Friedrich Engels

[Perspectives of the Anglo-Persian War]

Written end of January/beginning of February 1857.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 4941 of 19 February 1857, Leitartikel]

The possession of Herat, an Afghan principality which however has recently been occupied by the Persians, is the question that has induced the English, acting in the name of the East India Company, to occupy the most important Persian port on the Persian Gulf, Bushire. The political importance of Herat arises from the fact that it is the strategic centre of the entire country situated between the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and the Jaxartes on the west and north, and the Indus on the east, so that in the event of a great struggle between England and Russia for supremacy in Asia – a struggle whose sudden outbreak the English invasion of Persia may bring about – Herat will constitute the main objective of the contest and probably the theatre of the first great military operations.

That the importance attributed to Herat is not unfounded must be obvious to anyone who understands its geographical position. The interior of Persia is formed by a high plateau, surrounded on all sides by mountain chains which afford no outlet to the waters that flow down into the plain. These waters are not considerable enough to form one or several central lakes; they either lose themselves in vast swamps or gradually seep away in the dry sand of the great desert which fills the by far largest part of the Persian plateau and forms an almost insurmountable barrier between Western and North-Eastern Persia. The northern boundary of this desert is formed by the mountains of Khorassan, which extend almost exactly in an easterly direction from the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea and form the connecting link between the Elburz and the Hindu Kush; and precisely there, where these mountains send off a spur to the south, separating the Persian desert from the better-watered regions of Afghanistan, lies Herat, surrounded and supplied by a valley of considerable extent and luxuriant fertility. North of the Khorassan mountains we find a desert, similar to the one at their southern foot. Here, too, mighty rivers, like the Murghab, lose themselves in the sand. But the Oxus and the Jaxartes are so mighty that they traverse it and, in their lower course, form extensive valleys which can be cultivated. Beyond the Jaxartes, the desert gradually assumes the character of the steppes of Southern Russia, in which it finally loses itself completely. Thus we have three distinct areas of a relative civilisation extending between the Caspian Sea and British India. Firstly, the cities of Western Persia: Shiraz, Shuster, Tehran, and Isfahan. Secondly, the Afghan cities: Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar. Thirdly, the cities of Turan: Khiva, Bukhara, Balkh, and Samarkand. Between all these there is considerable intercourse, and the centre of this entire intercourse is necessarily Herat. The roads leading from the Caspian Sea to the Indus and from the Persian Gulf to the Oxus all meet in this city. Herat lies halfway between Kabul and Tehran, between Shiraz and Balkh. The chain of oases marking the great caravan route across the Persian desert via Yezd and Kohistan leads in a straight line to Herat, and on the other hand, the only road leading from west to east across Central Asia and avoiding the desert is the one over the Khorassan mountains and through Herat.

Thus Herat is a point which, in the hands of a strong power, can be used for the domination both of Iran and of Turan – of Persia as well as of Transoxiana. It gives its possessor, in the very highest degree, all the advantages of a central position, from which radiating attacks can be made in all directions with greater ease and prospect of success than from any other city in Iran or in Turan. At the same time, the difficulties of communication between any two of the cities Astrabad, Khiva, Bukhara, Balkh, Kabul, and Kandahar are so great that a combined attack on Herat, even by all of them, would have but little prospect of success. The different columns, if marching on Herat, would have scarcely any possibility of communication with one another and could be ambushed and beaten one after the other by an able general in Herat. Nevertheless, in such a case, columns coming from Kandahar, Kabul, and Balkh would certainly have better prospects than an attack made concentrically from the starting points of Astrabad, Khiva, and Bukhara, for the attack from Afghanistan would be carried from the mountains down into the plain and would entirely avoid the desert, while in an attack from the Caspian Sea and the Araxes, only one column (the one from Astrabad) would avoid the desert, while all the others would have to cross it and thereby entirely lose their communications with one another.

The three centres of civilisation, which have their common centre in Herat, form three distinct groups of states. In the west lies Persia, which has been turned into a vassal of Russia by the Treaty of Turcomanshai. In the east lie the states of Afghanistan and Beluchistan, whose most considerable communities, Kabul and Kandahar, may for the time being be equated with the vassal states of the Anglo-Indian Empire. In the north lie the Khanates of Turan, Khiva, and Bukhara, states which are nominally neutral, but in the event of a conflict will almost certainly join the winning party. The present dependence of Persia on Russia and of Afghanistan on the English is proved by the fact that the Russians have already sent troops to Persia and the English troops to Kabul.

The Russians possess the entire western and eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. Baku and Astrakhan, which lie 350 and 750 miles respectively from Astrabad, offer two excellent places for the establishment of magazines and the concentration of reserves. As the Russian fleet commands the Caspian Sea, the necessary supplies and reinforcements can be conveyed to Astrabad with great ease. The places on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, from which the roads to the Aral Sea start, are commanded by Russian forts. Further to the north and east, the chain of Russian forts marking the frontier line of the Ural Cossacks had already, in 1847, been advanced from the Ural river to the rivers Emba and Turgai, about 150 to 200 miles into the territory of the tributary Kirghiz hordes, and in the direction of the Aral Sea. Since then, forts have actually been erected on the shores of this sea, which, like the river Jaxartes, is at this moment ploughed by Russian steamers. There have even been rumours of an occupation of Khiva by Russian troops, but these rumours are at least premature.

