, probably of Palmerston’s own cooking. The next 
result must be the break up of the present Administration, whose 
head was the author of the last Chinese war, while its principal 
members had passed a vote of censure on their present chief for 
undertaking that war. At all events, Mr. Milner Gibson and the 
Manchester school**' must either withdraw from the present Liberal 
coalition, or, a thing not very probable, in unison with Lord John 
Russell, Mr. Gladstone and his Peelite*’ colleagues, compel their 
chief to submit to their own policy. 

512 

Il 
London, Sept. 16, 1859 

A Cabinet Council is announced for to-morrow in order to 
decide upon the course to be taken in regard to the Chinese 
catastrophe. The lucubrations of the French Moniteur and the 
London Times* leave no doubt as to the resolutions arrived at by 
Palmerston and Bonaparte. They want another Chinese war. I am 
informed from an authentic source that at the impending Cabinet 
Council Mr. Milner Gibson, in the first instance, will contest the 
validity of the plea for war; in the second instance, will protest 
against any declaration of war not previously sanctioned by both . 
Houses of Parliament; and if his opinion be overwhelmed by a 
majority of votes, will secede from the Cabinet, thus again giving 
the signal for a new onslaught on Palmerston’s administration and 
the break up of the Liberal coalition that led to the ousting of the 
Derby Cabinet. Palmerston is said to feel somewhat nervous as to 
the intended proceedings of Mr. Milner Gibson, the only one of 
his colleagues whom he is afraid of, and whom he _ has 
characterized more than once as a man peculiarly able “in picking 
holes.” It is possible that simultaneously with this letter you may 
receive from Liverpool the news of the results of the Ministerial 
Council. Meanwhile, the real bearing of the case in question may 
be best judged, not from what has been printed, but from what 
has been willfully suppressed by the Palmerston organs in their 
first publications of the news conveyed by the last overland mail. 

a “Chine. Aux embouchures du Pei-Ho, 1" juillet 1859”, Le Moniteur universel, 
No. 258, September 15, 1859; “The Disaster in China”, The Times, No. 23411, 
September 14, 1859; the leading article in The Times, No. 23413, September 16, 
1859.— Ed. 

The New Chinese War 513 

First, then, they suppressed the statement that the Russian 
treaty had already been ratified, and that the Emperor of China? 
had given instructions to his mandarins to receive and escort the 
American Embassy to the capital for the exchange of the ratified 
copies of the American treaty. These acts were suppressed with 
a view to stifle the suspicion that would naturally arise, that the 
English and French Envoys, instead of the Court of Pekin, are 
responsible for meeting obstacles in the transaction of their 
business, which were not encountered either by their Russian or 
American colleagues. The other, still more important, fact that was 
at first suppressed by The Times, and the other Palmerston organs, 
but is now avowed on their part, is that the Chinese authorities 
had given notice of their willingness to conduct the English and 
French Envoys to Pekin; that they were actually in waiting to 
receive them at one of the mouths of the river, and offered them 
an escort if they only consented to leave their vessels and troops. 
Now, as the treaty of Tien-tsin contains no clause granting to the 
English and French the right of sending a squadron of men-of- 
war up the Peiho, it becomes evident that the treaty was violated, 
not by the Chinese, but by the English, and that on the part of the 
latter there existed the foregone coriclusion to pick a quarrel just 
before the period appointed for the exchange of the ratifications. 
Nobody will fancy that the Hon. Mr. Bruce acted on his own 
responsibility in thus baffling the ostensible end aimed at by the 
last Chinese war, but that, on the contrary, he only executed secret 
instructions received from London. Now, it is true that Mr. Bruce 
was dispatched not by Palmerston, but by Derby; but, then, I have 
only to remind you that during the first administration of Sir 
Robert Peel, when Lord Aberdeen kept the seals of the Foreign 
Office, Sir Henry Bulwer, the English Embassador at Madrid, 
picked a quarrel with the Spanish Court, resulting in his expulsion 
from Spain,*™ and that, during the debates in the House of Lords 
on this “untoward event,” it was proved that Bulwer, instead of 
obeying the official instructions of Aberdeen, had acted up to the 
secret instructions of Palmerston, who then sat on the Opposition 
benches. 

