Written in late March and April 1856 Reproduced from the newspaper 

205, 206, 207 and 208, April 5, 12, 19 
and 26, 1856 

Signed: Karl Marx 

623 

[The People’s Paper, No. 205, April 5, 1856] 

The fall of Kars is the turning-point in the history of the 
sham-war against Russia. Without the fall of Kars no Five Points, 
no Conferences, no treaty of Paris, in one word: no sham peace.*”’ 
Then if we can prove from the Government’s own Blue 
Book *— carefully cooked, as it is mutilated by extracts, deformed 
by omissions, plastered and patched up by falsifications—that 
Lord Palmerston’s cabinet has planned from the beginning, and 
systematically carried out to the end, the fall of Kars, the veil is 
lifted and the drama of the Oriental War with all its startling 
incidents emerges from the mist diplomatically wrapt around it. 

Towards the end of May, 1855, General Williams reports to 
Lord Redcliffe, who reports to Lord Clarendon, that 

“a large force, consisting of 28,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 64 pieces of 
artillery, was assembled round Gumri, and that the Mushir” had _ received 
information of the intention of the enemy to attack Kars. We have in that 

entrenched camp 13,900 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 1,500 artillerymen and 42 field 
pieces.” 

Seven days later, on June 3rd, Williams informed Clarendon: 

“I have now four months provisions in the garrison of Kars, and I trust the 
central government, and the allies, will soon prove to this remnant of an army that 
it is not absolutely forgotten by them.” 

This despatch (see Kars papers, No. 231) was received in 
Downing-street,© on June 25th. On that day, consequently, the 

* Papers Relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey, and the Defence and 
Capitulation of Kars, London, 1856. Documents from this book are quoted 
below.— Ed. 

 Vassif Pasha.— Ed. . 
“10 Downing Street is the official residence of the British Prime 

Minister.— Ed. 

624 Kar] Marx 

British government knew that on Oct. 3rd, Kars must fall if not 
relieved; and this knowledge became the basis of its operations. 

On July llth, Lord Clarendon receives three despatches from 
General Williams, dated June 15th, 17th, and 19th, stating 
severally that a skirmish of the advanced posts had taken place; 
that on the 16th of June a regular attack of the entrenched camp 
by the Russians had been gallantly repulsed by the Turks, and 
lastly that the enemy had made a flank march upon _ the 
entrenched camp, and established himself in force (30,000) within 
an hour’s march of the weakest point of the Turkish position. 
Williams concludes the last of these despatches with the following 
words: 

“Unfortunately we have no irregular cavalry. ... "The enemy has already partially 
interrupted our communications with Erzeroum.” 

When the same news reached Constantinople, Lord Redcliffe 
was invited to a Conference at the Grand Vizier’s* house on the 
Bosphorus. It was proposed by the Turkish ministers to relieve 
Kars by an expedition from Redout Kaleh by Kutais into Georgia, 
the force to consist of — 

Vidal § (COnUNBENT wanes ounewhar aacvaunderacssead thats: 20,000 
BOatsGi'S i sie csccodenvateeg sess ssa ded Duaaicen di sesaerstebhveks doen 3,000 
PeACOU yi Cr at PISO sy, rees recused aisle Aaceereh tee bvasn te eeatecn 12,000 
Albanians. core ttosaSiicatar teadescoris ive nee eee ee 2,000 
PEON PY DE ATTA c's ord nace ecnavet ge Tanisha sed thas Va derestiaatian 5,000 
Egyptian Reeilar Cavalry vcsccttsuacvevssccdssatgteaidapasnats 800 
TRS OFS osaiGe dred bar ces sana utente Miah tt creas 600 

WOtaleasd eretastsbadend nts ove cs 43,400 

The Porte expressed its readiness to entrust the direction of this 
expedition to a British commander, and to accept General Vivian 
in that capacity. This proposition reached Lord Clarendon on July 
lith. On July 12th, Lord Redcliffe further informed him by 
telegraph that 

“Preparations for an eventual expedition [...] are in progress. It might save 
much valuable time if you would inform me at once by telegraph whether 

government is prepared to sanction a powerful diversion by Redout Kaleh and 
Kutais into Georgia.” 

From June 25th to July 12th the British government, apprised 
of the danger of Kars, moved not a finger to come to the rescue, 

“ Ali Mehemet Pasha.— Ed. 

The Fall of Kars 625 

not once was the telegraph set in motion; from the very day, 
however, when there is some Turkish plan for the relief of Kars to 
be thwarted, they suddenly are all activity. On July 13th (see No. 
248 of Kars papers) Clarendon addresses a despatch to Redcliffe 
to this effect: 

“Her Majesty's government are of opinion that the wiser course would be to 
send reinforcements to the rear of the Turkish army, instead of sending an 
expedition to the rear of the Russian army. The reinforcements might go to 
Trebizond, and be directed from thence upon Erzeroum. The distance from 
Trebizond to Erzeroum is less than from Redout Kaleh to Tiflis, and the march is 
through a friendly instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzeroum the army 
would meet supporting friends instead of opposing enemies, and supplies instead 
of famine. If the army at Kars cannot maintain that position against the Russians, it 
should fall back upon Erzeroum, and the whole Turkish force should be 
concentrated there. If the Russians are to be defeated, it will be easier to defeat 
them by the whole force collected than by divided portions of that force; and a 
defeat would be the more decisive, the further it took place within the Turkish 
fronter.” 

On the day following the receipt of Redcliffe’s telegraphic 
despatch, Clarendon becomes still more liberal, adding Erzeroum 
also to the list of places to be fallen back from. 

(Telegraphic.) 

