Friedrich Engels

On the Capture of Sevastopol

[_Neue Oder-Zeitung_ No. 429, September 14, 1855]

London, September 11. The cannon of St. James’s Park and the Tower announced the fall of the south side of Sevastopol to London yesterday evening at 9 o’clock. In the Lyceum, Haymarket and Adelphi theatres the managers at last had the satisfaction of calling for cheers, “God save the Queen” and “Partant pour la Syrie” on the strength of official despatches instead of, as hitherto, on false pretences.

The Crimean campaign has at last reached its turning point. About a week ago the Russian telegraphs admitted that the allied fire had done considerable damage to the lines of Sevastopol and that the damage had been repaired “as far as possible”, i.e. not completely. We then learned yesterday that on Saturday, September 8, in the afternoon, the Allies had assaulted 4 bastions, were repulsed before one of them, took two, had to evacuate one of these again, but finally held the fourth and most important, the Malakhov Tower (Kornilov Bastion), the loss of which compelled the Russians to destroy and evacuate the south side.

The arrival of considerable reinforcements after the battle of the Chernaya secured the allied generals against any possible undertaking by the Russian army at Inkerman; for even in the event that the remainder of the 4th and 6th Russian divisions, together with the two grenadier divisions, were added to that army, the Allies now found themselves in a position successfully to resist any number of troops that the Russians could throw across the Chernaya and at the same time retained forces sufficiently strong to carry on the siege and even to undertake an assault. It must be admitted that the French government this time was extraordinarily rapid in dispatching the troops intended to counterbalance the reinforcements already on the march from Poland and Volhynia. The number of French troops shipped to the East since the beginning of July must be estimated at at least 50,000. Under these circumstances and the corresponding effect of the advanced English and French mortar batteries, the trenches were advanced up to the ditch under cover of a vigorous fire. How far they advanced and whether the glacis was crowned _secundum artem_ <according to all the rules of art>, we do not yet know. The fire assumed more and more the character of a regular bombardment; vertical fire was successfully employed to make the place untenable for larger bodies of troops, and finally the assault was ordered.

On the Mamelon last spring the Russians had constructed a number of fire-proof and bomb-proof building compartments, with the aid of traverses and blinds <traverses and blinds>. These arrangements afforded them excellent protection against the enemy’s fire, but when the assault took place it was found that no space was left for the concentration of a sufficient number of troops for the defence of the work. Compartment after compartment, defended by only a handful of men, fell into the hands of the French and then served them as an immediate lodgement. The same mistake seems to have been made in the construction of the defence works of the Malakhov. The thing was overcharged, and once the French had seized the commanding point of the hill, the Russian works themselves afforded them protection against the Russian fire. As the Redan (Bastion No. 3) and the Redan of the Dockyard Bay (Bastion No. 1 of the Russians) lie on more level ground, they did not permit of the terrace-shaped and complicated defence works which could be applied on the Malakhov. Here, therefore, a simple _coupure_ <cut> seems to have been made in the bastion, severing the salient angle and exposing its interior to an overwhelming fire. The troops for its defence could therefore be concentrated more in the rear and the interior of the work be protected by sorties from the _coupure_. In consequence of this arrangement, which is generally adopted in such cases, the English lines and the French columns ordered to storm these positions were able to advance easily over the almost entirely abandoned outer rampart, but, once faced by the _coupure_, were crushed by the hail of bullets and forced to abandon the assault.

Immediately after the capture of the Malakhov, General de Sallas, on the French left attack, made an attempt to establish himself in the Central Bastion (No. 5, between the Flagstaff and Quarantine Bastions). He was repulsed. We do not know whether this assault was undertaken on his own private responsibility or whether it formed part of the original plan. We likewise do not know whether the French trenches had been advanced far enough towards the bastion to justify this daring attempt.

The capture of the Malakhov Hill immediately formed the turning point of the siege.

