Written between late June and Sep- 
tember 1855 

XXXII, XXXIII and XXXVI, August, 
September and December 1855 

PUTNAM’S MONTHLY. 
BA Magazine of Riterature, Science, and Art. 

[FIRST ARTICLE] 
[Putnam’s Monthly, No. XXXII, August 1855] 

The war raging on the shores of the Black Sea for the last two 
years, has called particular attention to the two millions of armed 
men kept in pay by Europe, even in the midst of peace, and 
destined, perhaps, to be very soon increased to twice that number; 
and if, as is all but certain, the war should continue, we may 
expect to see these four millions engaged in active operations, on a 
theater of war occupying, from sea to sea, the whole breadth of 
the European Continent. 

For this reason, an account not only of the armies hitherto 
engaged in the Eastern conflict, but of the more important 
remaining armies of Europe as well, cannot be uninteresting to 
our readers, especially as, on this side of the Atlantic, nothing has 
fortunately ever been seen approaching, in any degree, the 
magnitude of even the second-rate armies of Europe; wherefore 
the organization of such bodies is but vaguely known to the 
non-professional public among us. 

The jealousy which formerly surrounded the army of every 
power with mysterious secrecy, no longer exists.—Strange to say, 
even in countries the most adverse to publicity, where all 
departments of the civil administration remain, to the present day, 
enveloped in the darkness required by absolutism, the organiza- 
tion of the army is perfectly known to the public. Army lists are 
published, stating, not only the subdivision of the armed force in 
corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and squadrons, 
but also the dislocations of these bodies, with the numbers and the 
names of the officers commanding them. Whenever great reviews 
take place, the presence of foreign officers is not only tolerated, 
but even courted, criticism is solicited, observations are exchanged, 

the distinctive institutions and contrivances of each army are 
sagely discussed, and a publicity is established, which but too 
strangely contrasts with many other features in the same 
government. The actual secrets which a European war-ministry 
can contrive to keep to itself, are a few recipes for chemical 
compositions, such as rockets or fuses; and even these are found 
out very soon, or are superseded by the progress of invention; as, 
for instance, the British congreve-rocket composition, by Mr. 
Hale’s war-rockets, adopted in the U.S. army, and now in the 
British army also. 

This publicity causes, in time of peace, the various war- 
ministries of the civilized world to form, as it were, one large 
military committee, for the purpose of discussing the merit of all 
proposed innovations, and allowing each member to profit by the 
experience of all the remainder. Thus it has been brought about 
that the arrangements, organization and general economy of 
almost all European armies are nearly the same, and in this sense 
it may be said that one army is about as good as any other. But 
national character, historical tradition, and, above all things, 
different degrees of civilization, create as many diversities, and 
give to each army its peculiar points of excellence and weakness. 
The Frenchman and the Hungarian, the Englishman and the 
Italian, the Russian and the German, under certain circumstances, 
may be equally good and efficient soldiers; but, in spite of a 
uniform system of drill, which appears to level all distinctions, 
every one will be good in his own way, by virtue of qualities 
different from those possessed by his rivals. 

This brings us to a question but too often mooted between the 
military patriots of different nationalities: Which are the best 
soldiers? Of course, every people is jealous of its own fame; and, 
in the opinion of the general public, fed by narratives which, 
whatever they may lack in critical exactness, are amply adorned 
with high patriotic coloring,—one regiment of its own can “lick” 
any two or three of any other nation. Military history, as a science 
in which a correct appreciation of facts is the only paramount 
consideration, is but of very recent date, and boasts as yet of a 
very limited literature. It is, however, an established branch of 
science, and more and more every day scatters to the winds, like 
chaff, the unblushing and stupid bluster which too long has 
characterized works calling themselves historical because they 
made a trade of distorting every fact they recounted. The time is 
past when, in writing the history of a war, people can continue 
that war, so to say, on their own account, and safely cannonade 

The Armies of Europe 405 

the late enemy with dirt, after the conclusion of peace forbids 
them from cannonading him with iron.” And although many a 
minor point in military history remains still to be settled, yet thus 
much is certain, that there are none of the civilized nations which 
cannot boast of having, at some time or other, produced the best 
soldiers of their time. The German Landsknechte of the later 
middle ages, the Swiss soldiers of the sixteenth century, were for a 
period as invincible as the splendid Spanish soldiers, who 
succeeded them to the rank of “the first infantry of the world;” 
the French of Louis the Fourteenth, and the Austrians of Eugene 
disputed, for a while, with each other this post of honor, until the 
Prussians of Frederick the Great settled the question by defeating 
both of them; these, again, were hurled down into utter disrepute 
by a single blow at Jena,? and once more the French were 
universally acknowledged the first soldiers of Europe; at the same 
time, however, they could not prevent the English, in Spain, from 
proving themselves their superiors under certain circumstances 
and in certain moments of a battle.*” No doubt, the legions which 
Napoleon led, in 1805, from the camp of Boulogne to Auster- 
litz,° were the finest troops of their time; no doubt Wellington 
knew what he said, when he called his soldiers at the conclusion of 
the Peninsular war “an army with which he could go any where, 
and do any thing;” and yet the flower of this Peninsular British 
army was defeated at New Orleans, by mere militia men and 
volunteers, without either drill or organization.” 

The experience of all past campaigns, then, leads us to the same 
result; and every sensible old soldier, unbiassed by prejudice, will 
confirm it: that military qualities, both as regards bravery and 
aptitude for the work, are, upon the whole, pretty impartially 
distributed among the different nations of the world; that it is not 
so much the degree, as the special nature of the qualification, 
which distinguishes the soldiers of different nationalities; and that 
with the publicity established now-a-days in military matters, it 1s 
the assiduous application of thought, improvement, invention, to 
the military institutions and resources of a State, and the 
development of the military qualities specially distinguishing a 
nation, by which alone an army can be made, for a time, to rank 
foremost among its rivals. Thus we see, at once, what an 
advantage, in a military sense, a higher development of civilization 
gives to a country over its less advanced neighbors. As an example, 
we may mention that the Russian army, though distinguished by 
many soldier-like qualities of the first order, has never been able 
to establish a superiority over any army of civilized Europe. At 

even chances, the Russians would fight desperately; but up to the 
present war, at least, they were sure to be beat, whether their 
opponents were French, Prussians, Poles, or English. 

Before we consider the different armies separately, a few 
general remarks respecting them all are requisite. 

An army, especially a large one of from three hundred 
thousand to five hundred thousand and more men, with all its 
necessary subdivisions, its different arms, and its requirements in 
men, material, and organization, is itself so complicated a body 
that the highest possible simplification becomes indispensable. 
There are so many inevitable varieties, that it might be expected 
they would not be increased by factitious and unmeaning 
variegations. Nevertheless, habit and that spirit of show and 
parade which is the bane of old armies, has complicated matters in 
almost every European army to an incredible degree. 

The differences in size, strength, and temperament which are 
found, both in men and horses, in every country, necessitate a 
separation of light infantry and cavalry from heavy infantry and 
cavalry. To attempt to completely obliterate this separation, would 
be to mix up in one body individuals whose military qualifications 
are opposite by nature, and would, therefore, to a certain degree 
neutralize each other; thereby lessening the efficiency of the 
whole. Thus, either arm is naturally divided into two separate 
bodies—the one comprising the heavier and clumsier men (and 
horses respectively), destined principally for the great decisive 
charges, and the fight in closed ranks; the other forming the 
lighter, more active men, specially adapted for skirmishing, 
outpost and advanced guard duty, rapid maneuvers, and the like. 
So far, the subdivision is perfectly legitimate. But, in addition to 
this natural distribution, in almost every army, each subdivision is 
again subdivided into branches distinguished by nothing but 
fanciful distinctions of dress and by theoretical quibbles which are 
constantly contradicted by practice and experience. 

Thus, in every European army there exists a corps called 
Guards, pretending to be the élite of the army, but which in reality 
merely consists of the biggest monsters of men that can be got 
hold of. The Russian and the English Guards are most distin- 
guished in this respect; though no proof exists that they exceed in 
bravery and effectiveness the other regiments in either service. 
Napoleon’s Old Guard was a far different institution; it was the 
actual élite of the army; and bodily size had nothing to do with its 
formation. But even this guard weakened the rest of the army, by 
absorbing its best elements, and consideration for such an 

The Armies of Europe 407 

unrivaled corps led Napoleon, sometimes, into mistakes—as at 
Borodino,*”' where he did not bring the Guards forward at the 
decisive moment, and thereby missed the chance of preventing the 
Russian force from effecting their retreat in good order. The 
French have, beside their Imperial Guard, a sort of élite in every 
battalion, forming two companies—one of grenadiers, and the 
other of voltigeurs; thereby complicating the tactical evolutions of 
the battalion to an unnecessary degree. Other nations have similar 
corps. All these choice troops, beside their distinctive formation 
and dress, receive higher pay. It is said that such a system spurs 
the ambition of the private soldier, especially amongst excitable 
nations like the French and Italians; but the same object would be 
obtained, and perhaps more perfectly, if the men who had earned 
such distinctive marks should remain in the ranks of their 
respective companies, and were not made use of as a pretext for 
disturbing the tactical unity and symmetry of the battalion. 

A still more striking humbug is practiced with regard to the 
cavalry. Here the distinction between light and heavy horse forms 
a pretext for subdivisions of all sorts—cuirassiers, dragoons, 
carabineers, lancers, chasseurs, hussars, and so on. All such 
subdivisions are not only useless, they are actually preposterous by 
the complications they cause. Hussars and lancers are imitated 
from the Hungarians and Poles; but in Hungary and Poland these 
arms have their sense—they were the national arms, and the dress 
of the troops carrying them was the national dress of the country. 
To imitate such peculiarities in other countries, where the national 
spirit is wanting that gave them life, is, to say the least of it, 
ridiculous; and well might, in 1814, the Hungarian hussar, when 
greeted with the title of “comrade” by a Russian hussar, reply, 
“No comrade—I hussar, you harlequin!” (Nix camerad—ich husar, 
du hanswurst!) Another such ridiculous institution, in almost all 
armies, is formed by the cuirassiers—men actually disabled, and 
disabling their horses, too, by the weight of their breast-plates (a 
French cuirass weighs twenty-two pounds), and, for all that, not 
protected by them from the effects of a rifle-ball fired at a 
hundred and fifty yards distance! The cuirass had been got rid of 
in almost all European armies, when Napoleon's love of show and 
of monarchical tradition re-introduced it among the French, and 
his example was soon followed by all the nations of Europe. 

Beside our own little army, the Sardinian is the only one, among 
civilized nations, in which cavalry consists of plain light and heavy 
horse, without any further subdivision, and where the cuirass is 
completely done away with. 

408 Frederick En gels 

In the field artillery, a great complication of different calibers is 
found ‘in every army. The English have the greatest diversity in 
theory, carrying eight calibers and twelve different models of 
guns; but in practice their enormous material allows them to 
reduce their artillery to great simplicity. In the Crimea, for 
instance, the nine-pounder and the twenty-four pound howitzer 
are almost the only calibers in use. The French have introduced, 
during the last few years, the greatest possible simplicity, by 
replacing their four different calibers by one, the light twelve- 
pound howitzer-gun, of which we shall speak in its place. In most 
other armies, from three to four calibers are still in existence, not 
counting the varieties of carriages, tumbrils, wheels, and the like. 

The technical corps of the different armies, the engineers, and 
so on, to which we may add the staff, are organized in all armies 
upon a pretty similar footing, except that with the British, and to 
their great detriment, the staff does not form a separate corps at 
all. Other minor differences will be mentioned in their respective 
places. 

We begin with that army which, from the organization it 
received during the revolution and under Napoleon, has served as 
a sort of model to all European armies since the beginning of this 
century. 

I. THE FRENCH ARMY 

France had, when the present war broke out, one hundred 
regiments of infantry of the line (the 76th to 100th were, up to a 
recent date, called “light infantry,” but their drill and organization 
was in no way distinguished from the line regiments). Each 
regiment counts three battalions, two field-battalions, and the third 
as a reserve. In time of war, however, the third battalion can be 
very soon organized for field duty, and a fourth battalion, formed 
by the extra dépot company of each of the three battalions, 
undertakes the duties of the dépét. This was done during the wars 
of Napoleon, who even formed fifth, and, in some instances, sixth 
battalions. For the present, however, we can only count three 
battalions per regiment. Each battalion has eight service-companies 
(one of grenadiers, one of voltigeurs, and six center-companies); 
and each company, on the war footing, counts three officers and 
one hundred and fifteen non-commissioned officers and soldiers. 
A French battalion of the line, therefore, amounts, on the war 
footing, to about nine hundred and sixty men, one-eighth of 
whom (the voltigeur company) are especially set apart for light 
infantry duty. 

The Armies of Europe 409 

The special corps destined for light infantry service consist of 
the chasseurs-a-pied and of the African corps. The chasseurs, 
before the war, only ten battalions, were, in 1853, raised to twenty 
battalions, so that nearly every infantry division of the army (four 
regiments) can, on its formation, receive one chasseur battalion. 
These battalions count ten companies, or nearly 1300 men. The 
troops specially destined for African service consist of: three 
regiments, containing nine battalions of Zouaves; two regiments, 
or six battalions, of the Foreign Legion; six battalions of light 
infantry (of which, three battalions native chasseurs), together 
twenty-one battalions, or about 22,000 men. 

The cavalry is divided into four distinct portions: — 

1. Heavy or Reserve Cavalry, 12 regiments—2 of carabineers 
(cuirassier rifles), 10 of culrassiers=72 squadrons. 

2. Cavalry of the line, 20 regiments— 12 of dragoons, 8 of lancers= 120 
squadrons, 

3. Light Cavalry, 21 regiments— 12 chasseurs-a-cheval, 9 hussars= 126 
squadrons. 

4. African light cavalry, 7 regiments—4 Chasseurs d’Afrique, 
spahis=42 squadrons. 

The squadrons are of 190 men for the reserve and line cavalry, 
and 200 men for the light cavalry—on the war footing. In time of 
peace, there are scarcely four squadrons of 120 men_ fully 
equipped, so that, on every mobilization of the army, a great 
number of men on furlough have to be called in, and the horses 
for them to be found, which, in a country as poor in horses as 
France, can never be done without a large importation from 
abroad. 

The artillery, as recently reorganized, is formed in seventeen 
regiments: five of foot-artillery, for garrison and siege duty; seven 
of the line (for service with the infantry divisions); four of 
horse-artillery, and one of pontoniers. The foot-artillery appear to 
be destined to act in the field on emergencies only. The artillery 
of the line have their gun-carriages and limbers constructed so 
that the gunners can ride on them during quick movements. The 
horse-artillery is organized as in other services. The line and 
horse-artillery count one hundred and thirty-seven batteries, of six 
guns each, to which sixty batteries of the foot-artillery may be 
added as a reserve, altogether, 1,182 guns. 

Beside the above, the artillery comprises thirteen companies of 
workmen. 

The special services of the army comprise:—A general staff of 
560 officers; staffs for the fortresses, the artillery, and the 
engineers, of about 1,200 officers; three regiments of sappers and 
miners; five pack squadrons; five train squadrons; 1,187 medical 
officers, and so on. The total numbers are as follows: 

Infantry | 
Line, 300 bat’s and 300 dépot comp’s, ......... eee 335,000 
Chasseurs, 20 battalions, ...........ccccccccccccseeeceaeceeeeeseeueees 26,000 
African troops, 21 battalions, ....0....ceeeeesseeeneeeeneees 22,000 
383,000 
Cavalry 
Reserve, 72 sq. and 12 dépdts, 16,300 
Line, 120 ” 20—=—”” 28,400 
Light, 126 ” 21 31,300 
African, 42 ” 10,000 86,000 
Artil’y and special corps 1200 guns and 70,000 

1,200 guns and 539,000 

To these are to be added the newly formed Guard” in the 
strength of one division of infantry (two regiments of grenadiers, 
two of voltigeurs), one brigade of cavalry (one regiment of 
cuirassiers, one of guides), one battalion of chasseurs, and four or 
five batteries of artillery; as well as 25,000 men of the gendar- 
merie, 14,000 of whom are horse gendarmes. Two more 
regiments of infantry, the 101st and 102d, have recently been 
formed, and a new brigade of the foreign legion (Swiss) is in 
course of formation. Altogether, therefore, the French army, in its 
present organization, contains the cadres for about 600,000 men, 
and this will be a pretty correct estimate of its present strength. 

The army is recruited by ballot, among all young men who have 
reached their twentieth year. It is presumed that about 140,000 
men are annually available, of which number, however, in time of 
peace, from 60,000 to 80,000 only are taken for service. The 
remainder may be called in at any time during the eight years 
following their ballot. A great number of soldiers, besides, are 
dismissed on long furloughs during peace, so that the actual time 
of service, even of those called in, does not exceed from four to 

The Armies of Europe 411 

five years. This system, while it gives the troops actually serving a 
high degree of efficiency, does not prepare any drilled reserves 
for a case of emergency. A great continental war, in which France 
would have to act with two or three large armies, would force her, 
even in the second campaign, to bring into the field many raw 
levies, and would show, in the third campaign, a very sensible 
deterioration of the army. The French are, indeed, very handy at 
learning the trade of a soldier, but, in that case, why keep up the 
long period of service, which excludes the greater portion of the 
available young men from the benefit of a school of military 
instruction? 

Wherever military service is both compulsory and of long 
duration, the necessity of European society has introduced the 
privilege, for the wealthier classes, of buying off by a money- 
payment, in some shape or other, the obligation to serve 
personally. Thus, in France, the system of finding substitutes is 
legally recognized,** and about eighty thousand of these are 
constantly serving in the French army. They are mostly recruited 
from what are called the “dangerous classes;” they are rather 
difficult to handle, but, when once broken in, form capital 
soldiers. They require a very strict discipline to keep them in good 
behavior; and their notions of order and subordination are 
sometimes rather extravagant. Wherever there are large numbers 
of them in a regiment, they are sure to cause difficulties in a 
garrison. For this reason, it is thought that the best place for them 
is before the enemy, and, thus, the light troops of Africa are 
especially recruited from them; for instance, the Zouaves, who 
almost all entered the army as “remplacants.” The Crimean 
campaign has fully shown that the Zouaves carry their African 
habits everywhere—their love of plunder, as well as their unruly 
conduct in adversity, and it is, perhaps, in this sense that a 
kindred genius, the late Marshal St. Arnaud, said, in his bulletin 
on the battle of the Alma,*"* “The Zouaves are, indeed, the first 
soldiers of the world!’’* 

The equipment of the French army is, upon the whole, 
first-rate. The arms are well constructed, and, especially the 
cavalry saber, of a very good model, though, perhaps, it is a little 
too long. The infantry are accoutred according to the new system 
which was introduced, at the same time, in France and Prussia; by 

* A. de Saint-Arnaud, “Au quartier général 4 Alma. Champ de bataille d’Alma, 
le 21 septembre 1854”, Le Moniteur universel, No. 280, October 7, 1854.— Ed. 

