Friedrich Engels

The European War

Written about 29 January 1855.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 4316 of 17 February 1855, leading article]

As the date for the opening of the new conference at Vienna draws nearer, the chances of any concessions on the part of Russia vanish in a nebulous and most uncertain distance. The brilliant success of this grand diplomatic coup, the Czar’s prompt acceptance of the proposed basis of negotiations, places him, for the moment at least, in a dominating position, and makes it certain that, under whatever pretexts he may accede to the peace proposals, the only real basis on which he will now consent to settle the dispute is essentially that of the status quo. By accepting the four points, he has thrown Austria back into an ambiguous position, while he holds Prussia on leading-strings and gains time to throw his entire reserves and new troop formations to the frontier before hostilities can commence.

The mere fact that negotiations have been agreed upon at once sets free as many Russian soldiers of the army of observation on the Austrian frontier as can be replaced in two months or ten weeks – that is to say, at least 60,000–80,000 men. As the whole of the former Danubian army has ceased to exist as such, the 4th Corps having been in the Crimea since the end of October, the 3rd Corps having arrived there in the last days of December, and the remainder of the 5th Corps, together with cavalry and reserves, now being on the way thither, these troops on the Bug and the Dniester must be replaced by fresh troops drawn from the Western Army in Poland, Volhynia, and Podolia. Consequently, if the war is transferred to the centre of the continent, a delay of two or three months is of the utmost importance for Russia. For at the present moment, the forces scattered along the long line from Kalisch to Ismail are no longer capable, without reinforcements, of resisting the growing numbers of the Austrian troops confronting them. Russia has now gained this time, and we proceed to set forth the present state of her military preparations.

On previous occasions we have briefly delineated the Russian military organisation. The great active army destined to operate against the south and west of Europe originally consisted of six army corps of 48 battalions each, two corps of picked troops, each 36 battalions strong, together with a proportionately large number of cavalry, regular and irregular, and artillery. As we have already reported, the government not only called in the reserves to form the fourth, fifth, and sixth battalions of the picked troops, and the fifth and sixth of the other six army corps, but, by new levies, even the seventh and eighth battalions were formed in each regiment, so that the number of battalions for the six line corps was doubled, and for the picked troops (Guards and Grenadiers) more than doubled. These forces may now be approximately estimated as follows:

Guards and Grenadiers –  
the first four battalions per regiment  
96 battalions of 900 men  
86,400  

Guards and Grenadiers –  
the last four battalions per regiment  
96 battalions of 700 men  
67,200  

1st and 2nd Corps (not yet engaged) –  
the first or active four battalions per regiment  
96 battalions of 900 men  
86,400  

1st and 2nd Corps –  
the last four battalions per regiment  
96 battalions of 700 men  
67,200  

3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th Corps –  
the active battalions  
192 battalions of 500 men  
96,000  

3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th Corps –  
the last four battalions per regiment  
192 battalions of 700 men  
134,400  

Corps of Finland  
16 battalions of 900 men  
14,400  

Total number  
784  
552,000  

To this must be added:  

Cavalry, regular  
80,000  

Cavalry, irregular  
46,000  

Artillery  
80,000  

Total  
758,000  

Some of these estimates may appear high, but in reality they are not. The enormous recruiting carried out since the beginning of the war ought, notwithstanding the losses sustained, which all fell upon the 96 active battalions of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Corps, to have swollen the ranks of the army to an even greater extent, but we have amply deducted for the recruits who die before reaching their regiments. Moreover, our estimate regarding the cavalry is very low.

Of the above-mentioned troops, 8,000 men (one division of the 5th Corps) are in the Caucasus and must consequently be subtracted; for we are here leaving out of account the forces employed outside Europe. The remaining 750,000 men are distributed roughly as follows: On the shores of the Baltic Sea, the Baltic Army under General Sievers, composed of the Finland Corps and the reserves of the Guards, Grenadiers, and the 6th Corps, together with cavalry and artillery, approximately 135,000 men; a part of them, however, may be regarded as still undrilled recruits and scarcely organised battalions. In Poland and along the frontier of Galicia, from Kalisch to Kamenets, the Guards, Grenadiers, the 1st Corps, one division of the 6th Corps, and some reserves of the Grenadiers and the 1st Corps, together with cavalry and artillery, approximately 235,000 men. This army is the finest part of the Russian troops; it contains the picked troops and the best of the reserves. In Bessarabia and between the Dniester and Bug are two divisions of the 2nd Corps, and part of its reserves, approximately 60,000 men. These formed a part of the Army of the West, but after the Danubian army was sent to the Crimea, they were detached to take its place. They now face the Austrian troops in the Principalities under the command of General Panyutin. For the defence of the Crimea are destined, under Menshikov’s command: the 3rd and 4th Corps, one division of the 5th Corps, two divisions of the 6th Corps, and some reserves already there, besides one division each of the 2nd and 5th Corps on the march; the whole, together with cavalry and artillery, forms a force that can hardly be estimated at less than 170,000 men. The remainder of the reserves and of the new formations, particularly of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, is now being organised into a great reserve army by General Cheodayev. They are concentrated in the interior of Russia and must number about 150,000 men. How many of these march to Poland or the south, it is of course impossible to say.