A maneuver has also been carried out during these last days in 
the Palmerstonian press, which leaves no doubt, at least to those 
acquainted with the secret history of English diplomacy during the 
last thirty years, as to the real author of the Peiho catastrophe and 
the impending third Anglo-Chinese war. The Times intimates that 

4 Hien-Fung.— Ed. 

the guns planted on the forts of Taku which caused such havoc 
among the British squadron were of Russian origin, and were 
directed by Russian officers. Another Palmerstonian organ is still 
more plain spoken. I quote: 

“We now perceive how closely the policy of Russia is interwoven with that of 
Pekin; we detect great movements on the Amoor; we discern large Cossack armies 
maneuvering far beyond Lake Baikal, in the frozen dreamland on the twilight 
borders of the Old World; we trace the course of innumerable caravans; we espy a | 
special Russian envoy (Gen. Mouravieff, the Governor of Eastern Siberia) making ~ 
his way, with secret designs, from the remoteness of Eastern Siberia to the secluded 
Chinese metropolis; and well may public opinion in this country burn at the 
thought that foreign influences have had a share in procuring our disgrace and the 
slaughter of our soldiers and sailors.” 

Now, this is one of Lord Palmerston’s old tricks. When Russia 
wanted to conclude a treaty of commerce with China, he drove the 
latter by the opium war into the arms of her northern neighbor.”’ 
When Russia requested the cession of the Amoor, he brought it 
about by the second Chinese war,** and now that Russia wants to 
consolidate her influence at Pekin, he extemporises the third 
Chinese war. In all his transactions with the weak Asiatic States, 
with China, Persia, Central Asia, Turkey, it has always been his 
invariable and constant rule to ostensibly oppose Russia’s designs 
_by picking a quarrel, not with Russia, but with the Asiatic State, to 
estrange the latter from England by piratical hostilities, and by this 
roundabout way drive it to the concessions it had been unwilling 
to yield to Russia. You may be sure that on this occasion the whole 
past Asiatic policy of Palmerston will be again sifted, and I draw, 
therefore, your attention to the Afghan papers, ordered by the 
House of Commons to be printed on the 8th June, 1859.* They 
throw more light on Palmerston’s sinister policy, and the 
diplomatic history of the last thirty years, than any documents ever 
before printed. The case is, in a few words, this: In 1838 
Palmerston commenced a war against Dost Mohammed, the ruler 
of Cabul, a war that led to the destruction of an English army,’*’ 
and was commenced on the plea of Dost Mohammed having 
entered into a secret alliance against England with Persia and 
Russia. In proof of this assertion, Palmerston laid, in 1839, before 
Parliament, a Blue Book, chiefly consisting of the correspondence 
of Sir A. Burnes, the British envoy at Cabul, with the Govern- 
ment at Calcutta.” Burnes had been assassinated during an 

a Papers. East India (Cabul and Affghanistan). Ordered by the House of Commons, to be 
Printed 8 June 1859 [London, 1859].— Ed. 
b Correspondence Relating to Persia and Affghanistan, London [1839] ha. 

The New Chinese War 515 

insurrection at Cabul against the English invaders, but, distrustful 
of the British Foreign Minister, had sent copies of some of his 
official letters to his brother, Dr. Burnes, at London. On the 
appearance, in 1839, of the “Afghan papers,” prepared by 
Palmerston, Dr. Burnes accused him of having “garbled and 
forged the dispatches of the late Sir A. Burnes,”’* and, in 
corroboration of his statement, had some of the genuine 
dispatches printed. But it was only last Summer that the murder 
came out. Under the Derby Ministry, on the motion of Mr. 
Hadfield, the House of Commons ordered all the Afghan papers 
to be published in full, and this order has been executed in such a 
form as to constitute a demonstration, to the meanest capacity, of 
the truth of the charge of garbling and forgery, in the interest of 
Russia. On the title-page of the Blue Book appears the following: 

“NOTE.— The correspondence, only partially given in former returns, is here 
given entire, the omitted passages being marked by brackets, [ ].” 

