Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels

I

["Neue Oder-Zeitung" Nr. 385, 20 August 1855]

London, 17 August. The English-French war against Russia will unquestionably always figure in the history of warfare as “the inconceivable war.” Grandiloquence combined with the pettiest action, enormous preparations and meaningless results, caution bordering on timidity, followed by recklessness born of ignorance, more than mediocrity in the generals coupled with more than bravery in the troops, defeats following upon victories won through misunderstandings, as if by design, armies ruined by negligence and saved again by the strangest accident – a great ensemble of contradictions and inconsequences. And this characterises the Russians almost as much as their enemies. If the English have destroyed a model army through the maladministration of civilian officials and the sluggish incapacity of the officers; if the French have exposed themselves to useless dangers and had to endure enormous losses, solely because Louis-Napoleon affected to direct the war from Paris, the Russians have suffered similar losses through maladministration and foolish, but peremptory orders from Petersburg. The military talent of Emperor Nicholas has, ever since the Turkish war of 1828/29, been most carefully “suppressed” even by his most servile eulogists. If the Russians can point to Todleben, who is no Russian, they have, on the other hand, Gortschakow and [other] … ows, who in no respect fall short of the Saint-Arnauds and Raglans in incapacity.

One would think that, at least now, when so many heads are occupied in devising plausible plans for attack and defence, with such daily swelling masses of troops and material, some overwhelming idea must be brought to birth. But nothing of the kind. The war crawls forward, but its longer duration only helps to extend the space over which it is waged. The more new theatres of war are opened, the less happens on each of them. We now have six of them: the White Sea, the Baltic, the Danube, the Crimea, the Caucasus and Armenia. What happens over this astonishing extent of territory can be told in the space of a column.

Of the White Sea the Anglo-French wisely say nothing at all. Here they have only two possible military aims: to prevent the coastal and other trade of the Russians in these waters and, if possible, to take Archangel. The former has been attempted, but only partially; the allied squadrons, both last year and this, always arrived too late and then sailed away too early. The second object – the capture of Archangel – has never been undertaken. Instead of pursuing this, their real task, the blockading squadron has dissipated itself in desultory attacks on Russian and Lapp villages and the destruction of the petty belongings of destitute fishermen. This disgraceful procedure is excused by English correspondents on the grounds of the peevish irritation of a squadron which feels itself incapable of doing anything serious! What a defence!

On the Danube nothing happens. The delta of this river is not even cleared of the robbers who render it unsafe. Austria holds the key to the gate that leads from this side into Russia, and she seems determined to keep it fast.

In the Caucasus all is quiet. The formidable Circassians, like all wild and independent mountaineers, appear to be fully satisfied with the withdrawal of the Russian mobile column from their valleys and to have no desire to descend into the plain, except for plundering forays. They know how to fight only on their own territory, and, moreover, the prospect of annexation to Turkey seems by no means to inspire them.

In Asia, Turkey appears as she essentially is – her army here fully mirrors the decaying condition of the empire. It was necessary to call the Frankish Giaour to aid; but the Franks could do nothing here except throw up fieldworks. All their attempts to force the troops into a civilised mode of warfare failed utterly. The Russians have invested Kars and seem prepared to attack it regularly. It is difficult to discover a chance of relieving the town, unless Omer Pasha lands at Batum with 20,000 men and falls upon the Russian flank. It remains inconceivable, and in no way flattering to the Russians, that they have acted with such hesitation and caution towards so ill-disciplined an enemy, while 20,000–30,000 good troops stood at their own disposal. Whatever successes they may achieve in this theatre of war, the result can at most be the capture of Kars and Erzerum, for a march on Constantinople through Asia Minor is entirely out of the question. The war in Asia therefore possesses, for the time being, a more local interest, and since, given the inaccuracy of the existing maps, it is hardly possible to form a correct tactical or strategic judgment at a distance, we shall not enter further into it. There remain the two principal theatres of war, the Crimea and the Baltic.