4]2 Frederick Engels 

it, the cross-belts, for pouch and sword, or bayonet, are done away 
with; both are worn on a belt round the waist, supported by two 
leather braces over the shoulders, while the knapsack is loosely 
worn over the shoulders by two straps, without the old-fashioned 
connecting strap across the chest. Thus, the chest is left entirely 
free, and the soldier becomes a different man altogether from the 
unfortunate being strapped and buckled up in the sort of leather 
cuirass in which the old system confined him. The dress is plain, 
but tasteful; it must, indeed, be admitted that, in military, as well 
as in civilian fashions, the French have showed more taste than 
any other nation. A blue tunic, or frock-coat, covering the thighs 
to the knees, with a low standing collar cut out in front, scarlet 
trowsers, moderately wide, a light képi, the most soldier-like 
headgear yet invented, shoes and gaiters, and a comfortable gray 
capote, form an outfit as simple and efficient as any known in 
European armies. In Africa, the head is protected from the rays of 
the sun by a white flannel capote, and flannel under-clothing is 
also served out to the troops. In the Crimea, heavy cloth capotes 
were worn during the last winter, covering the head, neck and 
shoulders. The chasseurs-d-pied are clothed all in gray, with green 
facings; the Zouaves have a sort of Turkish fancy costume, which 
appears well adapted to the climate and the duty they have to do. 
The Chasseurs, and some other African battalions, are armed with 
the Minié rifle, the remainder of the infantry, with plain 
percussion muskets. There appears to be, however, an intention 
to increase the proportion of the troops armed with rifled 
muskets. 

The cavalry are a fine-looking class of men, lighter in weight 
than in many other armies, but none the worse for that. In the 
peace establishment, they are, upon the whole, passably well 
horsed by animals procured abroad, or from the horse-breeding 
establishments of the government, and the districts where they 
have succeeded in improving the native breed, which, until lately, 
was very poor. But, in case of war, when the number of horses has 
to be suddenly doubled, the resources of the country are 
altogether insufficient, and thousands of horses have to be bought 
abroad, many of which are scarcely fit for cavalry service. Thus, in 
any long war, the French cavalry will soon be deteriorated, unless 
the government can lay its hands on the resources of countries 
rich in horses, as it did in 1805, *6, and ’7. 

The artillery are now armed exclusively with the new light 
twelve-pound gun, the so-called invention of Louis Napoleon. But, 
as the light twelve pounder, adapted for a charge one quarter the 

The Armies of Europe 413 

weight of the ball, already existed in the English and Dutch 
armies, as the Belgians had already done away with the chamber 
in their howitzers, and as both Prussians and Austrians are in the 
habit, in certain cases, of firing shells from common twelve and 
twenty-four-pound guns, the pretended invention reduces itself to 
the adaptation of this light twelve pounder to the common French 
eight pounder carriage. However, the French artillery has 
evidently gained in simplicity and efficiency by. the change; 
whether its mobility has not suffered, remains to be seen; as also, 
whether the twelve pounder will be found efficient enough for 
hollow shot. We have, at Jeast, seen it stated that it has already 
been found necessary to forward howitzers of a heavier caliber to 
the army in the East. 

The tactical regulations of the French army are a strange 
compound of soldierly sense and old-fashioned traditions. There 
is, perhaps, no language better adapted for the short, distinct, 
dictatorial military word of command, than the French; yet the 
command is generally given with an excessive prolixity of 
words—where two or three words would be sufficient, the officer 
has to shout out a whole sentence, or even two. The maneuvers 
are complicated, and the drill contains a good deal of old- 
fashioned nonsense, quite inapplicable to the present state of 
tactics. In skirmishing, that very function which appears innate to 
the Frenchman, the men are drilled with a pedantry hardly 
surpassed in Russia. The same is true in some of the cavalry and 
artillery maneuvers. But whenever the French have to go to war, 
the necessity of the case very soon dispenses with these antiquated 
and pedantic maneuvers; and new tactical methods, suited to new 
situations, are arranged and introduced by nobody so quickly as by 
the French. 

Upon the whole, light troop duty is the forte of the French. 
They are literally the lightest troops in Europe. Nowhere is the 
average bodily size of the army so low as in France. In 1836, of 
about 80,000 men in the French army, only 743 were five feet 
eight inches or above; and only seven measured six feet; while full 
38,000 measured from four feet ten and a half inches to five feet 
two inches! And yet these littke men not only fight exceedingly 
well, but they also stand the heaviest fatigues, and beat, in agility, 
almost every other army. General Napier maintains that the 
British soldier is the heaviest laden fighting animal in the world; 
but he had never seen these French African campaigners carry, 
beside their arms and personal baggage, tents, firewood, provi- 
sions, heaped up on their backs to a hight far overtowering their 

shakos, and thus march thirty or forty miles in a day, under a 
tropical sun. And then compare the big, clumsy British soldier, 
who, in time of peace, measures five feet six inches, at least, with 
the puny, short-legged, tailor-like Frenchman, of four feet ten! 
And still, the litthe Frenchman, under all his load, remains a 
capital light-infantry-man; skirmishes, trots, gallops, lies down, 
jumps up, all the while loading, firing, advancing, retiring, 
dispersing, rallying, re-forming, and displays not only twice as 
much agility, but also twice as much intelligence as his bony 
competitor from the island of “rosbif.” This light-infantry service 
has been brought to perfection in the twenty battalions of 
chasseurs-a-pied. These incomparable troops, incomparable for their 
peculiar service, are drilled to make every movement, when within 
range of the enemy, in a sort of easy trot, called pas gymnastique, 
in which they make between one hundred and sixty and one 
hundred and eighty paces per minute. But not only can they run, 
with short intervals, for half an hour and more, but creeping, 
jumping, climbing, swimming, every movement that can possibly be 
required, are equally familiar to them, while they are first-rate 
riflemen. Who, at even odds, can hold out, in skirmishing fights, 
against these dead shots, finding shelter behind the least inequality 
of ground? 

As to the action of the French infantry in masses, their 
passionate character gives them great advantages with great 
disadvantages. Generally, their first charge will be business-like, 
rapid, determined, if not furious. If successful, nothing can resist 
them. If defeated, they will soon rally, and be in a position to be 
again brought forward; but, in an unfortunate or even chequered 
campaign, French infantry will soon lose its solidity. Success is a 
necessary element to all armies, but especially to those of the 
Romano-Celtic race. The Teutonic race has, in this respect, a 
decided superiority over them. The French, when Napoleon had 
once put them on the track, could, for fifteen years, overthrow 
everything before them, until reverses broke them down; but a 
seven years’ war,°”’ such as Frederick the Great carried through, a 
war where often enough he was on the brink of ruin, often 
defeated, and yet finally victorious—such a war could never be 
won with French troops. The war in Spain, 1809-14, affords a 
conclusive example on this head. 

Under Napoleon, the French cavalry were, in contrast to the 
infantry, far more renowned for their action in masses than for 
their duty as light troops. They were deemed irresistible, and even 
Napier admits their superiority over the English cavalry of that 

The Armies of Europe 415 

day.* Wellington, to a certain degree, did the same. And strange to 
say, this irresistible cavalry consisted of such inferior horsemen, 
that all their charges were made in a trot, or, at the very outside, 
an casy canter! But they rode close together, and they were never 
launched except when the artillery, by a heavy fire, had prepared 
the way for them; and then in large masses only. Bravery and the 
flush of victory did the rest. The present French cavalry, especially 
the Algerian regiments, are very fine troops, good riders in 
general, and still better fencers; though, in horsemanship, they are 
still inferior to the British, Prussians, and, especially, the Au- 
strians. But as the army, when placed on a war-footing, must 
double its cavalry, there is no doubt the quality will be 
deteriorated; it 1s, however, a fact, that the French possess, in a 
high degree, that essential quality of a horse-soldier which we call 
dash, and which makes up for a great many deficiencies. On the 
other hand, no soldiers are so careless of their horses as the 
French. 

The French artillery has always ranked very high. Almost all 
improvements made in gunnery, during the last three or four 
centuries, have originated with the French. During the Napoleonic 
wars, the French artillery were especially formidable by their great 
skill in selecting positions for their guns, an art then but 
imperfectly understood in other armies. All testimony agrees that 
none equaled the French in placing their guns so that the ground 
in front, while covering them from the enemy’s fire, was favorable 
to the effect of their own. The theoretical branch of artillery has 
also been constantly a favorite science with the French; their 
mathematical turn of mind favors this; and the precision of 
language, the scientific method, the soundness of views, which 
characterize their artilleristic literature, show how much this 
branch of science is adapted to the national genius. 

Of the special corps, the engineers, staff, sanitary and transport 
corps, we can merely say that they are highly efficient. The 
military schools are models of their kind. The French officer is not 
required to have that general education which is expected in 
Prussia; but the schools he has to pass through furnish him with a 
first rate professional training, including a thorough knowledge of 
the auxiliary sciences, and a certain proficiency in at least one 
living language. There is, however, another class of officers in the 
French army, viz., that selected from old non-commissioned 
officers. These latter seldom advance higher than to a captaincy, 

“ W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula..., Vol. ILI, p. 272.— Ed. 

so that the French often have young generals and old captains; 
and this system answers exceedingly well. 

Upon the whole, the French army shows, in all its features, that 
it belongs to a warlike and spirited nation, that feels a pride in its 
defenders. That the discipline and the efficiency of this army have 
overcome the seductions laid out for it by Louis Bonaparte, and 
that the Pretorians of December, 1851,? could so soon be turned 
into the heroes of the Crimea, certainly speaks highly to their 
credit. Never was an army more flattered, more courted by a 
government, more openly solicited to all sorts of excesses than the 
French in the autumn of 1851; never were they allowed such 
license as during the civil war of December; yet they have 
returned to discipline and do their duty very well. The Pretorian 
element, it is true, has, several times, risen to the surface in the 
Crimea, but Canrobert always succeeded in quelling it. 

Il. THE ENGLISH ARMY °°6 

The British army forms a complete contrast to the French. 
There are not two points of similarity between them. Where the 
French are strong, there the British are weak, and vice versa. Like 
old England herself, a mass of rampant abuses, the organization of 
the English army is rotten to the core. Everything seems to be 
arranged so as to prevent all possibility of the end aimed at ever 
being attained. By an inexplicable haphazard, the boldest 
improvements—though few, indeed—take their stand in the 
midst of a heap of superannuated imbecility; and yet, whenever 
the clumsy, creaking machine is set to work, it somehow or other 
manages to do its duty. 

The organization of the British army is soon described. Of 
infantry there are three regiments of guards, eighty-five regiments 
of the line, thirteen regiments of light infantry, two regiments of 
rifles. During the present war, the guards, the rifles, and a few 
other regiments have three battalions, the remainder have two—a 
dépot being formed by one company in each. The recruiting, 
however, is hardly sufficient to fill up the vacancies caused by the 
war, and so the second battalions can scarcely be said to be in 
existence. The present effective total of the infantry does certainly 
not exceed 120,000 men. 

4 Le., the troops that took part in the Bonapartist coup d’état of December 2, 
1851.— Ed. 

The Armies of Europe 417 

Beside the regular troops, the militia form part of the infantry 
as a sort of reserve or nursery for the army. Their number, 
according to act of Parliament,* may come up to 80,000, but they 
cannot now number more than 60,000, although, in Lancashire 
alone, there are six battalions called out. As the law stands at 
present, the militia may volunteer to serve in the Colonies, but 
cannot be conducted to foreign theaters of war. They can, 
therefore, only serve to set free the line-soldiers who garrison 
Corfu, Malta and Gibraltar, or, perhaps, hereafter, some of the 
more distant settlements. 

Of cavalry there are three regiments of guards (cuirassiers), six 
of dragoon guards (heavies), four of heavy dragoons, four of light 
dragoons, five of hussars, and four of lancers. Each regiment is to 
_be raised, on the war-footing, to 1,000 sabers (four squadrons of 
two hundred and fifty men, beside a dépot). Some regiments did 
go out with this strength, but the disasters of the Crimea in winter, 
the senseless charge at Balaklava,” and the dearth of recruits 
have re-established, on the whole, the old peace-footing. We do 
not think that the whole of the twenty-six regiments amount, at this 
moment, to 10,000 sabers, or 400 sabers per regiment, on an 
average. 

The artillery consists of the regiment of foot-artillery (twelve 
battalions, with ninety-six batteries), and the brigade of horse 
artillery (seven batteries and one rocket-battery). Each battery has 
five guns and one howitzer; the calibers of the guns are three, six, 
nine, twelve, and eighteen pounders, those of the howitzers four 
and two-fifth inches, four and a half inches, five and a half inches, 
and eight inches. Each battery, also, has two models of guns, of 
almost every caliber, heavy and light ones. In reality, however, the 
light nine pounder and twelve pounder, with four and a half inch 
and five and a half inch howitzer, form the field-calibers, and, 
upon the whole, the nine pounder may now be said to be the 
universally adopted gun of the British artillery, with the four and 
a half inch (twelve pounder) howitzer as an auxiliary. Beside these, 
six pounder and twelve pounder rockets are in use. 

As the English army, on its peace establishment, forms but a 
cadre for the war-footing, and as it is recruited entirely by 
voluntary enlistment, its real force, at a given moment, can never 
be precisely stated. We believe, however, we may estimate its 
present strength at about 120,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 
12,000 artillery, with about 600 guns (of which, not one-fifth part 

* The 1852 act of Parliament on the militia.— Ed. 

are horsed). Of these 142,000 men, about 32,000 are in the 
Crimea, about 50,000 in India and the Colonies, and the 
remaining 60,000 (of whom one-half are raw recruits, the other 
half drilling them) at home. To these are to be added about 
60,000 militia men. The pensioners, yeomanry cavalry, and other 
useless corps, not available for service abroad, we do not count at 
all. 

The system of recruiting by voluntary enlistment, makes it very 
difficult, in time of war, to keep up the efficiency of the army, and 
this the English are now, again, experiencing. We see again, as 
under Wellington, that 30,000 or 40,000 men is the very outside 
of what they can concentrate and keep up on a given theater of 
war; and as, now, they have not Spaniards for their allies but 
French, the “heroic little band” of Britishers almost disappears in 
the midst of the allied army. 

There is one institution in the British army which is perfectly 
sufficient to characterize the class from which the British soldier is 
recruited. It is the punishment of flogging. Corporal punishment 
does not exist in the French, the Prussian, and several of the 
minor armies. Even in Austria, where the greater part of the 
recruits consist of semi-barbarians, there is an evident desire to do 
away with it; thus the punishment of running the gauntlet has 
recently been struck out from the Austrian military code. In 
England, on the contrary, the cat-o’-nine-tails is maintained in its 
full efficiency—an instrument of torture fully equal to the Russian 
knout in its most palmy time. Strange to say, whenever a reform 
of the military code has been mooted in Parliament, the old 
martinets have stuck up for the cat, and nobody more zealously 
than old Wellington himself. To them, an unflogged soldier was a 
monstrously misplaced being. Bravery, discipline, and invincibility, 
in their eyes, were the exclusive qualities of men bearing the scars 
of at least fifty lashes on their backs. 

The cat-o’-nine-tails, it must not be forgotten, is not only an 
instrument calculated to inflict pain; it leaves indelible scars, it 
marks a man for life, it brands him. Now, even in the British 
army, such corporal punishment, such branding, really amounts to 
an everlasting disgrace. The flogged man loses caste with his 
fellow soldiers. But, according to the British military code, 
punishment, before the enemy, consists almost exclusively in 
flogging; and thus, the very punishment which is said, by its 
advocates, to be the only means of keeping up discipline in cases 
of great urgency, is the means of ruining discipline by destroying 
the morale and the point dhonneur of the soldier. 

The Armies of Europe 419 

This explains two very curious facts: first, the great number of 
English deserters before Sebastopol. In winter, when the British 
soldiers had to make superhuman exertions to guard the trenches, 
those who could not keep awake for forty-eight or sixty hours 
together, were flogged! The idea of flogg:ng such heroes as the 
British soldiers had proved themselves in the trenches before 
Sebastopol, and in winning the day of Inkermann’ in spite of 
their generals! But the articles of war left no choice. The best men 
in the army, when overpowered by fatigue, got flogged, and, 
dishonored as they were, they deserted to the Russians. Surely 
there can be no more powerful condemnation of the flogging 
system than this. In no former war have troops of any nation 
deserted in numbers to the Russians; they knew that they would 
be treated worse than at home. It was reserved to the British army 
to furnish the first strong contingent of such deserters, and, 
according to the testimony of the English themselves, it was 
flogging that made the men desert. The other fact is, the signal 
failure of the attempt to raise a foreign legion under the British 
military code. The Continentals are rather particular about their 
backs. The prospect of getting flogged has overcome the 
temptation of the high bounty, and good pay. Up to the end of 
June, not more than one thousand men had enlisted, where 
fifteen thousand were wanted; and this much is certain, if the 
authorities attempt to introduce flogging even among these one 
thousand reprobates, they will have to encounter a storm which 
will force them either to give way, or to dissolve the foreign legion 
at once. | 

The dress and equipments of the British soldiers are a model of 
what they should not be. Up to the present time, the dress in 
common wear is the same as armies used to wear as long ago as 
1815. No improvement has been admitted. The old swallow-tail 
coatee, disfigured by ugly facings, still distinguishes the British 
from every other soldier. The trowsers are tight, and uncomforta- 
ble. The old cross-belt system for fixing bayonet-scabbard, pouch 
and knapsack, reigns supreme in almost all regiments. The cavalry 
wear a better fitting dress than the infantry, and far superior; but, 
for all that, it is much too tight and inconvenient. Besides, the 
English are the only nation who have maintained in their army the 
red coat, the “proud red coat” as Napier calls it. This coat, which 
makes their soldiers look like dressed-up monkeys, is supposed by 
its brilliancy to strike terror into the enemy. But alas, whoever has 
seen any of the brick-colored British infantry must confess that 
their coats, after four weeks’ wear, inspire every looker-on with an 

15* 

incontrovertible idea, not of frightfulness, but of shabbiness, and 
that any other color would be far more terror-inspiring, if it only 
could stand dust, dirt, and wet. The Danes and Hanoverians used 
to wear the red coat, but they dropped it very soon. The first 
campaign in Schleswig proved to the Danes what a capital mark to 
the enemy is offered by a red coat and white cross-belts. 