The name of the official, which appears as a guaranty for the 
fidelity of the return, is “J. W. Kaye, Secretary in Political and 
Secret Departments,” Mr. Kaye being the “upright historian of the 
War in Afghanistan.” 

Now, to illustrate the real relations of Palmerston with Russia, 
against which he pretended to have set up the Afghan war, one 
instance may suffice for the present. The Russian agent, Vitkavich, 
who came to Cabul in 1837, was the bearer of a letter from the 
Czar to Dost Mohammed. Sir Alexander Burnes obtained a copy 
of the letter, and sent it to Lord Auckland, the Governor-General 
of India. In his own dispatches, and various documents inclosed 
by him, this circumstance is referred to over and over again. But 
the copy of the Czar’s letter was expunged altogether from the 
papers presented by Palmerston in 1839, and in every dispatch in 
which it is referred to, such alterations were made as were 
necessary to suppress the circumstance of the connection of the 
“Emperor of Russia” with the mission to Cabul. This forgery was 
committed in order to suppress the evidence of the Autocrat’s 
connection with Vitkavich, whom, on his return to St. Petersburg, 
it suited Nicholas to formally disavow. For instance, at page 82 of 
the Blue Book will be found the translation of a letter to Dost 
Mohammed, which reads now as follows, the brackets showing the 
words originally suppressed by Palmerston: 

a James Burnes’ statements about the forgery of the dispatches of Sir Alexander 
Burnes, The Free Press, No. 5, February 3, 1858.— Ed. 

516 | Karl Marx 

“The Embassador on the part of [the] Russia [or Emperor] came [from 
Moscow] to Teheran, and has been appointed to wait on the Sirdar at Candahar, 
and thence to proceed to the presence of the Ameer.[...] He is the bearer of 
[confidential messages from the Emperor and of the] letters from the Russian 
Embassador at Teheran. The Russian Embassador recommends this man to be a 
most trusty individual, and to possess full authority to make any negotiations, [on 
the part of the Emperor and himself], etc., etc.” 

These, and similar forgeries committed by Palmerston in order 
to protect the honor of the Czar, are not the only curiosity 
exhibited by the “Afghan papers.” The invasion of Afghanistan. 
was justified by Palmerston on the ground that Sir Alexander 
Burnes had advised it as a proper means for baffling Russian 
intrigues in Central Asia. Now Sir A. Burnes did quite the 
contrary, and consequently all his appeals in behalf of Dost 
Mohammed were altogether suppressed in Palmerston’s edition of 
the “Blue Book;” the correspondence being by dint of garbling 
and forgery, turned quite to the reverse of its original meaning. 
Such is the man now about to enter on a third Chinese war, on 
the ostensible plea of thwarting Russia’s designs in that quarter. 

517 

Ill 
London, Sept. 20, 1859 

That there is to be another civilization war against the Celestials 
seems a matter now pretty generally settled with the English press. 
Still, since the meeting of the Cabinet Council on Saturday last, a 
remarkable change has come over those very papers that were 
foremost in the howl for blood. At first the London Times, in an 
apparent trance of patriotic fury, thundered* at the double 
treachery committed—by cowardly Mongols who lured on the 
bonhomme” of the British Admiral by studiously falsifying appear- 
ances and screening their artillery—by the Court of Pekin, which, 
with deeper Machiavellism, had set those Mongol ogres to their 
damnable practical jokes. Curiously to say, although tossed on a 
sea of passion, The Times had, in its reprints, contrived to 
carefully expunge from the original reports all points favorable to 
the doomed Chinaman. To confound things may be the work of 
passion, but to garble them seems rather the operation of a cool 
head. However that be, on Sept. 16, just one day before the 
meeting of the Ministers, The Times veered round,‘ and, without 
much ado, cut one head off its Janus-headed impeachment. 