“The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 
Foreign Office, July 14th, 1855. 
“The plan for reinforcing the army at Kars contained in your despatches of 
30th June, and Ist instant (should be the 12th inst.) is disapproved. The reasons will 
be sent by the messenger to-day against employing the Turkish Contingent until it 
is fit for service. Trebizond ought to be the base of operations, and if the Turkish 
army of Kars and Erzeroum cannot hold out at the latter place against the 
Russians, it might fall back upon Trebizond where it would easily be reinforced.” 

If Kars is the key to Erzeroum, Erzeroum is the key to 
Constantinople, and the central point of the strategical and 
commercial lines of Anatolia. Kars and Erzeroum once in the 
hands of Russia, the British land-trade, via Trebizond to Persia, is 
cut off. The British Government, aware of all these circumstances, 
coolly advises the Porte to surrender the keys of its house in Asia, 
when scarcely one of the two was in danger, and invites the 
besieged army of Kars to come to the reinforcements forbidden to 
come to the besieged army. “If,” says his lordship, “the Russians 
are to be defeated” (where is the necessity? he seems to ask) he 
thinks a defeat would be the more decisive and easy the further it 
took place within the Turkish frontier, ie., the more strong places 
and territory are surrendered to the Russians, and, in fact, the 
nearer behind Constantinople. 

These despatches of Lord Clarendon are worthily backed by the 

following despatch from my lord “Take care of Dowb” Pan- 

mure,*” the English Carnot, to Lieutenant-General Vivian: — 

“Lord Panmure, to Lieut.-General Vivian, 
‘“War-Department, July 14, 1855. 

“Sir,—I transmit, herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which the 
Earl of Clarendon has addressed by the present opportunity to her Majesty’s 
embassy at Constantinople, on the subject of the plan proposed by the Porte for 
the relief of the Turkish army at Kars, and I have to acquaint you that IJ entirely 
concur in all that is said in that despatch as to the objectionable character of the 
plan proposed by the Porte. I place such full reliance on your professional ability, 
that I feel no anxiety lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild 
and undigested as that contemplated by the Porte. Whilst it is your duty to give 
every aid in your power, not simply as commanding the Contingent, but, as a 
British officer enjoying the confidence of her Majesty’s Government, to our allies 
the Turks, it is at the same time necessary that you should be cautious in not 
risking the honour of the British name and your own reputation, by undertaking 
military operations for which proper basis has not been laid down, communications 
opened, supplies arranged, and transportation provided. A coup de main by means 
of suddenly throwing an army on the coast to threaten, or even to attack, an 
enemy’s stronghold is one thing; but a deliberate expedition to invade an enemy’s 
country, and on his own territory, to make war upon him, is quite another. In the 
first case something may be hazarded; but in the other every preparation must 
precede action. Moreover, from all the information which has reached me, I have 
every reason to believe the army of Batoum to be in a deplorable state. I know the 
Contingent to be scarcely organised; of the Bulgarian troops you have no 
knowledge, and I presume that Beatson horse are as little reduced to control and 
discipline as your own troops. In short I am assured that it would be madness to 
attempt to succour Brigadier-General Williams in this way. It is too late to regret 
the policy which has left that gallant officer and his army exposed to such straits; 
but it would only be opening the way to fresh failures to follow out such schemes 
as have been proposed for the purpose of relieving him. You must, as I have no 
doubt you feel, lose no time in getting your force into order for service which will 
be sure to await you somewhere, as soon as you are ready for it; but organisation is 
as necessary for an army as endurance and valour, and without the former, the 
latter qualities are utterly unavailing.” 

This despatch puts down Lord Palmerston’s war minister a 
regular clown, useful only for the amusement of his master. To 
threaten, “or even” to attack, the stronghold of Sebastopol, where 
Russia had accumulated the defensive labour of twenty years, 
appears to him one thing very sensible, because it was a needless 
coup de main on the part of the allies; but a “deliberate invasion” 
on the part of the Porte, of an enemy’s country with the purpose 
of beating him—“Dowb” never heard of such a thing. He entirely 
concurs with Clarendon in opinion that, to strengthen the rear of 
one’s own army, instead of acting in the rear of the enemy, is the 
true essence of strategy—a point we may leave him to settle with 

The Fall of Kars 627 

Napoleon I, Jomini, and all other great strategists. He also concurs 
with his friend in thinking, that in warfare an army must never 
march through hostile, but always through friendly countries— 
“with supplies instead of famine’’—the true philosophy of the 
trencher-knife. But through the complacent silliness of the clown 
we catch a glimpse of the mind that moves him! or could it be 
given to poor Dowb, to make the discovery that Georgia was a 
hostile, instead of a friendly country—Georgia, Russia’s Poland in 
the Caucasus. 

The Turkish proposal which Dowb styles wild and ill-digested, 
was, in its general conception, bold, correct, we may say the only 
strategical idea given birth to in the whole war. It reduced itself 
to taking up an eccentric position with respect to the besieging 
army, to menace Tiflis, the centre of the Russian power in Asia, 
and to force Muravieff to retreat from Kars by the threat of 
becoming cut off from his basis of operations and line of 
communications. Such a Mingrelian expedition bade fair not only 
to relieve Kars, but to afford the opportunity of advancing 
offensively on all parts, and thus to gain the greatest point in all 
warfare—viz., to throw the enemy on the defensive. But the 
danger being urgent, such a plan, to result in success, required to 
be pushed on vigorously, with a sufficient force, and abundant 
means of supply and transport. Having in his immediate rear 
Gumri, as his first base of operations, a fortress directly calculated 
for the defensive against the Turkish territory, Muravieff was 
enabled to keep his position, till convinced of an advance upon 
Tiflis really becoming dangerous. To assume that character there 
was required a descent on the Circassian Coast of at least 55,000, 
the capture of Kutais, and the forcing of the pass of Gori. Omer 
Pasha, who, at a later period, undertook the same expedition at 
the head of 36,000 men, mustered on the Rioni hardly 18,000 to 
20,000. 

