Written about May 16, 1859.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 5647 of May 27, 1859, leader]

Our latest telegrams from the seat of war, which arrived yesterday by the Asia, extend to the 13th inst., and are thus exactly three days later than the news brought by the Vanderbilt. These telegrams consist of short and rather confused bulletins of the Sardinian government; the Austrians give no reports of their movements. In these three days nothing of great importance occurred. The campaign continues to assert its pre-eminence for slowness in the annals of modern warfare. We almost imagine ourselves carried back to those antediluvian times of pompous and inactive campaigning which Napoleon put such a sudden and decided end to. There stand two vast armies confronting each other on a line more than 40 miles long, each of which is in a position to operate on the field with 100,000 to 140,000 men. The one advances, the other reconnoitres, throws out its feelers now at this, now at that point of the enemy's position, and then withdraws, while the former army remains on the ground it occupies, so that now a distance of from eight to twenty miles separates the two from each other.

There are some facts which afford a rational explanation of this anomaly; yet it remains an anomaly, and that in consequence of the mistake committed by the attacking party at the beginning of the campaign. As we have already shown, the whole purpose and object of the Austrian invasion of Piedmont was frustrated by an indolence and irresolution of the Austrian movements which can scarcely be attributed to anything other than the vacillation of General Gyulay. The reports since received fully confirm this view. The Austrians give no explanations for the strange conduct of their army – a clear proof that the full responsibility for it falls upon their commander-in-chief. In fact, the Austrian bulletins, already a week after the beginning of the campaign, began to speak of the bad weather and the inundated state of the country, in order to account for their general having been compelled to withdraw his troops from the fever-laden rice swamps of the Po. And now our well-informed London correspondent writes to us that the Austrian Emperor has removed Gyulay from his supreme command and, in imitation of the example of Louis-Napoleon, will take over the command jointly with General Hess.

So far as we can now judge, the campaign appears to have taken the following course: At first the Austrian right wing was pushed forward against Novara and Vercelli, accompanied by demonstrations on the Lago Maggiore. The centre and probably also the left wing, which marched in parallel lines by way of Vigevano and Pavia, remained pretty far back. The column from Pavia reached Lomello with its main body only on the 2nd of May. The advanced position of the right wing apparently had the object, first, of diverting the attention of the allies by a threatened attack on the Dora and on Turin, and secondly, of requisitioning the resources of the upper part of the Lomellina for the benefit of the Austrian army. It was not until the 3rd of May that the attack of the main body of the Austrian army developed against the line of Casale and Valenza. On the 4th of May demonstrations were undertaken against Frassineto (opposite the mouth of the Sesia in the Po) and Valenza, while the right wing was drawn nearer to the centre; at the same time a bridge was thrown across the Po between Cambio and Sale and a bridgehead established on the southern bank of the river. According to some accounts, here the eighth Austrian army corps, which is said to have marched from Piacenza along the southern bank of the Po, effected its junction with the main body and crossed the river after a short excursion towards Tortona and Voghera and the destruction of the railway bridge over the Scrivia. According to other accounts and some of our latest telegrams, there is, however, still an Austrian force on the road between Piacenza and Stradella. It is difficult to say whether the reported excursion to Voghera was intended as a feint against Novi and the communications between Genoa and Alessandria; at all events, it misled most of the experienced editors of Turin, Paris and London into prophesying a decisive battle on the old battlefield of Novi or in the neighbourhood of Marengo; this prophecy was immediately nullified by the retreat of the Austrians to the northern side of the Po and the dismantling of their bridges. After the first days of May very heavy rains had set in. The Po then rose at Pavia by ten to twelve feet, and the tributary rivers correspondingly. The inundations of the rice fields in the Po valley – ordinarily no obstacle for a marching army, as the roads are formed by the dykes above the high-water mark – now became a serious matter; the whole country and many roads were flooded. Besides, the Austrians were not marching; they stood still in this swamp and had to camp either on the roads or on the wet fields. After having held out for some days in the midst of this inundation, they were compelled to fall back to higher and drier ground. They must in any case have suffered severe losses from sickness, especially cholera and fever. There now followed a concentration movement upon the district around Mortara and Novara, a retreat not before the enemy (for he remained quite quiet in his lines), but before the elements. Since then the Austrians have erected fortifications on the line of the Sesia and sent reconnoitring and foraging troops up to the very Dora line, which forms the extreme left of the allied position.

