Friedrich Engels

[The Successes of Russia in the Far East]

Written around 25 October 1858.

From the English.

_New-York Daily Tribune_ No. 5484 of 18 November 1858, Leading Article

The return match which Russia owed to France and England for its military defeats before Sevastopol has just taken place. The stubbornly fought and protracted battles on the Heracleatic Chersonese indeed damped Russia’s national pride and wrested from it a small strip of territory, but left it at the end of the war with a definite advantage. The condition of the “sick man” has considerably worsened; the Christian population of European Turkey, Greeks as well as Slavs, burn more than ever to cast off the Turkish yoke, and regard Russia more than ever as their sole protector. There is no doubt that in all the uprisings and conspiracies now going on in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Candia, Russian agents have a hand in them; yet the extreme enfeeblement and impotence of Turkey, which became manifest in the war and was further worsened by the obligations which the peace imposed upon that country, can alone sufficiently explain this general ferment among the Christian subjects of the Sultan. In this way Russia, in spite of the temporary surrender of a narrow strip of land – and it is perfectly clear that it will regain it at the first opportunity – has moved a good deal closer to the realisation of its plans regarding Turkey. Accelerated decay of Turkey and protectorate over its Christian subjects – these were the goals Russia aimed at when it began the war; but can anyone deny that Russia today exercises such a protectorate more than ever?

Thus, even in this unfortunate war, Russia is the sole gainer. Nevertheless, it owed a return match, and it has chosen a field for this game on which it has no rival – that of diplomacy. While England and France took up the costly struggle with China, Russia remained neutral and only intervened at the end. And the result is that England and France have waged war against China for Russia’s sole benefit. In this, Russia’s position was indeed as favourable as could be. China, as one of those tottering Asiatic empires, which one after another have fallen prey to the enterprising spirit of the European race, was so weak, so collapsed, that it did not even possess the strength to pass through the crisis of a popular revolution, so that even an acute insurrection has transformed itself into a chronic and apparently incurable malady; an empire so rotten that it was almost nowhere capable of governing its own people or resisting foreign aggression. While the British were scuffling with subordinate Chinese officials in Canton and discussing with each other the important question whether Commissioner Yeh really had acted according to the Emperor’s will or not, the Russians took possession of the land north of the Amur and, south of it, of the greater part of the Manchurian coast; they fortified themselves there, began surveys for a railway line, and drew up plans for towns and harbours. When England at last decided to carry the war to Peking, and France joined it, hoping to get something out of it for itself, Russia succeeded in creating the impression of being the disinterested protector of the weak Chinese and, at the conclusion of peace, in appearing almost in the role of mediator, although at that very moment it was robbing China of a territory as large as France and Germany put together, and of a river as long as the Danube; if we compare the various treaties concluded on this occasion, we cannot avoid stating that it becomes obvious to everybody that the war has benefited not France or England, but Russia.

