Karl Marx

The Proposed Peace Congress

From the English.

[*New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5624, April 30, 1859]

Paris, April 14, 1859

The British Government has at last thought fit to initiate the public into the official history of the European Congress, that *Deus ex machina* which the Russian and French wire-pullers caused to appear on the stage when they perceived how far they had fallen behind Austria in their war preparations. On this I would first remark that the note of Count Buol to Mr. Balabin, the Russian ambassador, dated Vienna, March 23, 1859, and the other note of the Austrian Minister to Lord A. Loftus, the British ambassador at the Court of Vienna, dated Vienna, March 31, were confidentially communicated by the Austrian Government to the Viennese newspapers on April 8, whereas John Bull only learned of them on April 13. But that is not all. The text of Count Buol’s note to Mr. Balabin, as transmitted by the English ministry to the London *Times*, reproduces only a part of the Austrian note and omits some highly important passages, which I shall insert in this letter, so that John Bull, via New York, may learn the diplomatic news which his acute mind is not trusted with because the English ministry deems it risky.

At first glance it can be seen from Buol’s note to Mr. Balabin that the proposal for a congress emanated from Russia, or, in other words, that it is a move concerted by the allied chess-players of St. Petersburg and Paris—a fact hardly calculated to fill us with any particular admiration for the sagacity or the sincerity of the gentlemen in Downing Street, who did not shrink even in Parliament from claiming a patent for this invention.

It is further evident from the note that Austria (and this fact was carefully suppressed by the French *Moniteur* when it reported that Austria had associated itself with the proposal for a general congress) was willing to meet the other Great Powers at a congress only on certain conditions.

“If,” says Count Buol, “in addition to this question” (i.e., the curbing of the “political system in Sardinia”) “the Powers should deem it necessary to bring other questions forward for discussion, these must already be made as precise as possible beforehand, and if in this connection the internal relations of other sovereign states come up for debate, the undersigned cannot refrain from insisting above all that the mode of procedure in this case accord with the principles laid down in the Aix-la-Chapelle Protocol of November 15, 1818.”

Thus Austria accepted the Russian proposal for a general congress under the following four conditions: First, the principal task of the congress should be to curb Sardinia and to act in the Austrian interest; second, the Aix-la-Chapelle Protocol should serve as the basis for the conferences; third, “every conference must be preceded by the disarmament of Sardinia”; and lastly, the questions to be discussed must “be specified precisely beforehand”. On the first point, comment is superfluous. To leave no doubt as to its meaning, Count Buol expressly adds that he regards this point “as the only truly essential one for the moral pacification of Italy”.

The second point, the recognition of the Aix-la-Chapelle Protocol, would signify on France’s part a direct recognition of the treaties of 1815 and of Austria’s special treaties with the Italian states. But what Bonaparte wants is precisely the annulment of the treaties of 1815, on which Austria’s rule over the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom rests, and of the special treaties that secure to Austria a decisive influence over Naples, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and Rome. The third condition, the prior disarmament of Sardinia, anticipates a success which Austria could otherwise achieve only through a successful campaign; and the last condition, the prior determination of the questions to be discussed, would deprive Bonaparte of the chief success which, together with the necessary gain of time for his war preparations, he hopes to obtain from the congress—namely, to take Austria by surprise and then, once she is entangled in the meshes of diplomatic conferences, to expose her before the public opinion of Europe by forcing her to give the signal for breaking off the peace negotiations, because she flatly rejects the demands suddenly presented to her by France and Russia.

The conditions which Austria laid down in her note to the Russian ambassador as prerequisites for her participation in a general congress may therefore be summed up as follows: Austria will take part in a European conference for the settlement of the Italian question if, before the convening of this conference, the European powers agree to side with Austria against Sardinia and to force Sardinia to disarm and to recognise the Treaty of Vienna and the supplementary treaties based on it; and finally, if Bonaparte is deprived of every pretext for breaking the peace. In other words, Austria will enter into a congress if this congress, before it has even assembled, pledges itself to concede to Austria everything she is now ready to enforce with the sword in hand. When one considers that Austria was fully aware that this congress constitutes merely an ambush laid for her by enemies determined on war, she cannot be blamed for having treated the Russo-French proposal in such an ironic manner.