II

["Neue Oder-Zeitung" Nr. 387, 21 August 1855]

London, 18 August. In the Crimea the siege drags on drowsily. Throughout the whole month of July, the French and English have been working on their new approaches against the Redan and Malachow, and although we continually heard that they had drawn “quite close” to the Russians, we now learn that on 4 August the head of the sap was no closer to the Russian main ditch than 115 metres, and perhaps not even that close. It is certainly gratifying to see hotspur Pélissier driven to the admission that his “system of assaults” has failed and that regular siege works must break the path for his columns. Nonetheless, it remains a peculiar mode of warfare to let 200,000 men lie quietly in their tents and, while awaiting the completion of the trenches, die in the meantime of cholera and fever. If the Chernaya is impassable, given the impregnable Russian position on the other side – as the Paris papers assert – an expedition to Eupatoria by sea and an attempt to force the Russians into the open field on that side, and to ascertain their real strength and the state of their resources, might still produce something advantageous. As things stand, the Turkish, Sardinian and, in part, the French and English armies are reduced to the role of passive spectators. A large part of them could therefore be employed in diversions. The only diversions, however, of which we learn, are performed at Astley’s Amphitheatre, in Surrey Gardens and Cremorne Gardens, where every evening, amid the storm of applause from patriotic Cockneys <a nickname for Londoners>, the Russians suffer frightful defeats.

The Russians must at this moment have received all their reinforcements and reached the maximum of their strength for the time to come. The English are sending out a few more regiments, the French have dispatched 10,000–15,000 men, more are to follow, and in all some 50,000–60,000 fresh troops are to be added to the allied forces in the Crimea. Moreover, the French government has registered or purchased a large number of river steamers (variously given as from 50 to 100), all of which are to be employed in an expedition in the Black Sea. Whether they are intended for the Sea of Azov or for entering the Dnieper and the Bug, where Ochakov, Kinburn, Kherson and Nikolayev would offer objects of attack, remains to be seen. We have earlier prepared our readers for the likelihood that towards the middle of August bloody encounters would take place, as by that time the Russians, after receiving their reinforcements, would again seize the initiative. <See the present volume, pp. 373/374> They did indeed, under General Liprandi, make a sortie against the French and Sardinians posted at the Chernaya, and were repulsed with heavy loss. The loss of the Allies is not stated and must therefore have been very considerable. More than telegraphic reports are required to enter more closely into this affair.

Finally, in the Baltic, “a great blow has been struck.” A great blow has been struck! See the English press. Bombardment of Sweaborg! Destruction of Sweaborg! All the earthworks and other works lie in ruins! In fact, Sweaborg has ceased to exist! Glorious triumph of the Allies! The fleet is in an indescribable state of enthusiasm! And now let us look at the fact itself. The allied fleets, 6 ships of the line, 4 or 5 large frigates (blockships) and about 30 mortar vessels and gunboats, sailed from Reval to Sweaborg on 7 August. On the 8th they took up their positions. The shallow-draught squadrons passed over the sandbanks and rocks to the west of the fortress, where larger ships cannot pass, and stationed themselves, it appears, at a long range from the islands on which Sweaborg is situated. The large ships remained outside, and, as far as we can judge, outside the range of the fortress works. Then the gunboats and mortar vessels opened their fire. Direct fire seems not to have been attempted, but merely bomb-throwing at the highest elevation the guns would allow. The bombardment lasted 45 hours. A certain amount of damage was done, which it is, however, impossible to estimate without detailed reports from both sides. The arsenal and various powder magazines (evidently smaller ones) were destroyed. The “town” of Sweaborg (so far as we know, only a few houses, inhabited by people employed by the fleet or fortress works) was burned down. The damage inflicted on the fortifications themselves can only be insignificant, for the fleets, as both admirals declare, counted not a single man killed, only a few wounded, and no loss whatever in their material. The best proof that they kept on the safe side; and, this being the case, they could indeed bombard but could not act by direct fire, by which alone fortifications can be destroyed. Dundas, far more decent and restrained in his dispatch than the French admiral (at least according to their wording in the Moniteur, which may have been coloured in Paris), admits that the damage done is confined, of the seven islands forming Sweaborg, to the three situated to the west of the main entrance channel to the bay of Helsingfors. No attack on the main entrance appears to have been even attempted. The large ships seem to have looked on idly, and the decisive act in such an attack, the landing of troops to seize and destroy the works, was not so much as contemplated. Thus the damage falls exclusively on stores and magazines, i.e. on easily replaceable things. If the Russians strain time and means, Sweaborg can be in as good a condition within three weeks as it ever was. Militarily speaking, it has suffered not at all, and the whole business boils down to an act whose material results are hardly worth the cost of production and which was undertaken partly because the Baltic fleet must have done something before returning home, partly because Palmerston wished to close the parliamentary session with a firework display. Unfortunately for this purpose it occurred 24 hours too late. That is the glorious destruction of Sweaborg by the allied fleets. We shall return to this subject as soon as detailed reports are to hand.