There can exist no doubt that an army of 20,000 men at 
Erzeroum would have been more useful than one of only 40,006 
in Mingrelia. On the other hand it should not be forgotten that at 
the time when the Porte made its proposal, the Russians at Tiflis, 
according to the Blue Book itself, amounted to only 15,000 men, 
and Bebutoff with his reinforcements had not yet arrived. 
Besides, the movement of an army sufficiently large for its 
purposes from Trebizond to Erzeroum, and thence to Kars, with 
supplies, ammunition, and guns, would have cost, on Omer 
Pasha’s assurance, exactly four months. Lastly, if the Porte 
proposed a right plan, with insufficient means, it was the part of 

its ally to provide the right means, and not to suggest a false plan. 
Sixty-thousand Turks were at that time pent up in the Crimea, in 
inactivity—and those the only effective troops of Turkey. 

“At Batoum, Sukum Kaleh, and other neighbouring stations on the coast,” 
writes Lord Redcliffe, under date 28th June, “it would be extremely difficult to 
muster more than 11,000 men.... The other parts of the empire (Bulgaria 
excepted), afford no additional reserves, with the exception of Bosnia, where it is 
still possible that a few thousand men might be detached; I speak of regulars, 
Bashi-bazouks may be procured, but your lordship knows what little dependency is 
to be placed on such undisciplined hordes....In Bulgaria I question the existence of 
more than 50,000 men, including garrisons.{...] Austria, it is true, has declared her 
intention of considering the passage of the Danube by Russia a casus belliand she 
also stands pledged to the exclusion of that power from the Danubian 
Principalities; but the resolution which in such an emergency would enable the 
Porte to take its line upon those assurances, and to overlook the awkwardness of 
leaving an important position inadequately defended is more fit to be admired than 
likely to be embraced.” 

What troops, then, remained at the disposal of the Porte, save 
the Anglo-Turkish Contingent? and this, as results from the 
despatches of Clarendon and Panmure, was only a contrivance to 
withhold from the Porte its last available force. 

But did the British Government oppose any plan of theirs to the 
Turkish one? Was it in any way bent on sending the Anglo- 
Turkish Contingent to Trebizond, and thence to Erzeroum or 
Kars? In his despatch dated July 14th, Clarendon declares himself 
“against employing the Turkish Contingent until it is fit for 
service.” If unfit for service, it was as unfit for the Erzeroum 
expedition as for the Mingrelian one. Clown Panmure, in. his 
despatch of the same day, writes to Vivian, the commander of the 
Contingent: — “You must lose no time in getting your force into 
order for service, which will be sure to await you somewhere, as 
soon as you are ready for it”—thus summoning him to be ready 
not for an immediate service, not for Erzeroum, but somewhere— 
that is, nowhere. Still, on Sept. 7th (see No. 302 of Papers), 
Clarendon considers the Anglo-Turkish Contingent so _ little 
organised as to be unfit to encamp in the entrenched lines before 
Sebastopol. It is thus evident that the British Government brings 
forth the Erzeroum plan, not to execute it, but to thwart the 
Mingrelian expedition of the Porte. It was not opposed to a 
certain plan for the relief of Kars, but to any plan. “It would be 
madness to attempt to succour the army of Brigadier-General 
Williams.... It is too late to regret the policy”(Palmerston’s policy) 
“which has left that gallant officer and his army exposed to such 
straits,” said Panmure to Vivian. It is too late to do anything but 

The Fall of Kars 629 

surrender Kars to Russia, and Erzeroum into the bargain, says 
Clarendon to Redcliffe. Not only was this plan settled by the 
Palmerstonian Government as early as July 13th, but it is 
confessed in the Blue Book, and not a moment shall we see them 
swerving from it. 

From No. 254 to 277 of the Kars Papers every despatch of 
Redcliffe during July exhibits the Porte busily engaged in the 
preparations for Vivian’s Mingrelian expedition. How came this to 
pass? 

On the 12th July, 1855, as will be remembered, Lord Redcliffe 
telegraphed to the Earl of Clarendon that the preparations for the 
Mingrelian expedition, under General Vivian were in progress, 
and “to save much valuable time,” he applied for Government 
instructions to be sent by telegraph. Consequently, by telegraph, 
Clarendon despatches his protest against the Turkish plan, but, 
although this message bears the inscription of July 14th on its 
front, it does not reach Constantinople ull July 30th, when we find 
Lord Redcliffe writing again to Clarendon:— ~ 

The unfavourable judgment passed by Her Majesty’s Government on the plans 
which have lately been under discussion, with a view to the relief of the Sultan’s* 
army at Kars, has naturally increased the Porte’s embarrassment. It was my duty to 
make it known to the Turkish Ministers, not only as an opinion, but, with respect 
to General Vivian’s Contingent, as a veto. A most serious dilemma is the immediate 
result. Her Majesty’s Government not only withhold the Contingent, but express a 
decided preference for the alternative of sending reinforcements to Erzeroum by 
way of Trebizond. This opinion is not adopted by the Porte, or indeed by any 
official or personal authority here. The Seraskier, Omer Pasha, General Guyon, 
and our own officers,[...] agree with the Porte, and the French Embassy, in preferring 
a diversion on the side of Redout Kaleh, as offering better chances of success, 
supposing, of course, the necessary means of transport, supply, and other 
indispensable wants, can be sufficiently provided.... Meanwhile, the advices from Kars 
are not encouraging, and time of precious value is unavoidably wasted in doubt and 
uncertainty. 

