Nr. 463, 4. Oktober 1855.
Mittagblatt

X. London, 29. September. (The Storming of Sebastopol.) On 8 September, 5 French and detachments of 2 English divisions were engaged. Out of about 45,000 men, the Allies lost, by their own admission, 10,000, i.e. nearly every fourth man. The Russian loss cannot be determined. According to General Niel’s report, the French had pushed their trenches close up to the Russian works on all points. Opposite the Little Redan (Bastion No. 1) and the Malakoff (Bastion No. 2), the head of the sap was only 25 yards from the Russian ditch. At the Flagstaff Bastion (Bastion No. 4) the distance was 30, at the Central Bastion (No. 5) 40 yards. On all these points, therefore, the assault columns were drawn up close to the objects of the assault. The English, despite the remonstrances of French engineers, had abandoned sapping 240 yards from the Great Redan (Bastion No. 3). The absurdity of this proceeding has already been pointed out. The French general distributed his forces as follows: Against the key of the whole position, the Malakoff, Mac Mahon’s Division; to the right of the Malakoff, against the curtain connecting it with Bastion No. 1, La Motterouge’s Division; on the extreme right, against Bastion No. 1 itself, Dulac’s Division. Mac Mahon had as reserve a division of Guards under General Mellinet. Thus far the French attack on the Karabelnaya side. On the town side, the Flagstaff Bastion, which forms a kind of advanced citadel on very strong ground and possesses inner works of considerable strength, was not to be attacked directly in front. Instead, the Central Bastion was to be stormed by Levaillant’s Division, which, in the event of success, was to be followed by d’Autemarre’s Division and was to turn the gorge of the Flagstaff Bastion. Simultaneously, it was then to be stormed in front by Cialdini’s Piedmontese brigade, which was concentrated in the trenches. The position between the Malakoff and the Flagstaff Bastion was occupied by the English. They were to attack the Redan. The Malakoff was to be stormed first, and after its capture the remaining columns were to advance upon their respective objectives. The Malakoff was a large redoubt, on the summit of the commanding hill from which it takes its name, closed on all sides, but with openings in the rear for the admission of reinforcements. It was connected by a curtain, on its right and left, with the Great and Little Redan. These too were closed redoubts, containing smaller works intended as redoubts, while their rear faces, whose embrasures were turned towards the interior of the redoubts, formed regular traverses (coupures). The gorges of these traverses were in turn connected with the Malakoff by a second, inner curtain, which formed a second line of defence. The interior of the Great and Little Redan was fairly free of obstacles and therefore completely commanded by the fire of the traverses and redoubts. The case was different with the Malakoff, on which the enemy’s fire had been concentrated since the capture of the Mamelon. Along its ramparts it was crammed with hollow traverses, which afforded bomb-proof shelter to the gunners and troops on duty, while its interior was filled with blockhouses, bomb-proof covered, serving as barracks, and wholly unsuited for defence against assault columns. When the first news of the capture of the Malakoff arrived, we expressed the view that the Russians had undoubtedly committed the same mistake as in the construction of the Kamchatka Redoubt on the Mamelon – namely, that, in order to secure themselves against the enemy’s fire, they had rendered the interior unusable for defence against assault by breaking it up into a series of small chambers. This view is now fully confirmed by General Niel’s report. The labyrinth of the Malakoff, like that of the Mamelon, proved indefensible. In ten minutes it was carried, never to be retaken. The French arrangements for the assault on the Malakoff are admirable. Everything had been foreseen and everything stood in readiness. A new kind of bridges, which have not been described, was used to cross the ditch. In less than a minute they were laid. Scarcely had the assault begun when the sappers constructed a flying sap from the trenches to the ditch, cut broad passages through the Russian breastworks, filled up the opposite ditch and formed a passable way into the interior of the Malakoff redoubt, on which reinforcements, reserves and even field guns could move. As soon as the whole redoubt was taken, the passages in the gorge were rapidly closed, embrasures cut, field guns brought up, and in a couple of hours, before the Russians could think of a serious attempt to retake the work, it was completely turned against themselves, and they came too late. Gunners stood ready to spike the guns in case of need, and infantry detachments carried short-handled entrenching tools in their belts. This attack took place under the immediate superintendence of Pélissier and Niel. The other attacks were on the whole unsuccessful, and particularly that on the Central Bastion miscarried. This assault under General de Salles was evidently undertaken with altogether insufficient forces, for as soon as the French reached the Russian breastwork, they were forced to seek cover behind it. The assault degenerated into a skirmishing fire and was therefore necessarily repulsed. The attack on the Little Redan was extremely bloody and the positions were defended with especial bravery by the Russians, who here alone repulsed five French brigades. We have on earlier occasions pointed out the absurdity of the system prevailing in the British Army, of making the assault columns so weak that they must be regarded as lost posts as soon as they encounter any serious resistance. This routine is based on the fact that the fortresses with which the English chiefly had to deal, particularly Wellington in Spain, were built after the old Italo-Spanish system and could therefore rarely contain more than 500 men. Just as everything becomes traditional with the English, so their method of assault – even though the assumptions on which it rests may have long since vanished. Thus Lord Raglan – with what success is known – imitated the old Wellington manner on 18 June. Instead of being taught by his misfortune, Simpson considered it his duty not only to imitate Raglan, but even to outdo him. On 8 September Simpson had 25,000 men on the spot. Of these he entrusted the actual assault to a number of 1,800. The attacks on the Redan, the Central Bastion and the Little Redan were, to a certain degree, merely demonstrations. The assault on the Great Redan assigned to the English, however, had a special significance. It was the position which would have rendered the capture of the Malakoff immediately decisive, because, while the Malakoff by its height commanded the Redan, the Redan in its turn commanded the approaches to the Malakoff and, once carried, would have taken in flank all Russian columns marching up that hill. The fall of the Malakoff decided the Russians to abandon the whole southern side; the fall of the Redan would have compelled them, at the very least, to clear the Karabelnaya in all haste, before they could have organised the well-arranged system of destruction by fire and explosion, under the cover of which they now effected a safe retreat. The English army, by the blunders of its general, thus prevented the completion of the victory. The crown of the day belongs to Generals Bosquet and Mac Mahon. Bosquet commanded the entire French assault on the right, and Mac Mahon commanded the division that held the Malakoff. The Russians fought with their usual passive bravery. The Malakoff was evidently taken by surprise. The garrison was at dinner, and only the artillery stood by its guns, ready for the attack.