Friedrich Engels

The Battle of the Chernaya

Written 31 August 1855.  
From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 4494, 14 September 1855, leader]

Contrary to our expectation, the mail of the *Africa*, which we received last Wednesday evening, contained no report from Prince Gorchakov of the battle fought on the 16th ult. on the Chernaya. Nevertheless the French and English reports, which we printed yesterday, furnish sufficient information to arrive at a tolerably accurate estimate of this affair. The French report astonishes one by the absence of that tendency to boastfulness which is only too often characteristic of a French swashbuckler, and which was so conspicuous in Pélissier's first bulletins. The old general is now unusually clear, business-like and matter-of-fact; he even acknowledges the courage displayed by the Russians on this occasion, and his report contrasts most favourably with General Simpson's amusing calculations of the numbers engaged, according to which some 15,000 French and Sardinians, without any particular exertion, would have beaten 60,000 Russians. The facts appear to have been about as follows:

On the morning of 16 August, before daybreak, the Russians descended from the Mackenzie Heights and took up a position on the edge of the hills that slope down towards the Chernaya. They were commanded by Prince Gorchakov in person, under whom General Read commanded the right wing (7th and 12th Divisions), while Liprandi with the 5th Division appears to have taken the centre, and the 17th Division formed the Russian left wing. Parts of the 4th and 6th Divisions were also present in the role of reserves, as it seems. The 5th Division, as well as

the troops belonging to the 4th and 6th, form part of the Second Corps (Panyutin's), which had only just arrived in the Crimea; the remainder consisted of old Crimean troops, which must have acted with greatly reduced effective strength.

The ground on the opposite side of the Chernaya is mostly flat, a continuation of the plain of Balaclava towards the river; but close to its banks this plain is broken by two groups of small hills, which rise stepwise from the Balaclava side, but sink downwards towards the Chernaya, and thus form a good defensive position against an enemy crossing the river. Between these two groups of hills lies the valley in which the British Light Cavalry charged in the Battle of Balaclava. The eastern group of hills, which formed the right wing of the position, was occupied by La Marmora with his two Sardinian divisions; the other, on the north-west, by three French divisions, which thus formed the centre and left wing of the position. The French were commanded by General d'Herbillon, who had posted Camous' division on the left, his own in the centre, and Faucheux's division on the right wing, where it joined Trotti's Sardinian division. The position gained an increase of strength from two obstacles immediately in front of it: firstly, the Chernaya, which river was at the time fordable indeed, but nevertheless compelled the Russians to cross it only at certain points and on a narrow front; secondly, the aqueduct, hewn into the rock in most places, and thus, even after its passage, presenting a steep rocky wall to be scaled. On the edge of the hills the French and Piedmontese had thrown up some light breastworks, just enough to shelter their artillery. The two groups of hills formed, so to speak, distinct bastions, which flanked one another with their artillery. Beyond the Chernaya, which was crossed by bridges at Tchorgun on the Sardinian extreme right and at an inn (called *Traktir* in Russian) in front of the French centre, the Piedmontese had two companies of advanced posts, while the bridge to the Traktir was covered by a weak bridgehead occupied by the French. The French advanced posts stood further behind.

On the morning of the 16th, after the Russians had brought their artillery into position on the heights east of the Chernaya, they sent their advanced troops down into the valley. Day had not yet broken, and a dense fog facilitated a surprise as at Inkerman. The allied advanced posts were driven back in a moment,

and at daybreak the bridgehead and the whole eastern side of the river were in their hands, while they were fighting with two French regiments for the passage of the bridge. Thereupon the 7th and 12th Russian Divisions, directly confronting the French divisions of Camous and d'Herbillon, descended into the valley in two close columns; and here they formed their attacking columns and advanced in two distinct masses – the 7th Division crossed the river and the aqueduct partly by fording, partly by throwing up flying bridges constructed in all haste, and marched against Camou, while the 12th Division, a part of which remained behind as a reserve, advanced against d'Herbillon across the bridge of the Traktir, whose defenders were thrown back in a moment by the overwhelming masses of the Russians. They advanced with more rapidity and fire than the Russians had ever shown before, up through the aqueduct and the hillsides. The 7th Russian Division had got pretty near the edge of the hill when Camous' troops, deployed in line, gave them a volley and then attacked them in flank and rear with such vehemence that the Russians immediately turned and recrossed the river under a murderous fire. If we may believe Pélissier, this 7th Division did not show itself again during the battle. In the centre the 12th Division succeeded in climbing the heights and driving back several French regiments. The fate of the battle seemed for a moment uncertain, when d'Herbillon detached a brigade of Faucheux's division to attack the left flank of the Russian columns, and after a short struggle the Russians were driven down the slope, followed by the French, who recaptured the bridge for a short time.

Gorchakov, however, had prepared a fresh attack. The remainder of the 12th Division and the 5th Division had descended into the valley, they supported the fugitives, who re-formed their ranks, and now the whole 12th and 5th Divisions moved forward to a second assault. They crossed the bridge close to its right and left and advanced with great liveliness against the allied centre (d'Herbillon's and Faucheux's divisions). But by this time the French had brought their whole artillery into position; they fired in front against the Russian columns, while the Sardinian artillery took them in flank. In spite of this murderous fire they advanced steadily and rapidly and again reached the heights. Here they found the French concentrated, deployed in line a little behind the edges of the hill. As soon as the heads of the columns had reached the edge, the French gave them a volley and then attacked them with the bayonet, in front and flanks.

