New-York Daily Tribune.
Nr. 4524, 19. Oktober 1855

Those who expected the Atlantic, which arrived yesterday, to bring decisive intelligence from the Crimea were disappointed. It is true we hear that the fleet has
sailed from before Sevastopol on a secret expedition, to which conjecture gives
the destination of Odessa or Nicola'ieff, and that a body of the French cavalry
have had a successful engagement with some Russian horse at a place fifteen
miles north of Eupatoria, in which they took six guns and a hundred and sixty
prisoners, with the loss of six men killed and twenty-seven wounded on the
French side. Of this event we have no details, nor any information to show that it
was anything more than an accidental encounter between an outpost of the allied
army about Eupatoria—said to be about forty thousand strong—and a similar
force of the Russians. Still, it is very likely that this affair is the opening of a
powerful movement in that direction, especially as the reconnoitering parties sent
on the Russian left flank toward Ai'todor and the upper outlets of the Baidar
valley report that there is no chance of turning the Russians by that work, all the
passes being intrenched and strongly guarded.

On the other hand, the Russians were busy on the north side of Sevastopol
evacuating certain magazines; but as these were exposed to the fire of the French
batteries, this operation cannot be taken as a certain symptom of retreat. Many
indications, however, tend to show that the mass of the Russian troops has taken
up a more central position near Sympheropol and Bakshiserai, from which it can
move with equal rapidity either toward the Mackenzie position, the Upper Belbeck, or the Alma, according to circumstances. This step has been rendered
necessary by the fall of the south side of the fortress and the consequent setting at
liberty of the whole of the allied siege-corps. As long as the south side held out
this was the point on which both parties had to concentrate their energies; now
there is no longer such a center for the contest, and the long line from Mackenzie
to the south coast near Yalta becomes the front of defense of the Russians. A
long line, especially in such broken ground as is this corner of the Crimea, can
only be defended by placing the main body so far to the rear that it is enabled to
reach every point liable to be attacked with equal facility; in this case, however,

the proximity to the Russian rear of a hostile station like Eupatoria obliges them
to draw their main body still further backward. For, with their steam fleets, the
Allies could in a single night so reénforce the army of Eupatoria as to enable it to
take a very energetic offensive against the Russian communications, unless the
mass of the Russians, grouped somewhere about Sympheropol, could send reénforcements to the small corps of observation now before that town. The question now is, whether the desire to place the main force so that it can assist every
point with equal facility, has not necessitated its removal to such a distance from
Mackenzie, Ai'todor, and the Upper Belbeck that a vigorous attack on one of
these points, combined with well-conducted demonstrations against the others,
might overthrow the detachments placed there before the main body could arrive.
To decide this, however, the exact dislocation of the Russian army should be
known.
That the Russians are in an actual movement of retreat toward Perekop we
have no direct evidence to show, but the stoppage of the forwarding of supplies
from Odessa and the arresting of the forward march of the reénforcements from
that neighborhood, are strong indications of an intention not to engage at present
any more of the resources of Russia in the Crimea. Very likely all decisive movements are stopped until the Emperor has arrived, and a great council of war been
held to decide on the conduct of the war during the Winter. Meantime, the
available reserves and even the first army-corps, the only one except the guards
which was still intact, are marching southward, being replaced in their late positions by the militia.
The Atlantic brings us some Russian documents on the late decisive events at
Sevastopol including Gorchakoff s siege journal up to Sept. 7, the eve of the
assault. A portion of it is transferred to our columns, showing how hotly contested every inch of ground was during the last month of the siege. During this
time the Russians admit having lost from five hundred to one thousand men
daily, or about twenty-two thousand in all. Add to these the eight thousand lost
on the Chernaya, and ten thousand probably lost during the assault, and we
arrive at forty thousand men disabled or killed, amounting to nearly the effective
force of a Russian army-corps! Such a loss in a single month in action alone
(beside the men lost by sickness) does indeed justify Gorchakoff in saying that he
had resolved on abandoning the south side even before the assault was given.

Sevastopol was certainly becoming too dear for Russia. A detailed history of this
last and most severe period of the siege must prove highly interesting whenever it
may be published. The fire of from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred guns, the
rifle-pit war on the whole of the long front, the subterraneous war of mines
carried on with an energy recalling the time before Vauban, the pushing of

trenches up to the edge of the ditch in four or five different places—all this is so
colossal in comparison to the common sieges figuring in military history that,
even with the many errors committed on both sides, this siege will form one of
the most memorable military events of all time. Its greatest importance, however,
is this: that it has forever demonstrated the immense strength of large fortresses,

forming in themselves a pivot for an army. If Sevastopol could do this, what
might not be done by Paris?

Fortresses, where they have not a merely local importance, can in future but
form the nuclei of large intrenched camps, protected in most instances by detached forts of permanent construction. Fortresses, and groups of fortresses espedaily, will have a value so long only as they can serve as pivots for an army in the
field, which again protects them from permanent blockade. Theoretical writers
had recognized this long since, but practice had never shown an example of a
defense demonstrating it on a large scale. Sevastopol has done so, and hence its
great importance for military history.