Friedrich Engels

Borodino

Written about January 28, 1858.

From the English.

[“The New American Cyclopædia”, Vol. III]

Borodino — a village in Russia, on the left bank of the Kolocha, about 2 miles from its confluence with the Moskva. It was after this village that the Russians named the great battle of 1812 which decided the possession of Moscow; the French call it the battle of the Moskva or of Mozhaysk. The battlefield lies on the right bank of the Kolocha. The Russian right wing was covered by this river from its mouth into the Moskva to Borodino; the left wing was drawn back en potence (in hook position) behind a stream and a ravine running from the extreme left at Utitsa to Borodino. Behind this ravine there are two hills crowned with incomplete redoubts or lunettes; the one nearest the centre was called the Rayevsky redoubt, the three situated on the hill further to the left were called the Bagration lunettes. Between these two hills lies another ravine, named after the village of Semyonovskoye behind it, which runs from the Russian left wing to the first ravine and joins it about 1,000 yards in front of the Kolocha. The main road to Moscow runs past Borodino, the old road at Utitsa to Mozhaysk runs in the rear of the Russian position. This line, extending over some 9,000 yards, was held by about 130,000 Russians, and Borodino in front of the centre was occupied. The Russian commander-in-chief was General Kutuzov. His troops were divided into two armies; the larger under Barclay de Tolly held the right wing and the centre, the smaller under Bagration stood on the left. The position was very badly chosen; for a successful attack on the left wing would have completely turned the right and the centre, and if the French had reached Mozhaysk before the Russian right wing had withdrawn — which was entirely possible — the Russians would have been hopelessly lost. But Kutuzov had no other choice after he had once rejected the excellent position of Tsaryovo Zaymishche, chosen by Barclay.

The French, led personally by Napoleon, numbered about 125,000 men; after dislodging the Russians on September 5, 1812, New Style (August 26, Old Style), from some light entrenchments on their left wing, they deployed for battle on the 7th. Napoleon’s plan was based on Kutuzov’s errors; he confined himself to observing the Russian centre and concentrated his forces against the left wing, which he intended to overpower, then to force his way to Mozhaysk. Accordingly, Viceroy Eugène had received orders to make a feint attack on Borodino; Ney and Davout were then to attack Bagration and the lunettes named after him, while Poniatowski was to turn the extreme left of the Russians at Utitsa. As soon as the battle was fully under way, Viceroy Eugène was to cross the Kolocha and attack the Rayevsky redoubt. Thus the entire front actually attacked did not exceed a length of 5,000 yards, and made it possible to place 26 men on every yard of front, an unprecedented depth of order of battle, to which the terrible Russian losses from artillery fire must also be ascribed. At daybreak, Poniatowski advanced on Utitsa and took it, but his opponent Tuchkov threw him out again. Since Tuchkov later had to send a division to support Bagration, the Poles retook the village. At 6 o’clock Davout attacked the proper left of the Bagration entrenchments. He advanced under the heavy fire of twelve-pounders, to which he could oppose only three- and four-pounders. Half an hour later Ney attacked the proper right of these lunettes. They were taken and retaken, and a bitter and indecisive struggle followed.

Bagration, however, very well recognised the large force with the powerful reserve and the French Guards standing in the background that was being brought up against him. There was no doubt about the real point of attack. He therefore gathered all available troops, called for a division of the Rayevsky corps, another of the Tuchkov corps, as well as Guards and grenadiers from the reserve army, and asked Barclay to send the entire corps of Baggovut. These reinforcements, amounting to more than 30,000 men, were immediately set in motion; from the reserve army alone Bagration received 17 Guard and grenadier battalions and 2 batteries of twelve-pounders. They could not, however, be at his disposal on the spot before 10 o’clock, and already before that time Davout and Ney undertook their second attack on the entrenchments, took them, and drove the Russians across the Semyonovskoye ravine. Bagration sent his cuirassiers forward; an irregular fight of great violence followed, in which the Russians regained ground as their reinforcements arrived, but were driven back again behind the ravine when Davout committed his reserve division. Both sides suffered enormous losses; almost all the higher officers were killed or wounded, Bagration himself being mortally hit. Now at last Kutuzov took some part in the battle and ordered Dokhturov to take command of the left wing and his own chief of staff Toll to superintend the defensive measures on the spot. Shortly after 10 o’clock the 17 Guard and grenadier battalions and Vasilchikov’s division arrived at Semyonovskoye. Baggovut’s corps was divided; one division was sent to Rayevsky, another to Tuchkov, and the cavalry to the right flank. Meanwhile the French continued their attacks. The Westphalian division advanced in the woods against the upper part of the ravine, while General Friant crossed this ravine without, however, being able to gain a foothold there. The Russians were now (half-past 10) reinforced by Borozdin’s cuirassiers from the reserve army and by part of Korff’s cavalry, but they were already too shattered to go over to the attack. At about the same time the French prepared a massive cavalry attack. In the Russian centre, Eugène Beauharnais had taken Borodino at 6 in the morning, crossed the Kolocha, and driven the enemy back. He quickly returned, however, and crossed the river again further upstream to attack — with the Italian Guards, the division of Broussier (Italians), the divisions of Gérard and Morand, and the cavalry of Grouchy — Rayevsky and the redoubt bearing his name. Borodino remained occupied. The crossing of Beauharnais’ troops caused a delay; his attack could hardly begin before 10 o’clock. The Rayevsky redoubt was occupied by Paskevich’s division, supported on its left by Vasilchikov and having Dokhturov’s corps as its reserve. About 11 o’clock the redoubt was taken by the French, Paskevich’s division completely annihilated and driven from the field of battle. But Vasilchikov and Dokhturov retook the redoubt; Duke Eugene of Württemberg’s division arrived in time, and now Barclay ordered Ostermann’s corps to take up position in the rear as a new reserve. With this corps the last disposable unit of the Russian infantry was brought within gunshot; now only 6 Guard battalions remained as reserve. Eugène Beauharnais was just about to go over to the attack on the Rayevsky redoubt for a second time around 12 o’clock when Russian cavalry appeared on the left bank of the Kolocha. The attack was halted and troops dispatched against the cavalry. But the Russians could neither take Borodino nor cross the marshy terrain of the Voina ravine and had to withdraw to the vicinity of Zodotsk; they had achieved nothing more than, to a certain degree, thwarting Napoleon’s intentions.