The advantages granted to the participants in the war, in which both Russia and the United States share, are of a purely commercial character and, as we have proved on earlier occasions, are largely illusory. Under the present circumstances, the China trade, with the exception of opium and some East Indian cotton, will continue to consist mainly in the export of Chinese goods, tea and silk; this export trade depends more on foreign demand than on the greater or lesser facilities which the Chinese government grants. Everybody could obtain tea and silk even before the Treaty of Nanking; after the conclusion of this treaty, however, the opening of the five ports had the result that a part of the trade passed over to Shanghai. The other ports have almost no trade at all, and in fact Swatow, the only one that has at least some importance, is not among these five ports. As for the opening of trade on the Yangtse-kiang, that has prudently been postponed until the time when His Imperial Majesty will have regained full sovereignty over the rebellious country on both sides of that river – a time which coincides with the Greek Kalends. Yet further doubts have arisen concerning the value of this new treaty. There are people who assert that the transit dues spoken of in Article XXVIII of the Anglo-Chinese treaty are pure imagination. The existence of these dues was suspected only because the Chinese wanted very few English goods and consequently English products could not penetrate into the interior of the country at all; at the same time, however, a certain sort of Russian cloth, which met the needs of the Chinese and was brought in via Kiakhta or Tibet, made its way even to the coast. It was forgotten that such charges, if they exist, would strike Russian just as much as English goods. So much is certain, that Mr. Wingrove Cooke, who was sent into the interior for this purpose, was not able to track down these so-called “transit dues”; and he had to confess, when publicly questioned on this subject, that he had “arrived at the mortifying conviction that our ignorance about China is an ignorance that has palpable effects.” On the other hand, Mr. J. W. Henley, the President of the British Board of Trade, in a published letter answers the question, “whether there is any evidence that such internal duties exist,” quite openly: “I am not in a position to give you the desired information about the existence of inland duties in China.” Accordingly, besides the rather unpleasant conviction that Lord Elgin has arranged a compensation without fixing a term of payment, and that he has carried the war from Canton to the capital only to conclude a treaty which will send the British forces from the capital back to Canton again to fight, a dark suspicion has taken hold of John Bull that he may have to pay the stipulated compensation out of his own pocket, since Article XXVIII will prove a strong incentive for the Chinese authorities to levy on British manufactured goods transit dues of 7 1/2 per cent, which on demand would be convertible into a 2 1/2 per cent import duty. To divert John Bull from taking a still closer look at his own treaty, the London “Times” thought it proper to feign great wrath at the American ambassador and to attack him violently because he allegedly botched everything, although in reality he had as much to do with the fiasco of the second Anglo-Chinese War as the man in the moon.

Thus the peace treaty, as far as it concerns English trade, has resulted in a new import duty and a series of stipulations which are either entirely without any practical value or are not observed by the Chinese and can at any moment serve as a pretext for a new war. England has obtained no territorial accession whatever – it could not claim any without allowing France to do the same; after all, a war led by England that would result in the emergence of French possessions on the Chinese coast would be altogether disadvantageous for England. As regards Russia, the case is quite different. Apart from sharing in all the obvious advantages – whatever they may be – that have been conceded to France and England, Russia has secured the whole of the land on the Amur, of which it had quietly taken possession. Not content with that, it has managed to get a Russo-Chinese commission formed for the determination of the boundaries. Now, we all know what such a commission is in the hands of Russia. We have seen such commissions at work on the Asiatic frontiers of Turkey, where they had been constantly cutting off piece after piece from that country for more than twenty years, until they were interrupted by the last war and the work now has to be done once more. Then there is the article regulating the postal service between Kiakhta and Peking. What was formerly an irregular and merely tolerated line of communication will now be regularly organised and legally fixed: a monthly postal connection shall be established between the two places, the journey of about 1,000 miles to take 15 days; moreover, a caravan shall travel the same route every three months. Now, it is obvious that the Chinese will either neglect this service or will not be able to carry it out; but since the connection is now legally secured to Russia, the consequence will be that it gradually falls into its hands. We have seen how the Russians have pushed their lines of posts through the Kirghiz steppes; we cannot doubt that in a few years a similar line will be erected straight across the Gobi Desert. Then we can say adieu to all dreams of a British predominance in China, because at any time a Russian army can then march on Peking.

One can easily picture the consequences which the establishment of permanent embassies in Peking will have. Look at Constantinople or Tehran! Wherever Russian diplomacy encounters English or French diplomacy, it is uniformly successful. Who can doubt that a Russian ambassador who has the prospect of possessing, in the course of a few years, an army equal to any task at Kiakhta – one month’s march from Peking – as well as a road prepared for its advance along its whole length, that such a Russian ambassador will be omnipotent in Peking?

It is a fact that Russia will soon be the first Asiatic power and will very quickly overshadow England on that continent. The conquest of Central Asia and the annexation of Manchuria increases its possessions by a territory that has the size of the whole of Europe apart from the Russian Empire, and leads it out of the snowy Siberia into the temperate zone. In a short time, the valleys of the Central Asian rivers and of the Amur will be populated by Russian colonists. The strategic positions thus gained are as important for Asia as those in Poland are for Europe. The possession of Turan threatens India; that of Manchuria threatens China. China and India, with their 450,000,000 inhabitants, are, however, at present the decisive countries of Asia.