The mail of the Canada reached us last evening from Boston, 
with Gen. Pélissier’s report on the repulse of the Allies on the 18th 
of June (which will be found in our columns today) and with other 
documents which complete the history of that disastrous affair. 
Having thus before us all necessary sources of information, we 
proceed to give our readers an exact and impartial analysis of the 
entire operation. With regard to its general character it is enough 
to say that of the many blundering affairs we have had to notice in 
this Eastern war, this is by far the most perfect piece of bungling. 

The French advanced trenches were from 400 to 500, and the 
English from 500 to 700 yards from the Russian batteries.* These 
distances mark the lengths of road which the respective columns 
of attack had to pass over without cover from the Russian fire, 
and unsupported by the fire of their own artillery; with sharp 
running, then, such as would destroy every vestige of order, they 
would be exposed to a fire of grape and musketry during from 
three to five minutes, a time quite sufficient to completely 
disorganize them. This single fact is characteristic of the whole 
plan. Unless the enemy’s fire were completely silenced, and the 
accumulation of large masses of troops in the hostile works 
effectively prevented by incessant vertical shell firing, there was 
not the slightest chance of success. 

The Russians appear to have judged well of the plans of the 
Alhes, if they were not, as Pélissier supposes, fully acquainted with 

them. They but feebly replied to the besieging fire on the 17th, 
withdrew their guns behind the parapets during the day, and 
blinded the embrasures, so that scarcely any were disabled for the 
next day’s work. This was decidedly the best plan, as their object 
could not be to extinguish the enemy’s fire at that time. During 
the night the guns were brought back into their positions, the 
columns and reserves told off for the defense were stationed, and 
thus they were in a condition to meet any assault that could be 
made upon their position. 

The plan agreed upon between Pélissier and Raglan was to 
reopen their fire at daybreak on the 18th with all the vigor they 
could give to it for a couple of hours, and then on a sudden to 
launch simultaneously seven storming columns—one_ French 
against the bastion close to the Careening Bay, two French against 
the Malakoff bastion, three English against the Redan bastion and 
one English against the cluster of houses and the cemetery 
situated between the Redan and the head of the inner harbor. 
This plan was sensible enough if there was to be an assault at all; 
its execution would subdue the Russian fire and disperse the 
Russian masses concentrated for the defense before the actual 
attack took place. On the other hand, the allied troops would have 
to suffer from the Russian fire while crowding the trenches, and 
the defenders would very probably soon perceive the presence of 
columns destined to attack their position with the bayonet. But this 
was by far the lesser evil. The origina] plan therefore was the best 
that could be devised under the circumstances. 

However, we are informed that? very late in the evening Pélissier 
learned that the Russians intended again to attack the Mamelon in 
force on the 18th. This should have been considered a godsend, for 
the defense of the Mamelon against any force the Russians could 
bring against it must have been safe, or else how could the Mamelon ” 
serve as a base of operations for the assault upon the Malakoff? Thus 
the Russians, defeated in their assault upon the Mamelon, would 
have been in a sad plight to fight a second battle for the Malakoff, 
and it would almost appear that under these circumstances the 
success of the operation against the latter position must have been 

certain. Pélissier appears to have thought differently. He counter- 
manded, late at night, the cannonade, and ordered the assault for 3 
o'clock in the morning, the signal to be given by three rockets. The 
English were informed of this change of disposition. 

This proceeding ended, as it was sure to do, in the way 
Napoleon used to say of bungling Generals: Ordre, contre-ordre, 
désordre.* Half an hour before the appointed time, the extreme 
right French column somehow or other got engaged with the 
enemy. Whether the Russians drew them out by a false sally, or 
whether, as Pélissier says, the General” mistook a French shell for 
the signal rockets, is not quite clear. At all events, Pélissier had to 
hurry his signal, and the columns, still engaged in finding their 
proper places in the trenches, had to start in half confusion, and 
in part from different starting points from those assigned to them. 
The middle French column; intended to turn the flank of the 
Malakoff, effected its purpose and got into the Russian works; but 
the other two columns could make no headway in the hail-storm 
of case-shot and musketry which assailed them. Each column 
consisted of a brigade of four battalions; the second brigade of 
each division was in second line, while the Guard formed the 
general reserve. Thus nearly four ‘divisions, or 20,000 men,were at 
hand for the purpose. The second line was brought up to the 
support of the first attack, but in vain; the Guards were sent 
forward, and they were arrested and then thrown back as well. 
Two battalions only remained disposable. It was now half-past 
eight. The brigade of the middle column, which had penetrated 
into the works, was ejected; on every point the French had been 
repulsed with great loss and no fresh troops were at hand. The 
English had not succeeded either. Pélissier gave the order for the 
retreat, which he says was effected with “dignity.” 