The new dress-regulation has brought forward a red coat of the 
cut of the Prussian coat. The infantry wear the Austrian shako, or 
the képi; the cavalry the Prussian helmet. The cross-belt accoutre- 
ments, the red color, the tight trowsers, are more or less 
maintained. Thus, the improvement amounts to nothing; and the 
British soldier will only look as strange as ever in the midst of the 
other European armies, dressed and accoutred, as they are, a little 
more in accordance with common sense. 

Nevertheless, one improvement has been carried out in the 
British army, which far surpasses anything that has been done in 
other countries. This is, the arming of the whole of the infantry 
with the Minié rifle, as improved by Pritchett. How the old men, 
at the head of the army, men generally so obstinate in their 
prejudices, could come to so bold a resolution, it is difficult to 
imagine; but they did it, and thus doubled the efficiency of their 
infantry. At Inkermann, there is no doubt that the Minié rifle, by 
its deadly certainty of aim and great power, decided the day in 
favor of the English. Whenever an English line of infantry delivers 
its fire, the effect must be overpowering to any enemy armed with 
the common musket, for the English Minié rifle loads as quickly as 
any smoothbored gun. 

The cavalry are fine men, well horsed, armed with swords of a 
very good model; and what they can do, they have shown at 
Balaklava. But, on the whole, the men are too heavy for their 
horses, and, therefore, a few months of active campaigning must 
reduce the British cavalry to nothing. The Crimea has given us a 
fresh example of this. If the standard for heavy cavalry was 
reduced to five feet six inches, and for light cavalry to five feet 
four or, even, two inches, as, we believe, it is now for the infantry, 
a body of men might be formed far more suitable for their actual 
field duties. But, as it is, the horses are too heavily loaded, and 
must break duwn before they can be used, with effect, against the 
enemy. 

The artillery, too, is composed of taller men than it should be. 
The natural standard of size for an artilleryman is, that he should 
be big enough to unlimber a twelve pound gun, and five feet two 
to five feet six inches are ample for this purpose, as we know from 

The Armies of Europe 42] 

abundant personal experience *” and observation. In fact, men of 

about five feet five, or six, inches, if stoutly made, are, generally, 
the best handlers of guns. But the British want a crack corps, and 
their men, therefore, though tall and elegant to look at, lack that 
compactness of body which is so necessary to a really useful 
artilleryman. Their artillery material is first-rate. The guns are the 
best in Europe, the powder is acknowledged to be the strongest in 
the world, the shot and shel] are of a smoothness of surface 
unknown anywhere else. But, for all that, no guns in the world 
have as much windage, and this shows by what sort of men they 
are commanded. There is hardly an artillery in Europe officered 
by men of so deficient professional education as the British. Their 
information very seldom goes beyond the mere elements of the 
science of artillery, and, in practice, the handling of field-guns is 
as much as they understand, and that but imperfectly. Two 
qualities, in both officers and men, distinguish the British artillery: 
uncommonly good eye-sight, and great calmness in action.* 

“ In the German version of this section, published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung of 
September 1, 1855 under the title “Dress and Equipments of the British Soldier”, the 
text of the last five paragraphs is given in a condensed and altered form: “The 
dress and equipments of the British soldiers are a model of what they should not 
be. Up to the present time, the dress in common wear is the same as the army used 
to wear up to 1815, altered but superficially by a new dress-regulation which gave 
the red coat a Prussian cut, the infantry the Austrian shako, or the képi, and the 
cavalry the Prussian helmet. Britain alone has maintained in her army the red coat, 
the ‘proud red coat’ as Napier calls it. The Danes and Hanoverians used to wear 
the red coat. The first campaign in Schleswig proved to the Danes what a capital 
mark it offered to the enemy. 

“Nevertheless, one improvement has been carried out in the British army, 
which far surpasses anything that has been done in other countries. This is, the 
arming of the whole of the infantry with the Minié rifle, as improved bv Pritchett. 
There is no doubt that at Inkerman the Minié rifle, by its deadly certainty of aim, 
decided the day in favour of the English. 

“The cavalry are fine men, well horsed, armed with swords of a very good 
model; and what they can do, they have shown at Balaklava. But, on the whole, the 
men are too heavy for their horses, and, therefore, a few months of active 
campaigning must reduce the British cavalry to nothing. As the horses are too 
heavily loaded, they must break down before they can be used, with effect, against 
the enemy. The Crimea has given us a fresh example of this. 

“The artillery, too, is composed of taller men than it should be. The artillery 
material is first-rate. The guns are the best in Europe, the powder is acknowledged 
to be the strongest in the world, the shot and shell are of a smoothness of surface 
not to be found anywhere else. The artillery material is the product of modern, 
industrial England, whereas the artillery officers are the product of old England. 
The former, therefore, is just as much above the level of the European armies as 
the latter are below it. Their education in most cases does not go beyond the mere 
elements of the science of artillery, and, in practice, the handling of field-guns is as 

Upon the whole, the efficiency of the British army is sorely 
impaired, by the ignorance, both theoretical and practical, of the 
officers. The examination which they are now expected to 
undergo, is actually ridiculous—a captain examined on the first 
three books of Euclid’! But the British army is mainly instituted 
for the stowing away, in respectable situations, of the younger sons 
of the aristocracy and gentry, and the standard of education for its 
officers must, therefore, be regulated, not by the requirements of 
the service, but by what little information is commonly expected in 
an English “gentleman.” As to the practical military knowledge of 
the officer, it is equally insufficient. The British officer believes he 
has only one duty to perform: to lead his men, on the day of 
battle, straight against the enemy, and to give them an example of 
bravery. Skill in handling troops, seizing favorable opportunities, 
and the like, is not expected from him; and as to looking after his 
men and their wants, why, such a thing hardly ever enters his 
head. One half of the disasters of the British in the Crimea arose 
from this universal incapacity of the officers. They have, however, 
one quality which fits them for their functions: being, most of 
them, passionate huntsmen, they possess that instinctive and rapid 
appreciation of advantages of ground, which the practice of 
hunting is sure to impart. 

The incompetence of the officers nowhere creates greater 
mischief than on the staff. As no regularly educated staff-corps 
exists, every general forms his own staff from regimental officers, 
ignorant of every part of their duty.’ Such a staff is worse than 
none. Reconnoitering, especially, is always done in a slovenly 
manner, as it must be, when done by men who know little of what 
is expected from them. 

The education of the other special corps is rather better, but far 
below the standard in other nations; and, in general, an English 
officer would pass as an ignoramus amongst men of his class in 
any other country. Witness the military literature of the British. 
Not a work hardly, but is full of blunders which would not be 

much as they understand, and that but imperfectly. Two qualities, in both officers 
and men, distinguish the British artillery: uncommonly good eye-sight, and great 
calmness in action.” — Ed. 

* The reference is to Euclid’s Elements, a work in 13 books which sets forth the 
fundamentals of ancient mathematics.— Ed. 

> The Neue Oder-Zeitung has:“...every general forms his own staff from his 
relations and protégés among the regimental officers without the least regard for 
special knowledge” .— Ed. 

j 
The Armies of Europe 423 

forgiven anywhere else, to a candidate for a lieutenancy. Every 
statement of facts is given in a slovenly, unbusiness-like, and 
unsoldier-like manner, leaving out the most important points, and 
showing, at once, that the writer does not know his business.*? The 
consequence is, that the most ridiculous statements of foreign 
books are credited at once.* We must, however, not forget to state 
that there are some honorable exceptions, amongst which 
W. Napier’s “Peninsular War,” and Howard Douglas’s “Naval 
Gunnery,” rank foremost.‘ 

The administrative, medical, commissariat, transport, and other 
accessory departments are in a deplorable state, and have 
experienced a thorough breakdown when put to the test in the 
Crimea.’ Efforts are made to improve them, as, also, to centralize 
the administration, but little good can be expected while the civil 
administration, and, in fact, the entire governing power, remains 
altogether the saine. 

With all these enormous drawbacks, the British army manages 
to hobble through every campaign, if not with success, yet without 
disgrace: There is a loss of life, a deal of mismanagement, a 
compound of blunders which astonish us when compared with the 
state of other armies under the same circumstances; yet there is no 
loss of military honor, there is seldom a repulse, almost never a 
complete defeat. It is the great personal bravery and tenacity of 
the troops, their discipline and implicit obedience, which bring this 
about. Clumsy, unintelligent, and helpless as the British soldier is 
when thrown upon his own resources, or when called upon to do 
the duty of light troops, nobody surpasses him in a pitched battle 
where he acts in masses. His forte is the action in line. An English 
line of battle will do what has scarcely ever been done by other 
infantry: receive cavalry in line, keep their muskets charged to the 
last moment, and fire a volley when the enemy is at thirty yards, 

; . : b 
* As an instance, we refer to the work on fire-arms by Col. Chesney, who is 
considered one of the best artillery officers in Great Britain. 

“ This sentence does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.— Ed. 

ie oe: Chesney, Observations on the Past and Present State of Fire-Arms.... In the 
Neue Oder-Zeitung the words “now General” are added in_ brackets after 
“Col.” — Ed. 

“ W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula....; H. Douglas, A Treatise on 
Naval Gunnery....— Ed. 

“Instead of this sentence the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: “Earlier we repeatedly 
pointed to the lamentable state of the commissariat, transport and other accessory 
departments. They experienced a thorough breakdown during the Crimean 
campaign.” — Ed. 

and in almost every instance with perfect success. The fire of 
British infantry is delivered with such a coolness, even in the most 
critical position, that it surpasses, in effect, that of any other 
troops. Thus, the Highlanders, in line, repulsed the Russian 
cavalry at Balaklava. The indomitable tenacity of this infantry was 
never shown to greater advantage than at Inkermann, where the 
French, under the same circumstances, would certainly have been 
overwhelmed; but, on the other hand, the French would never 
have allowed themselves to be surprised, unguarded, in such a 
position. This solidity and tenacity in attack and defense, form the 
great redeeming quality of the British army, and have alone saved 
it from many a defeat, well-merited and all but intentionally 
prepared by the incapacity of its officers, the absurdity of its 
administration, and the clumsiness of its movements. 

lil. THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 

Austria profited by the first moments of repose after her severe 
trials in 1848 and 1849, to reorganize her army upon a modern 
footing. Almost every department has been completely reformed, 
and the army is now far more efficient than ever. 

First comes the infantry. The line consists of sixty-two regi- 
ments, beside which there are one regiment and _ twenty-five 
battalions of rifles, and fourteen regiments and one battalion of 
frontier-infantry. The latter, with the rifles, make up the light 
infantry. 

An infantry regiment of the line consists of five field and one 
dépot battalion—together thirty-two companies—of which the 
field companies count 220 men, and the dépot companies 130 
men. Thus, the field battalion numbers about 1,300 men, and the 
whole regiment nearly 6,000 men, or as many as a British division. 
The whole line, therefore, on the war-footing, is about 370,000 
strong. 

The frontier infantry have per regiment, two fieid and one 
dépot battalion, together sixteen companies; in all, 3,850 men: the 
whole frontier infantry comprises 55,000 men. 

The chasseurs, or rifles, count in all thirty-two battalions, of 
about 1,000 men each: total, 32,000 men. 

In cavalry, the army has, of heavies: eight regiments of 
culrassiers, and eight of dragoons; of light horse: twelve of 
hussars, and twelve of lancers (seven of which were formerly light 
dragoons, or chevau-légers, but have been, latterly, turned into 
lancers). 

The Armies of Europe 425 

The heavy regiments count six squadrons, beside one dépot — 
the light ones eight squadrons, and one dépot squadron. The 
heavy regiments have 1,200 men, the light ones 1,600 men. The 
whole cavalry numbers about 67,000 men, on the war-footing. 

Of artillery, there are twelve field regiments, each consisting of 
four six pounders, three twelve pounder foot batteries, six cavalry 
batteries, and one howitzer battery, on the war-footing: total, 
1,344 guns; one coast regiment, and one rocket regiment, of 
twenty batteries, with one hundred and sixty tubes. Total, 1,500 
guns and rocket tubes, and 53,000 men. 

This gives a total effective number, on the war-footing, of 
522,000 fighting men. 

To these are to be added about 16,000 sappers, miners and 
pontoniers, 20,000 gens d’armes, the transport corps, and the like, 
raising the total to about 590,000 men. 

By calling in the reserve, the army can be increased by from 
100,000 to 120,000 men; and by draining the resources of the 
military frontier’? to their utmost limit, another 100,000 to 
120,000 men may be made available. But, as these forces could not 
be collected at a given moment, they would drop in gradually, and 
thus serve mainly to fill up the vacancies in the ranks. More than 
650,000 men Austria could hardly bring together, at a time, under 
arms. 

The army is divided into two quite distinct corps, the regular 
army and the frontier troops. For the first, the time of service is of 
eight years’ duration—after which the men remain two more 
years in the reserve. Long furloughs, however, are granted—as in 
France—and five years may be nearer the actual time the men are 
kept with the colors. 

The frontier troops are got together upon a quite different 
principle. They are the descendants of South-Slavonian (Croat or 
Serbian), Wallachian, and partly of German, settlers who hold 
their lands by military tenure under the crown, and were formerly 
employed to protect the frontier, from Dalmatia to Transylvania, 
against the inroads of the Turks. This service is now reduced to a 
mere formality, but the Austrian government, nevertheless, has 
shown no inclination to sacrifice this capita] nursery of soldiers. It 
was the existence of the frontier organization, which in 1848 saved 
Radetzky’s army in Italy, and which in 1849 made possible the 
first invasion of Hungary under Windischgratz. Next to Russia, it 
is to the South-Slavonian frontier regiments that Francis Joseph 
owes his throne. In the long stretch of country occupied by them, 
every crown-tenant (that is almost every inhabitant), is obliged to 

serve from his twentieth to his fiftieth year, when called upon. 
The younger men, of course, make up the strength of the 
regiments; the older men, generally, only take their turns at the 
frontier guard-houses, until called upon to serve in time of war. 
This explains how a population of about 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 
can furnish a contingent, in case of need, of 150,000 to 170,000 
men, or from ten to twelve per cent, of the whole number. 

The Austrian army has many points of resemblance to the 
British army. In both there are many nationalities mixed together, 
though each regiment, generally, belongs to one nation only. The 
Highland Gael, the Welshman, the [rishman, and the Englishman, 
scarcely vary more than the German, the Italian, the Croat, and 
the Magyar. In either, officers of all races, and even a great many 
foreigners, are to be found. In either, the theoretical instruction of 
the officers is extremely defective. In either, the tactical forms 
have retained a deal of the ancient line-formations, and adopted, 
in a limited degree only, the use of columns and skirmishing. In 
either, the dress is of an unusual color: with the English, red, with 
the Austrians, white. But in the efficiency of their arrangements, 
in the practical experience and competence of the officers, and in 
tactical mobility, the Austrians by far surpass the British. 

The dress of the soldier, leaving apart the absurd white color of 
the infantry coat, has been adapted in its cut to the modern 
system. A short tunic, like the Prussians’ sky-blue trowsers, a gray 

capote, a light képi, similar to the French, make a very good and 

serviceable dress, excepting, always, the tight trowsers of the 
Hungarian and Croat regiments, which form part of the national 
dress, but are, for all that, very inconvenient. The accoutrements 
are not what they should be; the cross-belt system has been 
maintained, The frontier troops and artillery are dressed in brown 
coats; the cavalry, either white, brown or blue. The muskets are 
rather clumsy, and the rifles, with which both the chasseurs and a 
certain portion of each company are armed, are of a rather 
antiquated model, and far inferior to the Minié rifle. The common 
musket is the old flint gun changed, in an imperfect manner, into 
a percussion musket, and very often misses fire. 

The infantry, and in this respect it is similar to the English, is 
more distinguished by its action in masses, than by its agility in 
light mfantry service. We must, however, except the frontier 
troops and the chasseurs. The first are, for the most part, very 
efficient im skirmishing, especially the Serbians, whose favorite 
warfare ts one of ambuscades. The chasseurs are mainly Tyrolians, 
and first-rate marksmen. But the German and Hungarian infantry 

The Armies of Europe 427 

generally impose by their solidity, and, during Napoleon’s wars, 
they often showed that in this respect they deserve to be placed 
along with the British. They, too, have more than once received 
cavalry, in line, without deigning to form square, and wherever 
they have formed squares, the enemy’s cavalry could seldom break 
them up—witness Aspern.?”’ 

The cavalry is excellent. The heavy or “German” cavalry, 
consisting of Germans and Bohemians,’ is well horsed, well armed, 
and always efficient. The light cavalry has, perhaps, lost by mixing 
up the German chevau-légers with the Polish lancers, but its 
Hungarian hussars will always remain the models of all light 
cavalry. 

The artillery, recruited mostly from the German provinces, has 
always stood high; not so much by early and judicious adoption of 
improvements, as by the practical efficiency of the men. The 
non-commissioned officers, especially, are educated with great 
care, and are superior to those of any other army. With the 
officers, theoretical proficiency is left too much an optional matter, 
but yet Austria has produced some of the best writers on the 
subject. In Austria, study is the rule, at least with subalterns, while 
in England, an officer who studies his profession is considered a 
disgrace to his regiment. The special corps, staff, and engineers, 
are excellent, as is proved by the beautiful maps they have made 
from their surveys, especially of Lombardy. The British ordnance 
map, though good, is nothing in comparison. 

