Friedrich Engels

Progress of the War Operations

Written on October 19, 1855.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune," No. 4538, November 5, 1855, leading article]

There is an abundance of news about the war. Apart from Gorchakov’s report, which we comment upon elsewhere, the official despatches arrived by the steamer on Saturday respecting the cavalry engagement near Kurulu, in the vicinity of Eupatoria, of which we have already written. To this must be added the news of an unsuccessful Russian assault on Kars, of the destruction of Taman and Phanagoria by the allies, and of the landing of a portion of the allied troops on the Kinburn peninsula.

The cavalry engagement in the neighbourhood of Eupatoria was fought by twelve French squadrons (the 4th Hussars, and the 6th and 7th Dragoons). According to General d’Allonville’s report, which is clearly and intelligibly drawn up, the French and Turks carried out an extended reconnaissance into the interior of the country by three different routes – one to the south, and two from Sasyk Lake to the north. The two latter columns met near the village of Dolshak, where they discovered the approach of the Russian cavalry. From this point on, the reports no longer agree. General d’Allonville asserts that while the French had dismounted and were watering their horses, eighteen Russian squadrons attempted to turn them from the south and to cut off their retreat to Eupatoria; whereupon he ordered his men to mount, threw himself upon the flank of the Russians, routed them, and pursued them for two leagues <old French measure of distance (4.45 km)>. Gorchakov, however, says that the Russians had only one regiment (the 18th Uhlan Regiment) or eight squadrons; that they were surprised by the French after they had dismounted in order to unlimber a battery of artillery, and that under these circumstances they had to save themselves by flight. He holds General Korff responsible for this error. Why a whole regiment of Uhlans had to dismount and help to unlimber a battery of eight guns, and why the gunners, whose proper business this was, were not on the spot, we are left to guess. Gorchakov’s whole report is so confused, so unmilitary, so permeated by the wish to excuse this first mishap to the cavalry, that it cannot be taken as a serious statement of facts. At the same time we see that General Korff is made responsible for this defeat, just as Selwan was for Silistria, Soimonov for Inkerman, Read for the Chernaya. Gorchakov himself remains, although beaten in every engagement, always the unconquered. Defeats were not inflicted upon him, not by any means; it is always some unfortunate subordinate who overturns the general’s wise plans by some gross blunder, and who, as a punishment for this offence, usually falls in battle. In this case, however, the culprit has the misfortune to remain alive. Perhaps he may later have something to say about Gorchakov’s despatch. Meanwhile, he has the satisfaction that his adversary presents him in a far more favourable light than his infallible commander-in-chief does. After this battle of Eupatoria, the British light cavalry division was sent there to reinforce the French.

Two further expeditions were undertaken at the extreme flanks of the Crimean theatre of war. One of them was sent from Kertch and Yenikale to the opposite side of the straits. The small fortresses of Taman and Phanagoria were destroyed, about 100 guns captured, and the allies have thereby fully secured access to the Sea of Azov. This operation was undertaken merely as a precautionary measure; its immediate results are of little influence.

The second expedition is of greater importance. The allied fleets, having on board about 10,000 men, first carried out a feint off Odessa, in which, however, not a shot was fired, and then sailed to Kinburn. This place lies near the extreme point of a spit, which encloses on the south the bay formed by the mouths of the Dnieper and the Bug. At this point the arm of the sea is about three miles wide; the passage into the bay is closed by a sandbank, which lies 15 feet under water (according to the best sea-charts). On the north side of this passage lies Ochakov, on the south side Kinburn. Both fortresses became known during the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1787, when the Bug formed the frontier between the two empires, and consequently Ochakov belonged to the Turks and Kinburn to the Russians. At that time Suvorov commanded the left wing of the Russian army (under Potemkin) and was stationed at Kinburn. The Turks, then masters of the Black Sea, crossed over from Ochakov. First they attempted a diversion and landed south-east behind the town of Kinburn; but when they saw that Suvorov was not misled by this feint, they landed with their main forces at the north-west point of the spit, directly opposite Ochakov. Here they entrenched themselves and attacked the fortress; but Suvorov, with far smaller forces than the Turks, made a sortie, attacked them, and drove them into the sea with the help of reinforcements coming up. The losses of the latter were enormous. Suvorov himself, however, was wounded during this fight, which was followed the next year, 1788, by the storming of Ochakov.

This time the allies landed not below, but about four miles above the town of Kinburn, in order to cut the land communications with Kherson and the interior of Russia. Their gunboats will very probably also soon cut the sea communications. The Kinburn spit, some six miles above the town, is, like that of Arabat, extremely narrow and lies so low and is so sandy that one strikes water if one digs a few feet below the surface. Therefore strong fortifications with deep ditches cannot be rapidly constructed there; and the works thrown up by the Turks in 1787 were either palisades or batteries covered with sandbags. The fortress of Kinburn itself cannot, for the same reason, be very formidable, since it is impossible to lay foundations for masonry escarps; however, since the war with the Turks, broad wet ditches have undoubtedly been dug. Nevertheless we are of opinion that Kinburn, if vigorously attacked, cannot hold out long against the allies, and once Kinburn is in their hands, it offers them prospects for important operations towards Kherson and Nikolayev, that is, towards the base of operations of the Russian army in the Crimea. This landing may therefore prove very important, if appropriate operations follow. But up to the departure of the steamer, no news of any decisive character had arrived, and from this we may conclude that this expedition too is being conducted in the usual leisurely, sleepy style of the allies.

