Friedrich Engels

The Crimean War

Written on 21 May 1855.

From the English.

[“New-York Daily Tribune” No. 4411 of 8 June 1855, lead article]

While we write, the field operations in the Crimea must have commenced of which we spoke a few days ago as being in preparation. <See the German variant in the present volume, pp. 213–216> With these operations the war, insofar as it is confined to the peninsula, enters a new and probably decisive stage of development. The rapid arrival of the Piedmontese and French reserves and particularly the sudden change by which Canrobert exchanged his command for that over a single corps, while Pélissier assumes the supreme command, are certain signs that the time has come for a change in the tactics of the Allies.

As for a general description of the terrain onto which the theatre of operations is to be transferred, and a general survey of the forces now engaged, we refer to our previous article. It will be remembered that the main position of the Russian army of observation, which maintains the connection with the north side of Sevastopol, lies on the plateau between Inkerman and the point where the road from Balaklava to Simferopol crosses the ridge that separates the valleys of the Chernaya and the Belbek. This position—of great natural strength—the Russians have completely entrenched. It extends for about four miles between the head of the Bay of Sevastopol and the inaccessible chain of mountains, and the Russians will be able to concentrate there at least 50,000 or 60,000 infantry and artillery, which is amply sufficient for the defence.

To attack this position frontally would require a great numerical superiority and entail frightful sacrifices; however, the Allies can afford neither the one nor the other. Even if they succeeded in capturing the entrenchments, their losses would be so heavy that they would be incapable of conducting the campaign energetically further. They must therefore attempt to draw off a number of Russians from there and find ways of outflanking them. It was for this purpose that the mysterious expedition to Kerch was undertaken. About 15,000 men of the Allies were embarked, passed before the eyes of the Russians off Yalta, sailed to Kerch and back again. Why they did not attempt to land is sought to be explained by a telegraphic order from Paris. In any case, this mere substitute for a demonstration must be characterised as a complete fiasco; no general in his right mind could be induced to divide his troops for the execution of an expedition which does not even dare to put up even the semblance of a fight. An attack on Kaffa, even if it had been contemplated at headquarters, seems finally to have been abandoned as well. To move troops to Eupatoria in order to break out from that point could not be considered, for otherwise the Piedmontese and French reserves would have been sent there immediately. And since there is no other harbour or good roadstead either on the coast between Balaklava and Kaffa or between Sevastopol and Eupatoria, the idea of outflanking the Russians by sea seems finally to have been given up; so nothing else remains but to outflank them by land, which—as we have already stated—must prove to be an extremely difficult operation.

Apart from the road above Inkerman occupied by the Russians, there is only one other military road, which leads from Balaklava to Simferopol. It runs along the south coast as far as Alushta, where it turns inland, crosses at an elevation of 2,800 feet above sea level the mountains east of Chatyr-Dag or Tent Mountain, the highest mountain in the Crimea, and descends through the valley of the Salgir, the main river of the Crimea, to Simferopol. From Balaklava to Alushta it is four, from Alushta to Simferopol three days’ marches—altogether about 95 English miles. But as there are no side roads on which the troops could march in several parallel columns, the whole army would have to advance on this one road in an enormously drawn-out column, marching in an uninterrupted stream for at least four or five days. In the neighbourhood of Alushta and on the pass there are

some old fortifications, and we can be sure that the pass itself will be found heavily entrenched. Instead of seven days, the army might require twelve before the pass of Chatyr-Dag could even be crossed—time enough for the Russians either to attack the corps left behind to secure the siege, or to move with the greater part of their forces against the enemy and, when he debouches from the defile, to meet him from the hills with superior strength, while light, mobile columns sent forward along the footpaths of the Upper Kacha and the Alma would throw themselves on his flank and rear. The greatest defect of a flank movement via Alushta, however, would be the complete absence of a base of operations. The open roadstead of Alushta does not permit the idea of converting that place even into a temporary base; thus, even before Alushta is passed, the Russian light infantry, descending the footpaths leading through the mountains, can quite effectively cut the connection with Balaklava.