“We fear,” it said, “that we cannot accuse the Mongols who resisted our attack 
on the forts of the Peiho of treachery;” 

but then, to make up for that awkward concession, it clung the 
more desperately to “the deliberate and perfidious violation of a 
solemn treaty by the Court of Pekin.” Three days later, after the 

a The Times, No. 23409, September 12, 1859 (leading article).— Ed. 
b Simpleton.— Ed. ; 
© The Times, No. 23413, September 16, 1859 (leading article).— Ed. 

Cabinet Council had been held, The Times, on further considera- 
tion, even 

“found no room for doubt that if Mr. Bruce and M. de Bourboulon had solicited 
the Mandarins to conduct them to Pekin, they would have been permitted to effect 
the ratification of the treaty.”* 

What, then, remains there of the treachery of the Court of 
Pekin? Not a shadow even, but in its place there remain two 
doubts on the mind of The Times. 

“It is,” says it, “perhaps doubtful whether, as a military measure, it was wise to 
try with such a squadron, our way to Pekin. It is still more doubtful whether, as a 
diplomatic measure, it was desirable to use force at all.” 

Such is the lame conclusion of all the indignation-bluster 
indulged in by the “leading organ,” but, with a logic of its own, it 
drops the reasons for war without dropping the war itself. 
Another semi-Governmental paper, The Economist, which had 
distinguished itself by its fervent apology for the Canton 
bombardment, seems to take a more economical and less rhetorical 
view. of things now that Mr. J. Wilson has got his appointment of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer for India. The Economist brings two 
articles on the subject, the one political, the other economical”; the 
first one winding up with the following sentences: 

“Now, all these things considered, it is obvious that the article of the treaty 
which gave our Embassador a right of visiting or residing at Pekin, was one literally 
forced upon the Chinese Government; and if it were thought absolutely essential to 
our interests that it should be observed, we think there was much room for the 
display of consideration and patience in exacting its fulfillment. No doubt it may be 
said that with such a Government as the Chinese, delay and patience are 
interpreted as signs of fatal weakness, and therefore the most unsound policy we 
could pursue. But how far are we entitled, on this plea, to vary the principles on 
which we should assuredly act toward any civilized nation in our treatment of these 
Oriental Governments? When we have wrung out an unwelcome concession from 
their fears, it may be perhaps the most consistent policy to wring out, also from 
their fears, the immediate execution of the bargain in the way most convenient to 
ourselves. But if we fail in so doing—if, in the mean time, the Chinese overcome 
their fears, and insist, with a suitable display of force, on our consulting them as to 
the mode to be taken for giving our treaty effect—can we justly accuse them of 
treachery? Are they not rather practising upon us our own methods of persuasion? 
The Chinese Government may—and it is very likely that it is so—have intended to 

a Here and below see The Times, No. 23415, September 19, 1859 (leading 
article).— Fd. 

b The reference is to the articles ““The Disaster in China” and ‘The Trade of 
China. Its Importance, Direct and Indirect”, The Economist, No. 838, September 17, 
1859.— Ed. 

The New Chinese War 519 

entrap us into this murderous snare, and never have purposed to execute the 
treaty at all. If this should prove to be so, we must and ought to exact reparation. 
But it may also prove that the intention to defend the mouth of Peiho against the 
recurrence of such a violent entry as was made good by Lord Elgin in the previous 
year, was not accompanied by any desire to break faith on the general articles of 
the treaty. As the hostile initiative came entirely from our side, and it was, of 
course, at any: moment competent to our commanders to retire from the 
murderous fire, opened only for the defense of the forts, we cannot certainly prove 
any intention of breaking faith on the part of China. And, till proof of a deliberate 
intention to break the treaty reaches us—we think we have some reason to suspend 
our judgment, and ponder whether we may not have been applying to our 
treatment of barbarians, a code of principles not very widely different from that 
which they have practised toward ourselves.” 