The defeat of the Russians before Kars will most probably prove to be the crowning event of the campaign in Armenia. The Turks, badly organised and short of war matériel of every kind, have played a pitiful part on this part of the theatre of war. Incapable of waging a war in the field, they contented themselves with occupying Kars, Erzerum, and the ground immediately commanded by these fortresses. General Williams, who had entered the Turkish service, commanded the garrison of Kars and superintended the construction of proper defensive works. Throughout the greater part of the summer the whole campaign on both sides was confined to skirmishes, raids, and foraging expeditions in the mountain country; the general and main result was that the Russians, who gradually gained ground, succeeded in blockading Kars and even in cutting its communications with Erzerum. Kars lies in a lateral valley of the upper Araxes; Erzerum at the sources of the Euphrates; Batum at the mouth of the Chorokh (Batis), the upper course of which passes near both Kars and Erzerum, so that one of the roads between these two places follows the basin of the Chorokh to Olti, where it turns through the mountains to Kars. Olti was therefore the central point for the Turks, especially as a road from Batum joins the one just mentioned there, and Batum was the place from which the nearest and largest reinforcements were to be expected. Had the Russians succeeded in taking Kars, their first step would have been to establish themselves in Olti and thereby cut off Erzerum from its nearest and best line of communication with the Black Sea and Constantinople. The Turks, however, were so disheartened that they fell back as far as Erzerum and only kept occupied the mountain pass between the upper Euphrates and the sources of the Araxes, while Olti was almost entirely neglected.

When Kars was more closely invested, they at last attempted to form a provision convoy at Olti and to force an entrance into Kars with a strong escort. A portion of the cavalry had been sent away from Kars, being useless there, and actually fought its way through the Russian-occupied territory as far as Olti; soon afterwards the convoy set out; but this time the Russians were more on their guard – the Turks were completely beaten and the convoy captured by the Russians. Meanwhile, the want of provisions began to make itself painfully felt in Kars. Omer Pasha was actually dispatched to Asia to take the command and organise an effective army at Batum. But to form a new army requires much time, and a march direct via Olti with the aim of relieving Kars was not exactly the best thing Omer Pasha could do, since Kars may be forced by want of provisions to surrender any day before assistance can arrive.

In this difficult situation the Turks found themselves at the end of September; Kars was considered as good as lost, and the Russians were certain of starving the town into surrender by mere blockade. But the Russians do not seem to have been willing to wait until the last flour in Kars had been baked and the last horse slaughtered. Whether from fear of the approaching winter, the state of the roads, lack of provisions, orders from above, or fear of Omer Pascha’s relief corps, they at all events decided to act at once and vigorously. Siege guns arrived from Alexandropol, a fortress situated on the frontier only a few leagues from Kars, and after a few days of constructing trenches and bombardment, Kars was stormed by the concentrated main forces of the Russian army under Murawjow. The battle was terrible and lasted eight hours. The Baschi-Bosuks and the irregular infantry, who had so often fled before the Russians in the field, fought here on more favourable ground. Although the attacking forces must have been four to six times as strong as those of the garrison, all attempts to force an entry into the town proved fruitless. Here the Turks had at last recovered their courage and their prudence. It is true the Russians more than once succeeded in approaching the Turkish batteries (most probably those of the lunettes open at the gorge, so that they were commanded by the fire of the second line of defence), but they could nowhere establish themselves. Their losses are said to have been immense; 4,000 dead are said to have been buried by the Turks; but before we believe this we must have more detailed and accurate information.

As regards Omer Pascha’s operations, he could do two things. Either come to the aid of Kars and march along the Tschoroch via Olti, in which case he would have risked arriving too late for the achievement of this objective, since he would then have had to lead his army on to the Armenian plateau, where the Russians are protected against an effective frontal attack by a strong line of fortresses and where Omer Pascha would have had no opportunity of attacking their flanks; or he would have had to march along the Rion to Kutais and from there across the mountains into the valley of the Kura to Tiflis. There he would encounter no fortified points of any importance and immediately threaten the centre of Russian power in Transcaucasia. A more effective means of recalling Murawjow from Armenia could not have been found, and our readers will remember that we have pointed out again and again that only this direction of operations offers the possibility of striking a heavy blow against the strength of the Russians in Asia. The suitable base of operations for this march would be Redut Kale; but since there is no safe harbour there, Omer Pascha has decided on Suchum Kale, where there is a good harbour and a better road along the coast. Whether the season is not already too far advanced for such serious undertakings we shall soon learn.