The course of operations which the Russians must follow in any serious attack on Central or Southern Asia is dictated by nature itself. A march overland from the Caucasus around the south-western corner of the Caspian Sea would encounter great obstacles in the shape of the mountains of Northern Persia, and the invading army would have to cover over 1,100 miles before its main objective, Herat, would be reached. A land march from Orenburg in the direction of Herat would have to cross not only the desert in which Perovski lost his army on his expedition to Khiva, but two further deserts that are equally inhospitable. The distance from Orenburg to Herat is 1,500 miles as the crow flies, and Orenburg is the nearest place which the Russians could take as a base of operations if they advanced from that direction. Now, both Russian Armenia and Orenburg are territories almost completely cut off from the centre of Russian power, the former by the Caucasus, the latter by the steppes. To concentrate in either of them the matériel and the men needed for the conquest of Central Asia is entirely out of the question. There remains only one line – that across the Caspian Sea, with Astrakhan and Baku as bases, with Astrabad on the south-eastern coast of the Caspian Sea as a point of observation, and with a marching distance of only 500 miles to Herat. And this line combines all the advantages that Russia could wish for. Astrakhan is for the Volga what New Orleans is for the Mississippi. Situated at the mouth of the greatest river of Russia, whose upper basin actually forms Great Russia, the centre of the empire, Astrakhan possesses every facility for forwarding soldiers and supplies to organise a great expedition. The opposite coast of the Caspian Sea at Astrabad can be reached in four days by steamers, in eight days by sailing ships. The Caspian Sea is indisputably a Russian water, and Astrabad, which has now been placed at Russia’s disposal by the Shah of Persia, lies at the starting point of that sole road from the west to Herat which entirely avoids the desert, as it runs through the Khorassan mountains.

Accordingly, the Russian government is acting. The main column, destined to advance against Herat in the event of further complications, is concentrating at Astrabad. Then there are two flank columns, whose cooperation with the main group is, however, fundamentally problematic and which therefore each have an independent objective. The light column concentrating at Tabriz is to protect the western frontier of Persia against hostile movements by the Turks and eventually to march on Hamadan and Shuster, where it secures the capital Tehran both against Turkey and against the English troops landing in the Persian Gulf at Bushire. The left column, setting out from Orenburg and very probably to receive reinforcements sent from Astrakhan to the western coast of the Caspian Sea, will have the task of securing the Aral region, marching on Khiva, Bukhara, and Samarkand, to ensure either the passivity or the support of these states, and, if possible, by a march up the Oxus to Balkh, to threaten the flank and the rear of the English at Kabul or near Herat. We know that all these columns are already on the march, and that the central and the right column are already at Astrabad and Tabriz. Of the advance of the right column we shall probably hear nothing for some time.

The base of operations of the English is the territory of the upper Indus, and their magazines must be established at Peshawar. From here they have already set a column in march towards Kabul; this city is four hundred miles as the crow flies from Herat. But in a serious war they would have to conquer, besides Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar, also the mountain forts guarding the Afghan passes. In this they will encounter scarcely more difficulties than the Russians in the taking of Astrabad, for they apparently support the Afghans against a Persian invasion.

The march from Kabul to Herat will present no insurmountable difficulties. Special flanking columns will not be required, for none of the Russian flanking columns will be in a position to approach, and should the Orenburg column, after a few campaigns, break out from Bokhara in the direction of Balkh, a strong reserve in Kabul would soon prove its worth. The English have the advantage that their line of operation is comparatively short, for although Herat lies exactly halfway between Calcutta and Moscow, the English base at the confluence of the Kabul and the Indus is only 600 miles from Herat, while the Russian base at Astrakhan is 1,250 miles away. The English at Kabul have, with regard to Herat, a hundred miles' advantage over the Russians at Astrabad, and as far as the terrain is known, they march through a better cultivated and more populated district and on better roads than the Russians can find in Khorassan. As regards the two armies, that of the English is undoubtedly the better for enduring the climate. Their European regiments would unquestionably fight with the same unshakeable steadfastness as their comrades at Inkerman, and the sepoy infantry is on no account to be despised. Sir Charles Napier, who saw them in many battles, had the highest opinion of them, and he was, every inch, a soldier and a general. The regular Indian cavalry is not worth much, but the irregulars are excellent and, under their European officers, decidedly to be preferred to the Cossacks.

Any further speculation about the prospects of such a war is, of course, completely useless. There is no possibility of estimating the forces that might be set in motion on one side or the other. It is not possible to foresee all the contingencies that may arise when events as momentous as those now seeming to approach take place. One thing alone is certain: that the armies that decide the struggle at Herat, the pivot, will, on account of the immense distances each party has to traverse, be comparatively small. Much will also depend on diplomatic intrigues and bribery at the courts of the various potentates grouped around Herat. It is almost certain that the Russians will fare best in these matters. Their diplomacy is better and more Oriental; they know how to be lavish with money when it is required, and, above all, they have a friend in the enemy's camp. The British expedition in the Persian Gulf is only a diversion capable of drawing a considerable part of the Persian army upon itself, but can achieve little in its direct results. Even if the 5,000 men now at Bushire were tripled, they could only march, at the utmost, as far as Shiraz and there halt. But this expedition is not intended to do more. If it gives the Persian government an idea of the vulnerability of the country from the seaward side, it will have attained its object. It would be absurd to expect more. The line on which the fate of all Iran and Turan must really be decided runs from Astrabad to Peshawar, and the decisive point on this line is Herat.