The great confusion of nationalities is a serious evil. In the 
British army, every man can at least speak English, but with the 
Austrians, even the non-commissioned officers of the non-German 
regiments can scarcely speak German. This creates, of course, a 
deal of confusion, difficulty, and interpreting, even between the 
officer and the soldier. It is partly remedied by the necessity in 
which frequent change of quarters places the officers of learning 
at least something of every language spoken in Austria. But yet, 
the inconvenience is not obviated. 

The severity of the discipline, which is whacked into the men by 
frequent applications of a hazel stick to their posteriors, and the 
long time of service, prevent the outbreak of serious quarrels 
between the various nationalities of the army, at least in time of 
peace. But 1848 showed how little internal consistency this body of 
troops possesses. At Vienna, the German troops refused to fight 
the revolution. In Italy and Hungary, the national troops passed 

* Czechs.— Ed. 

over to the side of the insurgents, without as much as a struggle. 
Here it is that the weak point of this army lies. Nobody can tell 
how far or how long it will hold together, or how many regiments 
will leave it in any peculiar case, to fight their former comrades. 
There are six different nations, and two or three different creeds, 
represented in this one army; and, as to the sympathies pervading | 
it, they must necessarily clash in a time like the present, when 
nations are panting for the free use of their forces. In a war with 
Russia, would the Greek Catholic Serbian, influenced by Panslavist 
agitation, fight the Russians, his cousins by race, and holding the 
same creed as he? In a revolutionary war, would the Italian and 
Hungarian forsake his country, to battle for an emperor foreign to 
him in Janguage and nationality? It is not to be expected; and 
therefore, whatever the strength of the Austrian army may be, 
very particular circumstances are required to bring its full power 
into play. 

429 

{SECOND ARTICLE] 
[Putnam’s Monthly, No. XXXIII, September 1855] 
I. THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 

The Prussian army deserves special notice, on account of its 
peculiar organization. While, in every other army, the peace- 
footing is the groundwork of the entire establishment, and no 
cadres are provided for the new formations which a great war at 
once necessitates, in Prussia, we are told, everything, to the 
minutest detail, is prepared for the war-footing. Thus, the peace 
establishment simply forms a school, in which the population are 
instructed in arms and maneuvers. This system, including, as it 
professes to do, the whole able-bodied male population in the 
ranks of the army on the war-footing, would appear to render the 
country which adopts it safe from every attack; yet this is by no 
means the case. What is attained is, that the country is stronger by 
about 50 per cent. than under the French or Austrian system of 
recruiting; by which means it is possible for an agricultural state of 
some seventeen millions of inhabitants, on a small territory, 
without a fleet or direct maritime commerce, and with compara- 
tively littke manufacturing industry, to maintain, in some respects, 
the position of a great European power. 

The Prussian army consists of two great divisions: of those 
soldiers who are still being trained—the line; and of those trained 
men who may be said to have been sent home on indefinite 
furlough—the landwehr. 

The service in the line lasts five years, from the twentieth to the 
twenty-fifth year of each man’s age; but three years of active 
service are thought sufficient; after which, the soldier is dismissed 
to his home, and placed for the remaining two years in what is 
called the war-reserve. During this time he continues to figure on 

the reserve-lists of his battalion or squadron, and is liable to be 
called in at any time. 

After having been, for two years, in the war-reserve, he passes 
into the first levy of the landwehr (erstes Aufgebot der Landwehy), 
where he remains up to his thirty-second year. During this period 
he is liable to be called in, every other year, for the exercises of 
this corps, which generally take place upon a pretty extensive 
scale, and in connection with those of the line. The maneuvers 
generally Jast a month, and very often from 50,000 to 60,000 
troops are concentrated for this purpose. The landwehr of the 
first levy are destined to act in the field along with the line. They 
form separate regiments, battalions, and squadrons, the same as 
the line, and carry the same regimental numbers. The artillery, 
however, remain attached to the respective regiments of the line. 

From the thirty-second to the thirty-ninth year, inclusive, the 
soldier remains in the second levy (zweites Aufgebot) of the 
landwehr, during which time he is no longer called upon for 
active duty, unless a war breaks out, in which case the second levy 
has to do garrison duty in the fortresses, thus leaving available the 
whole of the line and first levy for field operations. After the 
fortieth year, he is free from all liability to be called out, unless, 
indeed, that mysterious body called the Landsturm, or levy en 
masse, be required to arm itself. The landsturm includes every 
man not comprised in the former categories, with all those too 
small or too weakly, or otherwise liberated from service, between 
the sixteenth and sixtieth year of age. But this landsturm cannot 
even be said to exist on paper, for there is not any organization 
prepared for it, no arms or accoutrements provided; and if it 
should ever have to assemble, it would not be found fit for 
anything but police duty at home, and for a_ tremendous 
consumption of strong drink. 

As in Prussia every citizen is, according to law, a soldier, from 
his twentieth to his fortieth year, a population of seventeen 
millions might be expected to furnish a total contingent of at least 
a million and a half of men. But, in reality, not one half of this 
number can be got together. The fact is, that the training of such 
a mass of men would presuppose, at three years’ service with the 
regiments, a peace establishment of at least 300,000 men, while 
Prussia merely maintains something like 130,000. Thus various 
devices are employed to liberate a number of men otherwise liable 
to serve: men fit enough for duty are declared too weak, the 
medical inspection either selecting the best candidates only, or 
allowing itself to be moved by bribes in the selection of those 

The Armies of Europe 431 

considered fit for duty, and so on. Formerly, the reduction of the 
time of actual service, for the infantry, to two years only, was the 
means of bringing down the peace establishment to some 100,000 
or 110,000 men; but since the revolution,* the government, having 
found out how much an additional year of service will do in 
making the men obedient to their officers, and reliable in case of 
insurrection, the three years’ service has been generally introduced 
again. 

The standing army, or the line, is composed of nine army- 
corps—one of guards and eight of the line. Their peculiar 
organization will be explained presently. They comprise, in all, 
thirty-six regiments of infantry (guards and line), of three 
battalions each”; eight regiments of reserve, of two battalions each; 
eight combined reserve battalions, and ten battalions of chasseurs 
(Jager); in all, 144 battalions of infantry, or 150,000 men. 

The cavalry is composed of ten cuirassier, five dragoon, ten 
lancer, and thirteen hussar regiments, of four squadrons, or 800 
men each; in all, 30,000 men. 

The artillery consists of nine regiments, each composed, when 
on the war-footing, of four six-pounder, three twelve-pounder, 
and one howitzer, foot batteries, and three batteries of horse 
artillery, with one reserve company to be turned into a twelfth 
battery; beside four garrison companies, and one company of 
workmen. But as the whole of the war reserve and landwehr of 
the first levy (of the artillery) are required to man these guns, and 
to complete the companies, the line-artillery may be described as 
consisting of nine regiments, of about 2,500 men each, with about 
thirty guns in each regiment, fully horsed and equipped. 

Thus, the grand total of the Prussian line would amount to 
about 200,000 men; but from 60,000 to 70,000 men may safely be 
deducted for the war reserves, dismissed to their homes after 
three years’ service. 

The first levy of the landwehr counts, for every regiment of the 
guards and line, one of landwehr, except for the eight reserve 
regiments; beside, it has eight reserve battalions, forming a total of 
116 battalions, and about 100,000 men. The cavalry has two 
regiments of guards, and thirty-two of the line, with eight reserve 
squadrons; in all, 136 squadrons, or about 20,000 men. The 
artillery is attached to the line regiments, as before stated. 

* The revolution of 1848-49.— Ed. 
Not all regiments in the guards corps consisted of three battalions.— Ed. 

The second levy also counts 116 battalions, 167 squadrons 
(comprising sundry reserve and dép6t squadrons, whose duties are 
assimilated to those of the second levy), and some garrison 
artillery; altogether, about 150,000 men. 

With the nine battalions of sappers, several minor corps, about 
30,000 pensioners, and an army train amounting, on the 
war-footing, to no less than 45,000 men, the whole of the Prussian 
force is stated to amount to 580,000 men; of which, 300,000 are 
for the field, 54,000 for the dépots, 170,000 for the garrisons and 
as a reserve, with about 60,000 non-combatants. The number of 
field-guns attached to this army should be between 800 and 850, 
divided into batteries of eight guns (six cannon and two howitzers) 
each, 

For all these troops, not only the complete organization of the 
cadres, but also the arms and equipments, are provided; so that, in 
case of a mobilization of the army, nothing has to be found but the 
horses; and as Prussia is rich in horses, and as animals as well as 
men are liable to instant requisition, no great difficulty is 
presented by this necessity. So says the regulation; but how the 
matter stands, in point of fact, was shown when, in 1850, the army 
was mobilized. The first levy of the landwehr was equipped, 
though not without great difficulty; but the second levy found 
nothing provided, neither clothing, nor shoes, nor arms, and thus 
it offered the most ridiculous spectacle imaginable. Long before 
this occurred, competent judges, who had themselves served in the 
Prussian army, had predicted that such would be the case; and 
that, in point of fact, Prussia could, on an emergency, count upon 
nothing but the line and a portion of the first levy. Their opinion 
was fully borne out by the event. No doubt, the equipments for 
the second levy have since been provided; and this body, if called 
out now, would, in a month or six weeks, form a very respectable 
corps for garrison, and even field duty. But then, in time of war, 
three months’ drill is considered quite sufficient to prepare a 
recruit for the field; and thus, the cumbrous organization adopted 
by Prussia does not at all insure such enormous advantages as is 
generally believed. Beside, in a couple of years, the material 
reserved for the second levy will again have disappeared in the 
same way as that which had certainly once existed, but was not to 
be found when needed in 1850. 

Prussia, when adopting the principle that each citizen was to be 
a soldier, stopped half-way, and falsified that principle, thereby 
falsifying all her military organization. Once the system of 
conscription abandoned for that of universal compulsory service, 

The Armies of Europe 433 

the standing army, as such, ought to have been abolished. Mere 
cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers should have 
been maintained, through whose hands the young men should 
have passed for instruction, and the period of instruction should 
not have lasted longer than was necessary for the purpose. If such 
had been the case, the time of service, during peace, must have 
been brought down to a year, for all the infantry, at least. But that 
would not suit either the government or the military martinets of 
the old school. The government wanted a disposable and reliable 
army, to be used, in case of need, against disturbances at home; 
the martinets wanted an army which, in precision of drill, in 
general appearance, and in solidity, could rival the remaining 
armies of Europe, composed of comparatively older soldiers. A 
body of young troops, serving no more than a single year, would 
not do for either purpose. Consequently, the middle course of 
three years’ service was adopted, and hence arise all the faults and 
weaknesses of the Prussian army. 

As we have seen, at least one half of the available men are 
excluded from the army. They are at once inscribed on the rolls 
of the second levy, which body, swelled thereby nominally to 
enormous numbers, is completely swamped, in whatever efficiency 
it might possess, by a mass of men who never handled a musket, 
and are no better than raw recruits. This reduction of the actual 
military strength of the country by at least one half, is the first bad 
effect produced by the protracted time of service. 

But the line itself, and the first levy of the landwehr, suffer 
under this system. Of every regiment, one third has served less 
than three, one third less than two years, and the remaining third 
less than one year. Now it is not to be expected that an army 
composed like this can have those military qualities, that. strict 
subordination, that steadiness in the ranks, that esprit de corps, 
which distinguish the old soldiers of the English, Austrian, 
Russian, and even the French armies. The English, who are 
competent judges in this matter, from the long period their 
soldiers serve, consider that it takes three years completely to 
break in a recruit.* Now, as, in time of peace, the Prussian army is 
composed of men none of whom have ever served three years, the 
natural consequence is that these military qualities of the old 
soldier, or at least the semblance of them, have to be drummed 
into the young Prussian recruit by an intolerable martinetism. The 
Prussian subaltern and sergeant, from the impossibility of the task 

* See Sir W. Napier’s Peninsular War. 

imposed upon them, come to treat their subordinates with a 
roughness and brutality doubly repulsive from the spirit of 
pedantry with which it is coupled; and this pedantry is the more 
ridiculous because it is in complete contrast with the plain and 
sensible system of drill prescribed, and because it constantly 
appeals to the traditions of Frederick the Great, who had to drill a 
quite different set of men in a quite different system of tactics. 
Thus, real efficiency in the field is sacrificed to precision on the 
parade-ground, and the Prussian line, upon the whole, may be 
considered inferior to the old battalions and squadrons which, in the 
first onset, any of the great European powers can bring forward 
against it. 

This is the case, in spite of advantages of which no other army is 
possessed. The Prussian, as well as the German in general, makes 
capital stuff for a soldier. A country, composed of extensive plains 
varied by large groups of mountains, furnishes material in 
abundance for every different arm. The general bodily aptitude 
for both light infantry and line infantry duty, possessed equally by 
the majority of the Germans, is scarcely equaled by other nations. 
The country, possessing horses in plenty, furnishes numerous men 
for the cavalry, who, from their childhood, have been at home in 
the saddle. The deliberate steadiness of the Germans adapts them 
especially for the artillery service. They are, withal, among the 
most pugnacious people in the world, enjoying war for its own 
sake, and often enough going to look for it abroad, when they 
cannot have it at home. From the Landsknechte of the middle age 
to the present foreign legions of France and England, the 
Germans have always furnished the great mass of those mer- 
cenaries who fight for the sake of fighting. If the French excel 
them in agility and vivacity of onslaught, if the English are their 
superiors in toughness of resistance, the Germans certainly excel 
all! other European nations in that general fitness for military duty 
which makes them good soldiers under all circumstances. 

The Prussian officers form by far the best educated body of 
their class in the world. The general educational tests to which 
they are subjected are of a far higher standard than those of any 
other army. Brigade and divisional schools are maintained to 
complete their theoretical education; higher or more _ special 
military knowledge is provided for by numerous establishments. 
Prussian military literature holds a very high rank; the works it 
has furnished for the last twenty-five years sufficiently prove that 
their authors not only perfectly understood their own business, 
but could challenge, for general scientific information, the officers 

The Armies of Europe 435 

of any army. In fact, there is almost too much of a smattering of 
metaphysics in some of them, and this is explained by the fact 
that, in Berlin, Breslau, or Konigsberg, you may see officers taking 
their seats amongst the students at the university lectures. 
Clausewitz is as much a standard author in his line, all over the 
world, as Jomini; and the works of the engineer Aster mark a new 
epoch in the science of fortification. Yet, the name of a “Prussian 
lieutenant” is a by-word all over Germany, and, indeed, the 
caricatured esprit de corps, pedantry and impertinent manners 
inculcated by the general tone of the army, fully justify the fact; 
while nowhere are there so many old, stiff-necked martinets 
among the field-officers and generals as in Prussia—most of them, 
however, relics of 1813 and 715. After all, it must be acknowledged 
that the absurd attempt to force the Prussian line into what it can 
never be made to be—an army of old soldiers—deteriorates the 
quality of the officer as much as it does that of the soldier, and 
even more. 

The drill-regulations in the Prussian army* are, undoubtedly, 
niuch the best in the world. Simple, consistent, based upon a few 
common sense principles, they leave very little to be desired. They 
are owing to the genius of Scharnhorst, who was, perhaps, the 
greatest military organizer since Maurice of Nassau. The regula- 
tions for handling large bodies of troops are equally good. The 
scientific manuals, however, for the artillery service, which are 
officially recommended to the officers, are old-fashioned and by 
no means up to the requirements of the present time; but this 
blame is confined to works bearing a more or less official stamp, 
and does not at all bear upon Prussian artilleristic literature in 
general. 

The engineering body enjoy, and deservedly, a very high 
character. From them proceeded Aster, the first military engineer 
since Montalembert. They have constructed a seriés of fortresses, 
from Ko6nigsberg and Posen to Cologne and Coblentz, which has 
obtained the admiration of Europe. 

The equipment of the Prussian army, since the changes effected 
in 1843 and 44, is not very handsome, but very convenient for the 
soldiers. The helmet is a very efficient protection against sun and 
rain, the clothing is loose and comfortable, the adiustment of the 
accoutrements still better than that adopted in France. The guards 
and light battalions (one to each regiment) are armed with the 
rifled needle-gun; the remainder of the line are having their 

“ (G.].D. von Scharnhorst,] Kriegs-Artikel für das Preussische Heer.— Ed. 

muskets transformed, by a very simple process, into good Minié 
rifles; as to the landwehr, they, too, will, in two or three years, 
receive the Minié gun, but as yet they carry percussion muskets. 
The saber of the cavalry is too broad and crooked—most of the 
cuts fall flat. The material of the artillery, both in cannon, 
carriages, and harness, leave much to be desired. 

On the whole, the Prussian army, that is, the line and first levy, 
forms a respectable body of men, but nothing like what Prussian 
patriotic authors boast. The line, once in the field, will very soon 
throw off the fetters of the parade-ground, and, after a few 
engagements, be equal to their opponents. The landwehr of the 
first levy, as soon as the old soldier-like spirit has been 
re-awakened, and if the war be popular, will equal the best old 
troops in Europe. What Prussia has to fear, is an active enemy 
during the first period of a war, when troops of superior 
organization, and of older standing, are brought against her; but 
in a protracted struggle she will have a greater proportion of old 
soldiers in her armies than any other European state. In the 
beginning of a campaign, the line will form the nucleus of the 
army, but the first levy will very soon push it into the shade, by 
the greater bodily strength and the higher military qualities of its 
men. They are the real old soldiers of Prussia—not the beardless 
youths of the line. Of the second levy we do not speak; it has yet to 
show what it is. 

Il. THE RUSSIAN ARMY 

In Russia, too, a certain provision has been made for 
establishing cadres for the war-footing, by a scheme of reserves, 
similar, in some points, to the Prussian landwehr system. But, on 
the whole, the Russian reserve comprises such a limited number of 
men, and the difficulty of bringing them together from all the 
points of that vast empire is so great, that, as early as six months 
after the Anglo-French declaration of war,’ and before a single 
shot had been fired in the Crimea, the abolition of the system and 
the formation of new bodies, followed up since by other new 
formations, at once became necessary. Thus, in Russia, we must 
distinguish between the army as it was on the breaking out of the 
war, and the army as it is now. 

