Friedrich Engels

The Battle of Solferino

["Das Volk" No. 9, 2 July 1859]

The chivalrous Franz Joseph, whom the laurels of the false Napoleon would not let sleep, has shown us what it means when “a born warlord” seizes the reins of command. Already last week we saw how the army first had to occupy the position on the heights of Castiglione and, at the very moment when everyone was justified in expecting a battle, without a sword-stroke and without reason evacuated the position in order to go behind the Mincio. But Franz Joseph did not consider this sufficient to demonstrate his pitiful weakness and inconsistency. Scarcely was the army behind the Mincio when the “young hero” bethought himself of something better: It was unworthy of a Habsburg to quit the field thus without resistance; the army must turn about, recross the Mincio and attack the enemy.

After Franz Joseph, by this childish criss-cross marching, had sufficiently strengthened his troops’ confidence in their supreme war lord, he led them against the enemy. There were at most 150,000 of them; not even Bonaparte, the friend of truth, rates them higher. On a line at least 2 English miles long, the Austrians attacked. Thus there were at most 12,500 men to each mile (2,100 paces) of frontage – a ratio of forces that might certainly be adequate under certain circumstances for a shorter line, but with so long a front was absolutely too weak, and for an offensive was moreover altogether inappropriate, since the individual main thrusts could then certainly not be delivered with sufficient weight. In addition, the enemy was unconditionally superior, so the Austrian offensive was flawed from the very outset; a superior enemy was fairly certain to break through such a thin line at some given point.

On Thursday, 23 June, the general advance of the Austrians began; everywhere they drove back the enemy’s advanced troops with ease, occupied Pozzolengo, Volta, Cuidizzolo and by evening pressed forward as far as Solferino and Castelgoffredo. The following morning they hurled the enemy’s vanguard still further back, with the left wing reaching nearly as far as the Chiese; but now they came up against the enemy’s main force, and the battle became general. The two wings of the Austrians retained the advantage, particularly the right wing, which faced the Piedmontese and mauled them severely, so that here the Austrians were clearly victorious. But in the centre the faulty disposition made itself felt. Solferino, the key to the centre, after a tenacious struggle finally remained in the hands of the French, who simultaneously developed a strong superior strength against the Austrian left wing. These two circumstances induced Franz Joseph, who had probably committed every last man, to give the order to fall back. The Austrians withdrew – evidently in the best order and unpursued – and crossed the Mincio completely unmolested.

The details of the battle did not reach us in time to be discussed in this issue. So much, however, is certain: that the Austrian troops once again fought with outstanding bravery. This is proved by their steadfast holding out, for 16 hours, against a superior enemy, and particularly by their orderly and unmolested retreat. They appear to have no particular respect for Messieurs the French; Montebello, Magenta, Solferino seem to leave them with no other impression than the certainty that, given numerical equality, they could get the better not only of the French but also of the stupidity of their own generals. That they lost 30 cannon and allegedly 6,000 prisoners is a very pitiful result for the victor in such a main battle; the many village fights could not have brought him in less. But as brilliant as the conduct of the troops is in the face of superior strength, just as pitiful is the leadership again. Indecision, vacillation, contradictory orders, as if the troops were quite deliberately to be demoralised – it is by this that Franz Joseph has, within three days before the eyes of his army, irretrievably ruined himself. Nothing more wretched can be imagined than this arrogant youth, who presumes to want to command an army and who, like a reed in the wind, yields to the most contradictory influences, today following old Hess, tomorrow listening again to Herr Grünne’s opposite advice, today withdrawing and attacking suddenly tomorrow and never himself knowing what he wants at all. For the present, however, he has had enough and is withdrawing to Vienna, abashed and crestfallen, where he will receive a fine reception.

The war, however, is only just beginning. The Austrian fortresses will only now come into effect; the French will have to divide their forces as soon as they cross the Mincio, and with that begins a series of struggles for individual posts and positions, of detail engagements of a subordinate kind, in which the Austrians – who at last now have General Hess at their head – have greater chances of victory, even with forces smaller on the whole. Once the balance between the combatants has been restored in this way and by reinforcements, the Austrians can fall with concentrated superior strength upon the divided enemy and repeat the engagements of Sommacampagna and Custozza on a scale ten times larger. This is the task of the next six weeks. Besides, they are only now calling in the reserves, which will bring the army in Italy at least 120,000 men in reinforcements, while Louis-Napoleon, since the Prussian mobilisation, is in embarrassment as to where he is to get reinforcements.

The chances of the war have therefore changed little through the affair of Solferino. But one great result has been achieved: one of our principal father-princes has thoroughly disgraced himself, and his whole old-Austrian system is tottering. Throughout Austria, dissatisfaction with Concordat economy, centralisation, and bureaucratic rule is breaking out, and the people demand the overthrow of a system that distinguishes itself at home by oppression and abroad by defeats. The mood in Vienna is such that Franz Joseph is hastily betaking himself thither to make concessions. At the same time, our other father-princes are also disgracing themselves in a most gratifying manner; after the Prince Regent, the chivalrous one, as politician has displayed the same vacillation and lack of character as Franz Joseph as general, the petty robber states are again starting to squabble with Prussia over troop transit, and the Federal Military Commission declares itself able to report on Prussia’s proposal concerning free federal corps on the Upper Rhine only after a full 14 days’ deliberation. Matters are becoming entangled splendidly. This time, however, the gentlemen princes can disgrace themselves without danger threatening our nationality; on the contrary, the German people, an altogether different people since the upheaval of 1848, has become strong enough to get the better not only of the French and Russians, but also of the 33 father-princes at the same time.