Karl Marx

[The Project for the Regulation of the Price of Bread in France]

Written about November 19, 1858.

From the English.

New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5507, December 15, 1858, leading article.

The Emperor of the French has just undertaken the execution of one of his pet projects, namely the regulation of the price of bread throughout his empire. This idea he already announced with great definiteness in 1854 in his speech before the Corps Législatif on the occasion of the declaration of war against Russia. His declaration on this matter at that time is worth quoting; we reproduce it as follows:

“Above all I recommend to your attention the system now adopted by the city of Paris, for if, as I hope, it is extended over the whole of France, it will in future prevent those extreme fluctuations in the price of corn which, in times of plenty, make agriculture languish owing to the low price of wheat, and in years of scarcity inflict such great suffering on the poorer classes through the dearness of wheat. This system consists in establishing in all great centres of population a credit institution, a so-called Bakers’ Bank (Caisse de la Boulangerie), which during dear years could sell bread at a price infinitely lower than the official market price, on condition that its price shall be somewhat higher in years of abundance. As good harvests are generally more numerous than bad ones, it is easy to see that a balance can be struck between the two with ease. In addition, there is the immense advantage that credit societies will be found which, instead of profiting from the rise in the price of bread, like everyone else, would be interested in its cheapness; for, in contrast to what has existed hitherto, such societies would do business in times of plenty and lose money in years of dearth.”

The principle here advocated is that bread is to be sold “infinitely” below its market price in bad times and only “a little” above the same price in good times, the balance being struck from the hope that the good years will by far outweigh the lean ones.

When an imperial decree established the Bakers’ Bank in Paris in December 1853, the maximum price for a 4-pound loaf was fixed at 40 centimes; the bakers were empowered to claim compensation for their losses from the bank; the bank in turn formed its fund by the issue of bonds guaranteed by the Paris municipality; the latter, again, formed the guarantee fund by incurring new debts and raising the excise duties on articles of consumption at the gates of Paris.

A certain sum was, moreover, directly contributed by the government from the public treasury. By the end of 1854, the debts thus contracted by the Paris municipality, together with the government money, had already reached the sum of eighty million francs. The government then found itself compelled to retrace its steps and to raise the maximum price for a loaf of bread successively to 45 and 50 centimes. Thus the Paris population had partly to pay back, in the form of increased excise duties, what it saved on the price of bread, and the rest of France had to pay a general poor rate for the metropolis in the form of the direct government subsidy granted to the municipality of Paris. The experiment, however, proved a complete failure, since the price of bread in Paris during the bad times of 1855 to 1857 rose above the official maximum, and during the abundant harvests of 1857 and 1858 fell below it.

Far from discouraged by the failure of his experiment on a relatively small scale, Louis-Napoleon has now undertaken, by a most proper ukase, to organise the baking trade and the grain trade throughout France. A few weeks ago one of his newspapers in Paris attempted to convince the public that a “grain reserve” in all important towns was a necessity. The argument was that in the worst years of scarcity the greatest deficit in grain had been equal to the consumption of the whole population for 28 days, and that the average number of consecutive bad years was three. On these assumptions it was calculated that “an effective reserve for three months will be all that, according to human foresight, is needed.” If this reserve is to extend only to towns with a minimum population of 10,000 inhabitants, whose aggregate population in France (Paris excepted) amounts to 3,776,000 souls, if each person consumes on average 45 kilogrammes of wheat in three months, and the present price of wheat is about 14 francs per hectolitre, then such a reserve would, according to these considerations, cost between 31,000,000 and 32,000,000 francs! Now, on November 18, the Moniteur published a decree in the following terms:

“Art. 1. The reserve of the bakers in all towns where the baking trade is regulated by decrees and ordinances shall be that quantity of grain or flour which is necessary to supply the daily needs of each bakery during three months.

Art. 2. Within a month from this date, the prefects of the departments, after consulting the municipal authorities, shall decide whether the reserves are to be laid in in grain or in flour, and fix the period within which they are to be procured, likewise the proportion of them which may be stored in public warehouses.”

