Karl Marx

Austria and the War

Written at the end of August 1855.

From the English.

[New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4493, September 13, 1855, leader]

On another page we bring our readers the report of an Austrian officer on an inspection tour of Emperor Francis Joseph to the Galician army. The incidents of this journey related by the author and his remarks on the stations of the imperial forces confirm the opinion we have stated on previous occasions, that Austria, when it made warlike preparations last year, by no means acted a comedy to deceive the Western powers. It could certainly not enter upon such a sacrifice merely to throw dust in the eyes of the world.

It is true that Austria was brought to arm against Russia only by extreme necessity; and indeed, as long as a postponement was possible, Austria clung to the spider-thread of a prospect of peace held out as a bait by Russian diplomacy. At last, however, its patience was exhausted, and St. Petersburg learned, surprised and not without alarm, that Austrian columns were posted on the Galician frontier. This happened at a time when the Russians did not even admit the bare possibility of such an armament, and there could be no question of concentrating an army of equal strength on the Russian side in equally short time. Therefore, recourse had again to be made to the art of diplomacy. It need not be repeated in what manner and with what success this was undertaken. The whole huge army, which had only recently been drawn together on the Galician frontiers, was immediately dissolved, and thereby Russia’s apprehensions for that quarter were partially dispelled. We say partially, because with this army two important elements have made their appearance which do not disappear with the dissolution of the army. These are the fortifications and railways, which during the sojourn of the army in Galicia were erected, restored, or completed.

While in all other parts of the Empire the government allowed itself to be guided by the principle of leaving railway enterprises to private speculators, while the western railway which was to connect Vienna with Munich was even strikingly neglected, Baron Hess, the commander-in-chief in Galicia, employed thousands of soldiers in the construction of a line which, however great its strategic value may be, is at least for the present of doubtful commercial utility. The project for building this line might, under other circumstances, have remained in the desks of private engineers for another thirty years. There could be nothing more disagreeable for Russia than the construction of these railways, by which Austria is now in a position to reassemble the army just disbanded in not even a fifth part of the time that Russia would need to raise a similar army. Whoever may take the trouble to search through the statistics of the Austrian railway enterprise, and to compare what has been done in the East for purely political purposes with the slight attention paid to commercial interests in the West, cannot believe that the construction of these Galician railways was so hurried forward merely to mislead the world. It is indeed clear that a rapid completion of the western lines connecting Austria with Bavaria would have answered such a purpose far better.

Our opinion is confirmed to a still higher degree by the extensive improvements recently carried out and the increase of fortifications in the eastern provinces of Austria. If the construction of railways can be explained by strategic or other considerations, the erection and completion of a system of fortifications, and the unproductive expenditure entailed by such works, certainly admit of no explanation beyond the immediate need for them. What we have said about the proportionate extension of railway constructions in the East and West of Austria applies in a far higher degree to these fortifications. Of the thirty-six fortresses of the Austrian Empire, seven belong directly and nine indirectly to the eastern line of defence, most of which have only recently been developed to a high degree of perfection, as for instance Cracow, Przemysl, and Zaleszczyki. The two former, together with Lemberg, which cannot be more strongly fortified owing to its situation, command the road to Warsaw; the latter lies at the easternmost extremity of Galicia, opposite the important Russian fortress of Khotin. Cracow has been made a fortress of the first order, and all its works, as well as those of the other Galician fortresses, have been placed in complete readiness for war. It was once the custom in the Austrian army to entrust the command of fortresses to old worn-out generals, as a sort of honourable retirement, and such posts were regarded as a kind of exile for officers who had fallen into disgrace at court; but now we find throughout the East and North-East really able men, meritorious generals, and distinguished staff officers in command of the fortresses. Cracow is commanded by Field Marshal Wolter, Przemysl by Major-General Ebner, Zaleszczyki by Major-General Glaser, Karlsburg in Transylvania by General Sedlmayer, and Olmütz, on the north-western flank, by General von Böhm. At the same time, in the West it is just the opposite – there men and things are nearly ruins, quietly left to further decay. But how the picture there would change, should the Western powers take it into their heads to denounce Austria’s policy as equivocal! How the Austrian authorities would hurry to restore Linz with its forty Maximilian towers, now hardly considered a fortress, and Salzburg, once a stronghold of the first order! What do we see instead? Complete inaction and total absence of any warlike preparations. Even the soldiers returning from the East, where they hoped to reap laurels, lose their fighting spirit as soon as they approach the Bavarian frontier.