In a second article, on the same subject, The Economist dwells on 
the importance, direct and indirect, of the English trade to China. 
In the year 1858, the British exports to China had risen to 
£2,876,000, while the value of the British imports from China had 
averaged upward of £9,000,000 for each of the last three years, so 
that the aggregate direct trade of England with China may be put 
down at about £12,000,000. But beside these direct transactions 
there are three other important trades with which, less or more, 
England is intimately connected in the circle of exchanges, the 
trade between India and China, the trade between China and 
Australia, and the trade between China and the United States. 

“Australia,” says The Economist, “takes from China large quantities of tea 
annually, and has nothing to give in exchange which finds a market in China. 
America also takes large quantities of tea and some silk of a value far exceeding 
that of their direct exports to China.” 

Both these balances in favor of China have to be made good by 
England, who is paid for this equalization of exchanges by the 
gold of Australia and the cotton of the United States. England, 
therefore, independent of the balance due by herself to China, has 
also to pay to that country large sums in respect to gold imported 
from Australia and cotton from America. Now this balance due to 
China by England, Australia, and the United States is, to a great 
extent, transferred from China to India, as a set-off against the 
amount due by China to India, on account of opium and cotton. 
Be it remarked, en passant, that the imports from China to India 
have never yet reached the amount of £1,000,000 sterling, while 
the exports to China from India realize the sum of nearly 
£10,000,000. The inference The Economist draws from these 
economical observations is, that any serious interruption of the 
British trade with China would “be a calamity of greater 
magnitude than the mere figures of exports and imports might at 

first sight suggest,” and that the embarrassment consequent upon 
such a disturbance would not be felt in the direct British tea and 
silk trade only, but must also “affect” the British transactions with 
Australia and the United States. The Economist is, of course, aware 
of the fact that during the last Chinese war, the trade was not so 
much interfered with by the war as had been apprehended; and 
that, at the port of Shanghai, it was even not affected at all. But 
then, The Economist calls attention upon “two novel features in the 
present dispute” which might essentially modify the effects of a 
new Chinese war upon trade—these two novel features being the 
“Imperial,” not “local” character of the present conflict, and the 
“signal success” which, for the first time, the Chinese have 
effected against European forces. 

How very different sounds this language from the war-cry The 
Economist so lustily shouted at the time of the Lorcha affair.*** 

The Ministerial Council, as I anticipated in my last letter, 
witnessed Mr. Milner Gibson’s protest against the war, and his 
menace of seceding from the Cabinet, should Palmerston act up to 
the foregone conclusions betrayed in the columns of the French 
Moniteur. For the moment Palmerston prevented any rupture of 
the Cabinet, and the Liberal Coalition, by the statement that the 
force indispensable for the protection of British trade should be 
gathered in the Chinese waters, while before the arrival of more 
explicit reports on the part of the British Envoy, no resolution 
should be taken as to the war question. Thus the burning question 
was put off. Palmerston’s real intention, however, transpires 
through the columns of his mob-organ, The Daily Telegraph, which 
in one of its recent numbers says: 

“Should any event lead to a vote unfavorable to the Government, in the course 
of next year, an appeal will certainly be made to the constituencies.... The House of 
Commons will test the result of their activity by a verdict on the Chinese question, 

seeing that to the professional malignants, headed by Mr. Disraeli, must be added 
the Cosmopolitans, who declare that the Mongols were thoroughly in the right.” 

The fix in which the Tories are hemmed up, by having allowed 
themselves to become inveigled into the responsible editorship of 
events planned by Palmerston and enacted by two of his agents, 
Lord Elgin and Mr. Bruce (Lord Elgin’s brother), I shall, perhaps, 
find another occasion of remarking upon. 