The way from Constantinople to London being not a whit 
longer than the way from London to Constantinople, it is a very 
curious fact indeed that Redcliffe’s telegraphic despatch, leaving 
Constantinople on July 12th, should reach London on the 14th of 
that month, while Lord Clarendon’s despatch, leaving London on 
July 14th, should reach Constantinople only on the 30th, or about 
that date. Redcliffe, in his despatch of July 19th, complains of the 
silence of the Government whom he had entreated “to lose no 
time in making known its pleasure.” From a later despatch, dated 

* Abdul Mejid.— Ed. 
> Rushdi Pasha. “Seraskier” means “War Minister” .— Ed. 

630 Kar] Marx 

July 23rd, we learn that he had received no answer even then. In 
fact, the receipt of the answer is not acknowledged, as we have 
said, before the 30th. There can exist, then, no doubt that the 
London date of the Clarendon despatch is false, and that it was not 
sent until weeks after the date given in the Blue Book. This 
falsification betrays the aim of the delay. Time of precious value 
was to be wasted, doubt and uncertainty were to be engendered, 
and above all, the Porte was to kill the whole of the month of July 
with preparations for Vivian’s expedition, which the British 
Government was determined should not take place. 

631 

[IY] 

[The People’s Paper, No. 206, April 12, 1856) 

The strategical scruples of the British Government not allowing 
it to settle, during the interval of three months, its views of the 
great operations to be undertaken by the Porte, nothing would 
seem more fair and urgent than that it should have sent in the 
meantime, on its own responsibility, a small detachment via 
Erzeroum, to re-open the communications between that town and 
Kars. The allies were masters of the Black Sea, and the British 
Government had at its uncontrolled disposition General Beatson’s 
4,000 Bashi-bazouks, the only effective corps of Turkish irregular 
horse. Once landed at Trebizond they might have reached 
Erzeroum in ten days, escorting provisions to Kars, and thus 
enabling that fortress to prolong its resistance to from four to six 
weeks, when the severe Armenian winter setting in, all offensive 
movements on the part of the besiegers would have been stopped. 
General Beatson wrote to Redcliffe on the 7th July, applying to be 
sent on active service. 

No notice was taken of his memorial. On the 14th of August 
petitions were presented by the troops themselves, praying that 
they might not be inactive, but be despatched to Asia. They 
received no answer whatever. Beatson ventured upon a third 
remonstrance on September 12. The forbearance of the British 
Government being now exhausted by the harassing tmportunities 
of the indiscreet petitioner, some diplomatic-military intrigues 
were set on foot, crowned by Beatson’s dismissal from the service. 
As Beatson himself was dismissed from the service, so all his 
communications with the Cevernment are dismissed from the Blue 
Book. 

632 Karl] Marx 

We have seen how stubbornly the British Government was bent 
on an expedition to Erzeroum via Trebizond. On the news of the 
Russians having established themselves on the high-road between 
Erzeroum and Kars, and cut off a portion of the provisions 
collected for the Kars army, some spontaneous efforts at 
immediate relief were risked from Trebizond, behind the back of 
the British Embassy. In Redcliffe’s despatch, dated July 16th, 
1855, is enclosed a report from Vice-Consul Stevens, to this effect: 

“Trebizond, July 9, 1855. My Lord,—I have the honour to report that [...] 
Hafiz Pasha left for Erzeroum yesterday with 300 artillerymen and 20:field-pieces. 

A large force of irregulars, which may reach the number of 10,000, is now 
assembling, and will march to-day for the same place. (signed, Stevens.)” 

Redchiffe, as in duty bound, forthwith asks for explanations, on 
the Seraskier’s silence with regard to the collection of 10,000 
irregulars at Trebizond, and the advance of Hafiz Pasha for 
Erzeroum. 

¢ 

“All that I had heard on the subject from his Excellency,” he complains, “‘is 
that Toussoum Pasha was directed to go to Trebizond, and thence perhaps to 
Sivas, where he would assemble 4,000 trregulars, and proceed with them to the 
theatre of war.” 

By drawing lines between Trebizond, Sivas and Erzeroum, it will 
be seen that they form an isosceles triangle—the basis of which, 
viz., the line from Trebizond to Erzeroum, is about one-third 
shorter than either of the sides. To send, then, reinforcements 
direct from Trebizond to Erzeroum instead of sending Toussoum 
Pasha from Constantinople to Trebizond, from Trebizond, 
“perhaps,” to Sivas, there to waste time in collecting an irregular 
force, with the view of advancing perhaps upon Erzeroum, was 
too rash a course not to be rebuked by the British Ambassador. 
Not daring to tell the Seraskier that the relief of a besieged town 
depends on a well calculated dilatoriness, he puts him the 
question: 

“May it not be doubtful whether so large a body of Bashi-bazouks suddenly and 
loosely brought together, may be of any use to any party but the enemy?” 

The Seraskier very properly replying, 

“that he had insisted on having the necessary funds wherewith to pay them, 
which was the main instrument of control, and that he had threatened to retire 
from office, if his demand was not complied with.” 

Lord Redcliffe turns at once hard of hearing. 

In entering upon the second plan of operations proposed by the 
Porte, and baffled by its Allies, we tread a maze, where all is 
meander and no forth-right. 

