A few weeks more, and unless peace is made at Vienna 34 with a 
promptitude that nobody in Europe now seems to expect, we shall 
witness the opening on that Continent of a war in comparison 
with whose events the Crimean campaign will sink into that 
insignificance which, in a war between three of the greatest 
nations on the face of the earth, it always ought to have worn. The 
hitherto independent operations in the Black Sea, and in the 
Baltic, will then be connected by a line of battle extending across 
the whole breadth of the Continent which separates those two 
colossal inland lakes; and armies whose magnitude is adequate to 
the almost boundless extent of the Sarmatian plain, will contend 
for its dominion. Then, and then only, can the war be said to have 
become truly a European one. 

The Crimean campaign requires but a short additional notice at 
our hands. We have so often, and in such detail, described its 
character and its chances, that we have merely to record a few 
fresh facts in confirmation of our statements. A week ago we 
observed* that it had degenerated into a_ steeple-chase of 
reenforcements, and that the Russians were likely to get the best 
of this race. There is now hardly a doubt that by the time when 
the season admits of uninterrupted operations, followed up 
according to a preconcerted plan, the Russians will have from 
120,000 to 150,000 men in the Peninsula, to whom the Allies can, 
with superhuman efforts, oppose, perhaps, 90,000. Supposing, 
even, that both France and England had troops sufficient to send 
there, where are the transports to be found, as long as out of 

every four steamers sent to the Black Sea, three are kept there 
under all possible pretexts? England has already completely 
disorganized her transatlantic mail steam service, and nothing is at 
present in greater demand there than ocean steamers; but the 
supply is exhausted. The only thing which could save the Allies, 
would be the arrival in the Crimea exactly at the time it is wanted, 
of an Austrian corps of some 30,000 men, to be embarked at the 
mouth of the Danube. Without such a reenforcement, neither the 
Piedmontese corps, nor the Neapolitan corps, nor the driblets of 
Anglo-French reenforcements, nor Omer Pasha’s army, can do 
them any real good. 

Now let us see what part of their respective forces England and 
France have already engaged in the Crimea. We shall speak of the 
infantry only, for the proportions in which cavalry and artillery 
are attached to such expeditions are so variable that no positive 
conclusions respecting them can be established. Besides, the whole 
active force of a country is always engaged in proportion as its 
infantry is engaged. Of Turkey we speak not, for with the army of 
Omer Pasha she engages her last, her only army, in this struggle. 
What is left to her in Asia is no army; it is btit a rabble. 

England’ possesses, in all, 99 regiments, or 106 battalions of 
infantry. Of these, at least 35 battalions are on Colonial service. Of 
the remainder, the first five divisions sent to the Crimea took up 
about 40° battalions more; and at least eight battalions have been 
sent since as reenforcements. There remain about 23 battalions, 
hardly one of which could be spared. Accordingly, England fairly 
acknowledges, by her last military measures, the peace establish- 
ment of her army to be entirely exhausted. Various devices are 
brought forward in order to make up for what has been 
neglected. The militia, embodied to the number of some 50,000, 
are allowed to volunteer for foreign service. They are to occupy 
Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu, and thus to relieve about twelve battalions 
on Colonial service, which then may be sent to the Crimea. A 
foreign legion 1s decreed; but, unfortunately, no foreigners seem 
to come forward for enlistment under the rule of the cat-o’-nine- 
tails. Finally, on the 13th February, orders were issued to create 
second battalions for 93 regiments—43 of 1,000 men and 50 of 
1,200 men each. This would give an addition of 103,000 men, 

besides about 17,000 more men for the cavalry and artillery. But 
not one of these 120,000 men has as yet been enlisted; and then, 
how are they to be drilled and officered? The admirable 
organization and general management of the British army has 
contrived to engage, one way or another, between the Crimea and 
the colonies, almost the whole of the infantry, with the exception 
of depot companies and a few depot battalions—not only the 
men, but the cadres too. Now, there are plenty of half-pay 
generals, colonels and majors on the British army list [who] can be 
employed for this new force; but of captains on half-pay, as far as 
we know, there are none, or very few, while lieutenants, ensigns 
and non-commissioned officers are nowhere to be had in the 
manufactured state. Raw material there is in plenty; but raw 
officers to drill raw recruits would never do; and old, experienced, 
steady non-commissioned officers, as everybody knows, are the 
mainstay of every army. Besides this, we know from the best 
authority—Sir W. Napier—that it takes full three years to drill 
the tag-rag-and-bobtail of Old England into what John Bull calls 
“the first soldiers of the world” and “the best blood of England.” 
If that is the case when the cadres are at hand waiting to be filled 
up, how long will it take, without subaltern or non-commissioned 
officers, to manufacture heroes out of the 120,000 men who are 
not yet found? We may consider the whole military force of 
England so far engaged in this war that, for the next twelvemonth, 
the utmost the British Government can do will be to keep up a 
“heroic littk band” of forty or fifty thousand men before the 
enemy. That number could only be exceeded for very short 
periods, and with essential derangement of all preparation for 
future reenforcements. 