521 

IV 
London, Sept. 30, 1859 

In a former letter I asserted that the Peiho conflict had not 
sprung from accident, but, on the contrary, been beforehand 
prepared by Lord Elgin, acting upon Palmerston’s secret instruc- 
tions, and fastening upon Lord Malmesbury, the Tory Foreign 
Minister, the project of the noble Viscount, then seated at the 
head of the Opposition benches. Now, first, the idea of the 
“accidents” in China arising from “instructions” drawn up by the 
present British Premier is so far from being new, that, during the 
debates on the Lorcha war, it was suggested to the House of 
Commons, by so well informed a personage as Mr. Disraeli, and, 
curious to say, confirmed by no less an authority than Lord 
Palmerston himself. On February 3, 1857, Mr. Disraeli warned the 
House of Commons in the following terms: 

“I cannot resist the conviction that what has taken place in China has not been 
in consequence of the alleged pretext, but is, in fact, in consequence of instructions 
received from home, some considerable time ago. If that be the case, I think the time 
has arrived when this House would not be doing its duty unless it earnestly 

considered whether it has any means of controlling a system, which if pursued, will 
be one, in my mind, fatal to the interests of this country.’””* 

And Lord Palmerston most coolly replied: 

“The right hon. gentleman says the course of events appeared to be the result 
of some system predetermined by the Government at home. Undoubtedly it was.” 

a Benjamin Disraeli’s speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1857, The 
Times, No. 22595, February 4, 1857.— Ed. 

b Lord Palmerston’s speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1857, The 
Times, No. 22595, February 4, 1857.— Ed. 

In the present instance, a cursory glance at the Blue Book, 
entitled: “Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin’s special missions 
to China and Japan, 1857-59” will show, how the event, that 
occurred at the Peiho, on the 25th June, was already preceded by 
Lord Elgin on the 2d of March. Page 484 of the said 
correspondence, we find the following two dispatches: 

“THE EARL OF ELGIN TO REAR-ADMIRAL SIR MICHAEL 
SEYMOUR 

“Furious, March 2, 1859 

“Sir: With reference to my dispatch to your Excellency of the 17th ult. I would 
beg leave to state that I entertain some hope that the decision come to by her 
Majesty's Government on the subject of the permanent residence of a British 
Embassador at Pekin, which I communicated to your Excellency in a conversation 
yesterday, may induce the Chinese Government to receive, in a becoming manner, 
the representative of her Majesty, when he proceeds to Pekin for the exchange of 
ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin. At the same time, it is no doubt possible that 
his hope may not be realized, and, at any rate, I apprehend that Her Majesty’s 
Government will desire that our Embassador, when he proceeds to Tien-tsin, be 
accompanied by an imposing force. Under these circumstances, I would venture to 
submit, for your Excellency’s consideration, whether it would not be expedient to 
concentrate at Shanghai, at the earliest convenient period, a sufficient fleet of 
gunboats for this service, as Mr. Bruce’s arrival in China cannot long be delayed. I 
have, etc. 

Elgin and Kincardine” 

“THE EARL OF MALMESBURY TO THE EARL OF ELGIN 
“Foreign Office, May 2, 1859 

“My Lord: I have received your Excellency’s dispatch of the 7th of March, 
1859, and I have to inform you that her Majesty's Government approve of the 
note, of which a copy is therein inclosed, and in which your Excellency announced 
to the Imperial Commissioner that her Majesty's Government would not insist 
upon the residence of her Majesty’s Minister being permanently fixed at Pekin. 

“Her Majesty's Government also approve of your having suggested to Rear- 
Admiral Seymour that a fleet of gunboats should be collected at Shanghai in order 
to accompany Mr. Bruce up the Petho. 

