The chivalrous Francis Joseph, who cannot sleep for thinking of 
the laurels of the pseudo-Napoleon, has shown us what it means 
when “a hereditary war-lord” takes the reins in his hands. We saw 
last week how the army first had to occupy the position on the 
heights of Castiglione and then, at the moment when everyone 
should have expected a battle, abandoned the position without 
fighting and without a reason, to retire behind the Mincio.* But 
Francis Joseph did not feel that this was sufficient to prove his 
pitiful weakness and inconsistency. No sooner was the army 
behind the Mincio than the “young hero” thought up something 
better: it was unworthy of a Habsburg to quit the field in this way 
without resistance; the army had to make an about-face, cross the 
Mincio again and attack the enemy. 

After Francis Joseph had adequately reinforced his troops’ 
confidence in their Most Serene War-Lord by this puerile 
marching to and fro, he led them against the enemy. They were at 
most 150,000 in number; even Bonaparte, that lover of truth, does 
not set the figure higher. The Austrians attacked along a line at 
least 12 English miles long. Thus, there were at most 12,500 men 
for each mile (2,100 paces) of front, a concentration, to be sure, 
that is adequate for a shorter line under certain conditions but 
definitely too weak on so long a front, and completely unsuitable 
for an offensive, since the several main blows could not be 
delivered with sufficient power. In addition to that, the enemy was 
certainly superior in strength, so that the Austrian offensive was 
an error from the outset; an enemy with superior forces was fairly 

a See this volume, pp. 384-87.— Ed. 

The Battle at Solferino 393 

sure to break through such a thin line at some point. The general 
advance of the Austrians began on Thursday, June 23; they easily 
drove back the enemy outposts at all points, occupied Pozzolengo, 
Volta, Guidizzolo, and pressed on to Solferino and Castelgoffredo 
by nightfall. On the next morning they drove the enemy vanguard 
still further back, their left wing almost reaching the Chiese; now 
however they came up against the main forces of the enemy and 
the battle became general. Both wings of the Austrians had the 
upper hand, especially the right wing, which faced the Piedmon- 
tese and gave them rough treatment, so that the Austrians were 
clearly victorious here. But in the centre the defects of the plan 
came to light. Solferino, the key to the centre, finally remained in 
the hands of the French after stubborn fighting; at the same time 
they developed overwhelming pressure on the Austrian left wing. 
These two circumstances persuaded Francis Joseph, who had 
apparently thrown every last man into the fight, to give the 
order to retreat. The Austrians withdrew—obviously in perfect 
order and without being pursued—and crossed the Mincio unmo- 
lested. 

The details of the battle did not reach us in time to be discussed 
in this issue. This much is certain, however, that once again the 
Austrian troops fought with outstanding valour. This is proved by 
their steadfast resistance for 16 hours to a stronger enemy, and in 
particular by their orderly and undisturbed withdrawal. They do 
not seem to have any particular respect at all for messieurs the 
French; Montebello, Magenta and Solferino do not seem to have 
left any other impression on them than the conviction that, given 
equality in numbers, they can cope not only with the French but 
also with the stupidity of their own generals. The fact that they 
lost 30 guns and, allegedly, 6,000 prisoners is a pitiful result for 
the victor in such a major battle; the numerous engagements in 
villages could not yield him fewer spoils. But brilliantly as the 
troops conducted themselves in the face of superior strength, 
equally wretched was their leadership. Indecision, wavering, 
contradictory orders, as if the troops were to be quite intentionally 
demoralised—this is how Francis Joseph compromised himself 
irrevocably in the eyes of his army in three days. Nothing more 
woeful can be conceived than this arrogant youth presuming to 
command an army and yielding like a reed in the wind to the 
most contradictory influences, following old Hess today and taking 
Herr Gruinne’s contrary advice tomorrow, drawing back today and 
attacking suddenly on the morrow, and in general never knowing 
himself what he wishes. By now he has had enough of it, and is 

going back, shamed and crestfallen, to Vienna, where he will get a 
beautiful reception. 

But the war is only now beginning. The Austrian fortresses are 
only now coming into action; the French will now have to split up 
as soon as they cross the Mincio, and that will initiate a series of 
battles for single posts and _ positions, of minor secondary 
engagements in which the Austrians, who now at last have old Hess 
at their head, have better chances of victory despite their generally 
smaller forces. Once this, coupled with reinforcements, has 
reestablished the balance between the belligerents, the Austrians 
will be able to fall on the divided enemy with superior 
concentrations of forces and repeat the battles of Sommacampa- 
gna and Custozza°*” on a ten times larger scale. This is the task of 
the next six weeks. By the way, they are only now beginning to 
bring up their reserves, which will provide the army in Italy with 
at least 120,000 men in reinforcements, whilst Louis Napoleon is 
at a loss as to where to get reinforcements from, now that Prussia 
has mobilised. 

Accordingly, the Solferino affair has only slightly altered the 
chances of the war. But one great result has been achieved: One 
of our principal sovereigns has made an utter laughing-stock of 
himself, and his entire old-Austrian system is tottering. Discontent 
with the concordat business, with the centralisation, with rule by 
the bureaucracy, is breaking out all over Austria, and the people 
are demanding the overthrow of a system distinguished by 
oppression at home and defeats abroad. The mood in Vienna is 
such that Francis Joseph is hurrying there as fast as he can, to 
make concessions. At the same time our other sovereigns are 
making fools of themselves in the jolliest way; after the chivalrous 
Prince Regent* has exhibited the same irresolution and lack of 
character as a politician that Francis Joseph has shown as a 
general, the small states have started to squabble with Prussia 
again over the passage of troops, and the military commission of 
the Confederation has declared that it can make a decision on 
Prussia’s proposal of free federal corps on the Upper Rhine 
only after a good fortnight of reflection. Things are becoming 
splendidly complicated. This time the gracious princes can make 
fools of themselves without the menace of danger to our nationality; 
on the contrary, the German people, an entirely different 
people since the revolution of 1848, has become strong enough 

a William, Prince of Prussia.— Ed. 

The Battle at Solferino 395 

to cope not only with the French and Russians but also with its 
own 33 sovereigns at the same time.