The Fall of Kars 633 

From a despatch of Lieut.-Colonel Simmons’s, the British 
commissioner in Omer Pasha’s camp, dated July 15th, addressed to 
Lord Clarendon, and from Omer’s memoranda enclosed in it, the 
following facts may be collected. On June 23rd Omer Pasha 
received a letter from General Williams, stating that the communi- 
cation with Erzeroum was cut off, and requiring in the most 
pressing terms that reinforcements might be sent to Kars with the 
least possible delay, or that a powerful diversion might be made 
on the side of Redout Kaleh. Under date of July 7, Omer Pasha 
addressed a memorandum to the allied commanders—Simpson . 
and Pélissier—requesting them to assemble a council of the allied 
generals and admirals commanding-in-chief, in order to come to 
an immediate resolution. In his memorandum he proposes that, 

“he should throw himself, with the part of his army which is here’(at Balaklava) 
“and at Kertch— 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry from Eupatoria, and a proportional 
artillery —upon some point of the Coast of Circassia, and by menacing from thence 
the communications of the Russians, oblige them to abandon the siege of Kars.” 

In support of this proposal, Omer argues that the Ottoman 
army in Asia, to the number of 10,000 men blockaded in the 
entrenched camp of Kars by a superior Russian force, is in a 
position in which it is probable that from want of food it may be 
obliged to capitulate; that the garrison in Kars is in fact the 
Ottoman army in Asia; that if the garrison of Kars should yield, 
Erzeroum, a town, from its situation, difficult to fortify, will fall 
into the hands of the enemy, by which means he would become 
master of the communications with Persia, and of a great part of 
Asia Minor; that by accepting his proposal the Allies will make use 
of the chief advantages which they possess, viz., the facility of sea 
transport, and of the only Turkish army that is effective and 
capable of marching, viz., his own. In answer to that memoran- 
dum, Marshal Pélissier and General Simpson write that, “in 
absence of further information, they consider a conference would 
be premature.” Omer Pasha, however, on July 12th, addresses 
them again, to inform them that, 

‘in the meanwhile he had received from his Government a despatch, according 
to which, the whole of Turkey in Asia, up to the gates of Constantinople itself, is 
undefended, and entreating him, as every hour is of the greatest value, 
immediately to find the means, and put in execution the resources necessary to 
avert the great danger in which the Government of Turkey, and in consequence 
the cause of the Allies, are placed.” “Under these circumstances,” he adds, “since I 
have in the Crimea 60,000 Turks, of whom the greater part are Asiatics, and whose 
families and property are exposed to the ravage of the enemy, and since I find that 
that army is inactive in the Crimea, without prospects of any immediate service that 

634 Kar] Marx 

I can discover, I consider it my duty to my sovereign and the common cause to 
repeat my former proposal.” 

Accordingly he invites them to a conference at the English 
head-quarters. Simultaneously with this common note to the allied 
generals he caused [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons to address a confi- 
dential letter to General Simpson and Admiral Lyons, of which we 
give the following extract: — 

The Porte have proposed to General Vivian to take the Turkish Contingent to 
Redout Kaleh.... Omer Pasha, however, thinks there will be great risk in sending 
them there, as the men are not yet acquainted with their officers, the officers do 
not speak their language, and consequently cannot command them in the field, and 
the Contingent, although it might form a garrison, cannot yet be in a condition to 
march into the interior. The force of the Contingent also is small to make the 
contemplated operation. Omer Pasha also thinks that possessing, as he does, the 
confidence of the Turks, and being well-known in Asia, where he has had several 
campaigns, he is more likely to gain the sympathies and assistance of the 
inhabitants in provisioning and gaining information, [...] than strangers who do not 
know the language or country. 

On July 14th the Conference took place, attended by Omer 
Pasha, [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, Generals Simpson, Pélissier, and 
Martimprey, and Admirals Lyons, Bruat, and Stewart. Omer 
Pasha went into a detailed statement of the Russian forces in Asia, 
and their operations in the vicinity of Kars. He amply developed 
the arguments above quoted, and forcibly stuck to the opinion that 

“no time was to be lost in preparing a movement to check the progress of the 
Russians in Asia.” 

However, as {Lieut.-]Col. Simmons reports to Clarendon, 

“the generals and admirals having received no information from their 
respective ambassadors at Constantinople, which should lead them to believe that 
the affairs of Asia were in that precarious state in which Omer Pasha, from the 
information received from his Government, believed them to be,” decided that “in 
the absence of such information they would give no opinion on the subject.” 

In this instance, then, the allied generals declined giving any 
opinion on the subject, because they had received no information 
from their respective Governments. Afterwards, the allied Govern- 
ments declined giving their orders because their generals had not 
given their opinion. Rather startled at the cool behaviour of the 
allied commanders, at their curious tactics of making their 
incredulity in facts a reason for giving no opinion on them, and at 
the incivility of giving the lie to his Government, the only one 
immediately interested in the matter, Omer Pasha, rose at once, 
and peremptorily declared that, 

The Fall of Kars 635 

“under the circumstances, he felt it his duty to proceed to Constantinople for a 
few days to confer with his Government.” 

Accordingly, two days later, July 16th, he proceeded to 
Constantinople, taking with him [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, but 
being accompanied also by one [Lieut.-]Colonel] Suleau, “ostensibly 
travelling for the purpose of restoring his health” (see enclosure } 
in No. 270 of the Kars papers), but really charged by Pélissier and 
Simpson with the mission of thwarting Omer Pasha’s project. This 
Suleau, attached to the staff of Simpson, conveyed a letter to 
Redcliffe from poor General Simpson—the most unlucky warrior 
ever heard of, as General Evans has it*—in which that general 
tells his ambassador not that he and his colleagues did not believe 
in Omer Pasha’s statements, but that “they entertained the 
strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the 
Crimea at this moment”—not that they had thought fit to 
withhold their opinion from Omer Pasha, but that he 

“earnestly begs his Excellency to use his powerful influence with the Porte to 
cause their opinion to prevail over that of his Highness,” for “great public 
interests were at stake,” and “serious consequences might result from his success.” 

