Neue Oder-Zeitung.  
Nr. 409, 3 September 1855.  
Mittagblatt

X. London, 31 August. (On the Battle of the Tschernaja.) While we are still without a detailed Russian report on the Battle of the Tschernaja (of 16 August), the French and English reports for once allow us to form a fairly precise judgement of this affair. The defeat of 18 June seems to have checked to some degree the tendency to boastfulness that was so conspicuous in Pélissier’s first bulletins. His report on the Tschernaja affair is unusually clear, businesslike, and simple; he even acknowledges the bravery displayed by the Russians on this occasion, and compares favourably with General Simpson’s comical computations of the number of forces mutually engaged, according to which about 15,000 French and Sardinians, without any particular exertion, were supposed to have defeated 60,000 Russians.

On the morning of the 16th, before daybreak, the Russians came down from the Mackenzie heights and took up a position on the edge of the hills that slope down towards the Tschernaja. They were commanded by General Gortschakoff in person, under whom General Read commanded the right wing (7th and 12th divisions), while Liprandi appears to have occupied the centre, and the 17th division formed the Russian left wing. Parts of the 4th and 6th divisions were also present in the role of reserves, it seems. The 5th division, as well as the troops belonging to the 4th and 6th, are components of the 2nd Corps (Paniutin’s), which had only just arrived in the Crimea; the rest consist of old Crimean troops, whose divisions must have acted with much weakened effective numbers.

The ground on the opposite side of the Tschernaja is mostly flat, a continuation of the plain of Balaklava towards the river, but close to its banks this plain is broken by two groups of small hills, which rise in terraces from the Balaklava side, but fall away steeply on the side of the Tschernaja, thus forming a good defensive position against an enemy crossing the river. Between these two groups of hills lies the valley into which the British light cavalry made its famous charge in the Battle of Balaklava.

The eastern group of hills, forming the right wing of the position, was occupied by General Della Marmora with his 2 Sardinian divisions; the other group, to the north-west, by 3 French divisions, which thus formed the centre and the left wing of the position. The French were commanded by General d’Herbillon, who had posted Camou’s division on the left, Faucheux’s on the right wing, and his own in the centre. Faucheux’s division extended on the right wing to the point where it joined the Sardinian division of Trotti.

The position had, besides its strength, two obstacles immediately in front of it: first, the Tschernaja, a river that at the time was indeed fordable, but nevertheless obliged the Russians to cross it only at certain points and with a narrow front; second, the aqueduct, which at most places was hewn into the rock and thus, even after its passage, presented a steep rock wall to climb. On the edge of the hills, the French and Piedmontese had thrown up some light breastworks, just sufficient to shelter their artillery. The two groups of hills formed, as it were, distinct bastions, mutually flanking each other with their artillery.

On the far side of the Tschernaja, which was crossed by bridges at Tschorgun on the Sardinian extreme right wing and at Traktir in front of the French centre, the Piedmontese had two companies of outposts, while the bridge of Traktir was covered by a weak bridgehead occupied by the French. The French outposts stood further back.

On the morning of the 16th, after the Russians had brought their artillery into position on the heights east of the Tschernaja, they sent their advanced troops down into the valley. Day had not yet dawned, and a dense fog facilitated a surprise, as at Inkermann. The allied outposts were in an instant driven back, and by daybreak the bridgehead and the entire east bank of the river were in their hands, while they were fighting with 2 French regiments for the bridge crossing.

Thereupon the 7th and 12th divisions, placed directly opposite the French divisions of Camou and d’Herbillon, descended into the valley in two solid columns; here they formed their assault columns and advanced in two distinct masses. The 7th division crossed the river partly by wading, partly by hastily constructing flying bridges, and marched against Camou. The 12th division, a part of which remained behind as a reserve, advanced against d’Herbillon across the bridge of Traktir, whose defenders were in an instant thrown back by the overwhelming masses of the Russians.

They advanced with more swiftness and fire than the Russians had ever shown before, up through the aqueduct and up the hillside. The 7th (Russian) division had come fairly close to the edge of the hill, when Camou’s troops, deployed in line, gave them a volley and then attacked them on the flank and in the rear with such violence that the Russians immediately turned and recrossed the river under a murderous fire. If we are to believe Pélissier, this 7th division did not reappear during the battle.

In the centre, the 12th division succeeded in scaling the heights and driving back several French regiments. The fate of the battle seemed for a moment uncertain, when d’Herbillon ordered a brigade of Faucheux’s division to attack the left flank of the Russian columns, and after a short struggle the Russians were driven down the slope, followed by the French, who for a short time recaptured the bridge. Gortschakoff, however, had prepared a new attack. The remainder of the 12th division and the 5th division had descended into the valley; they supported the fugitives, who reformed their ranks, and now the 12th and 5th divisions advanced together for a second attack. They crossed by the bridge and closely to its right and left, and advanced with great animation against the allied centre (d’Herbillon’s and Faucheux’s divisions). But by this time the French had brought the whole of their artillery into position; they fired to the front against the Russian columns, while the Sardinian artillery took them in the flank. Despite this murderous fire, they advanced steadily and swiftly, and again reached the heights. Here they found the French concentrated, deployed in line somewhat behind the edge of the hill. As soon as the heads of the columns had reached the edge, the French gave them a volley and then attacked them with the bayonet, in front and in flank. The struggle was as brief as before. The Russians gave way and fled in disorder across the river, pursued by the musketry and artillery fire of the Allies. This second defeat of the Russians decided the battle in fact. The Russians had engaged three-quarters of their infantry and could not hope to receive fresh reinforcements on the battlefield. The Allies, it is true, had also engaged 3 out of their 5 divisions, but fresh troops were hurrying to their support from the camp before Sebastopol. Pélissier had sent for two more divisions of the line and one division of Guards, and they were on the move. This was about 8 o’clock in the morning. Gortschakoff, despite this threatening conjuncture, resolved upon a third attack.