Meanwhile Ney and Davout, standing on the Bagration hill, had laid down heavy fire across the Semyonovskoye ravine upon the Russian masses. All of a sudden the French cavalry set itself in motion. To the right of Semyonovskoye, Nansouty attacked the Russian infantry with full success, until Sievers’ cavalry took him in the flank and drove him back. On the left, Latour-Maubourg’s 3,000 horsemen advanced in two columns; the first was headed by two Saxon cuirassier regiments and twice rode over three Russian grenadier battalions that were just forming square; but this part of the French cavalry was also taken in the flank by the Russian cavalry. A Polish cuirassier regiment completed the smashing of the Russian grenadiers, but these were driven back again into the ravine, where the second column, two Westphalian cuirassier regiments and a Polish uhlan regiment, repulsed the Russians. With the ground thus secured, Ney and Davout’s infantry crossed the ravine. Friant occupied Semyonovskoye; the remaining Russians who had fought there, grenadiers, Guards and line, were finally driven back and their defeat was completed by the French cavalry. They fled in small, disorganised groups towards Mozhaysk and could only be rallied late at night; only the three Guard regiments preserved some order. Thus the French right wing, having defeated the Russian left, established itself by 12 o’clock in a position directly in the rear of the Russian centre; thereupon Davout and Ney urged Napoleon, in accordance with his own tactics, to complete the victory and to employ the Guards at Semyonovskoye in the rear of the Russians. Napoleon refused, however, and Ney and Davout, whose troops had been badly battered, did not dare to proceed without reinforcements.

On the Russian side, after Eugène Beauharnais had abandoned the attack on the Rajevsky redoubt, Eugene of Württemberg was sent to Semenovskoe, and Ostermann too had to change his front in this direction in order to cover the rear of the Rajevsky hill against Semenovskoe. When Sorbier, the French chief of artillery, saw these fresh troops, he sent for 36 twelve-pounders of the Guard artillery and formed a battery of 85 guns in front of Semenovskoe. While these guns heavily shelled the Russian masses, Murat brought forward the cavalry of Montbrun, which had so far remained intact, and the Polish uhlans. They surprised Ostermann’s troops as they were deploying and placed them in great danger, until Kreutz’s cavalry repulsed the French horsemen. The Russian infantry continued to suffer from artillery fire, but neither side dared to advance. By now it was about 2 o’clock, when Eugène Beauharnais, feeling secure with regard to the enemy cavalry on his left, again attacked the Rajevsky redoubt. While the infantry attacked it frontally, cavalry was sent from Semenovskoe into its rear. After a hard fight, the redoubt remained in the hands of the French, and shortly before 3 o’clock the Russians withdrew. From both sides a general cannonade ensued, but the active fighting was over. Napoleon still refused to commit his Guard, and the Russians could withdraw as they pleased. The Russians had employed all their troops, with the exception of the two first regiments of the Guard, and even these lost 17 officers and 600 men through artillery fire. The total loss of the Russians amounted to 52,000 men, besides lightly wounded and stragglers who soon found their way back; yet on the day after the battle their army numbered only 52,000 men. The French too had all their troops, except the Guards (14,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and artillery), engaged; they therefore fought decidedly superior forces. Moreover, their artillery was inferior, consisting mainly of three- and four-pounders, while a quarter of the Russian guns were twelve-pounders and the remainder six-pounders. The French lost 30,000 men; they captured 40 guns and took only about 1,000 prisoners. Had Napoleon committed his Guard, according to General Toll the destruction of the Russian army would have been certain. He did not, however, risk this last reserve, the core and mainstay of his army, and missed

thereby perhaps the opportunity to conclude peace in Moscow.

The above account is based, in the details that differ from the general reports, mainly on the “Memoirs of General Toll,” whom we have mentioned as Kutuzov’s chief of the general staff. This book contains the best Russian account of the battle and is indispensable for its correct appreciation.