Success indeed! It was Omer Pasha’s success that troubled 
Pélissier’s sleep, who, up to that period, had nothing to boast of 
but the disgraceful battle of the 18th of June.**’ Poor Simpson, the 
unlucky warrior, naturally obtuse, as General Evans affirms his 
mind to be, was clever enough to catch the uneasiness of his 
co-commander, and to manage an intrigue in the rear of Omer 
Pasha, the only manoeuvre he can be said to have executed during 
the whole Crimean campaign. 

In a despatch, dated July 19th, Redcliffe writes to Clarendon 
that 

“the night before last (July 17th) he was surprised to hear that Omer Pasha had 
arrived suddenly from the Crimea [...] and went straight to the Seraskier.” 

He chuckles at the rumour reported by the fanariot Pisani, 
that 

“the generalissimo’s arrival without the orders of his Government had created 
some feelings of dissatisfaction,” and is under “a strong impression that Omer will 
best consult the interests of the alliance by returning without unnecessary delay to 
the command of his forces in the Crimea.” 

* Evans’ speech in the House of Commons on February 29, 1856. The Times, 
No. 22304, March 1, 1856.— Ed. 
> Omer Pasha.— Ed. 

Notwithstanding Redcliffe’s strong impression, Omer Pasha’s 
stay at Constantinople was prolonged from the 17th of July to the 
beginning of September. It will be seen, by and by, how this 
waste of time was occasioned. 

On July the 23rd, Redcliffe informs Clarendon that 

“Omer Pasha [...] had proposed [...] to the Porte to make himself an incursion 
towards Georgia, starting from Redout Kaleh, and turning Kutais to good 
account.” 

This idea had been debated the night before (July 22) in a 
council at the Grand Vizier’s,*? and the result of the deliberations 
had been 

“that the troops to be employed in the above-mentioned manner, under the 
command of Omer, should be taken from Eupatoria, to the amount of 20,000, and 
from Bulgaria to the amount of 5,000, and that the Contingent, with its numbers 
completed, should occupy the vacant space at Eupatoria. By way of alternative, 
it is proposed, that if the above-mentioned plan be objectionable, it might be so far 
modified as to take only 10,000 men from the Crimea, and 15,000 from Bulgaria, 
including those destined to form part of the Contingent.” 

Now, this despatch, which Clarendon is said to have received on 
August Ist, on the arrival of which he immediately took occasion to 
address a despatch to Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador at 
Paris, is evidently and wilfully misconstrued in its main passage— 
viz., the passage in which the Porte is stated to have proposed the 
withdrawal from Eupatoria of 20,000 men, to be placed under the 
command of Omer Pasha, and their replacement at Eupatoria by 
the Turkish Contingent. It is this very passage to which Clarendon 
points in his despatch to Lord Cowley, stating “Her Majesty’s 
Government to be favourably disposed to it,” and expressing “his 
hope that the Government of the Emperor will concur in it.” In 
this passage Eupatoria is interpolated for Balaklava. From the 
despatch of [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, dated 15th July, received 
by Clarendon on the 30th July, it will have been seen that Omer 
Pasha, in his memoranda to the allied generals, and in the war 
council, insisted upon taking with him that part of his army which 
is here (Balaklava), which he had brought from Eupatoria, and 
which he declared the only one fit for the Asiatic campaign. Did 
Omer Pasha alter his opinion, after arriving at Constantinople? 
The contrary is shown from a despatch dated August 2nd, in 
which Simmons states: — 

“His Highness Omer Pasha informed me that he should be happy to give over 
to complete the contingent any of the Turkish troops under his command, except 

* Ali Mehemet Pasha.— Ed. 

The Fall of Kars 637 

the division which is now at the camp before Sebastopol, which being composed of 
his best troops, he is naturally desirous to have with him, if he make the proposed 
movement to Asia.” 

Will it be asserted that the Porte in the council of the night of 
July 22nd, arrived at a resolution contrary to Omer’s proposal? In 
the very despatch of 23rd July in which Redcliffe reports the 
Porte’s resolution, he tells Clarendon that, 

“Omer Pasha has been most graciously received and most generously rewarded 
by the Sultan,” and adds, “I need not add that he is on excellent terms with his 
Majesty's ministers, and particularly with the Seraskier Pasha.” 

Any discrepancy, therefore, between the Porte and its command- 
er-in-chief, is out of the question; both of them appear equally 
startled on receiving from London the injunction of placing the 
troops at Eupatoria under Omer’s command, and withdrawing 
from it the troops at Sebastopol and Kertch. What, then, was the 
intention of the British Government in forging the above passage? 
To conceal from the public that while exhibiting themselves as the 
patrons of Omer’s project before the French Government, by a 
mere shuffling of words they substituted for the Porte’s own 
proposal, one directly hostile to it. Thus a new subject of dispute 
was provided. Matters were embroiled still further, and the 
occasion was afforded to waste August and September with orders 
and counter-orders. The false play of the British Government is 
apparent even in the arrangement of the Blue Book. To confound 
the reader, Clarendon’s despatch to Cowley figures on page 248, 
followed up from page 248 to 252 by an extract from Redcliffe’s 
despatch of July 19th, Simpson’s letter to Redcliffe of July 16th, 
Omer Pasha’s letters and memoranda, and only in the last place by 
Redcliffe’s despatch of July 23rd, of which Clarendon’s instruction 
to Cowley pretends to be the sequel. 