The struggle was as brief as before. The Russians gave way and fled in disorder across the river, pursued by the musketry and artillery fire of the Allies. This second defeat of the Russians virtually decided the battle. The Russians had engaged three-fifths of their infantry and could not hope to receive fresh reinforcements on the battlefield. The Allies, too, had engaged three of their five divisions, but fresh troops were hurrying up from the camp before Sevastopol to their support. Pélissier had sent for two more divisions of the line and a division of Guards, and they were moving up. This was about 8 o'clock in the morning.

Gorchakov, despite these reverses, resolved upon a renewed attack. The 17th Division was now ordered forward and was to form the nucleus for that portion of the beaten troops which was still capable of being led against the enemy. The line of attack was again shifted to the left. It was Faucheux's division upon which the Russians fell this time. But in vain. The cross-fire of the French and Sardinian artillery decimated them before they could reach the summit of the hills; again the French lines broke their columns and drove them to the other side of the river, while the Piedmontese (Trotti's division) attacked them in flank and completed the victory. There now remained intact only the troops of the 4th and 6th Divisions, together about the effective strength of one division. To launch them would have been utterly useless. The defeat was unmistakable; and, accordingly, the Russians – bringing their artillery forward – began the retreat. Their own position was so strong that Pélissier considered an attack upon them out of the question; and hence they were only molested by the artillery and the skirmishers. The losses of the Russians on this occasion were enormous compared to those of the Allies. The former lost about 5,000 men in killed, wounded and prisoners; the latter only about 1,500. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the Russians had to make all their attacks constantly under the heavy artillery fire of the Allies, and especially under that of the Piedmontese, whose 16-pounders – a gun which is very hard to move, but, once brought into position, of the highest efficiency.

The Russians here made a simple frontal attack. To turn the French left wing at Inkerman seemed impossible, because the French batteries planted on the summit of the ridge commanded that space. To turn the Allies on the right, the bulk of the Russians would have had to descend into the valley of Baidar, where the ground is obviously too difficult for such cumbrous troops. Hence they preferred the

frontal attack and acted absolutely rightly in attempting a surprise. The surprise partly succeeded, but was not carried out with the requisite energy. Once the Russians had command of the passages of the Chernaya, they ought to have pushed forward their troops – just as they happened to be at hand – in order to exploit the advantage gained, before the French could recover from the first blow. Instead of that, they gave their opponents the time that was needed to place their troops and artillery in position, and the surprise, which might have placed the French heights in the hands of the Russians, in fact ceased almost as soon as they had reached the Chernaya. This is a fresh proof of how difficult it is to set Russian troops in motion under circumstances where rapid action and independent intervention of the subordinate commanders are required.

The French have always been notorious for a certain contempt for outpost duty. Even in their finest days, an active enemy was able, without running any great risk, to surprise their outposts every night and throw their camps into alarm. On this occasion the French proved that even the slow-moving Russians were capable of doing so. Their main position lay so close to the Tschornaja that their advanced troops should either have been pushed much further forward or—where the terrain did not permit this—reinforced to such a degree as to be able to hold out until the camp was under arms. The French, however, had pitched their camp without securing it by an adequate advance guard, and consequently the Russians could advance against their main position before they themselves were able to bring their full power of resistance into play. More active opponents than the Russians would have thrown numerically superior troops forward fast enough to storm the heights occupied by the French before any regular and systematic resistance could have been offered. But the Russians themselves were afraid of risking one or two divisions of their troops in a fight during the twilight, and thus they lost all the advantages of the surprise they had gained.

The decisive and easily won successes of the French in repulsing the Russian columns, when these had already scaled the heights, are attributable to a tactical system they have not often applied so far. They have evidently learned this mode of warfare from the English, who are masters at it. In the defence of a range of hills, the great advantage consists in being able to conceal the troops directly behind the crest of the hill, where they are drawn up in lines, completely sheltered, and await the emergence of the enemy columns. As soon as the heads of the columns appear above the crest, the line fires a volley at them, to which they can only reply with some musketry fire, and then attacks them frontally and on the flank with the bayonet. It was thus that the English fought at Bussaco, Pamplona, Waterloo and in other battles, and always with success. The troops of the European continent, however, seem to have forgotten this perfectly infallible method of defending a chain of hills. It is presented in the textbooks of tactics, but in practice it had almost disappeared owing to the general predilection for columns covered by skirmishers. The French deserve great credit for having adopted this simple and effective manoeuvre from their old adversaries. Had they been posted in columns, there is hardly any doubt that the Russians would have had greater superiority over them and might perhaps even have won. But, as things stood, the fire of infantry drawn up in lines, operating against an enemy disorganised by effective artillery fire and exhausted by the climbing of a steep hill, proved overwhelming; and a bold advance with the bayonet was sufficient to throw back the masses, who had already lost heart before the glittering steel was close upon them.

This is the third regular battle of this war that has been fought in the open field, and, like those at the Alma and at Inkerman, it was also distinguished by its comparatively short duration. In the wars of Napoleon, a characteristic feature was that a battle was opened by numerous skirmishes; each side sought to feel out the enemy before engaging him at decisive points and with decisive masses; and the decisive blow was struck only after each side had brought into action the majority of its troops.

By contrast, we see here that no time is lost, there is no fencing to exhaust the enemy; the blow is delivered at once, and the destiny of the battle hangs on the result of one or two attacks. This looks far bolder than Napoleon’s mode of warfare; but if a superiority of two to one, such as the Allies had at the Alma, or the notorious sluggishness of the Russians in manoeuvring seems to justify such an immediate action, it is nonetheless a fact that there is a great lack of generalship on both sides; and whenever blades who act according to this principle find themselves opposed to a general who well understands how to occupy their troops, to lay traps for them and to induce them to walk into them, they will very soon find themselves in a situation that is not very enviable.

In conclusion we repeat what we have often said: the decisive characteristics of the present war are bravery among the soldiers and mediocrity among the generals on both sides.