Friedrich Engels

The Resistance Power of Russia

Written on 25 September 1855.

[“Neue Oder-Zeitung” No. 455 of 29 September 1855]

The journey of the Emperor of Russia to Odessa; the transfer of his consort from Petersburg to the heart of holy Russia, to Moscow; the leaving behind of Constantine, the most warlike of his brothers, at the seat of government; all these circumstances are taken as so many proofs that Russia is resolved on the utmost resistance. Nikolayev and Kherson, the two most fortified points of Southern Russia, now form the centre of a reserve army that is being concentrated at this moment in the governments of Taurida and Kherson. In addition to the army reserves (troops belonging to the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th battalions), whose number is indeterminable, 40,000 militia are said to be concentrated in Nikolayev, while about 25,000 men are at Odessa. It is impossible to verify the accuracy of these statements. So much is certain: considerable forces are concentrating in Southern Russia.

The
strategic plan
of Russia takes into consideration not only the loss of the Crimea, but even an enemy invasion of Southern Russia. For this reason the Dnieper line has been chosen as the main line of defence, with Kherson and Nikolayev as the first, and Yekaterinoslav as the next, base of operations. Since Kherson and Nikolayev lie within range not only of gunboats but even of armed launches, a base further in the interior is necessary. Yekaterinoslav provides this. Situated at a point where the Dnieper, by a bend in its course, forms an angle of about 75 degrees, it is an excellent centre for an army retiring into the interior which intends to cover itself first behind the southern (NE to SW) and then behind the middle course (NW to SE) of this river. An army advancing from Perekop into the interior of Russia would first have to force the Dnieper at Kherson and then advance towards Yekaterinoslav, there to cross the same river anew. Any detachment advancing on the left bank of the Dnieper would be easily checked a few miles south of Yekaterinoslav, on the line of the Volchya, where this river empties into the main stream. To these advantages is added the fact that the whole country south of Yekaterinoslav is a vast steppe, 200 miles in extent, where it is as difficult to move an army through as to feed it, while the city itself, situated at the northern exit of the steppe and close to the rich and relatively densely populated provinces of Kiev and Poltava, can procure any required quantity of provisions without difficulty. Finally, Yekaterinoslav maintains communication with the army of the centre at Kiev and covers the road to Moscow. Yekaterinoslav is therefore being fortified and provided with everything necessary for provisioning the southern army. Stores of food, equipment, and munitions are being accumulated here. If, on the one hand, this speaks for the strategic acumen of the Russians—and the old general and deserter Jomini has certainly not schooled them for so long in vain—it proves, on the other hand, just as much that they do not believe in successes for a considerable time to come. Were the Allies to invade the interior of Russia (from Perekop), they would, it is true, have to force Yekaterinoslav. This, however, cannot be a question in this campaign and hardly in the campaign of 1856. Russia would first have to have evacuated the Crimea, the whole of Transcaucasia, the Caucasus as far as the Terek and the Kuban, Odessa to have become a prey to the flames, the harbour at Nikolayev to have been destroyed, and the Danube to have been cleared as far as Galatz—all these its outer extremities must first be amputated before the Allies could so much as hit upon the idea of undertaking a campaign into the interior of Russia. The far-seeing strategic plan of the Russians therefore seems de mauvais augure (of bad omen).

The allied troops are moving towards the valley of the upper Chornaya, in order to turn the extreme right flank, at Aitodor or the upper Belbek. The dispatches of Gortchakov and Pélissier concur in reporting this. It seems to us that this manoeuvre of the Allies is being carried out too ostentatiously to be really intended in this manner.

The task of the Allies now obviously consists in driving the Russians from the entrenched position on the Mackenzie Heights. If they succeed in this, the Russians must evacuate the North Fort and with it the Crimea. For between the Mackenzie Heights and Simferopol there is no tenable position that can be turned, and beyond Simferopol the steppe, untenable for large armies, offers no position at all. Whether the Russians will hold the Crimea therefore depends on their ability to maintain their present position, especially on the Mackenzie Heights.