Our columns, this morning, contain the official French, English, 
and Russian reports of a contest between the antagonists at 
Sevastopol. It was sufficiently important to require, in addition to 
the official documents, some words of explanation and comment 
from us. 

About a month ago, from the generally-successful sorties of the 
Russians, we came to the conclusion that the trenches had been 
pushed forward to a point at which the force of the besieged was 
equal to that of the besiegers*; in other words, that the proximity 
of the trenches was such as to enable the Russians to bring, in a 
sally, to any portion of the trenches, a force at least equal to what 
the Allies could bring up during the first hour or two hours. As 
an hour or two are quite sufficient to destroy the rivetings, and to 
spike the guns of a battery, the natural consequence was, that 
beyond this point the Allies could not push their approaches. 
Since then the siege came to a stand, until the arrival? of three 
French brigades (one of the Eighth, and two of the Ninth 
Division) allowed them to relieve part of the English infantry, and 
to establish stronger trench-guards. At the same time, the arrival 

of Generals Niel and Jones, of the Engineers, gave fresh activity to 
the siege operations, and remedied mistakes caused, principally, by 
the obstinacy of the French General Bizot, and by the numeric 
weakness of the British infantry. New approaches were now 
pushed forward, especially on the English side, where a parallel 
was opened at about 300 yards from the Russian works on the hill 
of Malakoff. Some of the batteries now erected were so far toward 
the Inkermann side that they would have taken part of the 
Russian batteries in the rear, or enfiladed them, as soon as their 
fire could be opened. Against these new lines the Russians have 
just taken a step which has been carried out with uncommon skill 
and _ boldness.* 

The Russian lines, as every plan shows, extend in a semicircular 
arch round the town, from the head of the Quarantine Bay to that - 
of the inner war harbor, and thence to the head of the Careening 
Bay. This latter bay is a small creek, formed by the extremity of a 
deep ravine, extending from the great harbor or Bay of. 
Sevastopol far up the plateau on which the Allies are en- 
camped.* On the western side of this ravine. extends a range 
of hights forming the Russian lines; the most considerable of 
these elevations is the hill of Malakoff, forming, by its com- 
manding position, the key of the whole Russian right. On the eastern 
side of the ravine and the Careening Bay, another elevation is 
situated, which, being completely under the fire both of the Russian 
batteries and of their men-of-war, remained out of the reach of 
the Allies as long as they could not completely interrupt the 
communication of Sevastopol with Inkermann, which was pro- 
tected by the fire of the forts and batteries on the north side of 
the harbor. But since the Allies had found positions to the east 
and south-east of Malakoff, for batteries to take in the Russian 
lines, flank and rear, this neutral hill had become important. 
Accordingly, on the night of February 21, the Russians sent a 
party of workmen to erect on it a redoubt, planned beforehand by 
their engineers.” In the morning the long trench and a beginning 
of parapets behind it, were visible to the Allies. They appear to 
have been entirely unable to understand the meaning of this; 
accordingly, they were content to let well alone. Next morning, 
however, the redoubt was all but complete, at least in its outline, 
for the sequel showed that the profile, that is, the depth of the 
ditch and strength of the parapet, was still very weak. By this time 

the Allies began to find out that this work was admirably situated 
to enfilade their own enfilading batteries, and thus to make them 
all but useless. The engineers protested that this work must be 
taken at any cost. Accordingly, Canrobert organized with the 
greatest secrecy, a storming column, consisting of about 1,600 
Zouaves and 3,000 Marines. The orders having to be given at a 
late hour, and all on a sudden, some delay occurred in collecting 
the troops at the rendezvous, and it was 2 o'clock on the morning 
of the 24th before they could start for the assault, the Zouaves 
leading. A short march brought them up to twenty yards from the 
ditch. As usual in assaults, not a shot was to be fired; the soldiers 
were made to take off the percussion-caps from their guns to 
prevent their being entangled in useless and dilatory firing. All at 
once, a few Russian words of command were heard; a strong body 
of Russians in the interior of the redoubt, rose from the ground, 
leveled their guns over the top of the parapet, and poured a volley 
into the advancing column. From the darkness and the well known 
inveterate habit of soldiers in intrenchments to fire always straight 
across the parapet, this volley can have had but little effect upon 
the narrow head of the column.* The Zouaves, hardly detained by 
the sloping sides of the incomplete ditch and rampart, in a 
moment were in the redoubt, and rushed at their opponents with 
the bayonet. A terrible hand-to-hand struggle took place. After 
some time the Zouaves possessed themselves of one-half of the 
redoubt, and, at a later period, the Russians entirely abandoned it 
to them. In the mean time, the marines, following the Zouaves at a 
short distance, either lost their way, or from some other reason, 
stopped on the brink of the hill. Here they were assailed in each 
flank by a Russian column, which, after a desperate resistance, 
drove them down the hill. During or shortly after this struggle, 
daylight must have dawned, for the Russians speedily retired from 
the hill—leaving the redoubt in the possession of the Zouaves— 
upon whom now opened all the Russian artillery which could be 
brought to bear on the spot. The Zouaves lay down for a moment, 
while some rifle volunteers, who had accompanied them, crept up 
to the Malakoff works, trying to fire at the Russian gunners 
through the embrasures. But the fire was too heavy; and, before 
long, the Zouaves had to retreat on the side toward Inkermann, 
which sheltered them against most of the batteries. They profess 
to have carried all their wounded with them. 