France,* with her larger army and far more complete organiza- 
tion, has engaged a far inferior proportional part of her forces. 
France possesses 100 regiments of infantry of the line, 3 of 
Zouaves, and 2 foreign legions, at 3 battalions each; beside 20 
battalions of rifles, and 6 African battalions—together 341 
battalions. Of these, 100 battalions, or one to each regiment of the 

line, are considered as dépét-battalions, for the reception and 
drilling of recruits; the two first battalions only are sent out for 
active service, while the dépét prepares the reenforcements 
destined to keep up their full strength. Thus, 100 battalions must 
be at once struck off the number. If subsequently these 
dépot-battalions are made use of as the groundwork for a third 
field battalion, as was more than once done under Napoleon, they 
can do so by having an extraordinary number of recruits made 
over to them, and then it is some time before they are fit for the 
field. Thus, the available force of the French army, at the present 
time, does not exceed 24] battalions. Of these, 25 at Jeast are 
required for Algeria. Four are at Rome. Nine divisions of infantry, 
or at least 80 battalions, have been sent to the Crimea, to 
Constantinople and to Athens. Altogether, say 110 battalions 
engaged, or very nearly one half of the available infantry of 
France, upon the peace establishment; minus the dépéts. Now, the 
arrangements in the French army, the dép6t-battalions organized 
beforehand, the calling in of the soldiers dismissed on furlough 
during their last year of service, the faculty of calling out the full 
number of every year’s conscription, beside extraordinary recruit- 
ings, and finally the aptitude of the French for military duty, allow 
the Government to double the number of their infantry in about a 
twelvemonth. Considering the quiet but uninterrupted armaments 
made since the middle of 1853, the establishment of ten or twelve 
battalions of Imperial Guards, and the strength in which the 
French troops mustered in their respective camps last autumn, it 
may be supposed that their force of infantry at home is now fully 
as strong as it was before the nine divisions left the country, and 
that, as regards the capability of forming third field battalions out 
of the dépét-battalions, without much impairing their efficiency as 
dépots, it is even stronger. If we estimate, however, at 350,000 
men, the infantry force which France will have on her own 
territory by the end of March, we shall be rather above than below 
the mark. With cavalry, artillery, &c., such an infantry force 
would, according to the French organization, represent an army of 
about 500,000 men. Of these, at least 200,000 would have to 
remain at home, as cadres for the dépéts, for the maintenance of 
tranquillity in the interior, in the military workshops, or hospitals. 
So that by the Ist of April, France might take the field with 
300,000 men, comprising about 200 battalions of infantry. But 
these 200 battalions would, neither in organization nor in 
discipline and steadiness under fire, be upon a par with the troops 
sent to the Crimea. They would contain many young recruits, and 

many battalions composed for the occasion. All corps where 
officers and men are strangers to each other, where a_ hasty 
organization upon the prescribed plan has but just been com- 
pleted in time before they march out, are vastly inferior to those 
old established bodies in which the habit of long service, of 
dangers shared together, and of daily intercourse for years, has 
established: that esprit de corps which absorbs very soon, by its 
powerful influence, even the youngest recruits. It must, then, be 
admitted that the eighty battalions sent to the Crimea represent a 
far more important portion of the French army than their mere 
number indicates. If England has engaged, almost to a man, the 
best part of her army, France, too, has sent to the East nearly 
one-half of her finest troops. 

We need not here go into a recapitulation of the Russian forces, 
having very recently stated their numbers and _ distribution.’ 
Suffice it to say that of the Russian active army, or that destined to 
act upon: the western frontier of the Empire, only the third, 
fourth, fifth and sixth corps have as yet been engaged during the 
war. The Guards and Grenadiers corps are quite intact, as is the 
first corps also; the second corps appears to have detached about 
one division to the Crimea. Beside these troops, eight corps of 
reserve, equal in number of battalions, if not in numerical 
strength, to the eight corps of the active army, have been, or are 
still being formed. Thus, Russia brings up against the West a force 
of about 750 battalions, 250 of which, however, may be still 
forming, and will always be weak in numbers, while 200 more 
have suffered great losses during two campaigns. The Reserve, as 
far as the fifth and sixth battalions of the regiments are 
concerned, must principally consist of old soldiers, if the original 
plan of organization has been followed up; but the 7th and 8th 
battalions must have been formed of recruits, and be very 
inefficient, as the Russian, in spite of his docility, is very slow to 
learn military duties. The whole reserve, besides, is badly 
officered. Russia, therefore, has engaged at the present time about 
one-half of her regularly organized active army. But then, the 
Guards, Grenadiers, first and second corps, forming the other 
half, which has not yet been engaged, are the very flower of her 
army, the pet troops of the Emperor, the efficiency of which he 
watches over with especial care. And, moreover, by engaging 

one-half of her active army, what has Russia obtained?* She has 
almost annihilated the offensive and defensive strength of Turkey; 
she has forced England to sacrifice an army of 50,000 men, and 
has disabled her for at least a twelvemonth; and she has, besides, 
forced France to engage a similar proportion of troops to those 
she herself engaged. And while the best African regiments of 
France are already before the enemy, Russia’s own élite has not yet 
fired a shot. 