The 17th division was ordered forward; it was at the same time to form the nucleus for the part of the defeated troops that was still capable of being led against the enemy. The line of attack was again shifted towards the left. It was Faucheux’s division that the Russians fell upon this time. But in vain. The crossfire of the French and Sardinian artillery decimated them before they could reach the crest of the hills; again the French lines broke their columns and drove them to the other side of the river, while the Piedmontese (Trotti’s division) attacked them in the flank and completed the victory. There remained only the troops of the 4th and 6th divisions untouched, together approximately of the effective strength of one division. To launch them would have been utterly useless.

Neue Oder-Zeitung.  
Nr. 411, 4 September 1855.  
Mittagblatt

X. London, 1 September. (On the Battle of the Tschernaja.) (Conclusion). We yesterday recounted the simple course of the Battle of the Tschernaja. For a correct estimate of the number of troops mutually engaged, it is necessary to await the Russian reports. As for the mutual losses, however, we can unconditionally assume that the number of dead, wounded, and prisoners on the Russian side amounts to at least 5,000, on the side of the Allies at most 1,500. This immense disproportion is explained by the fact that the Russians continually made their attacks under the heavy artillery fire of the Allies, and especially suffered from the Piedmontese 16-pounders — a piece of ordnance that is very difficult to move, but, once brought into position, of the highest efficacy.

The Russians made a simple frontal attack. Two roads for turning the position stood open to them. They could have fallen upon the French left wing in flank from Inkerman, or upon the French right wing, by descending with the main body of their assault column into the valley of Baidar. The first operation appeared impossible, because the French artillery planted on the crest of the mountain ridge opposite Inkerman commanded the position. The latter was impracticable with such unwieldy troops as the Russians, on account of the broken and difficult valley terrain. The Russians were therefore obliged to make a frontal attack, and sought, as is customary, to effect this by a surprise. The surprise succeeded in part, but was not carried out with the necessary energy.

Thus the enemy gained the time that was required to bring up his troops and place his artillery in position. The surprise that might have delivered the French heights into the hands of the Russians had in fact almost ceased when they had only reached the Chernaya. This is further proof of how difficult it is to set Russian troops in motion where rapid action and independent intervention by the lower commanders are required.

The French had always been notorious for a certain contempt for outpost duty. Even in their best times it had been possible for an active enemy to surprise the outposts and thus throw their ranks into momentary alarm. This time the neglect was all the more striking as Pélissier had been repeatedly informed by Russian deserters—and still on the eve of the battle—about the Russian plans. Moreover, the French were encamped on the heights without any proportionate advance guard, so that the enemy could advance before they themselves were in a position to bring their full power of resistance into play. This might have proved decisive against an active enemy. The Russians themselves seem to have dreaded risking one or two divisions in a fight during the uncertain twilight. Thus they lost all the advantages of surprise.

The rapid success of the French in driving the Russians from the chain of hills is owed to an imitation of English warfare. To deploy one’s own troops in line behind the crests of the hills, to wait calmly until the heads of the enemy columns show themselves, then to greet them with a volley which they can only answer with feeble musket fire, and then to attack with the bayonet—this method of defending a range of hills seemed to have been entirely lost in continental practice and preserved only in textbooks of tactics. The English, on the other hand, applied it continually with the same success at Busaco, Pamplona, Waterloo, and in other battles. The battle on the Chernaya forms the third “great” battle of the Crimean campaign. It takes its place alongside the battles of the Alma and Inkerman. What characterises all these battles is their enormous simplicity, one might almost say simple-mindedness. No lengthy manoeuvring, a few main attacks, rapid decision. In the Napoleonic battles, on the other hand, we find a great deal of skirmishing, manifold manoeuvres, and the main blow only delivered unexpectedly after the greater part of the troops had been provisionally engaged. The Crimean fashion looks bolder, but proves in fact only the mediocrity of the generals on both sides and confirms our view that in modern times the art of war has developed in inverse ratio to the material of war.

If the battle of the Chernaya testifies by no means as decisively against the Russians as the battle of Inkerman, it nonetheless proves once more beyond dispute the superiority of the Western armies. It points out to the prophets who, under the pretext of having discovered a “new” element in history, only give modern colour and form to their old school recollections about the fall of the Roman Empire, that they must look elsewhere than among the Muscovites for substitutes for the Goths.

In the *Morning Advertiser* Sir Charles Napier publishes, as he had long threatened, the correspondence carried on between him and Sir James Graham.