Karl Marx

[The Question of the Abolition of Serfdom in Russia]

Written on October 1, 1858.

From the English.

[“New-York Daily Tribune,” No. 5458, October 19, 1858, leading article]

The question of serfdom seems at present to be taking a serious turn in Russia; this is best recognised by the extraordinary step that Tsar Alexander II has been driven to take, in summoning a kind of general representation of the nobility to St. Petersburg to deliberate the abolition of serfdom. The activity of the Main Committee for the Peasant Question had been practically without success, and had only led to violent disputes among its own members, disputes in which Grand Duke Constantine, the chairman of this committee, had sided with the Old Russian party against the Tsar. Most of the government committees of the nobility, for their part, seem to have used this opportunity of official consultation on preparatory measures for the emancipation of the peasants solely to frustrate this measure. To be sure, there is among the Russian nobility a party that advocates the abolition of serfdom, but it is not only numerically in the minority, but also divided in opinion on the most important questions. To declare oneself against bondage, but to allow emancipation only under conditions which reduce it to a mere fraud – this attitude seems to be the fashion even among the liberal Russian nobility. In reality, this open resistance to emancipation, or the lukewarm support for it, among the old partisans of serfdom is only too natural. Loss of revenue, depreciation of the value of their landed property, and serious curtailment of the political power they have grown accustomed to exercising – all the many petty autocrats who revolve around the great autocrat as their centre – these are the immediate consequences they foresee; and one can hardly expect them to be very enthusiastic about it. As a result of the prevailing uncertainty whether a depreciation of estates is impending, it has already become impossible in some guberniyas to raise loans on the security of landed property. A large portion of the landed property in Russia is mortgaged to the state, and the landowners are asking themselves how they are to meet their obligations to the government. Many have private debts resting on their estates. A large number live from the quit-rents paid by their serfs, who have settled in the towns as merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and workers. These receipts would naturally disappear with the abolition of serfdom. Moreover, there are small boyars who own a very limited number of serfs, but, in proportion, an even smaller area of land. If every serf, as must be the case in the event of emancipation, receives a patch of land, the owners of these serfs will be reduced to beggary. From the standpoint of the great landowners, the emancipation of the peasants is regarded almost as a renunciation of their political power. Once the serfs are emancipated, what real barrier remains for the great landowners against the arbitrariness of the Tsar? And further, what will become of the taxes so urgently needed by Russia, whose amount depends on the real value of the land? What will become of the crown peasants? All these questions are discussed and provide many strong positions behind which the partisans of serfdom pitch their tents. This story is as old as the history of nations. In fact, the oppressed class cannot be freed without doing harm to the class that lives from its oppression, and without at the same time throwing into confusion the whole superstructure of the state that rests on such a miserable social basis. When the time for such a change has come, great enthusiasm is shown at first, congratulations are joyfully exchanged on mutual good will, with solemn words about the universal love of progress, and so forth. But as soon as deeds are to take the place of words, some shrink back, in fear of the spirits they have summoned, while the majority declare their determination to fight for their real or imaginary interests. It has only been under the pressure of revolution or as the result of a war that the legitimate governments of Europe have been able to abolish serfdom. The Prussian government did not dare to think of the emancipation of the peasants until it was languishing under the iron yoke of Napoleon; and even then it settled the question in such a way that it had to be taken up again in 1848; and it still remains, although in an altered form, a question to be solved in a future revolution. In Austria it was neither the legitimate government nor the good will of the ruling classes that solved this question, but the revolution of 1848 and the Hungarian insurrection. In Russia, Alexander I and Nicholas attempted, not from any motives of humanity, but for reasons of state policy, to bring about by peaceful means a change in the condition of the popular masses, but both failed. It must be added, however, that after the revolution of 1848-49, Nicholas abandoned his own earlier plans for emancipation and became an ardent supporter of conservatism. As regards Alexander II, it was hardly a matter of choice whether to rouse the slumbering elements or not. The legacy of war bequeathed to him by his father demanded unheard-of sacrifices from the Russian popular masses, the extent of which may be judged from a simple fact: in the period from 1853 to 1856, the sum of uncovered paper money in circulation rose from three hundred and thirty-three million to about seven hundred million roubles, this entire increase of paper money representing in fact merely anticipated taxes. Alexander II only followed the example of Alexander I, who during the war against Napoleon put the peasants off with promises of emancipation. Moreover, the late war ended in a shameful defeat, at least in the eyes of the serfs, who cannot be expected to be versed in the secrets of diplomacy. And to inaugurate his new reign with patent defeats and humiliations, and then break the promises made to the peasants during the wars – to venture such a step was too dangerous even for the Tsar.

It may be doubted whether even Nicholas, with or without an Oriental war, could have postponed this question any longer. At any rate, Alexander II could not do so, but he assumed – and the supposition was not wholly unfounded – that the nobles, who were all accustomed to subordination, would not shrink back before his orders, and would even consider it an honour to be allowed, by means of various committees, to play a part in this great drama. These calculations, however, have proved false. On the other hand, the peasants, who had exaggerated ideas of what the Tsar intended to do for them, began to lose patience when they perceived the slow procedure of their masters. The conflagrations that have broken out in some guberniyas are alarm signals that are unmistakable. It is further known that in Great Russia, as well as in the territories formerly belonging to Poland, disturbances have broken out, accompanied by terrible scenes, which caused the nobility to migrate from the countryside to the towns, where, under the protection of walls and garrisons, they can scornfully laugh at their enraged slaves. Under these circumstances, Alexander II has thought it proper to convoke something like an assembly of the estates. What if this assembly becomes a turning point in the history of Russia? What if the nobles insist on their own political emancipation as the precondition for any concession they make to the Tsar with regard to the emancipation of their serfs?