“ Britain and France officially declared war on Russia on March 27 and 28, 
1854, respectively.— Ed. 

The Armies of Europe 437 

The Russian army, in time of peace, is divided as follows: —1. 
The active army—six corps of the line, Nos. 1 to 6; 2. The reserve 
army—one corps of guards, one corps ot grenadiers, two corps of 
cavalry of the reserve; 3. The special corps—that of the Caucasus, 
that of Finland, that of Orenburg, that of Siberia; 4. The troops 
for inland duty—-veterans, inland guards, invalids, and so forth; 5. 
The irregular troops. To these must be added the reserves, 
consisting of soldiers dismissed on furlough. 

The composition of each of the six corps of the line is as 
follows: —it includes three divisions of infantry, consisting each of 
a brigade of the line and one of light infantry, each brigade 
consisting of two regiments, each regiment of four service- 
battalions; in all, six brigades or twelve regiments, comprising 
forty-eight battalions, with one battalion of rifles, and one of 
sappers; total, fifty battalions. There is also one division of light 
cavalry, containing one brigade of lancers, and one brigade of 
hussars, each of two regiments, or sixteen squadrons; total, 
thirty-two squadrons. The artillery consists of one division [of 
artillery] of three foot brigades, and one horse brigade; total, 
fourteen batteries or 112 guns; total, per corps, fifty battalions, 
thirty-two squadrons, 112 guns; grand total, 300 battalions, 192 
squadrons, 672 guns. 

The guards contain three divisions, or six brigades, comprising 
twelve regiments (nine of grenadiers, and three of carabineers, or 
light infantry); in all, thirty-six battalions, for the regiments of 
guards and grenadiers count three service-battalions only. There is 
also one battalion of rifles and one of sappers and miners, beside 
three divisions of cavalry (one cuirassiers, one lancers, one 
hussars), comprising six brigades or twelve regiments, and making 
in all seventy-two squadrons of cavalry. There is one division of 
five brigades and fifteen batteries (nine foot, five horse, one 
rockets); in all, 135 guns. The grenadier corps consists of three 
divisions or six brigades, comprising twelve regiments or thirty-six 
battalions of infantry, one battalion of rifles, and one of sappers 
and miners. This corps also counts one division of cavalry, 
including two brigades (lancers and hussars), made up of four 
regiments or thirty-two squadrons. The artillery consists of three 
foot and one horse brigade, with fourteen batteries; in all, 112 
guns. 

The reserve cavalry is organized as follows:—J1st corps: three 
divisions (two of cuirassiers, one of lancers), comprising six 
brigades or twelve regiments; in all, eighty squadrons (forty-eight 
of cuirassiers, thirty-two of lancers). There is also one division of 

horse artillery, containing three brigades, with six batteries; in all, 
forty-eight guns.—2d corps: three divisions (one lancers, two 
dragoons) or six brigades; including twelve regiments or 112 
squadrons (thirty-two of lancers, eighty of dragoons). There are 
also two squadrons of mounted sappers and pontoniers, and six 
batteries of horse artillery, comprising forty-eight guns. 

The Caucasian corps is composed of one reserve grenadier 
brigade, containing two regiments or six battalions; three divisions 
of infantry, containing twelve regiments or forty-eight battalions; 
one battalion of rifles, one of sappers; forty-seven battalions of the 
Caucasian line (militia); total, 103 battalions. The cavalry consists 
of one regiment of dragoons, of ten squadrons. Of artillery there 
is one division, with ten common and six mountain batteries, of 
180 guns in all. 

The Finland corps consists of one division, comprising twa 
brigades or twelve battalions of infantry; that of Orenburg, of one 
division, likewise of two brigades, but of only ten battalions; that 
of Siberia, of one division, comprising three brigades; making 
fifteen battalions. Finally, the grand total of the regular troops, 
actually under arms in time of peace, may be stated as follows: — 

Battal. Squad. Guns. 

6 corps of the line .................. 300 192 672 
Guards csiacatiacs hescbe Sees ies. 38 a2 135 
(GTOTIACHORS: ss casianiarsoivacterscnades 38 32 112 
Reserve cavalry ........:ccecees eee 194 96 
Caucasian COIps .........c:ceeeeees 103 10 180 
Pinlarid COMP pS oss ssesizenekigocasaess 12 — — 
Orenburg GOs, «isin 10 — — 
SIDEVIaA G0 ssdecechonsitas cesar 15 — — 
OPA i ci tetits asek turn cence ta ears 516 500 1,195 

The troops for inland service consist of fifty-two battalions of 
inland guards, 800 companies of veterans and invalids, eleven and 
a half squadrons of gens d’armes, and ninety-eight companies of 
artillery. These troops can hardly be counted in an estimate of the 
available force of the country. 

The irregular troops, mostly cavalry, form the following 
divisions: — 

1. The Don Cossacks: — fifty-six regiments, each of six sotnias; in all, 336 sotnias, 
thirteen batteries. 

The Armies of Europe 439 

2. The Tshornomor (Black Sea Cossacks): —seventy-two sotnias, nine battalions, 
three batteries. 

3. The Caucasian line Cossacks (on the Kuban and Terek):— 120 sotnias and 
three batteries. 

4. The Astrachan Cossacks: — eighteen sotnias, one battery. 

5. The Orenburg Cossacks:—sixty sotnias, three batteries. 

6. The Ural Cossacks: —sixty sotnias. 

7. The Bashkir levy: —eighty-five sotnias, almost all Bashkirs and Kalmyks. 

8. The Siberian Cossacks:—twenty-four battalions, eighty-four sotnias, three 
batteries, composed partly of Tungusians, Buriates, &c. 

9. The Azov Cossacks, engaged in naval service. 

10. The Danubian Cossacks in Bessarabia: twelve sotnias. 

I1. The Baikal Lake Cossacks, but recently formed, of unknown organization and 
strength. 

The total would amount to 847 sotnias (squadrons of 100 men 
each, from sto, hundred), thirty-three battalions, twenty-six bat- 
teries. This would make about 90,000 men of cavalry, and 30,000 
infantry. But, for actual war purposes on the western frontier, 
perhaps 40,000 to 50,000 cavalry, a few batteries, and none of the 
infantry are available. 

Thus, in time of peace, the Russian army (exclusive of the 
inland service troops) should consist of 360,000 infantry, 70,000 
cavalry, and 90,000 artillery; in all, 500,000 men; beside a number 
of Cossacks, varying according to circumstances. But of these 
500,000 men, the local corps of the Caucasus, of Orenburg, and 
Siberia cannot be made available for any war on ‘the western 
frontier of the empire; so that, against western Europe, not 
more than 260,000 infantry, 70,000 cavalry, and 50,000 artillery, 
with about 1,000 guns, can be used, beside some 30,000 Cos- 
sacks. 

So far for the peace establishment. For the event of a war, the 
following provisions were made: the full time of service was 
twenty, twenty-two, or twenty-five years, according to. cir- 
cumstances. But after either ten or fifteen years, according to 
circumstances, the soldiers were dismissed on furlough, after 
which they belonged to the reserve. The organization of this 
reserve has varied very much, but it appears, now, that the men 
on furlough belonged, during the first five years, to a reserve 
battalion (the fourth of each regiment in the guards and 
grenadiers, the fifth in the line), a reserve squadron, or a reserve 
battery, according to their respective arms. After the lapse of five 
years they passed to the dépot (fifth or respectively sixth) battalion 
of their regiment, or to the dépot squadron or battery. Thus, the 
calling-in of the reserve would raise the effective strength of the 
infantry and artillery about fifty per cent., of the cavalry about 

twenty per cent. These reserves were to be commanded by retired 
officers, and their cadres, if not in full organization, were 
nevertheless, to a certain degree, prepared. 

But when the war broke out, all this was altered. The active 
army had to send two divisions to the Caucasus, though it was 
destined to fight on the western frontier. Before the Anglo-French 
troops embarked for the east, three corps of the active army (the 
third, fourth, and fifth) were engaged in the campaign against the 
Turks. At that period, indeed, the reserves were concentrating, 
but it took an enormous length of time before the men could be 
brought up to their respective headquarters from all points of the 
empire. The allied armies and fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas, 
as well as the wavering policy of Austria, necessitated more 
vigorous measures; the levies were doubled and tripled, and the 
motley mass of recruits, thus got together, were formed, along 
with the reserves, into fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth 
battalions for all the infantry regiments, while a similar increase 
was made in the cavalry. Thus, the eight corps of guards, 
grenadiers, and line, instead of 376 battalions, now muster about 
800, while, for every two squadrons or batteries of the peace 
establishment, at least one of reserve has been added. All these 
figures, however, look more formidable on paper than in reality; 
for, what with the corruption of the Russian officials, the 
mal-administration of the army, and the enormous length of the 
marches from the homes of the men to the dépots, from the 
dépots to the points of concentration of the corps, and from 
thence to the seat of war, a great proportion of the men are lost 
or invalided before they come to meet the enemy. Besides, the 
ravages of disease, and the losses in battle, during the two last 
campaigns, have been very serious, and, altogether, we do not 
think that the 1,000 battalions, 800 squadrons, and 200 batteries 
of the Russian army, can much exceed, at present, 600,000 men. 

But the government was not satisfied with this. With a 
promptitude which shows how fully it is aware of the difficulty of 
bringing together large masses of men from the various portions 
of this vast empire, it decreed the levy of the militia as soon as the 
organization of the seventh and eighth battalions was completed. 
The militia, or opoltshenie, was to be organized in druginas 
(battalions) of 1,000 each, in proportion to the population of each 
province; twenty-three men out of every 1,000 males, or nearly 
one-quarter per cent. of the population were to serve. For the 
time being, the opoltshenie was called out in the western provinces 
only. This levy, made upon a population of 18,000,000, compris- 

The Armies of Europe 44] 

ing about 9,000,000 males, must have produced about 120,000 
men, and this agrees with what the reports from Russia state. 
There is no doubt that the militia will prove, in every respect, 
inferior even to the newly formed reserve, but, at all events, it isa 
valuable addition to the forces of Russia, and, if employed to do 
garrison duty in Poland, it can set free a good many regiments of 
the line. 

On the other hand, not only many Cossacks, but even 
considerable numbers of Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Kirghiz, Tungusians, 
and other Mongol levies have arrived on the western frontier. 
This shows how early they were ordered westwards, for many of 
them had above a twelve-month’s march to make before they 
could arrive at St. Petersburg, or on the Vistula. 

Thus, Russia has taxed her military resources almost to the 
utmost; and, after two years’ campaigning, during which time she 
has lost no decisive battle, she cannot muster more than 600,000 
to 650,000 regular troops, with 100,000 militia, and perhaps 
50,000 irregular cavalry. We do not mean to say that she is 
exhausted; but, there is no doubt, that now, after two years’ war, 
she could not do what France did after twenty years’ war, and 
after the total loss of her finest army in 1812: pour forth a fresh 
body of 300,000 men and arrest, for a time, at least, the onslaught 
of the enemy. So enormous is the difference, in military strength, 
between a densely and a thinly populated country. If France 
bordered on Russia, the 66,000,000 inhabitants of Russia would be 
weaker than the 38,000,000 French. That the 44,000,000 Germans 
are more than a match for the 66,000,000 subjects of the 
orthodox Czar, there is not the slightest doubt. 

The Russian army is recruited in various ways. The great body 
of the men is raised by the regular levy, which takes place one 
year in the western, and the next in the eastern provinces of 
Russia in Europe. The general percentage is four or five men 
levied out of every 1,000 (male) “souls;” for in the Russian census 
the males only are counted, as, according to the orthodox belief of 
the east, the women do not constitute “souls.”’ Those from the 
western half of the empire serve twenty, those from the eastern 
half twenty-five years. The guards serve twenty-two years; young 
men from the military colonies twenty years. Beside these levies, 
the soldiers’ sons are a fertile source of recruits. Every son born to 
a soldier while in service is obliged to serve; and this principle is 
carried so far that children borne by soldiers’ wives are claimed by 
the state, though the husband may have been at the other end of 
the empire for five or ten years. These soldiers’ children are called 

44? Frederick Engels 

cantonists, and most of them are educated at the expense of the 
government; from them most of the non-commissioned officers 
are taken. Finally, criminals, vagabonds, and other good-for- 
nothing individuals, are sentenced, by the courts of law, to serve in 
the army. A nobleman has the right of sending a serf, if otherwise 
able-bodied, into the army; and every father, when dissatisfied 
with his son, can do the same. “S’bogom idi pod Krasnuyu shapkoo.” 
Begone, then, with God, and put the red cap on—that ts to say, 
go into the army—is a common saying of the Russian peasant to a 
disobedient son. 

The non-commissioned officers, as we have said, are mostly 
recruited from the soldiers’ sons, educated in government 
establishments. From early boyhood subject to military discipline, 
these lads have nothing whatever in common with the men whom 
they are, subsequently, to instruct and direct. They form a class 
separate from the people. They belong to the state—they cannot 
exist without it: once thrown upon their own resources, they are 
fit for nothing. To get on, then, under the government, is their 
only object. What the lower class of employés, recruited from the 
sons of employés, are in the Russian civil service, these men are in 
the army: a set of cunning, low-minded, narrowly-egotistical 
subordinates, endowed with a smattering of elementary education, 
which almost renders them more despicable; ambitious from 
vanity and love of gain; sold, life and soul, to the state, and yet 
trying, daily and hourly, to sell the state, in detail, whenever they 
can make a profit by it. A fine specimen of this class is the 
feldjager or courier who accompanied M. de Custine during his 
travels in Russia, and who is admirably portrayed in_ that 
gentleman’s account of Russia.’ It is this class of men, both in the 
civil and military branches, which principally foments the immense 
corruption pervading all branches of the public service in that 
country. But as it is, there is no doubt that, if this system of total 
appropriation of the children, by the state, were done away 
with, Russia would not be able to find a sufficient number 
of civil subaltern employés and military non-commissioned 
officers. 

With the class of officers it is, perhaps, still worse. The 
education given to a future corporal or sergeant-major is a 
comparatively cheap article; but to educate officers for an army of 
one million (and that is the number for which the Russian cadres, 
officially speaking, should be prepared) is a costly affair. Private 

“A. de Custine, La Russie en 1839, T. 1V, pp. 283-85.— Ed. 

The Armies of Europe 443 

establishments do nothing or little for the purpose. The state, 
again, must do everything. But it evidently cannot educate such a 
mass of young men as are required for this use. Consequently, the 
sons of the nobility are, by a direct moral compulsion, induced to 
serve for at least five or ten years in the army or the civil service; 
for every family in which three consecutive generations have not 
“served,” loses its privilege of nobility, and especially the right to 
own serfs—a right without which, in Russia, extensive landed 
property 1s worse than valueless. Thus, vast numbers of young 
men are brought into the army with the rank of ensign or 
lieutenant, whose entire education consists, at the best, in a certain 
fluency in French conversation on the most ordinary topics, and 
some little smattering of elementary mathematics, geography and 
history—the whole drummed into them for mere show. To them, 
to serve is an ugly necessity, to be gone through, like a prolonged 
medical treatment, with unfeigned disgust; and as soon as the 
prescribed time of service has elapsed, or the grade of major is 
attained, they retire, and are inscribed on the rolls of the dépot 
battalions. As to the pupils of the military schools, they, too, have 
almost all been crammed so as to pass the examinations; and they 
are, even in mere professional knowledge, far behind the young 
men from the Austrian, the Prussian, or French military schools. 
On the other hand, young men of talent, application, and passion 
for their special branch, are so rare in Russia that they are seized 
upon wherever they show themselves, be they foreigners or 
natives. With the greatest liberality, the state provides them with 
all the means for completing their studies, and gives them rapid 
promotion. Such men are used to show off Russian civilization 
before Europe. If they are inclined to literary pursuits, they meet 
with every encouragement so long as they do not overstep the 
bounds of Russian government requirements, and it is they who, 
have furnished what little there is of value in Russian military 
literature. But up to the present time, the Russians of all classes 
are too fundamentally barbarous to find any enjoyment in 
scientific pursuits or head-work of any kind (except intrigues), 
and, therefore, almost all their distinguished men in the military 
service are either foreigners, or, what nearly amounts to the same, 
“ostzeiski,” Germans from the Baltic provinces. So was the last 
and most distinguished specimen of this class, General Todtleben, 
the chief engineer at Sebastopol, who died in July from the effects 
of a wound.”” He was certainly the cleverest man at his trade in 
the whole siege, either in the Russian or the Allied camp; but he 
was a Baltic German, of Prussian extraction. 

In this manner the Russian army has among its officers the very 
best and the very worst men, only that the former are present in 
an infinitesimally small proportion. What the Russian government 
thinks of its officers it has plainly and unmistakably shown in its 
own tactical regulations. These regulations do not merely prescribe 
a general mode of placing a brigade, division, or army-corps in 
action, a so-called “normal disposition,” which the commander is 
expected to vary according to the ground and other circumstances, 
but they prescribe different normal dispositions for all the 
different cases possible, leaving the general no choice whatever, 
and tying him down in a manner which, as much as possible, takes 
all responsibility from his shoulders. An army-corps, for instance, 
can be arranged, in battle, in five different ways, according to the 
regulations; and, at the Alma, the Russians were actually arrayed 
according to one of them—the third disposition—and, of course, 
they were beaten. This mania of prescribing abstract rules for all 
possible cases, leaves so little liberty of action to the commander, 
and even forbids him to use advantages of ground to such an 
extent, that a Prussian general in criticising it says: 

“Such a system of regulations can be tolerated in an army, only, the majority of 

whose generals are so imbecile, that the government cannot safely intrust them 
with an unconditional command, or leave them to their own judgment.” 

