The campaign in Italy, which by now has lasted almost a month, 
has taken a peculiar and unexpected course. Two large armies, 
each of not much less than 200,000 men, concentrated opposite 
each other in the first days of May. While the outposts are within 
cannon range of one another, the two main bodies watch each 
other, put out feelers now here, now there, engage in light 
fighting at isolated points, make changes in their fronts, extend 
one wing or the other; but there are no large-scale encounters. 
This way of waging war seems out of keeping with the modern 
system of rapid decisive blows; it seems to be a step backwards 
from the lightning-quick moves and short campaigns of Napoleon. 

Since Napoleon two new elements have changed warfare 
significantly. The first is the improved defence of states by 
entrenched camps and groups of fortresses at suitable points of 
the terrain. The fortresses of Napoleon’s times were either too 

insignificant, too isolated from one another, or in terrain that was 
too indifferent strategically to raise serious obstacles to his 
operations. A victory in the open field or an outflanking march 
forced the enemy army away from its fortresses. 

What fortifications can do was proved by Danzig in 1813, the 
quadrilateral of fortresses in Lombardy in 1848, Komorn in 1849, 
Sevastopol in 1855.°* At the present time the position of the 
Franco-Piedmontese behind the Po and the Tanaro, between 
Casale, Alessandria and Valenza, forms such a system of grouped 
fortresses which shields an army even against considerably larger 
forces. The French succeeded in throwing so many troops behind 
this position before the Austrians arrived that an attack lost all 
prospects of decisive success, so that time was gained to bring up 

The Campaign in Italy 347 

the rest of the French troops and assemble all their supplies and 
equipment. This brought the Austrian offensive to a halt at Casale 
and Valenza, and since neither a frontal attack nor a serious 
outflanking of the position was possible, there was nothing else the 
Austrians could do but make demonstrations on the flanks, west of 
the Sesia and south of the Po, combined with the requisition of the 
useful resources for the army available in those districts. 

The second factor that has changed warfare significantly since 
the time of Napoleon is steam. It was only by means of railways 
and steamships that the French were able to throw such masses of 
troops into Piedmont in the five days between the delivery of the 
Austrians’ ultimatum and their actual invasion that any Austrian 
attack on the Piedmontese position was doomed to failure, and so 
to reinforce these masses during the following week that by May 
20 at least 130,000 French were in the line between Asti and Novi. 

The inevitable corruption and administrative disorder under the 
rule of an adventurer like Louis Bonaparte, however, result in 
the material required for the French campaign arriving only 
slowly and inadequately. In favourable contrast to this are the 
order and rapidity with which the Austrian army corps were 
transferred to Italy in full combat readiness. This cannot but 
affect the future course of the war. 

The Austrians cannot advance because they have come up 
against the position between the Piedmontese fortresses; the 
French cannot because their armament is not yet complete. This is 
the reason for the operations coming to a standstill, and for the 
unmerited interest in the small action of Montebello. The whole 
affair comes down to the following: The Austrians received word 
that the French were shifting their right wing towards Piacenza; 
this movement aroused the suspicion that the intention was to 
cross the Po between Pavia and Piacenza and thus outflank the 
Austrian position in the Lomellina in the direction of Milan. The 
Austrian Fifth Army Corps (Stadion) therefore sent three brigades 
over a bridge thrown across the Po at Vaccarizza (below Pavia), in 
order to occupy the position before the Stradella and carry out a 
reconnaissance in the direction of Voghera. Near Casteggio these 
three brigades came up against the allied outposts and near 
Montebello against the first brigade of the French division of 
Forey, which they drove back out of Montebello. Soon after this, 
the second French brigade arrived, and now the Austrians were 
driven from the village after a stubborn fight; they beat off an 
attack on Casteggio and drove the French back on Montebello in 
disorder and would undoubtedly have taken it (the majority of 

their troops had not yet entered battle) if a brigade of the French 
division of Vinoy had not arrived in the meantime. Seeing these 
reinforcements, the Austrians halted their advance. They had 
achieved their purpose; they knew now where the nearest bodies 
of troops of the French right wing stood, and they withdrew 
unhindered from Casteggio towards the Po and then over it to the 
main army, certain now that the French had not yet undertaken 
any serious movement against Piacenza. The Austrians are quite 
right to stay concentrated on the left bank of the Po as long as 
they have no imperative reason to throw their entire army over to 
the right bank; it would be a mistake to split the army a cheval* the 
river, and the Vaccarizza bridge, with its bridgehead, enables them 
to make the crossing at any time and to attack any French advance 
on the Stradella by the flank. 

Garibaldi, at the head of 5,000 volunteers, has turned the 
Austrian right flank and is now on Lombard soil. According to 
the latest reports, the Austrians are already on his heels, and he is 
in great danger of being cut off, something that certainly would 
please Bonaparte the liberator greatly. 

Prince Napoleon Plon-Plon has been ordered to organise an 
army corps in Leghorn (Tuscany), which is to fall on the flank of 
the Austrians. The French soldiers are furious and the Austrians 
laugh. 

On Saturday and Sunday the Sardinians tried to establish 
themselves on the left bank of the Sesia but were prevented from 
doing so by the Austrians. 

First. published in Das Volk, No. 4, ia ite 
May 28, 1859 Published in English for the first 

time