The Malakhov completely commands the Karabelnaya and the eastern slope of the hill on which the town of Sevastopol is built. It takes in the rear the sea forts on the southern side of the harbour and renders the whole inner harbour and the greater part of the outer harbour untenable for the Russian warships. Through the fall of the Malakhov the continuity of the defence lines of Sevastopol was interrupted precisely at the point on which the security of the whole depended. Possession of the Malakhov therefore signified possession of the Karabelnaya, the destruction of the town by bombardment, the taking of the Flagstaff Bastion in flank and rear, and the disappearance of the last chances of holding Sevastopol. Up to that point Sevastopol was a camp fortified for a large army, as all important modern fortresses are. With the capture of the Malakhov it was reduced to the rank of a mere bridgehead for the Russian garrison on the north side, and a bridgehead without a bridge at that.

Some Russian ships in the harbour had already been set on fire by the bombs of the allied batteries. The Malakhov, once armed with French cannon, would have made it impossible for the remaining Russian ships to find a safe anchorage, except close to the foot of Forts Nicholas and Alexander, where there is room for only very few. Hence the Russian sinking and
burning of ships of the line and war steamers. The complete occupation of the Karabelnaya side will impose upon the Allies the beginning of field operations. Although they will not be able to establish many batteries and numerous troops in this part of the town, on account of the fire from the north side, they have at any rate succeeded in reducing the Russian share of Sevastopol to less than half its extent before September 8, and to a fortress that can contain only a limited number of defenders. Not only is the offensive power of the garrison completely broken, but its defensive power is also considerably weakened. A much smaller number of men will suffice to continue the siege, and the troops thus set free, together with the forces now on the way or in the camp of Maslak, will be available for an expedition to Eupatoria. The more one studies the reciprocal position of the Allies and the Russians on the Chernaya, the more one convinces oneself that at present neither side can dislodge the other without great numerical superiority and extraordinary sacrifices. The opinion is therefore gaining ground more and more in the allied camp that 60,000–70,000 men must be shipped to Eupatoria in order to march from there against the Russian lines of communication at Simferopol. The Russians would thereby be forced to a battle in the open field, the success of which, under present circumstances, seems assured to the Allies. But everything depends on their seizing the present moment with speed and energy.

Variant Texts

Instead of this sentence, the _New-York Daily Tribune_ No. 4506 of September 28, 1855, says: “The loss of this point forced the Russians on the 9th to march with their troops from the south side to the north side, thus abandoning the town of Sevastopol, after having blown up their magazines, blown up the buildings, destroyed the defence works by mine explosions, and, to use General Pélissier’s words, turned the whole place into a vast blazing furnace. They also burned their steamers, sank their last warships, and finally destroyed the bridge near Fort Paul.”

In the _New-York Daily Tribune_ the following sentence appears here: “After all the preceding events of this remarkable siege, it was to be expected that the French ran not the slightest danger of being driven out of their new positions, if they were properly aware of their tasks.”

In the _New-York Daily Tribune_ the following text appears here: “It was therefore prudent to abandon the town. We have, indeed, heard much about new works erected on the rear side of the slope of the Malakhov with the aim of maintaining the defence of the Karabelnaya after the loss of this fortification. But they do not appear to have been of such value as to induce Prince Gorchakov to continue the defence. We shall, however, very soon know what they really represent.”

Instead of the last two sentences, the _New-York Daily Tribune_ brings the following text: “Assuming the Russians had 200,000 men in the Crimea (which of course they do not), then 80,000 men would be required for the defence of the forts on the north side, 60,000 for the position on the Chernaya, and 60,000 to meet the allied army at Eupatoria. Given the present morale of the allied troops, it is certain that they will beat the Russians with equal numbers and in equally favourable positions. Since they can also, by taking up a position on the Russian line of communications, force the latter to deliver a battle, there appears to be no risk in such an undertaking. On the contrary, it is probable that the Russians could oppose at most 60,000 men to this expeditionary army. The sooner, however, such a manoeuvre is undertaken, the better for the Allies, and if they act with energy, they may expect great results. They now possess both moral and numerical superiority, and we do not doubt that they will take advantage of it before a new winter on the plateau has reduced their numbers and weakened their morale.

In fact, the latest reports state that already on the 13th, 25,000 men have sailed for Eupatoria, and we shall no doubt hear that an even larger force will follow.

Of these important events we have so far received only the meagre information of the telegraph. When more complete details reach us, we shall return to this subject.” (The last two paragraphs were added by the editors of the _Tribune_.)