London, June 8. The arrival of three French reserve divisions in 
addition to the two Sardinian divisions makes it impossible for the 
allies to remain spellbound within the narrow confines of the 
Heracleatic Chersonese. So, on May 25, shortly after General Pélis- 
sier assumed command, they sent 20,000-25,000 men to the 
Chernaya, occupied the line of this river and expelled the Russian 
outposts from their positions on the heights overhanging the river’s 
right bank. It will be remembered that more than a month ago we 
pointed out* that this, the Russians’ advanced line of defence, was 
not their true battlefield and that consequently, instead of holding 
their ground and accepting battle along this line, they would 
probably give it up at the first serious assault so as to concentrate all 
their forces on the strong line between Inkerman and the range of 
hills to the east of that place. This has now happened. By this 
advance the allies have nearly doubled the extent of the area 
occupied by them, and opened a gateway to the fertile valley of 
Baidar, which may become very useful in the future. Up to now, 
however, the advantage gained has not been swiftly and vigorously 
followed up. The first movement was immediately followed again by 
stagnation. Lack of transport facilities may have made this inevitable. 
Disunity between the allied commanders is cited as one cause. The 
shelling of Sevastopol, resumed on June 6, shelling No. 3, arouses 
the suspicion that it may be intended to return after an interlude to 
the old routine. The shelling may, however, be combined with 
operations in the field. At any rate, one necessary measure (cf. No. 
241 of the N.O-Z.)” has at last been taken—the transportation of 

some 20,000 Turks under the personal command of Omer Pasha 
from Eupatoria to Chersonese. The allied army has thus increased to 
a full 200,000 men. With a fighting force of this size active operations 
can certainly be begun as soon as the organisation of supplies and 
transport facilities permits the army to take the field. But here there 
seem to be great difficulties to be overcome. 

The second affair to be mentioned in the story of the main 
army is the battle between the Quarantine Harbour and the 
Central Bastion (No. 5 of the Russians). It was stubborn and 
bloody. As we can now see from General Pélissier’s report, the 
Russians held all the ground from the head of the Quarantine 
Harbour to the churchyard, and from there to the Central Bastion 
by means of detached earthworks and trenches, although even the 
official British Admiralty map of the siege-works indulges in the 
fantasy of placing French fortifications over the whole of this 
important area. As soon as the Flagstaff and Central bastions were 
seriously threatened, and the outer works protecting them were 
taken by the French, the Russians turned this extensive stretch 
into one great fortification. In a few nights long lines were 
connected with one another, ramparts thrown up intended to 
enclose the whole area and form a spacious place d’armes, i.e. a 
fortified place where the troops could be gathered in safety in 
order to act against the flanks of any French attack or to 
undertake strong assaults on the flanks of the advanced French 
fortifications. To deprive the Russians of the time to carry out 
their plan, Pélissier decided to fall on them immediately, while 
their earthworks were still incomplete. On the evening of May 22 
an attack was made in two columns. The left column established 
itself in the Russian trenches at the head of the Quarantine 
Harbour and managed to dig itself in; the right column also 
captured the advance trenches but was forced to retire again at 
daybreak by the heavy fire of the enemy. On the following 
evening the attempt was renewed with stronger columns and 
complete success. The entire fortification was captured and turned | 
against the Russians by removing the gabions from one side of the 
trench to the opposite side. In this action the French seem to have 
fought again with the famous furia francese, although it has 
to be admitted that the manner in which Pélissier describes 
the difficulties to be overcome is not free from a tinge of 
boasting. 

It is generally known that the expedition to the Sea of Azov was 
rewarded with total success. A flotilla consisting chiefly of the light 
warships of the two fleets, manned by 15,000 British, French and 

Turks, seized Kerch, Yenikale and the straits leading to the Sea of 
Azov without encountering resistance. Advancing into this lake, the 
ships appeared off Berdyansk, Genichesk and Arabat, destroying 
or compelling the Russians to destroy large supplies of corn and 
munitions, a number of steamships and nearly 200 transport 
boats. At Kerch they succeeded in capturing Gorchakov’s letters 
to the commander of the place. The Russian commander-in- 
chief complains about the lack of provisions in Sevastopol and 
urges the rapid despatch of fresh supplies. Now it turns out that 
throughout the campaign the Sea of Azov was the main channel 
along which the Russians in the Crimea had been receiving their 
supplies and that 500 sailing-boats had been used to transport 
them. As the allies have up to now only found and destroyed 200 
such boats, the remaining 300 must be further up near Taganrog 
or Azov. A squadron of steamships has therefore been sent out in 
search of them. The success of the allies is all the more important 
as it forces the Russians to send al] supplies along a slow and less 
safe land-route via Perekop or via the interior of the Sivash Sea* 
and to set up their main depots at Kherson or Berislav on the 
Dnieper, in positions far more exposed than those at the head of 
the Sea of Azov. The almost uncontested success of this expedition 
is the greatest reproach to the allies’ conduct of the war. If such 
results can now be achieved in four days, why was the expedition 
not sent out in September or October last year, at a time when 
similar breaches in the Russians’ line of communication might have 
entailed the retreat of their army and the surrender of Sevastopol? 

The land forces accompanying this expedition are intended to 
protect the steamers if necessary, to supply the captured places 
with garrisons and to go into action against the Russian 
communications. Their main corps seems intended to act in the 
field as a simple flying corps, making sorties whenever there is a 
chance of dealing a swift blow, retiring behind its fortifications under 
cover of the ships’ guns, and, if the worst comes to the worst, 
embarking again when threatened by a greatly superior enemy 
force. If this is its purpose it can perform important duties, and 
15,000 are not too many for this. If on the other hand it is 
intended to act as an independent corps with its own base of 
operations, undertaking a serious flanking movement against the 
Russians and attempting to pose a serious threat to the interior of 
the Crimea, then 15,000 men, weakened by detachments, are far 
too few for such an operation and run a considerable risk of being 

cut off, surrounded by superior forces and annihilated. At present 
we only know that they have landed at Kerch and are engaged in 
preparing it for defence against the interior. The Russians having 
voluntarily evacuated Sudjouk Kale, Anapa remains the only 
fortress in their hands on the Circassian coast. It is a natural 
stronghold that is now moreover well fortified. We doubt that the 
allies will attack it at the moment. Should they do so they will be 
making a big mistake, if not positive of rapid success. They would 
be dispersing troops that need the utmost concentration and 
wasting their energies by attacking new targets before the old ones 
are secured.