Some time ago, when a question respecting the Persian war was 
addressed to Lord Palmerston in his own House of Commons, he 
tauntingly replied: “As soon as the peace is ratified the House may © 
express its opinions on the war.”* The treaty of peace signed at 
Paris, March 4, 1857, and ratified at Bagdad, May 2, 1857, has 
now been laid before the House. It consists of fifteen Articles, 
eight of them being freighted. with the usual treaty-of-peace 
ballast. Article V. stipulates that the Persian troops are to 
withdraw from the territory and city of Herat, and from every 
part of Affghanistan, within three months, from the date of the 
exchange of the ratifications of the treaty. By Art. XIV. the British 
Government, on its part, engages, So soon as the above stipulation 
be carried into effect, “to withdraw without delay the British 
troops from all ports, places and islands belonging to Persia.” » 

Now it should be recollected that the evacuation of Herat by the 
Persian troops was spontaneously offered by Feroukh Khan, the 
Persian Embassador, during his protracted conferences at Con- 
stantinople with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and before the 
capture of Bushire had yet occurred. The only new profit 
accruing to England from this stipulation is, therefore, limited to 
the privilege of enchaining, during the most unhealthy season, her 
troops to the most pestilential spot of the Persian Empire. The 

4 Palmerston’s speech in the House of Commons on May 18, 1857, The Times, 
No. 22684, May 19, 1857.— Ed. 

Persia”, The Times, No. 22704, June 11, 1857.— Ed. 

terrible ravages the sun and swamps and the sea inflict during the 
summer months, even on the native population of Bushire and 
Mohammerah, are chronicled by old and modern writers; but why 
refer to them, since a few weeks ago, Sir Henry Rawlinson, a very 
competent judge, and a Palmerstonian too, publicly declared that 
the Anglo-Indian troops were sure to sink under the horrors of 
the climate?* The London Times, on receiving the news of the 
Mohammerah victory, proclaimed at once the necessity of advanc- 
ing despite the treaty of peace to Shiraz, in order to save the 

troops.” The suicides, too, of the British Admiral and General,‘ 
' placed at the head of the expedition, were due to their profound 
anxiety as to the probable fate of the troops, whom, by 
Governmental instruction, they were not to push beyond Moham- 
merah. A Crimean catastrophe on a smaller scale may thus be 
safely expected; this time proceeding neither from the necessities 
of war, nor from the blunders of the Administration, but from a 
treaty written with the sword of the victor. There occurs one 
phrase in the articles quoted which, if it suit Palmerston, may be 
worked into “a small bone of contention.” 

Art. XIV. stipulates the “withdrawal of the British troops from 
all ports, places and islands belonging to Persia.’ Now it is a 
controversial matter whether or not the town of Mohammerah 
does belong to Persia. The Turks have never renounced their 
claims to that place, which, situated on the Delta of the Euphrates, 
was their only seaport on that river always accessible, the port of 
Bassora, being at certain seasons too shallow for ships of large 
burden. Thus, if Palmerston pleases, he may hold Mohammerah 
on the pretext of its not “belonging” to Persia, and of waiting for 
the final settlement of the boundary question between Turkey and 
Persia. 

Art. VI. stipulates that Persia agrees to 

“relinquish all claims to sovereignty over the territory and city of Herat and the 
countries of Affghanistan;” to “abstain from all interference with the internal 
affairs of Affghanistan;” to “recognize the independence of Herat and the whole 
of Affghanistan, and never to attempt to interfere with the independence of those 
States;” to refer, in case of differences with Herat and Affghanistan, “for 
adjustment to the friendly offices of the British Government, and not to take up 
arms unless these friendly offices fail of effect.” 

May 11, 1857, The Times, No. 22679, May 13, 1857.— Ed. 

b The Times, No. 22681, May 15, 1857, leading article.— Ed. 

The British Government, on their part, engage 

“at all times to exert their influence with the States of Affghanistan to prevent 
any causes of umbrage being given by them,” and “to use their best endeavors to 
compose differences in a manner just and honorable to Persia.” 

