Karl Marx

The Peace

Written on 15 July 1859.
From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 5698 of 28 July 1859, Leading Article]

According to the news which we received with the "Europa", it appears that the Italian confederation, announced by Napoleon III as one of the bases of his peace with Franz Joseph, is a highly uncertain and dubious affair. Up to now it is merely a project to which Austria has agreed, but which has yet to be submitted to the Italian governments. It seems as if not even Sardinia, whose king, by the by, was evidently not consulted on the conclusion of peace, would care to join, although his king must of course do what he is told. Meanwhile a rumour is circulating that the Pope Pius IX, who is proposed as honorary president of the federation, has written to Louis-Napoleon that he will appeal to the Catholic powers for protection – a rather dubious refuge at a moment when it is precisely France against which they would need to be protected. As for the recently expelled monarchs of Tuscany, Modena and Parma (Leopold II, Francis V and Louise de Bourbon), they are apparently to be restored to their respective thrones; under these circumstances they will undoubtedly be ready to join any confederation that may be ordered of them. But from the King of Naples, now the only independent ruler in Italy, we hear nothing at all; and it is not impossible that he will flatly refuse. Thus it is still questionable whether there will be any federation at all, and a still greater question what kind it will be, if it should after all come into being.

One important fact has now become a certainty: Austria retains all four great fortresses and the Mincio becomes the western boundary of its territory. Thus it still holds the key to Upper Italy in its hands, and can take advantage of any favourable opportunity to recover what it has now been obliged to give up. This fact alone shows how utterly unfounded Napoleon’s assertion is, that he has achieved his aim of driving Austria out of Italy in principle. It is indeed no exaggeration to say that if Napoleon defeated Austria in the war, Austria has decisively defeated him in the conclusion of peace. Austria has renounced nothing more than what had been taken from it. France has obtained, for an expenditure of about one hundred million dollars and the lives of about fifty thousand of its sons, the control over Sardinia, much honour for its soldiers, and the reputation of a quite fortunate and somewhat successful general for its Emperor. For the Emperor this is much, but for France, which has borne all the costs and suffered all the losses, it is little; and it is not surprising that discontent is said to prevail in Paris. As the reason for this sudden termination of the war, Napoleon stated that it had assumed dimensions incompatible with the interests of France. In other words, it had the tendency towards a revolutionary war, which included the possibility of an insurrection in Rome and an uprising in Hungary. It is a remarkable fact that the same Napoleon, shortly before the battle of Solferino, invited Kossuth to his headquarters and actually urged him to undertake a revolutionary diversion in favour of the Allies. Before this battle, therefore, he did not fear the dangers that, immediately afterwards, filled him with terror. That circumstances alter cases is no new observation, but it is applicable to the present situation. It is superfluous to adduce further proofs that this man is as selfish as he is unscrupulous, and that, after shedding the blood of fifty thousand men to satisfy his personal ambitions, he is ready to abjure and renounce every one of the hypocritical principles in whose name he had led them to the shambles.

One of the first results of the present arrangement is the forced resignation of the Cavour ministry in Sardinia. Although Count Cavour, one of the cleverest men in Italy, had absolutely nothing to do with the conclusion of peace, he could not maintain himself in the face of the indignation and disappointment of the public. It will probably be long before he regains power. And it will be long before Louis-Napoleon himself will again induce the sentimental and the enthusiasts to see in him a champion of liberty. The Italians will now hate him more than all other representatives of tyranny and betrayal; and we need not be surprised if the daggers of Italian assassins again attempt to take the life of the man who left Austria sitting almost as firmly as before on the neck of Italy, while he promised and pretended to conquer Italy’s independence.