On the English side the columns of attack were told off with 
that parsimoniousness characteristic of the British Army. The 
leading columns counted but 1,800 men each, or 1,000 men less 
than the French columns.‘ Of these 1,800, but 1,000 were intended 

for fighting—the rest for working parties. In second line, the 
remainder of the brigade from which the force was taken, say 
1,200 to 1,400 men, were behind each column. In third line, the 
second brigade of each division was behind its first brigade. 
Finally, the Guards and Highlanders (first division) formed the 
general reserve. Thus, of the whole English infantry assembled 
on the ground, but 7,200 men were to be launched in the first onset, 
and of these but 4,000 were actual combatants. This weakness in the 
first columns was caused, first, by the traditions of the British service, 
and, secondly, by their habit of attacking in line; for all reports lead 
to the conclusion that even in this instance they attacked in line, and 
thus offered a gratuitously large aim to the grape of the enemy. The 
complication caused by the arrangement of four different lines 
one behind another, in narrow and irregular trenches, created 
great disorder and mischief from the beginning, and would have 
created utter confusion had the struggle become anything like 
serious. 

The first and third columns (from right to left) were to turn the 
flanks of the Redan, while the second was to attack its salient angle 
as soon as they had succeeded. The fourth or extreme left 
column, as stated, had to attack the head of the inner harbor. 
When the signal was given, as was the case with the French, the 
columns were still in movement toward their respective positions. 
The first column, however, jumped over the parapet of the 
trenches and was instantly saluted with a murderous fire of 
case-shot. The troops, disordered by the climbing, could not form. 
Col. Yea, who commanded, was already shouting for a bugler to 
sound the retreat; no bugler was found, and on they went in great 
disorder. Some penetrated to the abattis surrounding the Redan, 
but in vain. The mass of the column fell back at once and sought 
the shelter of the trenches. The third column advanced a minute 
or two later. It missed its road, and assailed the face of the Redan 
near the apex, instead of the flank. It staggered forward under a 
tremendous hail of projectiles, but was broken and retreated in 
complete disorder in a very few minutes. The whole affair lasted 
less than fifteen minutes.* Thus ended the attack upon the Redan, 
before any of the complicated reserves of Lord Raglan had time to 
come up to its support. The second column was so startled by this 
sudden breakdown of its flanking bodies that it did not even stir 
out of the trenches. 

The fourth column, commanded by Maj. Gen. Eyre, whose 
report we publish,*? alone succeeded in establishing itself in the 
cemetery and the houses surrounding. Here about 1,800 men held 
out during the day. They could not retreat, for the ground behind 
them was open and under the cross fire of the Russians. Thus they 
fought as well as they could till 9 o’clock at night, when they effected 
their retreat during the darkness. Their losses amounted to more 
than one-third of their number. 

Thus ended Pélissier’s grand attack upon the Karabelnaya 
suburb. It was hastily determined upon, more hastily changed in 
its main features at a late period, and carried out with extreme 
blundering. The Russian was right who said to an English officer 
during the armistice of the 19th “Your Generals must have been 
drunk yesterday when they ordered the assault.” 

A newspaper correspondent writing from the scene describes it 
as “an infantry Balaklava.” ”? This is perfectly just, and sums up 
in the briefest manner the criticisms which all intelligent military 
men must make upon this calamitous repulse.” 

Written about July 6, 1855 Reproduced from the New-York 
Tribune, No. 4447, July 21, 1855, re-