The Russian soldier is one of the bravest men in Europe. His 
tenacity almost equals that of the English and of certain Austrian 
battalions. As John Bull boasts of himself, he does not know when 
he is beaten. Russian squares of infantry have resisted, and fought 
hand to hand, a long while after the cavalry had broken them; 
and it has always been found easier to shoot them down than to 
drive them back. Sir George Cathcart, who saw them in 1813 and 
14,’ as allies, and in 1854 in the Crimea, as enemies, gives them 
the honorable testimonial that they are “incapable of panic.” Beside 
this, the Russian soldier is well made, healthy, a good marcher, a 
man of few wants, who can eat and drink almost anything, 
and more obedient to his officers than any other soldier in the 
world. And yet the Russian army is not much to boast of. Never, 
since Russia was Russia, have the Russians won a single battle 
against either Germans, French, Poles, or English, without being 
vastly superior in numbers. At even odds, they have always been 
beaten by any army, except Turks or Prussians; and at Citate 

“G. Cathcart, Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 
1813.— Ed. 

The Armies of Europe 445 

and Silistria,>!° 

them. 

The Russians are, above all things, the clumsiest soldiers in the 
world. They are not fit either for light infantry or for light cavalry 
duty. The Cossacks, capital light cavalry as they are in some 
respects, are so unreliable generally, that before the enemy a 
second line of out-posts is always placed in the rear of the line of 
Cossack out-posts. Beside, the Cossacks are totally unfit for a 
charge. As to the regular troops, infantry and cavalry, they are not 
fit to act in skirmishing order. The Russian, imitator as he is in 
everything, will do anything if ordered or compelled, but will do 
nothing if he has to act upon his own responsibility; in fact, this 
term can hardly be applied to a being who never knew what 
responsibility was, and who will go to be shot at with the same 
passive obedience as if he were ordered to pump water, or to whip 
a comrade. To expect from the Russian soldier, when acting on 
out-post duty or in skirmishing order, the rapid glance of the 
Frenchman, or the plain common sense of the German, would be 
an tnsult to him. What he requires is command—clear, distinct 
command—and if he does not get it, he will perhaps not go 
backwards, but he will certainly not go forwards, nor use his own 
senses. 

The cavalry, though a deal of expense and care has been 
bestowed upon it, has never been excellent. Neither in the wars 
against the French, nor in that against Poland, did the cavalry 
distinguish itself. The passive, patient, enduring obedience of the 
Russians is not what is wanted in cavalry. The first quality of the 
horseman is just what the Russian lacks most: “dash.” Thus, when 
the 600 English dragoons, with all the daring and pluck of real 
horsemen, dashed at the numerically far superior Russians at 
Balaklava, they rode down before them Russian artillery, Cossacks, 
hussars, lancers, until they came to the solid columns of the 
infantry; then they had to turn back; yet, in that cavalry action, it 
is still doubtful who deserves to be called the victor. If such a 
senseless charge had been made against any other army, not a 
man would have returned; the enemy would have taken them in 
flank and rear, and cut them down singly. But the Russian 
horsemen actually awaited them standing, and were ridden down 
before they thought of moving their horses! Surely, if anything 
should condemn the Russian regular cavalry, it is such a fact as 
this. 

The artillery is provided with a material of unequal quality, but 
where it has good guns, it will do its duty well. It will display great 

the Turks, though inferior in numbers, defeated 

bravery in the field, but it will always be found wanting in 
intelligence. A Russian battery which has lost its officers is good for 
nothing; and while the officers live, it can only take the positions, 
often absurd, prescribed by the regulations. When besieged in a 
fortress where patient endurance and constant exposure to danger 
are required, the Russian artillery will distinguish itself, not so 
much by precision of aim, as by devotion to duty and steadiness 
under fire. The whole of the siege of Sebastopol proves this. 

In the artillery and engineers, however, are to be found those 
well-educated officers whom Russia shows off before Europe, and 
who are really encouraged to use their talents freely. While in 
Prussia, for instance, the best men, when subalterns, have usually 
been so thwarted by their superiors, and while all their proposed 
improvements have been snubbed as presumptuous attempts at 
innovation, so that many of them have had to seek employment in 
Turkey, where they have made the regular artillery one of the 
best in Europe—in Russia, all such men are encouraged, and, if 
they distinguish themselves, make a rapid and brilliant career. 
Diebitsch and Paskiewitsch were generals at twenty-nine and 
thirty years of age, and Todtleben, at Sebastopol, in_ less 
than eight months was advanced from a captain to a major- 
general. 

The great boast of the Russians is their infantry. It is of very 
great solidity, and, used in line or column, or behind breastworks, 
will always be awkward to deal with. But here its good qualities 
end. Almost totally unfit for light infantry duty (the so-called 
chasseurs are light infantry in name only, and the eight battalions 
of rifles attached to the line corps are the only real light infantry 
in the service), usually bad marksmen, good but slow marchers, 
their columns are generally so badly placed that it will always be 
possible to pound them well with artillery before they are charged. 
The “normal dispositions,” from which the generals dare not 
deviate, contribute a great deal toward this. At the Alma, for 
instance, the British artillery made terrible havoc amongst the 
Russian columns long before the equally clumsy British line had 
formed, defiled across the river and re-formed for the charge. But 
even the boast of solid tenacity must be taken with a considerable 
grain of salt, since at Inkermann 8,000 British infantry, surprised 
in a position but incompletely and slovenly occupied, resisted, in 
hand to hand fight, the 15,000 Russians brought against them for 
more than four hours, and actually repelled every renewed attack. 
This battle must have shown the Russians that, upon their own 
favorite ground, they had found their masters. It was the bravery 

The Armies of Europe 447 

of the British soldiers and the intelligence and presence of mind 
of both non-commissioned officers and soldiers which defeated all 
the attempts of the Russians; and from this battle we must 
consider as justified, the claim of the British to the title of the first 
infantry of the line in the world. 

The clothing of the Russian army is a pretty close imitation of 
that of the Prussians. Their accoutrements are very badly 
adjusted; not only the belts for bayonets and cartridge pouch are 
crossed over the chest, but also the straps which hold the 
knapsack. There are, however, some alterations being made just 
now, but whether they affect this point, we do not know. The 
small arms are very clumsy, and have only been lately provided 
with percussion caps; a Russian musket is the heaviest and most 
unwieldy thing of its kind. The cavalry swords are of a bad model 
and badly tempered. Of the guns, the new ones taken in the 
Crimea, are described as very good and of excellent workmanship; 
but whether that is uniformly the case is very doubtful. 

Finally, the Russian army still bears the stamp of an institution 
in advance of the general state of civilization of the country, and 
has all the disadvantages and drawbacks of such hot-house 
creations. In petty warfare, the Cossacks are the only troops to be 
feared, from their activity and indefatigability; but their love of 
drink and plunder makes them very unreliable for their comman- 
der. In grand war, the slowness with which the Russians move will 
make their strategic maneuvers little to be feared, unless they have 
to deal with such negligent opponents as the English were last 
autumn. In a pitched battle, they will be obstinate opponents to 
the soldiers, but not very troublesome to the generals who attack 
them. Their dispositions are generally very simple, founded upon 
their prescribed normal rules, and easy to be guessed at; while the 
want of intelligence in both general and field officers, and the 
clumsiness of the troops, make it a matter of great risk for them to 
undertake important maneuvers on a battle field. 

Ill. THE SMALLER ARMIES OF GERMANY 

Bavaria has two army-corps, of two divisions each. Each division 
contains two brigades of infantry (four regiments of infantry and 
one battalion of rifles), one brigade of cavalry, containing two 
regiments, and three foot and one horse batteries. Each army- 
corps has, beside, a general reserve of artillery, of six foot 
batteries, and a detachment of sappers and miners. Thus, the 

whole army forms sixteen regiments of three battalions each, with 
six battalions of rifles, in all, fifty-four battalions; two regiments of 
cuirassiers, and six.of light dragoons, in all, forty-eight squadrons; 
two regiments of foot artillery (of six six-pounder and _ six 
twelve-pounder batteries each), and one of horse artillery (four 
six-pounder batteries), in all, twenty-eight batteries of eight guns 
each, making 224 guns, beside six companies of garrison artillery, 
and twelve train companies; there are also one regiment of 
engineers, of eight companies, and two sanitary companies. The 
whole strength, on the war-footing, is 72,000 men, beside a 
reserve and landwehr, the cadres of which, however, do not 
exist. 

Of the army of the Germanic Confederation,*'* Austria fur- 
nishes the Ist, 2d, and 3d corps; Prussia the 4th, 5th, and 6th; 
Bavaria the 7th. The 8th corps is furnished by Wurttemberg, 
Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt. 

Wurttemberg has eight regiments (sixteen battalions) of infan- 
try, four of cavalry (sixteen squadrons), one regiment of artillery 
(four foot and three horse-batteries, with forty-eight guns). Total, 
about 19,000 men_on the war-footing. 

Baden keeps four regiments (eight battalions), two fusileer 
battalions, one rifle battalion; in all, ten battalions of infantry, with 
three regiments, or twelve squadrons of cavalry, and four foot and 
five horse-batteries, containing together forty guns. Total, on the 
war-footing, 15,000 men. 

Hesse-Darmstadt has four regiments or eight battalions of 
infantry, one regiment or six squadrons of light horse, and three 
batteries of artillery (one mounted) of eighteen guns. Total, 
10,000 men. 

The only peculiarity of the 7th and 8th army-corps is, that they 
have adopted the French gun-carriage for the artillery. The 9th 
federal army corps is formed by the kingdom of Saxony, which 
furnishes one division, and Electoral Hesse and Nassau, which 
furnish the second. 

The quota of Saxony is four brigades of infantry, of four 
battalions each, and one of rifles, of four battalions; beside four 
battalions of the line, and one battalion of rifles as a reserve, still 
unorganized; four regiments of light horse, of five squadrons 
each; one artillery regiment, six foot and two horse-batteries. 
Total, twenty battalions of infantry, twenty squadrons and fifty 
guns; or 24,500 men on the war-footing. In Electoral Hesse there 
are four regiments or eight battalions, with one battalion of 
fusileers and one of rifles; two squadrons of cuirassiers, seven 

The Armies of Europe 449 

squadrons of hussars; three batteries, of which one of horse 
artillery. Total, ten battalions, nine squadrons, nineteen guns, and 
12,000 men on the war-footing. Nassau affords seven battalions, 2 
batteries, or 7,000 men, and twelve guns, on the war-footing. 

The 10th army-corps consists of Hanover and Brunswick, which 
maintain the first division; and of Mecklenburg, Holstein, Olden- 
burg, and the Hanse towns,* which furnish the second division. 
Hanover furnishes eight regiments or sixteen battalions, and four 
battalions of light infantry; six regiments or twenty-four squadrons 
of cavalry, and four foot and two horse-batteries. Total, 22,000 
men, and thirty-six guns. The artillery is on the English modei. 
Brunswick furnishes five battalions, four squadrons, and twelve 
guns, in all, 5,300 men. The small States of the second division are 
not worth mentioning. 

Finally, the smallest of the small fry of German States form a 
reserve division, with which the entire army of the German 
Confederation, on the war-footing, may be summed up in a table, 
as follows: — 

I. CONTINGENTS. If. RESERVE CONTINGENTS. 

Inf. Cav. Gns_ Total. Inf. Cav.  Gns_—— Total. 

AUUSUT1A; acca devesces 73,501 13,546 192 94,899 36,750 6,773 96 47,411 
PESS1G- sides iiscetiox 61,629 11,355 160 79,484 30,834 5,660 80 39,742 
Bavariay ccs 27,566 5,086 72 35,600 13,793 2,543 36 17,800 
Eighth Corps, ..... 23,369 4,308 60 30,150 11,685 2,154 32 15,075 
Ninth Corps, ....... 19,294 2,887 50 24,254 9,702 1,446 25 12,136 
Tenth Corps, ...... 22,246 3,572 58 28,067 11,107 1,788 29 14,019 
Reserve 

Division, .......... 11,116 11,116 5,584 5,584 

Total cacicacds 238,721 40,754 592 303,493 119,455 20,364 298 151,767 

This of course does not represent the real armed force of the 
Confederation, as, in case of need, Prussia, Austria, and Bavaria 
would furnish far more than the above contingents. The troops of 
the 10th corps and reserve division, perhaps, also, those of the 9th 
corps, would form the garrisons, so as not to interfere, by their 

* The free cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Ltibeck.— Ed. 

multifarious organizations and peculiarities, with the rapidity of 
field operations. The military qualities of these armies are more or 
less the same as those of the Austrian and Prussian soldiers; but, 
of course, these small bodies furnish no occasion for developing 
military talents, and many old-fashioned arrangements exist 
among them. 

In a third and concluding article, we shall consider the Spanish, 
Sardinian, Turkish and other armies of Europe. 

45] 

[THIRD ARTICLE] 
[Putnam’s Monthly, No. XXXVI, December 1855] 
1. THE TURKISH ARMY 

The Turkish army, at the beginning of the present war, was in a 
higher state of efficiency than it had ever reached before. The 
various attempts at reorganization and reform made since the 
accession of Mahmud, since the massacre of the Janissaries, and 
especially since the peace of Adrianople, had been consolidated 
and systematized. The first and greatest obstacle—the indepen- 
dent position of the pashas in command of distant provinces—had 
been removed, to a great extent, and, upon the whole, the pashas 
were reduced to a discipline somewhat approaching that of 
European district commanders. But their ignorance, insolence, 
and rapacity remained in as full vigor as in the best days of Asiatic 
satrap rule; and if, for the last twenty years, we had heard little of 
revolts of pashas, we have heard enough of provinces in revolt 
against their greedy governors, who, originally the lowest domestic 
slaves and “men of all work,” profited by their new position to 
heap up fortunes by exactions, bribes, and wholesale embezzle- 
ment of the public money. That, under such a state of things, the 
organization of the army must, to a great extent, exist on paper 
only, is evident. 

The Turkish army consists of the regular active army (Nizam), 
the reserve (Redif), the irregular troops, and the auxiliary corps of 
the vassal states. 

The Nizam is composed of six corps (Orders), each of which is 
raised in the district it occupies, similar to the army-corps in 
Prussia, each of which is located in the province from which it 
recruits itself. Altogether the organization of the Turkish Nizam 

16* 

and Redif is, as we shall see, copied from the Prussian model. The 
six Orders have their head-quarters in Constantinople, Shumla, 
Toli-Monatzir, Erzeroum, Bagdad, and Aleppo. Each of them 
should be commanded by a Mushir (field marshal), and should 
consist of two divisions or six brigades, formed by six regiments of 
infantry, four of cavalry, and one of artillery. 

The infantry and cavalry are organized upon the French, the 
artillery upon the Prussian system. 

A regiment of infantry 1s composed of four battalions of eight 
companies each, and should count, when on its full comple- 
ment, 3,250 men, inclusive of officers and staff, or 800 men 
per battalion; the general strength, however, before the war, 
seldom exceeded 700 men, and in Asia was almost always much 
less. 

A cavalry regiment consists of four squadrons of lancers, and 
two squadrons of chasseurs, each squadron to contain 151 men; in 
general, the effective strength was here even more below the 
standard than in the infantry. 

Each artillery regiment consists of six horse and nine foot 
batteries, of four guns each, thus representing a total of sixty 
guns. 

Every order was thus expected to number 19,500 infantry, 3,700 
cavalry, and sixty guns. In reality, however, from 20,000 to 21,000 
men in all is the utmost ever reached. 

Beside the six Orders, there are four artillery regiments (one of 
reserve, and three of garrison artillery), two regiments of sappers 
and miners, and three special detachments of infantry sent to 
Candia, to Tunis, and Tripoli, of a total strength of 16,000 men. 

The total strength of the Nizam, or regular standing army, 
before the war, should, therefore, have been as: follows: 

36 reg. of infant. averaging .... eee 2,500—90,000 
24 =” CAVED Os cs talteis Dorey at yseeea venancen te 660-670 — 16,000 
Yee Pel ARCO Y aca seahstse duvaishiovnilies nUeeieeateaeusiecauie 9,060 
Bo PALHISON. aja skslenen Suanlalaies MEN ae a hackineaaus 3,400 
ZT | SEPSIS BING TITIES 2e5 vociciihshcesanataiqynseccbaisienoeoee 1,600 
De ChiC dh CBr 8 sactncostieractiatecenbatnestethe betes adit 16,000 
136,000 

The soldiers, after having served five years in the Nizam, are 
dismissed to their homes, and form, for the seven following years, 

The Armies of Europe 453 

part of the Redif or reserve. This reserve counts as many orders, 
divisions, brigades, regiments, etc., as the standing army; in fact, it 
is to the Nizam what in Prussia the first levy of the landwehr is to 
the line, with the sole exception, that in Prussia, in larger masses 
than brigades, line and landwehr are always mixed, while in the 
Turkish organization they are to be kept separate. The officers 
and non-commissioned officers of the Redif are constantly 
assembled at the dépots, and once a year the Redif are called in 
for exercise, during which time, they receive the same pay and 
rations as the line. But such an organization, presupposing a 
well-regulated civil administration, and a civilized state of society, 
far from having been reached in Turkey, must in a great degree exist 
on paper only, and if we count, therefore, the Redif as equal in 
numbers to the Nizam, we shall certainly put it down at its highest 
possible figure. 

The auxiliary contingents consist of troops from: 

1. The Danubian Principalities, ................ 6,000 men. 
Di SOTA cessstlatolaieathide des anita tenease ete tis 20,000 ” 
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ..............06006 30,000 ” 
4. Upper Albania, ciisssci.seveesescsedageicoaieates 10,000 ” 
Big, BEES PIU cores: ahipisie ten GacaeueMadvee damacthuagehata ees 40,000 ” 
6. Fanis and Tripoli; c.gascenetetecsiesiennee 10,000 ” 
Total, about 20.0.0... eee cece ee eee 116,006 

To these troops must be added the volunteer Bashi Bazouks, 
whom Asia Minor, Kurdistan, and Syria can furnish in great 
numbers. They are the last remnant of that host of irregular 
troops which, in past centuries, flooded Hungary, and twice 
appeared before Vienna. Mostly cavalry, their inferiority, even 
to the worst-equipped European horseman, has been proved by 
two centuries of all but constant defeats. Their self-confidence has 
disappeared, and now they serve no other purpose than to swarm 
around the army, eating up and wasting the resources upon which 
the regular body should subsist. Their love of plunder and 
unreliable temper make them even unfit for that active outpost 
duty which the Russians expect from their Cossacks; for the Bashi 
Bazouks, when most wanted, are least to be found. In this present 
war, it has, therefore, been found desirable to keep their numbers 

down, and we do not think that there were ever collected more 
than 50,000 of them. 