We must now stay for a moment in the Foreign-office, 
Downing-street, there beholding the Earl of Clarendon busily 
engaged in acting the head clerk of great Palmerston. Two days 
after the despatch of his message to Redcliffe on July the 16th, he 
is forwarding to Redcliffe another despatch concluding with the 
following words: 

“Her Majesty’s Government would still recommend that whatever force is sent 
for the relief of the army of Kars should proceed to Trebizond. If, indeed, Omer 
Pasha, who, we understand, is’ about to proceed to Constantinople, should 
determine to take any part of his own army with Tunisians and Albanians, to 

Redout Kaleh, her Majesty’s Government would have nothing to say to that 
proceeding.” 

Redcliffe’s despatch dated Constantinople, 23rd July, having 
reached London on August Ist, in exactly nine days, the despatch 
of Clarendon dated 16th July, again wants more than half a 
month to reach Constantinople. It had not arrived on July 30th, 
when Redcliffe wrote that 

“her Majesty’s Government insisting upon having the reinforcements sent via 
Trebizond placed the Porte in the most serious dilemma.” 

Redcliffe, then, was not in possession of Clarendon’s despatch, 
according to which her Majesty’s Government have nothing to say 
to the Redout Kaleh expedition, if undertaken by Omer Pasha 
himself. It is a feature peculiar to the chronology of this strange 
diplomatic-military drama that all despatches sure to create delay 
arrive with the most admirable speed, while all those pretending to 
recommend speed arrive with the most inexplicable delay. But 
there is another point quite as startling in Clarendon’s last-quoted 
despatch. While Lord Redcliffe writes from Constantinople, dated 
July 19th,that he was surprised to learn of Omer Pasha’s sudden 
arrival at Constantinople, on the 16th of July, on the very day 
Omer Pasha left the Crimea, Clarendon informs Redcliffe, from 
London, that “he understands Omer to be about to proceed to 
Constantinople.” Omer Pasha himself, we know, adopted this 
resolution only on July 14th, after the breaking up of the 
war-council. In the interval from July 14th to the 16th no vessel 
left Sebastopol] for Constantinople, so that Omer was obliged to 
request Admiral Lyons to place at his disposition her Majesty’s 
ship Valorous. Are we then to understand that while the 
despatches, the Foreign-office telegraph, from London, require 
seventeen days to arrive at Constantinople, the despatches it 
receives from the Crimea convey intelligence of events even before 
they do happen? Not quite so. There was the submarine telegraph 
from Sebastopol to Varna, and the telegraph from Varna to 
London; so that Clarendon may have had direct intelligence the 
very day of the war-council’s sitting. But where is this telegraphic 
despatch dated Sebastopol? Certainly not in the Blue Book. It is 
simply suppressed. And why? The same electric wire which 
informed Clarendon of Omer Pasha’s intended departure must 
have informed him of the resistance he met with on the part of 
Pélissier, that is on the part of the French Government. Thus the 
question would naturally arise why Clarendon quietly waited from 
16th July to the Ist of August to break the matter to the French 
Government, and to commence negotiations with it on the point 
on which the whole campaign depended? To prevent this question 

The Fall of Kars 639 

the telegraphic despatch has disappeared. But having suppressed 
that despatch from the Crimea, why did he insert his own 
despatch, from London, dated the 16th July? As no trace can be 
discovered of the latter ever having reached Constantinople, its 
omission would have caused no palpable blank in the Blue Book. 
A double-edged end was aimed at. On the one hand the readiness 
of the English Government to relieve Kars was to be paraded in 
contrast to the difficulties raised by Bonaparte, and the whole 
odium of the delay to be shifted to his shoulders. On the other 
hand, Clarendon’s belief in the spurious despatch of the 23rd July, 
was to be proved by his willingness to leave to Omer Pasha any 
part of his army, before he was aware of the resojution of the 
Porte to clog him with the Eupatoria army; having once become 
aware of this resolution, Clarendon, it is true, did stand upon it, 
Omer Pasha’s and the Porte’s protests notwithstanding. All the 
proceedings of Clarendon, his encouraging the Porte to occupy 
July with Vivian’s expedition, his deferring the negotiations with 
Bonaparte to August, his substitution in the despatch to Paris a 
spurious proposition of the Porte, the very acceptance of which by 
Bonaparte was sure to become a source of further imbroglio in 
this comedy of errors—all these proceedings tended to the same 
end—to kill time. 

640 

[The People’s Paper, No. 207, April 19, 1856] 

On August 2nd, 1855, Lord Cowley telegraphs from Paris that 
“Count Walewski foresees objections to the proposal” made by 
Clarendon in the name of the Porte. Thus the occasion 1s afforded 
to the clever Earl of displaying, in a despatch dated August 3rd, 
his patriotic zeal, and of pressing on the French Government the 
enormous consequences likely to arise from Kars and Erzeroum 
falling into the hands of Russia. The following day, Aug. 4th, he 
receives a despatch from Paris to this effect: 

“Telegraphic—Lord Cowley to the Earl of 
Clarendon. 
“Paris, August 4, 1855.— The French Government will not oppose the projected 

expedition to Asia Minor under Omer Pasha, provided that the numbers of the 
Turkish contingent before Sebastopol are not diminished.” 

Notwithstanding its conditional form this is the unconditional 
acceptance of the proposal made by Clarendon on August Ist in 
the name of the Porte according to which the troops stationed at 
Eupatoria were to be given over to Omer Pasha, and General 
Vivian’s contingent to replace them there. On the same day 
Clarendon despatched the following to Redcliffe: 

“August 4th—QOmer Pasha can go to relieve Kars, provided he does not 
diminish his Turkish troops before Sebastopol or disturb the garrison at Yenikale.” 