Therefore the march over Alushta can hardly be undertaken. The risk far outweighs the possible advantages. There is, however, another way to outflank the Russians. If in the march over Alushta all the advantages offered to the Allies by the great road are counterbalanced to a considerable extent by the fact that the Russians can make use of the footpaths for attacks, why could not the same footpaths serve the Allies to the same advantage? This would entail an entirely different mode of operating. In that case, the Allies would draw up the main body of their field troops, including the corps destined to blockade the north side of Sevastopol, directly opposite the Russian camp above Inkerman, and thereby compel their opponents to hold fast the great mass of their troops in the entrenchments. Meanwhile, Zouaves, Chasseurs, light infantry, British rifles, and even the mounted Chasseurs d’Afrique <light cavalry intended for service in Africa>, and whatever mountain artillery can be raised, would be formed into as many columns as there are footpaths leading from the Baidar valley and from the south coast near Alupka, 30 miles from Balaklava, into the valleys of the Belbek and the Kacha. A night march would suffice to bring the troops that have to turn the extreme left flank of the Russians via the Baidar valley to the south coast, where the enemy can no longer reach them. Another day’s march would bring them to Alupka. Above Alupka stretches the

steep chain of the Yaila Mountains, which on its northern slope forms, at about 2,000 feet above sea level, a plateau offering good sheep pasturage; the plateau descends over rocky precipices into the narrow valleys of the little rivers Biyuk Uzen and Uzen Bash, which at their confluence form the river Belbek. Three footpaths lead up to this plateau near Alupka and issue into the valleys of the two little Uzen rivers. This entire terrain is perfectly practicable for infantry such as the Zouaves and Chasseurs, who have become accustomed in Africa to mountain warfare of a far more difficult kind. From the valley of the Upper Chernaya, better known under the name of Baidar valley, at least two footpaths lead to the valley of the Upper Belbek, and finally a path branches off from the road to Balaklava and Simferopol shortly before the mountain pass, crosses the ridge three miles south-east of Mackenzie’s Farm, and leads directly to the left flank of the entrenched positions of the Russians. However rough these paths may be, they must be passable for the French light troops from Africa. “Where a goat can go, a man can go; where a man, a whole battalion; where a whole battalion gets through, one or two horses can also get through with some effort, and finally it may even be possible to bring a field-piece through.” We should not really be surprised if these worn sheep tracks and footpaths marked on the maps prove to be even country roads—bad ones, to be sure, but still quite usable for a flank movement in which artillery too can accompany the columns. In this case, the outflanking should be executed with as strong a force as possible, and then the Russians, even without a serious frontal attack, will soon be compelled to abandon their entrenchments. But if these paths are not passable for field guns (rockets and mountain howitzers get through anywhere), the outflanking detachments will turn into simple mobile columns, driving the Russian troops as far as possible out of the upper valleys of the Belbek, penetrating into the valley of the Kacha, threatening the Russian rear, cutting their communications, destroying their convoys, collecting reliable intelligence, reconnoitring the country, and drawing upon themselves as many Russian detachments as possible, until the road offering the fewest difficulties has been made passable enough for artillery. Then strong forces could be sent after them and the Russian rear so seriously threatened that an evacuation of the entrenchments is forced. We do not believe that an advance of mere infantry and light cavalry over these mountains on the left flank and

in the rear of the Russians can achieve such an effect, since they could not seriously threaten the Russian communications without descending into terrain where artillery regains its full effect and thereby secures the superiority to the side that takes possession of it. But there can be no doubt that with some ingenuity the artillery can be put in a position to follow the outflanking columns. At Jena, Napoleon showed what can be done with a simple footpath winding up a steep hill; within five hours the road was made wide enough for cannons, the Prussians were attacked in the flank, and victory on the next day was secured. And where a Crimean arba <Crimean cart> can get through, a field gun can also get through; some of the footpaths in question, especially those leading from the Chernaya to the Belbek, seem to be such old country roads for arbas.

But in order to carry out such a movement, the first condition is to have sufficient forces at one’s disposal. The Russians will certainly have the advantage of numbers and a better knowledge of the terrain. The former can be offset by a bold advance by Omer Pasha from Eupatoria toward the Alma. Even if the Russian superiority in cavalry does not allow him to move quickly or far forward, he can nevertheless, if he manoeuvres well and secures his communications properly, compel Prince Gorchakov to deploy more infantry against him. But to rely on such a secondary operation would be too uncertain a matter for the Allies. Hence, to accomplish the advance from Balaclava, the best course for them would be to transfer, a day or two before the real attack, some 20,000 Turks to the Chersonese (which they have done, as we reported some time ago [this sentence was obviously inserted by the editors of the “N.-Y. D. T.”]), where they would be worth twice as much as at Eupatoria. This would enable them, together with the cavalry numbering some 6,000 men, to attack the Russians with close to 110,000 men, who would be able to oppose them with roughly 65,000-75,000 men (including 15,000 to 20,000 from the garrison of the North Side) and 10,000 cavalry. But as soon as the turning corps begins to threaten the Russian left flank and rear, the forces sent against it would be comparatively weak, since the detachments from the North Side could not expose themselves to the danger of being cut off from their entrenched camp around the citadel; and the Allies, being in a position to employ their entire available field army wherever they choose, would therefore be very superior. In this case, then, they could count on success with certainty; but if they attack the Russians without this assistance, and the numerical ratio of the two armies as given from reliable sources is correct, they have only slight chances of success. Their flanking corps would be too weak and could be completely ignored by the Russians, who, by a bold sally from their lines, could drive the weakened Allies over the precipice down into the Chernaya.

