London, August 15. Bratiano recently addressed a letter to The 
Daily News in which he depicts the suffering of the inhabitants of 
the Danubian principalities under the Austrian army of occupa- 
tion, alludes to the equivocal attitude of the French and English 
consuls and then puts this question: 

“Is Austria acting as an ally or even as a neutral party when she maintains an army 
of 80,000 in the principalities thereby, as the official despatches prove, preventing the 
Turks entering Bessarabia and also the formation of a Romanian army which could 
have taken an active part in the war, while withdrawing 200,000 men from Galicia thus 
enabling Russia to send a similar number to the Crimea?” 

Austria’s ambiguous position arose the moment when neither 
neutral nor an ally, she set herself up as a mediator. The following 
extract from a despatch of Lord Clarendon to the Viennese 
Cabinet, dated June 14, 1853, seems to prove that England in part 
forced her into this role: 

“Tf the Russian army proceeded beyond the Principalities, and other provinces of 
Turkey were invaded, a general rising of the Christian population would ensue, not in 
favour of Russia, nor in support of the Sultan,” but for their own independence; and it 
would be needless to add that such a revolt would not be long in extending itself to the 
Danubian Provinces of Austria but it would be for the Austrian Government to judge 
of the effect it might produce in Hungary and in Italy, and the encouragement it must 
give to the promoters of disorder throughout Europe whom Austria has reason to 
fear, and who even now would appear to think that the moment is at hand for the 
realisation of their projects. It was these considerations, I said, that rendered Her 
Majesty's’ Government most anxious to unite with Austria for an object so essential to 
the best interests of society, and to endeavour with her to discover some mode by 
which the just claims of Russia may be reconciled with the sovereign rights of the 
Sultan.” 

Another question concerning Austrian policy remains as unan- 
swered at the conclusion of the parliamentary session as at the 
start. What was Austria’s position with regard to the Crimean 
expedition? On July 23 this year Disraeli asked Lord John Russell 
on what authority he had declared that “one of the principal causes 
of the Crimean expedition was the refusal of Austria to cross the river 
Pruth”’* 

Lord John Russell could not remember—i.e., he said “his 
authority was a vague recollection, a general recollection”. Disraeli 
then addressed the same question to Palmerston, who said 

“he would not answer questions taken piecemeal from a long course of 
negotiations between Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of one of the 
Sovereigns’ who was to a certain degree in alliance with Her Majesty.” 

With this apparently evasive answer Palmerston was evidently 
only indirectly confirming Russell’s claim, pleading delicacy with 
regard to the “ally to a certain degree”. Let us now move from 
the House of Commons to the House of Lords. On June 26 this 
year Lord Lyndhurst delivered his philippic against Austria: 

“Early in June” (1854) “Austria resolved on making a demand upon Russia to 
evacuate the principalities. That demand was made in very strong terms with 
something like an intimation that if it were not complied with Austria would resort 
to forcible means to secure this object.” 

After some historical remarks Lyndhurst continues: 

“Well, did Austria then immediately carry into effect any attack upon Russia? 
Did she attempt to enter the principalities? Far from it. She abstained from doing 
anything for a period of several weeks, and it was only when the siege of Silistria 
had been raised and the Russian army was in retreat, and when Russia herself had 
served a notice that she would within a certain time leave the principalities and 
retire behind the Pruth [...]—that Austria again remembered her engagements.” © 

In reply to this speech Lord Clarendon declared: 

“When Austria entered into these successive engagements with England and 
France and when she made those extensive and costly preparations for war, when, 
moreover she urgently proposed that military commissioners should be sent by 
France and England to the head-quarters of General Hess, I have no doubt she 
intended and expected war. But she also expected that long before the season for 
military operations began the allied armies would have obtained decisive victories in 
the Crimea, that they would be free, and would be able to undertake other 

House of Commons on July 19, 1855.— Ed. 

operations in concert with her own forces. That, unfortunately, was not the case; 
and if Austria had at our invitation declared war, she would in all probability have 
had to wage that war single-handed.” 

Sull more astonishing is Ellenborough’s later statement in the 
House of Lords, which to this moment has not been challenged by 
any munister: 

“Before the expedition to the Crimea was despatched, Austria proposed to 
communicate with the allied Powers on the subject of future military operations; 
acting, however, upon preconceived opinions, the allies sent that expedition, and 
then Austria at once said that she could not meet the Russians single-handed, and 
that the expedition to the Crimea rendered it necessary for her to adopt a different course of 
action. At a subsequent period, just at the commencement of the conference at 
Vienna, when it was of the greatest possible importance that Austria should act 
with us—at that time, still looking to nothing but the success of your operations in 
the Crimea, you withdrew from the immediate vicinity of Austria 50,000 good 
Turkish troops, thus depriving Austria of the only assistance on which she could 
rely in the event of a military expedition against Russia. It is clear, therefore, my 
lords, and also from the recent statements of the noble earl, Clarendon, that it is our 
ill-advised expedition to the Crimea which has paralysed the policy of Austria, and 
which has reduced her to her present difficult position. Before that expedition sailed 
to the Crimea I warned the Government. [...}] I warned them of the effect which that 
expedition would produce upon the policy of Austria.” 

Here then we have a direct contradiction between the statement 
of Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, between his statement and 
the statement of Lord John Russell and the statement of Lord 
Ellenborough. Russell says: the Crimean expedition sailed because 
Austria refused to cross the Pruth, i.e., to take sides against Russia 
with arms in hand. No, says Clarendon. Austria could not take 
sides against Russia because the Crimean expedition did not have 
the desired result. Finally, Lord Ellenborough: the Crimean 
expedition was undertaken against the will of Austria, and forced 
her to abstain from the war with Russia. These contradictions— 
however one may interpret them—prove in any case that the 
ambiguity was not merely to be found on the side of the Austrians. 

a 333, August 18, 1855. ac This version is published in En-