As these are facts which speak for themselves, there remains only one question to be cleared up, namely: through whose fault was Austrian policy thwarted, and this country burdened with an enormous additional debt, without immediate advantage to itself or to its ostensible allies? We know that the opinion is current in Vienna and repeated throughout Germany, that Austria drew back for fear of finding a second adversary in Prussia, and because a war undertaken without the aid of Germany would offer no guarantee of its speedy termination, as the exceptional position of the Empire requires. We must, however, insist on the opposite view. We consider that if Austria had boldly attacked the Russian army, then Prussia and the rest of Germany, more or less slowly or hesitatingly, would have been compelled to follow in its footsteps.

Who, then, must be held responsible for the present Austrian policy? England, under the leadership of that brilliant procrastinator and loquacious swaggerer, Lord Palmerston. To prove this assertion, one must leave the military camp and enter the diplomatic labyrinth. On July 23, Mr. Disraeli asked Lord John Russell for the authority for his statement that “one of the principal causes of the Crimean expedition was Austria’s refusal to cross the Pruth.” Lord John could not remember; that is, he said his “authority was a recollection in general.” Mr. Disraeli then put the same question to Lord Palmerston, who

“declined to answer any such questions, taken piecemeal out of a long series of negotiations between Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of one of the sovereigns who was, to a certain degree, an ally of Her Majesty’s. All he could say with regard to himself was that he had always been of the opinion that the Crimea was the place where the most effective blow could be struck against Russia’s preponderance in the Black Sea; and if there were no other reason, that, in his opinion, was quite sufficient for a campaign.” “My opinion,” he declared, “was that the Crimean expedition was the best step that could be taken.”

Thus we learn from Lord Palmerston that the Crimean campaign was initiated not by Austria, not by Bonaparte, but by himself. On June 26, Lord Lyndhurst, while making a violent attack upon Austria, stated that Austria

“at the beginning of June had resolved to call upon Russia to evacuate the Principalities. The summons had been couched in very harsh terms, implying a kind of threat to resort to force of arms if the demand were not complied with.”

After some historical remarks the learned lord continued:

“Did Austria immediately make any attack on Russia? Did she attempt to enter the Principalities? Far from it! She abstained from every action for several weeks, until the siege of Silistria was raised and the Russian army was in retreat, and after Russia herself had declared that she would evacuate the Principalities within a certain time and retire behind the Pruth.”

Thus Lord Lyndhurst accuses Austria of saying one thing and doing another. Lord Clarendon followed him in the debate, and from him we may get an idea of the genius which transformed the Austria of May and June into the Austria of July and August. He says,

“when Austria entered into her successive engagements with England and France, and made her extensive and costly warlike preparations – when she further proposed that military commissions from France and England should be sent to the headquarters of General Hess, she undoubtedly intended and expected war. But she likewise expected that, long before the season for the opening of warlike operations had arrived, the allied armies would have won decisive victories in the Crimea, that they would be free and able to undertake other operations in conjunction with her own forces. This was unfortunately not the case, and if Austria, at our invitation, had declared war, in all probability she would have had to carry it on alone.”

Thus Lord John Russell’s statement stands in direct contradiction to Lord Clarendon’s exposition. Lord John declares that the Crimean expedition was undertaken because Austria refused to cross the Pruth – that is, to take part in the war against Russia. Lord Clarendon tells us that Austria could not take part in the war against Russia on account of the Crimean expedition.

Next, we may usefully take into consideration an unrefuted statement by Lord Ellenborough:

Before the Crimean expedition was despatched, Austria proposed to enter into communication with the allied powers concerning future war operations; the allies, however, acting on preconceived opinions, despatched that expedition, and now Austria at once declared that it could not attack the Russians in isolation, and that the Crimean expedition forced it to adopt a different mode of procedure. At a later period, precisely at the beginning of the Vienna Conferences, when it was of the utmost importance that Austria should act with us – at this time, still exclusively preoccupied with the success of your operations in the Crimea, you withdrew 50,000 good Turkish troops from Austria’s immediate neighbourhood, and thus deprived it of the only assistance upon which it could count in the event of a war expedition against Russia. It is therefore clear, my Lords, as also follows from the declarations of the noble Earl, that it was our ill-advised Crimean expedition which paralysed Austria’s policy and drove it into such a difficult position that it was at once prevented from pursuing a course consonant with its honour, its dignity and its interests. Before this expedition sailed for the Crimea, I ventured to indicate to the government what its necessary consequences would be. I pointed out the effect which this expedition would produce upon Austria’s policy.

Lord Ellenborough’s advice was not followed. Palmerston despatched the Crimean expedition at the very moment when its departure was best calculated to prevent and hinder Austria’s hostilities against Russia. It almost looks as if he had intended to render assistance to the great enemy of England, and as if he had deliberately brought Austria into its present ambiguous position in the Principalities, in order to deliver it over to Russian diplomacy and to push it still nearer to the edge of the abyss into which it must finally sink. In this affair, as in so many others during his long and inglorious career, Palmerston has achieved brilliant successes in the defence of Russia’s interests, whatever his real design may have been.