So far, then, Russia has had the best of it, although her troops 
employed in Europe cannot boast of a single success, but have 
had, on the contrary, to give way in every action of moment, and 
to abandon every one of their enterprises. But the matter will 
change entirely as soon as Austria joins in the war. She has an 
army of some 500,000 men ready for the field, beside 100,000 
more in the dépéts, and 120,000 more in reserve; an army, which, 
by very little extraordinary recruiting, may be brought to some 
850,000 men. But we will take its number at 600,000, inclusive of 
dépots, and omitting the reserve, which has not yet been called in. 
Of these 600,000 men, 100,000 are in the dépots, about 70,000 
more in Italy and other portions of the interior not menaced by 
Russia. The remaining 430,000” are assembled in several armies, 
from Bohemia through Galicia to the Lower Danube, and 150,000 
men could be in a very short time concentrated upon any given 
point. This formidable army at once turns the balance against 
Russia, so soon as Austria begins to act against her; for since the 
whole of the late Russian army of the Danube has been drafted 
into the Crimea, the Austrians are superior to the Russians on 
every point, and can bring their reserves to the frontier quite as 
soon, in spite of the start the Russians have now got. There is only 
this to notice: that the Austrian reserve is far more limited in its 
number than that of the Russians, and that the 120,000 reserve 
soldiers once called in, all further increase must arise from fresh 
recruiting, and, therefore, be very slow. The longer, therefore, the 
Austrians hold back a declaration of war, the more advantage they 
give to Russia. To make up for this, we are told, a French 
auxiliary army is to march into Austria. But the road from Dijon 
or Lyons to Cracow is rather long, and unless matters are well 

arranged, the French army may arrive too late, unless the intrinsic 
value of the reorganized Austrian army should render it a match 
for even a moderately superior number of Russians.’ 

Austria, then, is the arbiter of the situation. Ever since she took 
up a military position on her Eastern frontiers, she has maintained 
her superiority over the Russians. If well-timed arrivals of Russian 
reserves should for a moment deprive her of it, she may trust to 
her experienced generals—the only ones, save a very few 
Hungarians, who of late years have shown military genius—and to 
her well-organized troops, most of whom have been under fire. A 
few skilful maneuvers, a very slight step backward, would force 
her opponent to such detachments as to assure her a fair field. 
Militarily speaking, Russia is thrown completely on the defensive 
the very moment Austria moves her armies.” 

Another point must be mentioned. If France raises her domestic 
army to 500,000 men, and Austria increases her total forces to 
800,000, either of these countries is capable of calling, within a 
twelvemonth, at least 250,000 men more under arms.‘ On the 
other hand, the Czar, if ever he completes the seventh and eighth 
battalions of his infantry regiments, thereby raising his total active 
force to say 900,000 men, has done almost everything in his power 
for defense. His late recruiting is said to have everywhere met 
with considerable difficulties; the standard of hight has had to be 
lowered, and other means resorted to, to get the requisite number 
of men. The decree of the Emperor, calling the whole of the male 
population of Southern Russia under arms, far from being an 
actual increase of the army, is a plain confession of the 
impossibility of further regular recruiing. This means was 
resorted toon the French invasion of 1812, when the country was 
actually invaded; and then in seventeen provinces only. Moscow 
then furnished 80,000 volunteers, or one tenth of the population 
of the province; Smolensk sent 25,000 men, and so forth. But, 
during the war they were nowhere; and these hundreds of 
thousands of volunteers did not prevent the Russians from 
arriving on the Vistula in as bad a state, and in as total a 

dissolution as the French themselves.* This new levy en masse 
means, besides, that Nicholas is resolved on war to the utmost. 

But if Austria’s participation in the war, throws Russia, militarily 
speaking, om the defensive, this is not necessarily the case, 
politically speaking. The Czar’s great political means of offense — 
we have called attention to it more than once—is the raising of 
the Austrian and Turkish Slavons and the proclamation of 
Hungarian independence. How greatly these measures are 
dreaded by Austrian statesmen is known to our readers. No doubt, 
in case of necessity, the Czar will resort to this means; with what 
result, remains to be seen. We have not spoken of Prussia—she is 
likely to go, finally, with the West against Russia, though perhaps 
only after some storms which nobody can foresee. At all events, 
until some national movement takes place, her troops are not 
likely to play a* very important part, and, therefore, we may for 
the present take very little account of her. 

Written about February 20, 1855 Reproduced from the New-York 
Tribune, No. 4332, March 8, 1855, re-