Neue Oder-Zeitung.
Nr. 301, 2. Juli 1855.
Mittagblatt

X. London, 29. Juni. (Über die Ereignisse in der Krim.) We have only been in possession of the detailed and official reports on the events of 6, 7, and 8 June for a few days. June 6 and 7 were devoted to a cannonade along the whole line of the allied batteries. But whereas on the left attack (from the Flagstaff Bastion to the Quarantine Bastion) this cannonade remained a mere demonstration, it was meant seriously on the right attack (from the Redan to Mount Sapoun). Here the Russian works were subjected to a particularly heavy fire. When their fire seemed sufficiently silenced and their defenders sufficiently weakened, on the evening of the 7th, an assault was ordered. The French had two positions to take, forming two plateaux, separated from one another by a ravine; the English one plateau, with a ravine on each side. The manner in which the two armies prepared for the assault was characteristic of their peculiar capabilities and traditions. The French brought into action 4 divisions, 2 for each separate attack. Thus two divisions were concentrated against the Green Mamelon (Kamchatka Redoubt), and two others against Mount Sapoun, and each attack with two brigades, in separate columns, in front for the assault, and two brigades in reserve. 18 battalions therefore had to charge and 18 to support them, together 36 battalions numbering 30,000 men. This disposition accords entirely with the regulations and traditions of the French army, which always attacks in columns in great charges and sometimes in excessively unwieldy ones. The English, if similarly formed, would have required two divisions for the part of the work falling to them, and two brigades for the assault and two for the reserve. But true to their own system, they detached for the charge about 1,000 men, or roughly 2 battalions, scarcely amounting to half a French brigade. They had undoubtedly strong reserves, but nevertheless employed only one man where the French would have used three. This is a consequence partly of the British system of attacking in line instead of in columns, and partly of the great tenacity of the British soldier in defensive positions. The 1,000 British troops were not all unleashed at once; first 200 charged and took the Russian works; the rest followed in the same manner, and these British soldiers, once established in the Russian position, held it against successive attacks and under the continuous frontal and enfilading fire from the Russian works. When morning broke, over half of their number were dead or wounded; but the place belonged to them, and some had here and there pursued the Russians right into the Redan. This was a feat of arms of which 1,000 Frenchmen would not have been capable. But the passive endurance of the British soldier under fire knows scarcely any limit, and when, as on that night, the hand-to-hand fighting assumes the form of his favourite kind of combat, street brawling, he is in his own element and will lay about him with fanaticism, one against six.

As regards the French attack, General Pélissier gives us long enumerations of the brigades and regiments engaged in it and a compliment for all; but his account of the respective positions and lines of attack of each column is thoroughly unclear, whilst his report on the course of the action is almost unintelligible, and his statement of the losses is entirely absent. By comparing this official bulletin with other reports we can gather that the French took the Mamelon at the first assault, followed the retreating Russians as far as the Malakoff Bastion, penetrated into it, were thrown back by the Russians, lost the Mamelon again, formed up behind it in a semicircle, and after a new attack finally took possession of it. On the other side of the Careening Bay ravine, the Volhynian Redoubt was taken with slight loss; the struggle for the Selenginsk Redoubt, which lies behind it, was more serious, but cannot be compared with that for the Mamelon. In consequence of the excessive number of troops which Pélissier hurled at the points attacked, and of the unwieldy columns which the French were thus compelled to form, their loss must have been very considerable, as is confirmed by the official silence about the number of killed and wounded.

The Russians find themselves in peculiar circumstances. They could not garrison these advanced works with numerous troops, since this would have exposed them to certain destruction by the enemy’s fire, even before the assault began. Thus they could keep only a minimum of defenders in these redoubts and had to rely on the commanding fire of their artillery from the Malakoff and the Redan, as well as on the action of the reserves. They had 2 battalions, approximately 800 men, in the Mamelon. The Mamelon Redoubt was in addition so complicated in its construction—intersected by a kind of improvised casemates—that, although well covered against artillery, its garrison was almost helpless against an assault, since each compartment barely sufficed to harbour one cannon and one man to serve it. As soon, therefore, as the gun was dismounted, the infantry, assigned to the defence of the work against an assault, had no space for a position from which to act upon the assault columns by simultaneous fire in mass. Broken up into small detachments, it succumbed to the impetuosity of the attackers, and proved once again that, where it cannot fight in large masses, it equals neither the French in intelligence, fire, and quickness of eye, nor the English in desperate bulldog courage.

The engagement of the 7th was followed by ten days’ quiet, during which trenches were pushed forward and connected, batteries laid out, and cannon and ammunition brought up. At the same time reconnaissances were carried out into the interior of the country. The first towards the Baidar Valley, 12 miles from Balaklava on the road to the south coast. The second, towards Aitodor, 6 miles beyond Tchorguna on the Chernaya, was made in the right direction. Aitodor lies on the elevated tract of land that leads to the valley of the upper Belbek, where alone, as we established long ago, the Russian position at Inkerman can be turned. But to send a column for reconnaissance to that point and not to follow up this step at once by occupying the tract of land and beginning operations—what does that mean except giving the enemy warning of the side from which he is threatened? The intention of a flank march to outflank the enemy was indicated too clearly by this manoeuvre to be misunderstood by the Russians. Instead of following up this feeble demonstration in the field, Pélissier made the unlucky attack of 18 June, on the orders of the man who declared before the Chamber of Peers that ‘it was his special calling to avenge Waterloo’. He is responsible only for the manner in which Pélissier carries out the order. We still lack all closer reports to judge the tactical part of this affair. As for the strategic aspect, every child now grasps that the nearest way to Sevastopol leads over Inkerman and the Russian defensive army there.

The necessity of reinforcing the Crimean army has long been felt by Russia. The completion of the reserve battalions of the regular army and the raising and organisation of the militia (Opolchenie) into 200 battalions, as well as especially the reduction of the Austrian army of observation, now afford the opportunity for this. A reserve army has been formed at Odessa, of which around 25,000 men are said to be stationed at Nikolayev, 12–15 days’ march from Sevastopol. Two divisions of grenadiers are said to be on the march from Volhynia. By the middle of July, therefore, and perhaps earlier, the Russians may have regained their numerical superiority, unless the troops now facing the enemy suffer decisive defeats in the meantime. We hear, it is true, that 50,000 French are marching to Toulon and Marseilles for embarkation, but they certainly arrive too late and can do little more than fill the gaps caused in the ranks by battle and disease (now reappearing).