Thus the numerical strength of the Turkish army, at the 
beginning of the war, may be estimated as follows: 

NAZaINly. dascscsdivcndseidius catevevcaetasbcncives ueeetiaaeeeee 136,000 
REC Ey <2io i disutiaceawa anita be eee 136,000 
Auxiliaries, regulars from Egypt and 
fn 59 Sen 50,000 
Do. irregulars, Bosnia and Albania, .......... 40,000 
Bashi BazGuks, sec sccelasadiiesteichgevvocannsveeesenny 50,000 
i Gro) | eee ec er Serer enrol Seen ene ern See Ree 412,000 

But again, from this sum total several deductions have to be 
made. That the Orders stationed in Europe were in pretty good 
condition, and as near their full complement as can be expected in 
Turkey, seems pretty certain; but in Asia, in the distant provinces 
where the Mussulman population predominates, the men might be 
ready, while neither arms, nor equipments, nor stores of 
ammunition were forthcoming. The Danubian army was formed 
from the three European Orders principally. They were the 
nucleus around which the European Redifs, the Order of Syria, 
or, at least, a good part of it, and a number of Arnauts,’ Bosnians, 
and Bashi Bazouks were collected. Yet the excessive caution of 
Omer Pasha—his constant unwillingness up to the present time to 
expose his troops in the field—is the best proof that he has but a 
limited confidence in the capabilities of this, the only good regular 
army Turkey ever possessed. But in Asia, where the old Turkish 
system of embezzlement and laziness was still in full blossom, the 
two Orders of the Nizam, the whole of the Redifs, and the mass of 
the irregulars were unable to withstand a Russian army vastly 
inferior in numbers; in every battle they were beaten, and, at the 
end of the campaign of 1854, the Asiatic army of Turkey had all 
but ceased to exist. There, then, it is clear that not only the details 
of the organization, but a great proportion of the troops 
themselves had no real existence. The want of arms, equipments, 
ammunition, and provisions, was the constant complaint of the 
foreign officers and newspaper correspondents in Kars and 
Erzeroum; and they plainly stated that nothing but the indolence, 
incapacity, and rapacity of the Pashas was the cause of it. The 
money was duly sent to them, but they always appropriated it to 
their own uses. 

* Turkish name for Albanians.— Ed. 

The Armies of Europe 455 

The equipment of the Turkish regular soldier is on the whole 
imitated from the western armies, the only distinction being the 
red fez or skull-cap, which is about the worst head-gear possible in 
that climate, where, during the heats of summer, it causes 
frequent sun-strokes. The quality of the articles furnished is bad, 
and the clothing has to stand longer than can be expected, in 
consequence of the officers generally pocketing the money 
destined for its renewal. The arms are of an inferior description, 
both for the infantry and cavalry; the artillery alone has very good 
field-guns, cast at Constantinople, under the direction of Euro- 
pean officers and civil engineers. 

The Turk, in himself, is not a bad soldier. He is naturally brave, 
extremely hardy and patient, and, under certain circumstances, 
docile. European officers who have once gained his confidence, 
can rely upon him, as witness Grach and Butler at Silistria, and 
Iskender Bey (Ilinski) in Wallachia. But these are exceptions. On 
the whole, the innate hatred of the Turk for the “Giaour” is so 
indelible, and his habits and ideas are so different from those of a 
European, that, so long as his remains the ruling race in the 
country, he will not submit to men whom he inwardly despises as 
incommensurably his inferiors. This repugnance is extended to 
the very organization of the army, ever since it has been put upon 
a European footing. The common Turk hates Giaour institutions 
as much as the Giaours themselves. Then the strict discipline, the 
regulated activity, the constant attention required in a modern 
army are things utterly hateful to the lazy, contemplative, fatalist 
Turk. The officers, even, will rather allow the army to be beaten 
than exert themselves, and use their own senses. This is one of the 
worst features in the Turkish army, and alone would suffice to 
make it unfit for any offensive campaign. 

The private and non-commissioned soldiers are recruited by 
volunteers and the ballot; the lower grades of officers are 
sometimes filled by men promoted from the ranks, but generally 
by the camp-followers and domestic servants, the tshibukdjis and 
kafeidjis of the higher officers. The military schools at Constan- 
tinople not very good in themselves, cannot furnish young men 
enough for the vacancies. As to the higher ranks, a system of 
favoritism exists, of which the western nations have no idea. Most 
of the generals were originally Circassian slaves, the mignons of 
some great man in the days of their youth. Utter ignorance, 
incapacity, and self-sufficiency rule supreme, and court-intrigue is 
the principal means of advancement. Even the few European 
generals (renegades) in the service would not have been accepted, 

if they had not been absolutely necessary to prevent the whole 
machine from falling to pieces. As it is, they have been 
indiscriminately taken, both from men of real merit and mere 
adventurers. 

At present, after three campaigns, no Turkish army can be said 
to exist, except the 80,000 men of Omer Pasha’s original army, 
part of which is stationed on the Danube, and part in the Crimea. 
The Asiatic army consists of about 25,000 rabble, unfit for the 
field, and demoralized by defeat. The remainder of the 400,000 
men are gone nobody knows where; killed in the field or by 
sickness, invalided, disbanded, or turned into robbers. Very likely 
this will be the last Turkish army of all; for, to recover from the 
shock received by her alliance with England and France, is more 
than can be expected from Turkey. 

The time is gone by when the contests of Oltenitza"’ and Citate 
created an exaggerated enthusiasm for Turkish bravery. The 
stubborn inactivity of Omer Pasha sufficed to raise doubts as to 
their other military qualifications, which not even the brilliant 
defense of Silistria could entirely dispel; the defeats in Asia, the 
flight of Balaklava, the strictly defensive attitude of the Turks in 
Eupatoria, and their complete inactivity in the camp _ before 
Sebastopol have reduced the general estimate of their miltary 
capabilities to a proper level. The Turkish army was so constituted 
that a judgment on its general value was hitherto completely 
impossible. There were, no doubt, some very brave and well- 
managed regiments, capable of any duty, but they were greatly in 
the minority. The great mass of the infantry lacked cohesion, and 
was, therefore, unfit for field-duty, though good behind intrench- 
ments. The regular cavalry was decidedly inferior to that of any 
European power. The artillery was by far the best portion of the 
service, and the field-regiments in a high state of efficiency; the 
men were as if born for their work, though no doubt the officers 
left much to desire. The Redifs appear to have suffered from a 
general want of organization, though the men no doubt were 
willing to do their best. Of the irregulars, the Arnauts and 
Bosnians were capital guerrillas, but nothing more, best used in 
defending fortifications; while the Bashi Bazouks were all but 
worthless, and even worse than that. The Egyptian contingent 
appears to have been about on a level with the Turkish Nizam, the 
Tunisian nearly unfit for anything. With such a motley army, so 
badly officered and subject to such maladministration, no wonder 
it is all but ruined in three campaigns. 

The Armies of Europe 457 

Il. THE SARDINIAN ARMY 

This army is composed of ten brigades of infantry, ten 
battalions of rifles, four brigades of cavalry, three regiments of 
artillery, one regiment of sappers and miners, a corps of 
carabineers (police troops), and the light horse in the island of 
Sardinia. 

The ten brigades of infantry consist of one brigade of guards, 
four battalions of grenadiers, two battalions of chasseurs, and nine 
brigades of the line, equal to eighteen regiments of three 
battalions each. To these are added ten battalions of rifles 
(bersagheri), one for every brigade, thus constituting a proportion 
of light infantry, actually trained, far stronger than in any other 
army. 

There is, besides, a dépot battalion for every regiment. 

Since 1849, the strength of the battalions has been very much 
reduced, from financial motives. On the war-footing, a battalion 
should number about 1,000, but on the peace-footing there are 
no more than about 400 men. The remainder have been dismissed 
on indefinite furlough. 

The cavalry counts four regiments of heavy, and five of light 
cavalry. Every regiment has four field and one dép6t-squadron. 
On the war-footing, a regiment should count about 800 men in 
the four field-squadrons, but on the peace-footing there are 
scarcely 600. 

The three regiments of artillery consist of one regiment of 
workmen and _ artificers, one of garrison artillery (twelve com- 
panies), and one of field-artillery (six foot, two horse, two heavy 
batteries of eight guns each). The light batteries have eight Jb. 
guns and twenty-four lb. howitzers, the heavy batteries sixteen Ib. 
guns; in all eighty guns. 

The regiment of sappers and miners has ten companies, or 
about 1,100 men. The carbineers (horse and foot) are very 
numerous for such a small kingdom, and number about 3,200 
men. The light horse, doing duty as police troops in the island of 
Sardinia, figure about 1,100 strong. 

The Sardinian army, in the first campaign against Austria, in 
1848, certainly reached the strength of 70,000 men. In 1849, it 
was very near 130,000.°"" Afterwards it was reduced to about 
45,000 men. What it is now it is impossible to say, but there is no 
doubt that, since the conclusion of the treaty with England and 
France,°'? it has been again increased. 

This great elasticity of the Piedmontese army, which allows it to 

increase or diminish the numbers present under arms at any time, 
arises from a system of recruiting very nearly akin to that of 
Prussia; and, indeed, Sardinia may be called, in many respects, the 
Prussia of Italy. There is in the Sardinian states a similar 
obligation for every citizen to serve in the army, though, unlike 
Prussia, substitutes are allowed; and the time over which this 
obligation extends, consists, as in Prussia, of a period of actual 
service and another period, during which the soldier dismissed 
from the ranks remains in the reserve, and 1s liable to be called in 
again in time of war. The system is something between the 
Prussian method and that of Belgium and the minor German 
states. Thus, by calling in the reserves, the infantry, from about 
30,000 men, may be raised to 80,000, and even more. The cavalry 
and field artillery would undergo but a small augmentation, as in 
these arms the soldiers generally have to remain with the 
regiments during the whole period of their service. 

The Piedmontese army is as fine and soldier-like a body of men 
as any in Europe. Like the French, they are small in size, especially 
the infantry; their guards do not average even five feet four 
inches; but what with their tasteful dress, military bearing, 
well-knit but agile frames, and fine Italian features, they look 
better than many a body of bigger men. The dress and 
equipments are, with the infantry of the line and guards, upon the 
French principle, with a few details adopted from the Austrians. 
The bersaglieri have a costume of their own, a little sailor’s hat 
with a long hanging plume of cock-feathers and a brown tunic. 
The cavalry wear short brown jackets, just covering the hip-bone. 
The percussion-musket is the general arm of the infantry; the 
bersaglieri have short Tyrolese rifles, good and useful weapons, 
but inferior to the Minié in every respect. The first rank of the 
cavalry used to be armed with lances; whether this is still the case 
with the light-horse we cannot say. The eight Ib. calibre for the 
horse and light-foot batteries gave them the same advantage over 
the other continental armies which the French had while they 
preserved this calibre; but their heavy batteries, carrying sixteen 
pounders, rendered them the heaviest field artillery of the 
continent. That these guns, when once in position, can do 
excellent service, they have shown on the Chernaya,°*” where their 
accurate firing contributed a great deal to the success of the Allies, 
and was universally admired. 

Of all the Italian states, Piedmont is the best situated for 
creating a good army. The plains of the Po and its tributaries 
produce capital horses, and a fine, tall race of men, the tallest of 

The Armies of Europe 459 

all Italians, exceedingly well-adapted for cavalry and heavy 
artillery service. The mountains, which surround these plains on 
three sides, north, west, and south, are inhabited by a hardy 
people, less in size, but strong and active, industrious and 
sharp-witted, like all mountaineers. It is these that form the staple 
of the infantry, and especially of the bersaglieri, a body of troops 
nearly equaling the Chasseurs de Vincennes in training, but 
certainly surpassing them in bodily strength and endurance. 

The military institutions of Piedmont are, upon the whole, very 
good, and, in consequence, the officers bear a high character. So 
late as 1846, however, the influence of the aristocracy and the 
clergy had a great deal to do with their appointment. Up to that 
period, Charles Albert knew but two means of governing—the 
clergy and the army; in fact, it was a general saying in other parts 
of Italy, that in Piedmont, out of three men you met in the street, 
one was a soldier, the second a monk, and only every third man a 
civilian. At present, of course, this has been done away with; the 
priests have less than no influence, and, though the nobility 
preserve many officers’ commissions, the wars of 1848 and ’49 
have stamped a certain democratic character upon the army which 
it will not be easy to destroy. Some British Crimean newspaper 
correspondents have stated that the Piedmontese officers were 
almost all “gentlemen by birth,” but so far from this being the 
case, we know, personally, more than one Piedmontese officer who 
rose from the ranks, and can safely assert that the mass of the 
captains and lieutenants are now composed of men who either 
gained their epaulettes by bravery against the Austrians, or who at 
least are not connected with the aristocracy. 

We think that the greatest compliment that can be paid to the 
Piedmontese army is contained in the opinion expressed by one of 
its late opponents, General Schonhals, quarter-master-general of 
the Austrian army in 1848 and °49. In his “Recollections of the 
Italian Campaigns’, this general, one of the best officers of the 
Austrian army, and a man violently opposed in every way to 
anything smacking of Italian independence, treats the Piedmon- 
tese army throughout with the highest respect. 

“Their artillery [...],” he says, “consists of picked men, under good and 
well-informed officers; the matériel] is good, and the calibre is superior to ours [...].” 
“The cavalry is no contemptible arm; the first rank carry lances, but as a very adroit 
rider only can well manage this arm, we should not like to say that this innovation was 
exactly an improvement. Their school of equitation, however, [...] is very good.” “At 
Santa Lucia, both parties fought with astonishing bravery. The Piedmontese attacked 
with great vivacity and impetuosity—both Piedmontese and Austrians performed 

many feats of great personal valor.” “The Piedmontese a:iny [...] has a right to 
mention the day of Novara without a blush,”—and so on.* 

In the same way, the Prussian General Willisen, who assisted in 
part in the campaign of 1848, and who is no friend of Italian 
independence, speaks highly of the Piedmontese army.” 

Ever since 1848, a certain party in Italy has looked upon the 
king of Sardinia as the future chief of the whole peninsula. 
Though far from participating in that opinion, we still believe that 
whenever Italy shall reconquer her freedom, the Piedmontese 
forces will be the principal military instrument in attaining that 
object, and will, at the same time, form the nucleus of the future 
Italian army. It may undergo, before that happens, more than one 
revolution in its own bosom, but the excellent military elements it 
contains will survive all this and will even gain by being merged in 
a really national army. 

Ill. THE SMALLER ITALIAN ARMIES 

The papal army hardly exists except on paper. The battalions 
and squadrons are never complete, and form but a weak division. 
There is, besides, a regiment of Swiss guards, the only body on 
which the government can place any reliance. The Tuscan, 
Parmesan and Modenese armies are too insignificant to be 
mentioned here; suffice it to say that they are organized, upon the 
whole, on the Austrian model. There is, besides, the Neapolitan 
army, of which, too, the least said the sooner mended. It has never 
shone conspicuously before the enemy, and, whether fighting for 
the king, as in 1799, or for a constitution, as in 1821, it always 
distinguished itself by running away.*”! Even in 1848 and ’49, the 
native Neapolitan army was everywhere beaten by the insurgents, 
and, had it not been for the Swiss, King Bomba‘ would not now 
be on his throne. During the siege of Rome, Garibaldi advanced 
with a handful of men against the Neapolitan division and beat it 
twice.*? The army of Naples, on the peace-footing, is estimated at 
26,000 or 27,000 men, but in 1848 it is stated to have num- 
bered nearly 49,000 men, and the full footing should raise it to 
64,000. Of all these troops, the Swiss are alone worth mentioning. 

“Engels is quoting from the anonymously published book by C. Schénhals, 
Erinnerungen eines osterreichischen Veteranen aus dem italienischen Kriege der Jahre 1848 
und 1849, Bd. I, S. 166, 167 and 223; Bd. II, S. 239.— Ed. 

> A reference to W. Willisen’s book Der Italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1848.— Ed. 

© Ferdinand II. He was nicknamed King Bomba after the bombardment of 
Messina by Neapolitan troops in 1848.— Ed. 

The Armies of Europe 461 

They consist of four regiments, of two battalions each, and 
should number, when complete, 600 men per battalion, or 4,800 
men. But the cadres are now overfilled, so that each battalion is 
about 1,000 strong (the fourth, or Bernese regiment, alone 
mustering 2,150), and the whole number may be estimated at 
nearly 9,000. These are really first-rate troops, commanded by offic- 
ers of their own country, and independent, in their internal organ- 
ization and administration, from the government of Naples. They 
were first taken into pay in 1824 or ‘25, when the king,’ no longer 
trusting the army that so shortly before had revolted, found it neces- 
sary to surround himself with a strong body-guard. The treaties 
or “capitulations,” as they were called, were concluded with the 
different cantons for thirty years; the Swiss articles of war and the 
Swiss military organization were secured to the troops; the pay was 
three-fold that of the native Neapolitan soldiers; the troops were 
recruited by volunteers from each canton, where recruiting offices 
were established. Pensions were secured to retiring officers, 
veterans, and the wounded. If, at the expiration of the thirty 
years, the capitulation was not renewed, the regiments were to be 
broken up. The present Swiss constitution **? forbids recruiting for 
foreign service, and the capitulations, therefore, were canceled 
after 1848; recruiting was stopped, at least ostensibly, in Switzer- 
land, but at Chiasso and other points of Lombardy, dépots were 
established, and many a recruiting agent secretly continued his 
business on Swiss soil. So eager was the Neapolitan government 
for recruits, that it did not refuse to accept the refuse of the 
political refugees then in Switzerland. The King of Naples, under 
these circumstances, confirmed the privileges granted to the Swiss 
soldiers by the capitulations, and in August last, when the thirty 
years had elapsed, by a special decree again prolonged these 
privileges for so long a time as the Swiss should remain in his 
service. 