Now, if this article is stripped of its red tape, it means nothing 
beyond the acknowledgment by Persia of the independence of 
Herat, a concession to make which Feroukh Khan had declared 
himself ready at the Constantinople conferences. It is true that, by 
virtue of this-article, the British Government is appointed the 
official intermeddler between Persia and Affghanistan, but that 
part it was, since the commencement of this century, always acting. 
Whether it be able or not to continue it, is a question, not of right, 
but of might. Besides if the Shah* harbors at the Court of 
Teheran any Hugo Grotius, the latter will point out that any 
stipulation by which an independent State gives a_ foreign 
Government the right of interfering with its international relations 
is null and void according to the jus gentium,” and that the 
stipulation with England is the more so, since it converts 
Affghanistan, a merely poetical term for various tribes and States, 
into a real country. The country of Affghanistan exists, in a 
diplomatic sense, no more than the country of Panslavia. 

Art. VII., which stipulates that, in case of any violation of the 
Persian frontier by the Affghan States, 

“the Persian Government shall have the right [...] to undertake military 
operations for the repression and punishment of the aggressors,” but “must retire 
within its own territory so soon as its object is accomplished,” 

is but a literal repetition of just that clause of the treaty of 1852° 

which gave the immediate occasion for the Bushire expedition. 
--By Art. IX. Persia admits the establishment and recognition of 
British Consul-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular 
Agents, to be placed on the footing of the most favorite nation; 
but by Art. XII. the British Government renounces 

“the right of protecting hereafter any Persian subject not actually in the 
employment of the British mission or of British Consuls-General, Consuls, 
Vice-Consuls and Consular Agents.” 

The establishment of British Consulates in Persia being agreed 
to by Feroukh Khan before the commencement of the war, the 

present treaty adds only the renunciation, on the part of England, 
of her right of protectorate over Persian su bjects, which right 
formed one of the ostensible causes of the war. Austria, France 
and other States ‘have obtained the establishment of Consulates in 
Persia without recurring to any piratical expeditions. 

Lastly, the treaty forces Mr. Murray back on the Court of 
Teheran, and prescribes the apology to be made to that 
gentleman, for being characterized in a letter addressed to Sadir 
Azim* by the Shah, as a “stupid, ignorant and insane man,” as a 
“simpleton,” and as the author of a “rude, unmeaning and 
disgusting document.”” The apology to be made to Mr. Murray 
was likewise offered by Feroukh Khan, but then declined by the 
British Government, who insisted upon the dismissal of Sadir 
Azim, and Mr. Murray’s solemn entry into Teheran “to the sound 
of cornet, flute, harp, sackbut, psaltery, dulcimer, and all manner 
of music.”© By accepting, as Consul-General in Egypt, personal 
favors from Mons, Barrot; by sending, on his first landing at 
Bushire, the tobacco then presented to him in the Shah’s name to 
the bazaars, there to be publicly sold; by acting the knight-errant 
of a Persian lady of dubious virtue, Mr. Murray has failed to 
impress on the Oriental mind very high notions of British integrity 
or dignity. His forced readmission at the Persian Court must, 
therefore, be considered a rather questionable success. On the 
whole, the treaty contains, beyond the offers Feroukh Khan made 
before the outbreak of the war, no stipulations worth the paper 
they are written upon, and still less the treasure spent and the 
blood shed. The clear profits of the Persian expedition may be 
summed up in the odium incurred by Great Britain throughout 
Central Asia; the disaffection of India, increased by the withdraw- 
al of Indian troops, and the new burdens thrown on the Indian 
Exchequer; the almost inevitable recurrence of another Crimean 
catastrophe; the acknowledgment of Bonaparte’s official mediation 
between England and Asiatic States; lastly, the acquisition by 
Russia of two strips of land of great importance—the one on the 
Caspian, the other on the north-coast frontier of Persia. 

Written on June 12, 1857 oe Reproduced froin the newspaper 

Daily Tribune, No. 5048, June 24, 1857