“I am, Malmesbury” 

Lord Elgin, then, knows beforehand that the British Govern- 
ment “will desire” that his brother, Mr. Bruce, be accompanied by 
“an imposing force” of “gunboats” up the Peiho, and he orders 
Admiral Seymour to make ready “for this service.” The Earl of 
Malmesbury, in his dispatch dated May 2, approves of the 

The New Chinese War 523 

suggestion intimated by Lord Elgin to the Admiral. The whole 
correspondence exhibits Lord Elgin as the master, and Lord 
Malmesbury as the man. While the former constantly takes the 
initiative and acts upon the instructions originally received: from 
Palmerston, without even waiting for new instructions from 
Downing street, Lord Malmesbury contents himself with indulging 
“the desires” which his imperious subaltern anticipates him to feel. 
He nods assent, when. Elgin states that the treaty being not yet 
ratified, they had “not the right to ascend any Chinese river; 
he nods assent, when Elgin thinks they ought to show much 
forbearance toward the Chinese in regard to the execution of the 
article of the treaty relating to the embassy to Pekin; and, nothing 
daunted, he nods assent when in direct contradiction to his own 
former statements, Elgin claims the right to enforce the passage of 
the Peiho by an “imposing fleet of gunboats.’’ He nods assent in 
the same way that Dogberry nodded assent to the suggestions of 
the sexton.’ 

The sorry figure cut by the Earl of Malmesbury, and the 
humility of his attitude, are easily understood if one calls to mind 
the cry raised on the advent of the Tory Cabinet, by the London 
Times” and other influential papers, as to the great peril 
threatening the brilliant success which Lord Elgin, under the 
instructions of Palmerston, was about to secure in China, but 
which the Tory Administration, if for pique only, and in order to 
justify their vote of censure on Palmerston’s Canton bombard- 
ment, were likely to baffle. Malmesbury allowed himself to be 
intimidated by that cry. He had, moreover, before his eyes and in 
his heart the fate of Lord Ellenborough, who had dared openly to 
counteract the Indian policy of the noble Viscount, and in reward 
for his patriotic courage, was sacrificed by his own colleagues of 
the Derby Cabinet.**? ‘Consequently, Malmesbury resigned the 
whole initiative into the hands of Elgin, and thus enabled the 
latter to execute Palmerston’s plan on the responsibility of his 
official antagonists, the Tories. It is this same circumstance which 
for the present has put the Tories in a very dismal alternative as 
to the course to be taken in regard to the Peiho affair. Either they 
must, sound the war-trumpet with Palmerston, and thus keep him 
in office, or they must turn their backs on Malmesbury, upon 
whom they heaped such sickening flatteries during the last Italian 
war. 

a Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing, Act IV, Scene 2.— Ed. 
b No. 22930, March 2, 1858 (leading article).— Ed. 

The alternative is the more trying since the impending third 
China war is anything but popular with the British mercantile 
classes. In 1857 they bestrode the British lion, because they 
expected great commercial profits from a forcible opening of the 
Chinese market. At this moment, they feel, on the contrary, rather 
angry at seeing the fruits of the treaty obtained, all at once 
snapped away from their hold. They know that affairs look 
menacing enough in Europe and India, without the further 
complication of a Chinese war on a grand scale. They have not 
forgotten that in 1857, the imports of tea fell by upward of 
24 millions of pounds, that being the article almost exclusively 
exported from Canton, which was then the exclusive theater of 
war, and they apprehend that this interruption of trade by war 
may now be extended to Shanghai and the other trading ports of 
the Celestial Empire. After a first Chinese war undertaken by the 
English in the interest of opium smuggling, and a second war 
carried on for the defense of the lorcha of a pirate, nothing was 
wanted for a climax but a war extemporized for the purpose of 
pestering China with the nuisance of permanent Embassies at its 
Capital. 

Written on September 13, 16, 20 and 30, 

1859 
Tribune, Nos. 5750, 5754, 5761 and 5768, Daily Tribune