Friedrich Engels

The Campaign in the Crimea

["Neue Oder-Zeitung" No. 221, 14 May 1855]

London, 11 May. The impatience of the French army has compelled Canrobert to blurt out the Allies’ plan of operations. The 25,000 men of the reserve army are to be transported to the Crimea; 30,000–40,000 more—French and Piedmontese—are to follow. As soon as the reserve army has arrived, the French will take the field, cross the Chernaya, attack the Russians wherever they encounter them, endeavour to effect a junction with Omer Pasha’s troops somewhere in the vicinity of the Alma and Kacha, and then act according to circumstances. Meanwhile, the steamers of the fleets are to attack Kaffa and Kerch and, should they succeed in seizing them, to hold these places as possible pivots or supporting points for the active army in the field. This is indeed the only possible plan for the Allies to bring the Crimean campaign to a successful conclusion. But such action in the open field requires a significant preponderance of forces on the side of the Allies. Without it they can expect to gain no decisive advantage over the Russian army of observation. What, then, is the balance of forces at this moment?

The French have in the Crimea 9 divisions of infantry and 1 brigade of cavalry (Chasseurs d’Afrique <light cavalry intended for service in Algeria>). At 7,000 men per division this gives an infantry of 63,000 men, together with 1,500 cavalry. The English have 5 divisions of infantry of at most 6,000 men each and 1 division of cavalry of 2,000 men. In addition, there is a division of Turkish

infantry of about 6,000 men there. Add to this the French reserve army, of which no more than 20,000 bayonets, including the 4,000 Piedmontese landed on 3 May, can be brought to the Crimea by the time fixed by Canrobert for the opening of the campaign. The total forces of the Allies before Sevastopol then yield the following result:

French

infantry

83,000,

cavalry

1,500

English

ditto

30,000,

ditto

2,000

Turkish

ditto

6,000

Total:

infantry

119,000,

cavalry

3,500

The composition of the French reserve army at Constantinople is little known. We do not know, therefore, whether any new cavalry can be brought to the Crimea at this moment. At most, the increase in cavalry with which they can open the campaign will amount to 2,000 men, so that their total cavalry would rise to 5,500. To continue the siege, at least as many troops are necessary as are at present engaged in this task, namely 46,000 men (4 French divisions of 7,000 men each and three English of 6,000). To these must be added the sailors, the troops charged with the guarding of Balaklava and the line of entrenchments up to Inkerman, which at the same time form a reserve for the siege corps. At a low estimate, they amount to 12,000 men, including therein the 6,000 Turks mentioned above. Estimating the sailors and marines at 4,000, 54,000 men are to be deducted from the total of 119,000, so that 65,000 men infantry and 5,500 cavalry, together somewhat over 70,000 men, remain available for field operations. Furthermore, account must be taken of: Omer Pasha’s corps at Eupatoria, approximately 35,000 men infantry and 3,000 or 4,000 cavalry. Of these, 15,000 must remain behind as garrison of the place, so that Omer Pasha would probably take the field with 20,000 men infantry, 4,000 cavalry, in all 24,000.

The total sum of the Allied forces for
field operations
in 2 divided corps is therefore:

Infantry

Cavalry

Total

Army before Sevastopol

65,000

5,500

70,500

Army before Eupatoria

20,000

4,000

24,000

85,000

9,500

94,500

If we take the lowest estimate the
Russians
themselves give of their present forces in the Crimea, we obtain 120,000 men

infantry and 20,000 men cavalry. From this must be deducted for the defence of Sevastopol 50,000 men, namely 26,000 for the south side and 24,000 for the north fort and the entrenched camp. There remain available for the field 70,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry. It is impossible to determine even approximately the number of field artillery. However, the difficulty the Allies experience in procuring horses and the large proportion in which cannon accompany every Russian army scarcely permit any doubt that the Russians will be superior in artillery to their opponents. Equally clear is the superiority of the Russians in cavalry. As regards infantry, the Allies
combined
are superior in it to the Russians, but each of their two operating corps by itself is weaker. The greatest advantage of the Russians, however, is their position. Posted on the triangle between the Alma, Sevastopol and Simferopol, they hold in the north, against Omer Pasha, the entrenched position on that river, defensible with 15,000 men infantry in the front, while a flanking movement of the Russian cavalry threatens to cut off the Turks from Eupatoria. Should Omer Pasha therefore advance even as far as the Alma, he will never be able to cross it before the Anglo-French have thrown the Russians back on Simferopol and thus forced them to abandon the Alma. In this case a junction of the two corps could be effected. The advance of the Anglo-French army is therefore the basic condition of all success. This advance of the Allies, however, can hardly take place other than by the road to Mackenzie’s Farm. The road from there towards the Alma and Simferopol is defended by a double line of entrenchments, the first on the ridge overhanging the Chernaya, the second on the north side of a mountain gorge running down from the chain of rocks in the vicinity of Mackenzie’s Farm to the head of the Bay of Sevastopol. This second and main line of defence, extending only about two English miles, is said to be very strongly entrenched, and here the first decisive action will have to be fought for the Allies, an action that will decide whether they are to remain penned up, locked in on the Heraclean Chersonese, or to press forward into the interior of the country. Advantageous for the Russians is the narrow front on which the Allies must operate here. If the Russians were beaten here and their position taken, nothing would remain for them but to fall back on the Belbek and hold this line against the Allies, while a detached corps on the Alma kept the Turks at bay. Even if beaten here, their superiority in cavalry and the poor means of transport, which do not allow the Allies to subsist at a greater dis-

tance from the coast, would permit them to withdraw out of the Allies’ reach. Their line of retreat would lie on the prolongation of their left wing, which is certainly a very unfavourable position. It is likely, however, that the Russians will attempt from the outset to occupy the Allies on the Chernaya, but to throw their main force upon Omer Pasha, in order to surround and crush him with cavalry, and then to turn with their entire force against the Anglo-French.