In all these operations we can discover not a single feature of good generalship. In fact, after the first favourable moment for an attack on the allied position had once been missed, the whole advance into the Lomellina became completely purposeless and lost its significance. The pushing forward of the Austrian right wing was a decided mistake. No time ought to have been wasted in diversionary manoeuvres. The only correct plan of operations was to march straight upon the enemy, attack him and beat him before he could fully concentrate his forces. If it is true that Benedek’s eighth corps marched along the southern bank of the Po, this was a further mistake; it was separated from the main body of the army by a large river, and if the rain had set in a day or two earlier, the construction of the bridge at Cambio would have been impossible, and the Austrians would have found themselves in that isolated position in which they hoped to find the enemy. The entire crossing of the Po was apparently forced upon them by the necessity of bringing Benedek across. Why was he not on the northern bank from the beginning? By building the bridge over the Po and the operations connected with it, they were compelled to remain some days longer in the pestilential swamps than would otherwise have been necessary. Finally, the whole campaign seems to have been conducted badly. In all these Austrian movements there is no determination. Demonstrations are undertaken in all directions, and yet we nowhere see a movement towards a real attack. Thus they grope their way along the whole line of the enemy, until at last the inundation erects an impassable barrier some miles wide between the contending armies. For want of better occupation, and in order to appear at least active, they now reconnoitre in the direction of the Dora; but all these reconnaissances have been carried out by small flying columns, which cannot act with striking force and must turn back as soon as they encounter any advanced post.

While the Austrians are thus in reality doing nothing, their opponents appear to be engaged in the same game. They are now as concentrated as they can possibly be on the long line which they occupy. Their positions are as follows: The extreme left line, formed by the Dora and the Po as far as Casale, is occupied by the French corps of General Niel, comprising two divisions. The left wing is at Casale and consists of two Piedmontese divisions and 3,000 volunteers under Garibaldi. The centre at Valenza is formed by the French corps of General Mac-Mahon and one Piedmontese division – together three divisions. The right wing, at Alessandria, consists of the French corps of Canrobert and one Piedmontese division – together three divisions. On the extreme right at Novi and Arquata is the French corps of Baraguay d’Hilliers and one Piedmontese division – together three divisions. The reserve is formed by two divisions of the French Guard in Genoa. If we estimate the division at 10,000 men – that will be high enough, as the French had no time to recall their men on furlough and therefore count fewer, while the Sardinian divisions are stronger – we arrive at a total of 150,000 men; that is about the strength of the troops now drawn up on the side of the allies. Of these, 110,000 to 120,000 men could be employed in battle. Their extraordinarily passive conduct up to now may partly be due to the lack of preparation on the part of the French, who carry very little artillery and ammunition with them, and partly to orders from Louis-Napoleon, who undoubtedly intends to reap the first laurels of the campaign himself. This new general arrived at Genoa on the 12th, where he was received by the people with acclamation. On the 13th he saw King <Victor Emanuel II>, who came from the camp for a conference. On the same day he issued a Napoleonic proclamation, the wording of which we give on another page, and on the 14th he intended to proceed to the army.

The rains now appear to have abated as well, and the next or the following mail may bring us news of a more definite character. This state of hesitation and inactivity cannot last much longer. Either the Austrians must go back across the Po again, or a battle must be fought in the Lomellina. It may be that the Austrians have sought out and prepared a strong defensive position in order to receive the onslaught of the allied troops there. If they have found one, this would be the shrewdest thing they could do; they cannot well fall back without any fight and would at the same time, in such a position, be able to throw the whole of their force, which they now have at their disposal, into the engagement, while the allies would be weakened by the garrisons they would have to leave behind in Casale, Alessandria and Valenza.

In the meantime both parties are looking out for reinforcements. Austria has sent a corps of 50,000 men under General Wimpffen to Trieste and its environs, which is to serve as a reserve for the army of Italy, while Louis-Napoleon has organised two further army corps for Italy; besides, rumours are buzzing about that Prince Napoleon is to lead a motley army which is to land somewhere on the peninsula, in order to conquer a kingdom for him there.