The parts of the Austrian document which I have so far commented on are those which the British ministry deemed suitable for publication. The following sentences from Buol’s despatch were suppressed in Malmesbury’s version of the Austrian note:

“Austria will disarm as soon as Piedmont has disarmed. Austria is most anxious to preserve peace, for it desires peace and knows how to value it, but it desires a sincere and durable peace, which it is honestly convinced it can secure without loss of its own power and honour. It has already made many sacrifices to maintain tranquillity and order in Italy. So long, however, as the required preliminaries have not been drawn up and become a settled matter, Austria can indeed carry on its armaments more measuredly, but not suspend them. Its troops will continue to march into Italy.”

After the Russo-French feint had thus been thwarted, England intervened, spurred on by its illustrious ally on the other side of the Channel, to compel Austria to agree to the proposal for a congress of the Great Powers for the discussion of the Italian complications. England gave expression to its wish that the Imperial government should accept the plans hatched in Downing Street. There is probably hardly a document in the annals of diplomatic history of such impudent irony as Count Buol’s reply to the English ambassador at Vienna. First, Buol repeats his demand that Sardinia must already lay down its arms before a congress and thus surrender to Austria at discretion.

“Austria,” he says, “could not appear at the congress until Sardinia is completely disarmed and the *corps francs* (free corps) have been dissolved. Once these conditions have been fulfilled and observed, the Imperial government declares itself ready to give the assurance in an official form that Austria will not attack Sardinia during the continuance of the congress, so long as the latter respects the Imperial territory and that of its ally.”

If Sardinia therefore disarms, Austria will only pledge itself not to attack the disarmed Sardinia during the continuance of the congress.

Buol’s reply to England’s proposals is framed in a truly Juvenalian spirit. To the British recommendation “not to touch the territorial relations and the treaties of 1815”, Buol loudly declares: “Quite my opinion!” and adds that “the implementing provisions of the treaties shall also not be touched”. The English endeavour to find ways of maintaining peace between Austria and Sardinia is interpreted by Buol as meaning that “the congress is to seek the means of moving Sardinia to resume the fulfilment of its international duties”. Buol will allow Europe to “discuss” and “debate” the contemplated “evacuation of the Papal States and the reforms that may be required in the Italian states”, but with the proviso that “the final adoption of this proposal be subject to the decision of the states directly interested”. In response to the British “proposal of a compromise to replace the special treaties between Austria and the Italian states”, Buol insists on “the legal validity of the treaties”, but is willing to consent to a revision if Sardinia and France agree to bring up their respective possessions of “Genoa” and “Corsica” for discussion.

It is a fact that Austria gave the same answer to the English proposals as it had already given to the Russian despatch. Upon this second disappointment, Russia and France induced poor Lord Malmesbury to propose to Austria, as a preliminary step, a general disarmament. In the Tuileries it was naturally assumed that Austria would flatly reject such a proposal, since it possesses a head start in armament vis-à-vis all its rivals; but once again Bonaparte had reckoned without his host. Austria knows that Bonaparte cannot disarm without at the same time ridding himself of the burdensome weight of the imperial crown. So Austria agreed to a proposal which had only been made in order to be rejected. There was great consternation in the Tuileries, which, after 24 hours’ reflection, enriched the world with the discovery that “a simultaneous disarmament of the Great Powers means nothing other than the disarmament of Austria”. One need only read the following impudent screed of the *Patrie*, a newspaper directly inspired by Napoleon III:

“In any case, the disarmament proposal applies only to two powers, Austria and Piedmont—Austria, which has concentrated its forces in Italy to an unprecedented extent, and Piedmont, which, faced with the Austrian army in Lombardy, is forced to answer the threats of war with defensive preparations. The disarmament question which Austria has raised is a question that must be settled first; as soon as Austria withdraws its army from Italy, Piedmont cannot fail to note the example that is thereby given it.

As for France, it does not need to disarm (*elle n’a pas à désarmer*), simply because it has not armed beyond the usual measure, because it has not concentrated troops on its borders, and because it does not even intend to make use of its right to respond to Austria’s threats—threats which are directed against Piedmont and against the peace of Europe. For France there can be no question of dismissing even a single able-bodied soldier from the army, or of placing a single additional cannon into the arsenal. Disarmament for France can only mean committing itself not to arm further.”

We cannot believe that Austria puts forward further-reaching claims; that would render worthless the pledge which Austria, undoubtedly in a friendlier mood (mieux inspirée), wished to give for the peace of Europe when it proposed a disarmament, in which it—as it knows very well—would itself have to make a beginning.