This little affair was carried out with great bravery by the 

Zouaves and a Gen. Monet, and with great skill combined with 
their usual tenacity by the Russians. They consisted of the two 
regiments of Selenghinsk and Volhynia, the strength of which, 
after several campaigns, cannot have exceeded 500 men per 
battalion, or 4,000 men in all. Gen. Kroushoff commanded them.* 
Their arrangements were so admirable that the French declare 
that the whole plan of attack must have been known to them. The 
attack upon the marines was completely and almost instantaneous- 
ly successful, while their retreat out of the incomplete redoubt had 
the effect of exposing the unfortunate and unsupported Zouaves 
to an overwhelming fire, which must have remained silent as long 
as the struggle within the redoubt was going on. 

Gen. Canrobert found that this defeat had a very great effect on 
his troops. Their impatience which had made itself remarkable on 
various occasions, now broke out with full force. The assault upon 
the town was demanded by the soldiers. The word of treason, that 
everlasting excuse for a defeat suffered by the French, was loudly 
pronounced, and Gen. Forey, without any apparent reason, was 
even nominally pointed out as the party who betrayed to the 
enemy the secret resolutions of the French Council of War. So 
confused was Canrobert, that in one breath he wrote an order of 
the day representing the whole affair as a brilliant though relative 
success, and a note to Lord Raglan proposing an immediate 
assault, a proposal which Lord Raglan, of course, declined.” 

The Russians, on their part, maintained their new redoubt, and 
have since been busy completing it. This position is of great 
importance. It secures the communication with Inkermann and 
the arrival of supplies from that direction. It menaces the whole 
right of the allied siege-works,“ by taking them in flank, and 
necessitating fresh approaches to paralyze it. Above all, it shows 
the capability, in the Russians, not only to hold their ground, but 
even to advance beyond it. In the latter part of February they 
pushed trenches of counter-approach toward the allied works 
from their new redoubt. The reports do not, however, state the 
exact direction of these works. At all events, the presence of the 
two regiments of the line in Sevastopol proves that the garrison, 

hitherto consisting of marines and sailors only, has been considera- 
bly reenforced, and is strong enough for any eventuality. 

It is now reported that by the 10th or 11th of March, the Allies 
would be in a position to open their batteries upon the Russian 
defenses, but, with the resources of the Russians and the 
difficulties of the Allies, how is it to be expected that the first 
condition will be fulfilled, namely: That the besiegers’ fire will be 
superior to that of the besieged, and so far superior, too, as to 
silence the Russian batteries before the English and French have 
exhausted their stores of ammunition? But let us suppose even 
this result is obtained. Suppose even that at this decisive moment 
the Russians in the field should neglect attacking the positions of 
Inkermann and Balaklava. Suppose the assaults attempted upon 
the first Russian line, and suppose that line even carried: What 
then? Fresh defenses, fresh batteries, strong buildings converted 
into small citadels requiring a new set of batteries to bring them 
down, are before the storming columns; a hail of grape and 
musketry drives them back, and it is as much as they can do if 
they hold the first Russian line. 

Then follows the siege of the second, then that of the third 
line—not to mention the numerous minor obstacles which the 
Russian engineers, as we now have learned to know them; cannot 
have failed to accumulate in the interior of the space intrusted to 
their care. And during this time, wet and heat, and heat and wet 
alternately, on a ground impregnated with the animal decay of 
thousands of men and horses, will create diseases unknown and 
unheard of. The pestilence, it is true, will reign within the town as 
well as without; but which party will have to give in to it first? 

Spring will carry along with it terrible things on this little 
peninsula of five miles by ten, where three of the greatest nations 
of Europe are fighting an obstinate struggle; and Louis Bonaparte 
will have plenty of reason to congratulate himself when his great 
expedition comes to develop its full fruit.