To this decree is appended a list of the towns “in which the baking trade is regulated” and which, consequently, have to lay in reserves. The list includes all the towns of France of any degree of importance, except Paris and Lyon, in which reserves already exist and which therefore do not fall under the provisions of this decree. Altogether there are no fewer than 161 towns, and among them are Marseilles, St. Quentin, Moulins, Caen, Angoulême, Dijon, Bourges, Besançon, Évreux, Chartres, Brest, Nîmes, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Montpellier, Rennes, Tours, Grenoble, St. Étienne, Nantes, Orléans, Angers, Rheims, Châlons, Metz, Lille, Douai, Valenciennes, Beauvais, Arras, St. Omer, Calais, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Rouen, Le Havre, Mâcon, Le Mans, Amiens, Abbeville and Toulon. According to the last census, the population of the 161 towns may now be put at about 8,000,000! This then gives 5,500,000 hectolitres worth from 70,000,000 to 80,000,000 francs for the reserves. In transmitting the decree by circular to the prefects of the departments, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce informs them that, although they “ought not to compel the bakers to fulfil the obligations imposed upon them by the decree precipitately,” they must fix the period allowed for the execution of this measure “within reasonable limits.” He leaves it to the prefects to decide, from local considerations, whether the reserves are to be laid in in grain or in flour. He then informs them that the present measure, comprehensive as it is, may be regarded as capable of extension.

“The Government does not exaggerate, Monsieur le Préfet, the importance of the measure I have described. It is perfectly aware that the decree concerns only a small part of the population, and has therefore concerned itself with the possibility of extending its sphere of action. The inhabitants of market-towns and villages bake their own bread and take from their harvest the quantity of wheat necessary for their families for the duration of a year. As regards these families, government interference would be useless and impossible. But in a certain number of chief towns of departments and in a larger number of arrondissement and cantonal centres and even in large villages, the bakers produce a considerable portion of the bread consumed, and yet are not subject to any regulation and are not obliged to lay in any reserves. Is it not possible to bring the bakers of such places under the same regime and impose upon them the same salutary law of prudence? The Government is inclined to believe that its prescriptions would, in this respect, encounter no serious objections.”

Before, however, subjecting the whole of the rest of France except the small villages to the above decree, the Minister instructs the prefects to consult the municipal authorities of those places which are not yet within the scope of this decree. He then tells the prefects how the reserves are to be stored:

“The bakers must as far as possible make use of the outbuildings of their shops, since these will be easy to supervise. But you must call upon the municipalities to establish public warehouses and place them at the disposal of the bakers, warehouses designed to receive, against payment of a rent fixed by tariff, the reserves which they cannot store themselves. I have no doubt that the enlightened cooperation of the municipal authorities will render these measures easy of execution.”

The Minister comes at last to the vital question, where the money for carrying out the decree is to come from:

“As regards the realization of the necessary capital, I am convinced that the bakers will make the most earnest efforts to raise the sums they need. Such an investment offers such great commercial advantages and promises to yield such legitimate profits that they can hardly fail to obtain credit, especially at a moment when the rate of interest is so low. Would it be expecting too much good will on the part of the capitalists in each commune to look for their cooperation in favour of the bakers? Would they not find in the reserves created a secure security for their advances—and a security which is rather destined to rise than to fall in value? I shall be happy if the efforts to which you devote yourself in this matter are crowned with success.

I ask myself whether the municipalities might not, if necessary, following the example of the Caisse de Paris, create resources and employ them for advances to the bakers. To promote and facilitate such advances and to multiply them by circulation, the grain stores intended for the reception of the reserves could be given the character of bonded warehouses (magasins généraux) and could issue warehouse warrants, which would certainly be most willingly accepted by our financial institutions, and particularly by the Bank of France.”

The Minister concludes his circular by pointing out that within twenty days the prefects are to inform him of what they propose with regard to the execution of the second article of the decree, and within a month are to report what the municipalities of the towns and villages not included in the decree recommend.

Now, we do not intend to enter, at this moment, upon the question of the public granaries, but the enormous significance of this economic coup d’état requires no lengthy commentary. It is well known that the current price of grain in France is desperately low, and that, in consequence, signs of discontent are perceptible among the peasantry. Through the artificial demand created by means of the three-months’ reserve, Napoleon attempts to raise prices artificially and thus to stop the mouth of agricultural France. On the other hand, he proclaims himself to the proletarians of the towns as a kind of socialist providence, though in a fairly clumsy manner, for the first palpable effect of his decree must be that the workers will be forced to pay more for their bread than before. The “saviour of property” shows the bourgeoisie that not even the formal meddling of his ridiculous legislative organs, but a simple personal ukase on his part is all that is needed to treat their bourses with caprice, to dispose of municipal property, to disturb the course of trade, and to subject their money dealings to his private machinations. Finally, the question must still be considered from the purely Bonapartist point of view. Immense constructions for public granaries will become necessary throughout the whole of France, and what a fresh field of activity for jobs and plunder will they open up! An unexpected turn is also given to the grain trade. What profits can be pocketed by the Crédit mobilier and the other gambling partners of his Imperial Majesty! In any case, we may be sure that the Imperial Socialist will prove more successful in raising the price of bread than he has been in the attempts to lower it.