IV. THE SWISS ARMY 

In Switzerland no national standing army exists. Every Swiss 1s 
compelled to serve in the militia, if able-bodied; and this mass is 
divided into three levies (Auszug, erstes and zweites Aufgebot?), 
according to age. The young men, during the first years of 
service, are called out separately for drill, and collected from time 

* Ferdinand I.— Ed. 
Men under arms, first levy and second levy.— Ed. 

to time in camps; but whoever has seen the awkward gait and 
uncomfortable appearance of a Swiss squad, or heard the jokes 
they crack with the drill-sergeant while under drill, must at once 
see that the military qualities of the men are but very poorly 
developed. Of the soldierly capabilities of this militia we can only 
judge by the one example of the Sonderbund war, in 1847,°*4 
which campaign is distinguished by the extremely small number of 
casualties in proportion to the forces engaged. The organization of 
the militia is almost entirely in the hands of the various cantonal 
governments; and, though its general form is fixed by federal 
laws, and a federal staff is at the head of the whole, this system 
cannot fail to create confusion and want of uniformity, while it 
must almost necessarily prevent a proper accumulation of stores, 
the introduction of improvements, and the permanent fortification 
of important points, especially on the side where Switzerland is 
weak, toward Germany. 

The Swiss, like all mountaineers, make capital soldiers when 
drilled; and, wherever they have served as regular troops under 
foreign banners, they have fought exceedingly well. But being 
rather slow-headed, they need drilling much more, indeed, than 
either French or North Germans, to give them confidence in 
themselves, and cohesion. It is possible that national feeling might 
possibly replace this in the case of a foreign attack upon 
Switzerland, but even this is very doubtful. An army of 80,000 
regular troops, and less, would certainly be a match for all the 
160,000 and more men which the Swiss say they can congregate. 
In 1798, the French finished the business with a few regiments.*”° 

The Swiss boast a great deal of the rifles of their sharp-shooters. 
There are, certainly, in Switzerland, comparatively more good 
shots than in any other European country, the Austrian Alpine 
possessions excepted. But when one sees how these dead shots, 
when called in, are almost all armed with clumsy common 
percussion muskets, the respect for the Swiss sharp-shooters is 
considerably lessened. The few battalions of rifles may be good 
shots, but their short, heavy pieces (Stutzen) are antiquated and 
worthless compared with the Minié, and their awkward, slow 
method of loading, with loose powder from a horn, would give 
them but a poor chance when opposed to troops armed with less 
superannuated weapons. 

Altogether, arms, accoutrements, organization, drill, everything 
is old-fashioned with the Swiss, and very likely will remain so as 
long as the cantonal governments have anything to say on the 
subject. 

The Armies of Europe 463 

V. THE SCANDINAVIAN ARMIES 

The Swedish and Norwegian armies, though united under one 
crown, are as separate as the two countries to which they belong.*”*° 
In contrast to Switzerland, both give us the example of an Alpine 
country with a standing army; but the Scandinavian peninsula 1s 
altogether, by the nature of the soil, and the consequent poverty, 
and thin population of the country, so much akin to Switzerland, 
that even in the military organization of both, one system, and that 
the militia system, predominates. 

Sweden has three sorts of troops,—regiments raised by volun- 
tary enlistment (Varfvade truppar), provincial regiments (Indelta 
truppar), and Reserve troops. The Varfvade consist of three 
regiments of infantry, containing six battalions, two of cavalry and 
three of artillery, with thirteen foot and four horse batteries, 
altogether 96 six Ib., 24 twelve Ib., and 16 twenty-four Ib. guns. 
This makes a total of 7,700 men, and 136 guns. These troops 
contain all the artillery for the whole army. 

The Indelta form twenty provincial regiments of two battalions, 
with five separate battalions of infantry, and six regiments of a 
strength varying from one to eight squadrons. They are estimated 
at 33,000 men. 

The Reserve troops form the mass of the army. When called in 
they are expected to reach 95,000 men. 

There is, besides, in the province of Gotaland, a sort of militia 
constantly under arms, numbering 7,850 men, in twenty-one 
companies and sixteen guns. Altogether, therefore, the Swedish 
army comprises about 140,000 men with 150 field guns. 

The volunteers for the enlisted regiments are generally engaged 
for fourteen years, but the law allows engagements of three years. 
The Indelta are a sort of inilitia, living, when once trained, in 
farms apportioned to them and their families, and called in only 
once a year for four weeks’ drill. They have the revenues of their 
farms for pay, but when assembled they receive a_ special 
compensation. The officers also receive crown-lands on tenure in 
their respective districts. The Reserve consists of all able-bodied 
Swedes from twenty to twenty-five years of age; they are drilled a 
short time, and afterwards called in a fortnight in every year. 
Thus, with the exception of the few Varfvade and the Gothland 
troops, the great body of the army—Indelta and Reserve—are, to 
all intents and purposes, militia. 

The Swedes play a part in military history which is beyond all 
proportion to the scanty population which furnished their 

renowned armies. Gustavus Adolphus, in the thirty years’ war,” 
marked a new era in tactics by his improvements; and Charles 
XII, with his adventurous foolhardiness which spoiled his great 
military talent, actually made them do wonders—such as to take 
entrenchments with cavalry. In the later wars against Russia, they 
behaved very well; in 1813, Bernadotte kept them as much as 
possible out of harm’s way, and they were scarcely under fire, 
unless by mistake, except at Leipsic,*" where they formed but an 
infinitesimal part of the allies. The Varfvade, and even the 
Indelta, will, no doubt, always sustain the character of the Swedish 
name; but the Reserve, unless assembled and drilled a long time 
before brought into action, can only figure as an army of recruits. 

Norway has five brigades of infantry containing twenty-two 
battalions and 12,000 men; one brigade of cavalry, of three 
divisions of chasseurs, containing 1,070 men; and one regiment of 
artillery of about 1,300 men; beside a reserve of militia, of 9,000 
men; altogether about 24,000 men. The character of this army 
does not vary much from that of Sweden; its only distinguishing 
feature is a few companies of chasseurs, provided with flat 
snow-shoes, on which, with the assistance of a long pole, they run, 
Lapland fashion, very rapidly over the snow. 

The Danish army is composed of twenty-three battalions of 
infantry (one of guards, twelve line, five light, five chasseurs) in 
four brigades, each battalion numbering about 700 men on the 
peace-footing; three brigades of cavalry (three squadrons of 
guards, six regiments of dragoons, of four squadrons each, the 
squadron containing 140 men in time of peace), and one brigade 
of artillery (two regiments and twelve batteries with 80 six Ib. and 
16 twelve lb. guns), and three companies of sappers. Total, 16,630 
infantry, 2,900 cavalry, 2,900 artillery and sappers with ninety-six 
guns. 

For the war-footing, each company is raised to 200, or the 
battalion to 800 men, and each squadron to 180 men, raising the 
line in all to 25,500 men. Besides, thirty-two battalions, twenty- 
four squadrons, and six batteries of the reserve can be called in, 
representing a force of 31,500 men and raising the total of the 
force to about 56,900 or 57,000 men. Even these, however, can be 
increased in case of need, as during the late war Denmark proper 
alone, without either Holstein or Schleswig, could muster from 
50,000 to 60,000 men,*”? and the Duchies are now again subject to 
the Danish conscription. 

The army is recruited by ballot, out of the young men of from 
twenty-two years and upwards. The time of service is eight years, 

The Armies of Europe 465 

but actually the artillery remain six years, the line four years only 
with the regiments, while for the remainder of the time they 
belong to the reserve. From the thirtieth to the thirty-eighth year 
the men remain in the first, and then up to the forty-fifth year in 
the second levy of the militia. This is all very nicely arranged, but, 
in any war against Germany, nearly one-half of the troops—those 
from the Duchies—would disband and take up arms against their 
present comrades. It is this strong admixture of Schleswig- 
Holsteiners which forms the great weakness of the Danish army, 
and, in reality, almost nullifies it in any complications with its most 
powerful neighbor. 

The Danish army, since its reorganization in 1848-49, has been 
well equipped, well armed, and brought altogether to a very 
respectable footing. The Dane, from Denmark proper, is a good 
soldier and behaved very wel! in almost every action of the three 
years’ war; but the Schleswig-Holsteiner proved himself decidedly 
his superior. The corps of officers is good upon the whole, but 
there is too much aristocracy and too little scientific education in 
it. Their reports are slovenly made, and similar to those of the 
British, to which army the Danish troops likewise appear related in 
their want of mobility; but they have not shown of late that they 
possess such immovable steadiness as the victors of Inkermann. 
The Schleswig-Holsteiners are, without any dispute, among the 
best soldiers in Europe. They are excellent artillery men, and as 
cool in action as the English, their cousins. Though inhabitants of 
a level country, they make very good light infantry; their first 
rifle-battalion in 1850 might have vied with any troop of its class. 

VI. THE ARMY OF HOLLAND 

The Dutch army numbers thirty-six battalions of infantry in 
nine regiments, containing 44,000 men in all; four regiments of 
dragoons composed of twenty squadrons; two squadrons of 
mounted chasseurs; and two squadrons of gens d’armes; in all, 
twenty-four squadrons, comprising 4,400 cavairy, with two regi- 
ments of field artillery (five six Ib. and six twelve lb. foot, two six 
Ib. and two twelve Ib. horse batteries, of 120 guns in all), and one 
battalion of sappers, making a total of 58,000 men, beside several 
regiments in the cojonies. But this army does not always exist in 
time of peace. There is a nucleus remaining under arms, 
consisting of officers, subalterns, and a few voluntarily enlisted 
men. The great mass, though obliged to serve for five years, are 
drilled during a couple of months, and then dismissed so as to be 

called in for a few weeks in each year only. Besides, there is a sort 
of reserve in three levies, comprising all the able-bodied men from 
twenty to thirty-five years of age. The first levy forms about 
fifty-three, and the second twenty-nine battalions of infantry and 
artillery. But this body is not at all organized, and can hardly be 
accounted even as militia. 

VU. THE BELGIAN ARMY 

The Belgian army has sixteen regiments of infantry, containing 
forty-nine battalions, beside a reserve battalion for each regiment; 
comprising in all 46,000 men. The cavalry consists of two 
regiments of chasseurs, two of lancers, one of guides, two of 
cuirassiers, making thirty-eight squadrons, beside seven reserve 
squadrons, in all 5,800 men. There are four regiments of artillery 
(four horse, fifteen foot batteries, four dépot batteries, twenty-four 
garrison companies), with 152 guns, six and twelve pounders; and 
one regiment of sappers and miners, numbering 1,700 men. The 
total, without the reserve, is 62,000 men; with the reserve, 
according to a late levy, it may be raised to 100,000. The army is 
recruited by ballot, and the term of service is eight years, but 
about one half of that time is passed on furlough. On the 
peace-establishment, therefore, the actual force will scarcely reach 
30,000 men. 

VHI. THE PORTUGUESE ARMY 

The Portuguese army consisted, in 1850, of the following 
troops: — 

Peace War 
footing. footing. 
Infantry, ...... 18,738 40,401 
Cavalry, ........ 3,508 4,676 
Artillery, ...... 2,707 4,098 
Engineers and Staff 495 
25,681 49,670 

The artillery consists of one field-regiment, of one horse and. 
seven foot batteries; three regiments of position and garrison 
artillery, and three detached battalions in the islands. The calibre 
is six and twelve pounds. 

The Armies of Europe 467 

IX. THE SPANISH ARMY 

Of all European armies, that of Spain is, from _ peculiar 
circumstances, most a matter of interest to the United States. We 
give, therefore, in concluding this survey of the military establish- 
ments of Europe, a more detailed account of this army than its 
importance, compared with that of its neighbors on the other side 
of the Atlantic, might seem to warrant. 

The Spanish military force consists of the army of the interior, 
and of the colonial armies. 

That of the interior counts one regiment of grenadiers, 
forty-five regiments of the line, of three battalions each, two 
regiments of two battalions each in Ceuta, and eighteen battalions 
of cazadores or rifles. The whole of these 160 battalions formed, 
in 1852, an effective force of 72,670 men, costing the state 
82,692,651 reals, or $10,336,581, a year. The cavalry comprises 
sixteen regiments of carabineers, or dragoons and lancers, of four 
squadrons each, with eleven squadrons of cazadores, or light 
horse, in 1851; in all 12,000 men, costing 17,549,562 reals, or 
$2,193,695. 

The artillery numbers five regiments of foot artillery, of three 
brigades each, one for each division of the monarchy; beside five 
brigades of heavy, three of horse, and three of mountain artillery, 
making a total of twenty-six brigades, or, as they are now called, 
battalions. The battalion has in the horse artillery two, in the 
mountain and foot artillery four batteries; in all ninety-two foot 
and six horse batteries, or 588 field guns. 

The sappers and miners form one regiment of 1,240 men. 

The reserve consists of one battalion (No. 4) for every infantry 
regiment, and a dépot-squadron for each cavalry regiment. 

The total force—on paper—in 1851 was 103,000 men; in 1843, 
when Espartero was upset, it amounted to 50,000 only; but at one 
time Narvaez raised it to above 100,000. On an average 90,000 
men under arms will be the utmost. 

The colonial armies are as follows: 

1. The army of Cuba; sixteen regiments of veteran infantry, 
four companies of volunteers, two regiments of cavalry, two 
battalions of four batteries foot, and one battalion of four batteries 
of mountain artillery, one battalion of horse artillery with two 
batteries, and one battalion of sappers and miners. Beside these 
troops of the line, there is a milicia disciplinada* of four battalions 
and four squadrons, and a milicia urbana of eight squadrons, 

* Disciplined militia.— Ed. 

making a total of thirty-seven battalions, twenty squadrons and 
eighty-four guns. During the last few years this standing Cuban 
army has been reinforced by numerous troops from Spain; and if 
we take its original strength at 16,000 or 18,000 men, there will 
now be, perhaps, 25,000 or 28,000 men in Cuba. But this is a 
mere approximation. 

2. The army of Porto Rico; three battalions of veteran infantry, 
seven battalions of disciplined militia, two battalions of native 
volunteers, one squadron of the same, and four batteries of foot 
artillery. The neglected state of most of the Spanish colonies does 
not allow any estimate of the strength of this corps. 

3. The Philippine Islands have five regiments of infantry, of 
eight companies each; one regiment of chasseurs of Luzon; nine 
foot, one horse, one mountain battery. Nine corps of five 
battalions of native infantry, and othr provincial corps, previously 
existing, were dissolved in 1851. 

The army is recruited by ballot, and substitutes are allowed. 
Every year a contingent of 25,000 men is levied; but, in 1848, 
three contingents, or 75,006 men, were called out. 

The Spanish army owes its present organization principally to 
Narvaez, though the reguiations of Charles III, of 1768,* still form 
the groundwork of it. Narvaez had actually to take away from the 
regiments their old provincial colors, different in each, and to 
introduce the Spanish flag into the army! In the same manner he 
had to destroy the old provincial organization, and to centralize 
and restore unity. Too well aware, by experience, that money was 
the principal moving lever in an army which had almost never 
been paid and seldom even clad or fed, he also tried to introduce 
a greater regularity in the payments and the financial administra- 
tion of the army. Whether he succeeded to the full extent of his 
wishes, is unknown; but any amelioration introduced by him, in 
this respect, speedily disappeared during the administration of 
Sartorius and his successors. The normal state of “no pay, no 
food, no clothing,” was reestablished in its full glory; and while 
the superior and general officers strut about in coats resplendent 
with gold and silver lace, or even don fancy uniforms, unknown to 
any regulations, the soldiers are ragged and without shoes. What 
the state of this army was ten or twelve years ago, an English 
author thus describes: — 

“The appearance of the Spanish troops is, to the last degree, unsoldierly. The 
sentry strolls to and fro [...] on his beat, his shako almost falling off the back of his 

* Ordenanzas de S. M. para el regimen, disciplina, subordinacion, y servico de sus 
ejercitos, T. I-Il.— Ed. 

The Armies of Europe 469 

head, his gun slouched on his shoulders, singing outright {...] a lively seguidilla with 
the most sans fagon air in the world. He is, not unfrequently, destitute of portions of 
his uniform; or his regimental coat and lower continuations are in such hopeless rags, 
that, even in the sultry summer, the slate-colored great-coat is worn as a slut-cover [...]; 
the shoes [...], in one case out of three, are broken to pieces, disclosing the naked toes 
of the men—such in Spain are the glories of the vida militar.” * 

A regulation, issued by Serrano, on Sept. 9, 1843, prescribes 
that: — 

“All officers and chiefs of the army have in future to present themselves in 
public m the uniform of their regiment, and with the regulation sword, whenever 
they do not appear in plain clothes; and all officers are also to wear the exact 
distinctive marks of their rank, and no other, as prescribed, without displaying any 
more of those arbitrary ornaments and ridiculous trimmings by which some of 
them have thought proper to distinguish themselves.” 

So much for the officers. Now for the soldiers: — 

“Brigadier General Cordoba has opened a subscription in Cadiz, heading it with 
his name, in order to procure funds for presenting one pair of cloth trousers to 
each of the valiant soldiers of the regiment of Asturias!” 

This financial disorder explains how it has been possible for the 
Spanish army to continue, ever since 1808, in a state of almost 
uninterrupted rebellion. But the real causes hie deeper. The long 
continued war with Napoleon, in which the different armies and 
their chiefs gained real political influence, first gave it a pretorian 
turn. Many energetic men, from the revolutionary times, remained 
in the army; the incorporation of the guerrillas in the regular 
force even increased this element. Thus, while the chiefs retained 
their pretorian pretensions, the soldiers and lower ranks al- 
together remained inspired with revolutionary traditions. In this 
way the insurrection of 1819-23 was regularly prepared, and later 
on, in 1833-43,°*° the civil war again thrust the army and its chiefs 
into the foreground. Having been used by all parties as an 
instrument, no wonder that the Spanish army should, for a time, 
take the government into its own hands. 

“The Spaniards are a warlike but not a soldier-like people,” said 
the Abbé de Pradt.” They certainly have, of all European nations, 
the greatest antipathy to military discipline. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that the nation, which for more than a hundred years was 
celebrated for its infantry, may yet again have an army of which it 
can be proud. But, to attain this end, not only the military system, 
but civil life, still more, requires to be reformed. 

“Here and below Engels quotes from the anonymously published book by 
T. M. Hughes, Revelations of Spain in 1845, Vol. I, pp. 326 and 329.— Ed. 
Dominique de Pradt, Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d’Espagne, 
p. 189.— Ed. 

470) 

Karl Marx