Thus, the Emperor Nicholas, who last summer counted fewer than 500,000 men on the western frontier of his empire, from Finland to the Crimea, has now stationed 600,000 men there, besides a reserve of 150,000 men being formed in the interior of the country. In spite of this, he is now weaker vis-à-vis Austria than he was then. In August or September there stood in Poland and Podolia 270,000 Russians, and on the Pruth and Dniester the Danubian army, numbering about 80,000 men; the latter was kept there more on account of the Austrians than for anything else. That makes, in all, 350,000 men who could have operated against Austria. Now there are, as we have seen, only 295,000 men concentrated along the Austrian outpost line, while Austria now has 320,000 men directly opposed to them, and, to support them, 70,000–80,000 men in Bohemia and Moravia. This momentary numerical inferiority on the Russian side, as well as the great uncertainty that, at this season of the year, new formations will arrive in time from the interior of the country—and in a country where the whole administration is corrupt—are completely sufficient reasons for the Russian government to try to gain as much time as possible. Such a numerical inferiority renders the Russians incapable of offensive operations, and in an open country like Poland, without large river lines between the two armies, this is tantamount to the necessity of retreating to a tenable position at the first engagement. In this particular case it means splitting the Russian army into two parts, one of which would have to retire upon Warsaw, the other upon Kiev; between these two halves would lie the impassable morasses of the Polesie, which extend from the Bug (not the southern Bug, but a tributary of the Vistula) to the Dnieper. Indeed, it would be a greater piece of luck than the Russians usually have in such cases, if a large number escaped being driven into these swamps. Thus, even without a battle, the greater part of southern Poland, Volhynia, Podolia, Bessarabia, the region from Warsaw to Kiev and Kherson would have to be evacuated. On the other hand, a superior Russian army could just as easily, without risking a decisive battle, expel the Austrians from Galicia and Moldavia and seize the passes to Hungary; the consequences of such a result can easily be imagined. In fact, in such a war as that between Austria and Russia, the first successful offensive movement is of the greatest importance for each party, and each will do its utmost to establish itself first on the territory of the other.

We have often said that this war would not possess the military interest usually attributed to European wars, until Austria declared herself against Russia. Even the combats in the Crimea are nothing but a great war on a small scale. The enormous marches of the Russians, the sufferings of the Allies, have reduced the belligerent armies to such an extent that no really great battle has been fought. What are these encounters where only 15,000 to 20,000 men are brought into action on each side? What strategic operations of really scientific interest can take place within the small space from Chersonesus to Bakhchisarai? And even there, whatever may happen, the troops never suffice to occupy the whole line. The interest consists more in what is not done than in what is done. For the rest, anecdote is staged in place of history.

It will, however, be a different matter when the two great armies now facing each other on the Galician frontier come into action. Whatever intentions and abilities the commanders may have, the sheer size of the armies and the nature of the terrain admit of no sham war and no irresolution. Rapid concentrations, forced marches, stratagems and turning movements of the grandest kind, changes of operational bases and lines—in truth, manoeuvring and fighting on a large scale and according to truly military principles will here become a necessity and a matter of course. Then the commander who allows himself to be influenced by political considerations, or who acts with lack of resolution, will lose his army. On such a scale and in such a country, war at once takes a serious and earnest turn. That would, if it breaks out, make a Russo-Austrian war one of the most interesting events since 1815.

As regards the prospect of peace, that is by no means so clear as it seemed a few weeks ago. If the Allies are prepared to put an end to the struggle substantially on the conditions of the status quo, peace might come about; but how little hope there is of that we need not explain to our readers. Certainly we cannot expect that Russia—since half of Germany is, at least morally, acting in its favour, and after it has raised the huge armies whose strength we have set forth above—will agree to any conditions which France and England are likely to propose or approve. To the almost uninterrupted series of advantageous peace treaties, from Peter the Great to the Peace of Adrianople, there will now hardly succeed a treaty that gives up the mastery of the Black Sea, even before Sevastopol has been taken and only one third of the Russian forces have been engaged. If, however, peace cannot be concluded before the fall of Sevastopol or before the Allied expedition is fully developed, it will be less probable once the Crimean campaign has been decided. If Sevastopol falls, Russia’s honour—if the Allies are defeated and driven into the sea, their honour will not permit them to conclude an agreement until more decisive results have been achieved. Had the preparations for the conference been accompanied by an armistice, as we hinted when we learned that the Tsar had accepted the Four Points, there would have been reason to continue to entertain hopes of peace; but under present circumstances we must admit that a great European war is much more probable.