Another manoeuvre by the Allies is also held to be possible: an immediate assault on the South Side of Sevastopol. It is even said that an unconditional order to undertake this assault has been telegraphed from Paris, and that Canrobert resigned because he could not take responsibility for carrying out a movement which, in his opinion, would have meant the loss of 40,000 men. Judging by what we have come to know of the military ideas of Louis Bonaparte, which he displays through his interference in the present campaign, it is by no means incredible that such an order might have been given. But it is even less likely that even so audacious a sabreur as Pélissier would have accepted the execution of such an order. In the past month the French soldiers must have gained a fairly good idea of the resistance they will encounter in an assault. And an operation that cannot be carried out without the loss of some 40,000 men – that is more than a third of the entire army available for the assault – certainly has very little prospect of success. Pélissier may indeed be eager to pick up the marshal’s baton that has slipped from Canrobert’s hands, but we very much doubt whether he is Bonapartist enough to stake his fortune and his reputation against such overwhelming odds. But even if we assume that the assault was successful, that not only the first line of defence, but also the second line was taken, that even the barricades, the loopholed houses, and the huts of the defenders that block the approach to the coastal forts, that these coastal forts themselves were taken, and the whole South Side fell into the hands of the Allies, at a loss of, say, only 30,000 against a loss of 20,000 Russians – what then? The Allies would have lost 10,000 men more than the Russians, the fortress would have to be abandoned at once, and the campaign would become even more difficult than before.

But there is a circumstance which at once excludes the idea of an immediate general assault. On the basis of semi-official reports we had
merely for the sake of polemics in an earlier article on the siege [see present volume, p. 203] felt induced to admit that the Russians had been driven out of their new advanced works before Sevastopol. At the same time we pointed out that we had every reason to doubt the accuracy of such reports, since the Allies would have proclaimed any success of this kind loudly and unequivocally. Now we positively know from the Russian side that the Kamchatka (the Mamelon), Selenginsk, and Volhynia redoubts are still in their possession, while reports from the Allied camp not only confirm this, but also admit that the besieged have thrown up further advanced works. The advantage the Allies gained by pushing their advanced approaches closer to the fortress has thus been entirely offset by the counter-approaches of the Russians, and the line at which the two sides can meet with equal forces is still far from the main ditch. But an assault is only advisable when the line at which the strength of the attacker, in ordinary siege operations, equals that of the defender, runs along the main ditch. It is clear that otherwise the assaulting columns would be overthrown and annihilated before they could even reach the edge of the breastwork. So long, therefore, as the Russians cannot be driven back beyond the main ditch, it will be impossible to storm the main rampart situated behind this main ditch. As for the second line constructed behind this ditch, there can at present be no question whatever of taking it.

It is possible that there is a chance of success for a partial attack on the left, or city side, on the section from the Quarantine Bastion to the Flagstaff Bastion, where the French are delivering their main attack. But in this regard, the policy of the French government keeps us completely in the dark as far as the extent and strength of the Russian advanced works are concerned, and the latest Russian news, which has recently all been transmitted by telegraph, contains no definite and detailed account. The Russians themselves admit, however, that the French works near the Flagstaff Bastion lie close to the main rampart and that a mine has been sprung there, though without any significant results. Here, therefore, a local assault might succeed, but owing to the projecting position of this bastion and the commanding ground behind it (the Russian Jasonovski Redoubt [in the English text: “the Russian Garden Battery”]), it is very doubtful whether anything would be gained by the capture of this bastion,

which must have been isolated from the rest of the fortifications by one or two traverses in its rear, thereby preventing the assaulting columns from establishing themselves there, or at least from advancing further.

Whether the assault is attempted or field operations are undertaken, the Allies will have to contend with considerable difficulties. But in any event, the drowsy mode of warfare that has been carried on since the arrival of the Allies before Sevastopol is approaching its end, and exciting events as well as operations of genuine military interest can now be expected.