BIDASSOA *”° 

Bidassoa, a small river of the Basque provinces of Spain, noted 
for the battles fought upon its banks, between the French under 
Soult and the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese, under Welling- 
ton. After the defeat of Vittoria in 1813,°%! Soult collected his 
troops in a position, the right of which rested on the sea opposite 
Fuenterrabia, having the Bidassoa in front, while the centre and 
left extended across several ridges of hills toward St. Jean de Luz. 
From this position he once attempted to relieve the blockaded 
garrison of Pampeluna, but was repulsed. San Sebastian, besieged 
by Wellington, was now hard pressed, and Soult resolved to raise the 
siege. From his position of the lower Bidassoa it was but 9 miles to 
Oyarzun, a village on the road to San Sebastian; and if he could 
reach that village the siege must be raised. Accordingly, toward 
the end of Aug. 1813, he concentrated 2 columns on the Bidassoa. 
The one on the left, under Gen. Clausel, consisting of 20,000 men 
and 29 guns, took a position on a ridge of hills opposite Vera (a 
place beyond which the upper course of the river was in the hands 
of the allies), while Gen. Reille with 18,000 men, and a reserve of 
7,000 under Foy, took his station lower down, near the road from 
Bayonne to Irun. The French intrenched camp to the rear was 
held by d’Erlon with 2 divisions, to ward off any turning 
movement of the allied right. 

Wellington had been informed of Soult’s plan, and had taken 
every precaution. The extreme left of his position, sheltered in 
front by the tidal estuary of the Bidassoa, was well intrenched, 
though but slightly occupied; the centre, formed by the extremely 
strong and rugged ridges of San Marcial, was strengthened with 
field-works, and held by Freire’s Spaniards, the Ist British division 

standing as a reserve on their left rear near the Irun road. The 
right wing, on the rocky descents of the Pena de Haya mountain, 
was held by Longa’s Spaniards and the 4th Anglo-Portuguese 
division; Inglis’s brigade of the 7th division connecting it with the 
light division at Vera, and with the troops detached still further to 
the right among the hills. Soult’s plan was, that Reille should take 
San Marcial (which he intended forming into a bridge-head for 
ulterior operations), and drive the allies toward their right, into 
the ravines of Pena de Haya, thus clearing the high road for Foy, 
who was to advance along it straight on Oyarzun, while Clausel, 
after leaving a division to observe Vera, should pass the Bidassoa a 
little below that place, and drive whatever troops opposed him up 
the Pena de Haya, thus seconding and flanking Reille’s attack. 
On the morning of Aug. 31, Reille’s troops forded the river in 
several columns, carried the first ridge of San Marcial with a rush, 
and advanced toward the higher and commanding ridges of that 
group of hills. But in this difficult ground his troops, imperfectly 
managed, got into disorder; skirmishers and supports became 
mingled, and in some places crowded together in disordered 
groups, when the Spanish columns rushed down the hill and 
drove them back to the river. A second attack was at first more 
successful, and brought the French up to the Spanish position; but 
then its force was spent, and another advance of the Spaniards 
drove them back into the Bidassoa in great disorder. Soult having 
learned in the mean time that Clausel had made good his attack, 
slowly conquering ground on Pena de Haya, and driving 
Portuguese, Spaniards, and British before him, was just forming 
columns out of Reille’s reserves and Foy’s troops for a third and 
final attack, when news came that d’Erlon had been attacked in his 
camp by strong forces. Wellington, as soon as the concentration of 
the French on the lower Bidassoa left no longer any doubt of the 
real point of attack, had ordered all troops in the hills on his 
extreme right to attack whatever was before them. This attack, 
though repulsed, was very serious, and might possibly be renewed. 
At the same time, a portion of the British light division was drawn 
up on the left bank of the Bidassoa so as to flank Clausel’s 
advance. Soult now gave up the intended attack, and drew Reille’s 
troops back across the Bidassoa. Those of Clausel were not 
extricated till late in the night, and after a severe struggle to force 
the bridge at Vera, the fords having become impassable by a heavy 
fall of rain on the same day, the allies took San Sebastian, except 
the citadel, by storm, and this latter post surrendered on Sept. 9. 
The second battle of the Bidassoa took place Oct. 7, when 
BATTLES OF THE BIDASSOA, AUGUST 31 AND OCTOBER 7, 1813 

Wellington forced the passage of that river. Soult’s position was 
about the same as before; Foy held the intrenched camp of St. 
Jean de Luz, d’Erlon held Urdax and the camp of Ainhoa, Clausel 
was posted on a ridge connecting Urdax with the lower Bidassoa, 
and Reille stood along that river from Clausel’s right down to the 
sea. The whole front was intrenched, and the French were still 
employed in strengthening their works. The British right stood 
opposed to Foy and d’Erlon; the centre, composed of Girdén’s 
Spaniards and the light division, with Longa’s Spaniards and the 
4th division in reserve, in all 20,000 men, faced Clausel; while on 
the lower Bidassoa Freire’s Spaniards, the Ist and 5th Anglo- 
Portuguese divisions, and the unattached brigade of Aylmer and 
Wilson, in all 24,000 men, were ready to attack Reille. Wellington 
prepared every thing for a surprise. His troops were drawn up 
well sheltered from the view of the enemy during the night before 
Oct. 7, and the tents of his camp were not struck. Beside, he had 
been informed by smugglers of the locality of 3 fords in the tidal 
estuary of the Bidassoa, all passable at low water, and unknown to 
the French, who considered themselves perfectly safe on that side. 

On the morning of the 7th, while the French reserves were 
encamped far to the rear, and of the one division placed in Ist line 
many men were told off to work at the redoubts, the 5th British 
division and Aylmer’s brigade forded the tidal estuary, and 
marched toward the intrenched camp called the Sansculottes. As 
soon as they had passed to the other side, the guns from San 
Marcial opened, and 5 more columns advanced to ford the river. 
They had formed on the right bank before the French could offer 
any resistance; in fact, the surprise completely succeeded; the 
French battalions, as they arrived singly and irregularly, were 
defeated, and the whole line, including the key of the position, the 
hill of Croix de Bouquets, was taken before any reserves could 
arrive. The camp of Biriatu and Bildox, connecting Reille with 
Clausel, was turned by Freire’s taking the Mandale hill, and 
abandoned. Reille’s troops retreated in disorder until they were 
stopped at Urogne by Soult, who arrived in haste with the reserves 
from Espelette. While still there, he was informed of an attack on 
Urdax; but he was not a moment in doubt about the real point of 
attack, and marched on the lower Bidassoa, where he arrived too 
late to restore the battle. The British centre, in the mean time, had 
attacked Clausel, and gradually forced his positions by both front 
and flank attacks. Toward evening he was confined to the highest 
point of the ridge, the Grande Rhune, and that hill he abandoned 
next day. The loss of the French was about 1,400, that of the allies 

about 1,600 killed and wounded. The surprise was so well 
managed that the real defence of the French positions had to be 
made by 10,000 men only, who, on being vigorously attacked by 
33,000 allies, were driven from them before any reserves could 
come to their support.