New-York Daily Tribune.
Nr. 4598, 14. Januar 1856

The European war has evolved another anomalous piece of treaty-making. Sardinia, seized by England and France with diplomatic gentleness rivaling the gymnastics of the hog-killers in Cincinnati, of late so graphically described in our
columns is first thrown into the boiling cauldron of war's toil and trouble; and
now, to continue the porcine metaphor, Sweden is caught by the hind-leg by the
same political butchers. It is difficult, however, at this time, before we have the
details and antecedents of the negotiation, to find out the real meaning of the
treaty just made by the Allies and the latter Power. It is called a defensive treaty,
but no statement of reasons for its adoption accompanies it, according to custom
in such matters. We do not indeed call to mind any treaty patched up under
similar circumstances. No encroachment whatever on the side of Russia is known
to have incited it, or is at all mentioned. No complaint on the Swedish side has
been made public. On the contrary, Sweden, or at least King Oscar, has uniformly declared that Russia has given him no cause to complain. This declaration is
quite credible, for it would be madness for the Czar to deal otherwise than most
tenderly with a neighbor, under such circumstances as the present.
By this treaty, neutrality is not altogether and openly abandoned, but Sweden
puts herself under cover of the Allies, renouncing even her own decision and right
of action. The principal point, however, relates to fisheries and pasturages, which
henceforth Sweden is bound not to concede to Russia without French and English permission; and the same qualification extends to concessions of Swedish
territory if required by Russia. It might be inferred from this that the Czar had
made demands for such concessions; but this may be doubted, as his head and
hands are full of other matters than those afforded by granite rocks in the polar
region. The Emperor Nicholas may have wished to possess a station for the
Russian military and commercial vessels in some of the harbors of Norway that
do not freeze, in order thus to facilitate the communications between the harbors
of the Baltic and the White Seas. Such a wish could only have been realized by
friendly negotiation, and could not be pregnant with the danger of invasion. As
to the right of fishing along the shores, that question was settled in its most

minute details forty-five years ago by the convention of Tornea concluded in
1810. This regulated the frontiers and the rights of subjects dwelling on seashores, islands, river-banks, and lands separating Sweden and Finland, which
had been acquired by Russia through the Fredrikshamn treaty of 1809, after a
disastrous war to which Sweden was incited by England. If border warfare has
taken place since that period, if pasturages have been invaded, it could only have
been a family broil, as the Imperial Government does not possess any domains in
that quarter. Along the banks of the River Tornea, north of the city of that name,
dwell only Finnish populations, on the Swedish equally with the Russian side;
and it is difficult to imagine that the encroachment on private lands by friendly
and homogeneous inhabitants could menace the integrity of Sweden, or cause her
to take refuge under the falcon wing of France and England.

As it stands now, this treaty is either an insult to Russia, or will soon be so
considered. The secret article said to be annexed to it, is doubtless its principal
feature. Its published articles seem rather to provoke a quarrel surreptitiously
than to exhibit the manliness of doing it openly. If so, it is not a commendable
thing. If Sweden desired to profit by the entanglements of Russia, and to recover
her lost possessions, she should have joined the alliance and boldly declared war.
However, if the war continues and Sweden takes part in it, she may recover her
Finnish possessions; but should it be soon concluded, then this minatory treaty
will probably rankle in the heart of the stronger Power, which seldom forgets or
forgives injuries.

Moreover, the course formerly taken by Sweden at the instigation of England,
proved fatal to the Vasas and to the country itself. In 1809 England allured
Gustavus IV., by a subsidy of $7,000,000, to declare war against Russia. England
then abandoned her ally, or at least did not succor her. Russia, then an ally of
Napoleon, being provoked by the Anglo-Swedish alliance, invaded and conquered Finland, and Gustavus was obliged by the nation to descend from the throne,
after which his old uncle Charles took the crown, and subsequently Bernadotte
was elected King, and the Vasas became exiles. Not that under present circumstances we would forebode a like calamity for Sweden, but the actual war does
not yet menace the fall of Russia, and such a neighbor can in the long run render
Sweden very uncomfortable. Russia may now quietly swallow this treaty; but
with her hereditary tenacity of purpose she may bide her time, and when Sweden
has lost her present alliance, and France and England least think it likely, she
may glut her revengeful stomach. For nearly a hundred and eighty years previous
to the year 1794 the Russian people nourished their hatred against the Poles for
their occupation of Moscow in 1612. Now Poland is nationally extinct.