The French government had only protested against the 
diminution of the Turkish troops before Sebastopol. The English 
government add another clog by sequestrating the Turkish troops 
at Yenikale too. On August 8th, Clarendon received a letter from 
General Williams dated Kars, July l4th, stating that General 

The Fall of Kars 641 

Muravieff had made close reconnaissances on the 11th and 12th 
July, and that on the 13th 

“he appeared with his whole army on the southern heights above Kars which 
form the, key of our defences, and by the crowning of which Kars was taken in 
1828." °° 

The letter concludes with the words, 

“[ have just heard that the Russian general expects reinforcements from 
Bayazid via Gumri, and that those troops recently expelled from the garrisons of 
the coast of Circassia are also marching into the interior of Georgia, and may take 
part in the future operations of Asia Minor.” (No. 276) 

Having become aware of the reinforcement of the Russians, the 
zeal of Clarendon for the diminution of the Turkish forces 
receives a fresh impulse. He immediately sits down to complete his 
index militum prohibitorum*: 

“Telegraphic—The Earl of Clarendon to Lord 
Redcliffe. 

“Foreign-office, Aug. 9, 1855.—General Vivian’s contingent to go immediately 
to Eupatoria. The Turkish troops there 10,000 or 12,000 to go with Omer Pasha to 
Redout Kaleh. The Turkish troops at Balaklava and Kertch not to be diminished in 
number. The Turkish force to go to Redout Kaleh under Omer Pasha, to be 
completed to its proper number by troops from Bulgaria or elsewhere, not from 
the Crimea.” 

Here, then, we behold Clarendon again extending the circle 
of interdiction. Recollecting, from ([Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons’s 
despatch of July 15th, that Omer Pasha intended taking with him 
“the part of his army which is here (Balaklava) and at Kertch— 
25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry from Eupatoria and artillery,” he 
now forbids the Porte to touch the garrison at Kertch, and extends 
Bonaparte’s objection to the removal of Turkish troops from 
Sebastopol to the whole Crimea—save Eupatoria; and even the 
number of troops at the latter place dwindles down to 10,000 or 
12,000, instead of the 20,000 mentioned in his despatch to the 
French Government, dated August 1. With a sort of clownish 
humour he leaves the Porte at liberty to look out for troops 
“elsewhere.” Having filled the bomb at London, he may now 
quietly await its bursting at Constantinople. 

In Clarendon’s despatch to Redcliffe of July 16th, we were 
struck by this passage: “If, indeed, Omer Pasha, who, we 
understand, is about to proceed to Constantinople, should 

* List of withheld troops.— Ed. 

determine to take any part of his own army to Redout Kaleh, Her 
Majesty’s Government have nothing to say to that proceeding.” 
Now, from a letter of Fuad Effendi to Redcliffe, dated July 31, 
from Redcliffe’s answer of August 4, and from Redcliffe’s letter of 
August 8 (see No. 282 and enclosures), it results that Clarendon’s 
despatch, dated July 16th, had not yet reached Constantinople on 
August 8: Fuad Pasha states in.his letter that what has been begun 
of the measures (relating to the Mingrelian expedition) had been 
suspended, in consequence of “the official and categorical answer 
expected (from London) having not yet been received,” and 
defends the Turkish plan of a Mingrelian expedition against “the 
substance of the English despatches,” according to which “the 
succours must be sent through Erzeroum by way of Trebizond.” 
Redcliffe, in his answer, dated Aug. 4, tells us that 

“when latterly called upon to declare the opinions of his Government, he 
performed that duty with a painful sense of the embarrassments which surrounded 
the Porte,” 

increased as they would be by the opinion “he was called upon 
to declare,” and adds: 

“Though Her Majesty’s Government have declared their decided preference for 
a more direct operation by Trebizond and Erzeroum, their objections to a 
diversion on the side of Circassia would in all likelihood be modified if the force 
employed were of a compact or reliable character.” 

In his despatch to Clarendon, dated August 8, he complains that 
the Government 

“still leans with all its weight on Trebizond as the only true chance of relief.... 
The military authorities are decidedly in favour of it’(the Mingrelian expedition)... 
“Amidst so many motives to vigorous support of the only practicable scheme of 
relief, [...] I made no reserve in communicating the adverse opinions of Her 
Majesty's Government to the Porte.” 

Clarendon’s answer to this latter despatch of Redcliffe’s (August 
20) must be considered from a double point of view—with respect 
to Redcliffe’s assertion that in his opinion the English Government 
had resisted the Mingrelian expedition up to August 8, and with 
respect to the plan which Clarendon forwarded to Paris on 
August 1 as the Porte’s own plan. As to the first point, Clarendon 
declares (see No. 283):— 

“My various messages by telegraph, and my despatch of the 4th inst., which you 
will have received since the date of your despatch, will have shown you that Her 
Majesty’s Government, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, 
were willing that Omer Pasha should proceed to Asia to effect a diversion for the 
relief of Kars, and Her Majesty’s Government in that case no longer insists upon 

The Fal! of Kars 643 

the view they had entertained at first, that the relief should be given by way of 
Trebizond.” 

With the exception of the despatch of July 14, in which 
Clarendon protested against the Mingrelian expedition, and 
summoned the Turks to fall back from Erzeroum and Kars, and 
his despatch, dated August 9, which Redcliffe, of course, could not 
have received on August 8, Clarendon had, according to the Blue 
Book, sent no telegraphic despatch at all. It is therefore a palpable 
falsehood when he speaks of his “various messages by telegraph” 
withdrawing the veto of the British Government against the 
Mingrelian expedition. Why does he not refer to his despatch 
dated July 16? Because it figures only in the Blue Book, was 
written only for the Blue Book, and has never left the 
Foreign-office at Downing-street. Redcliffe, as if aware of the trap 
Jaid for him, writes to Clarendon, dated August 13 (No. 286):—