Friedrich Engels 
The great event of the war 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4519, 13. Oktober 1855 

The great event of the war. 

The details of the successful general assault at Sevastopol, on the 8th ult, 
are now fully known to us, through the official reports of the allied 
commanders, and the correspondence of the European journals, the most 
5 important of which have already occupied a place in our paper. Of 
course these interesting statements have been read quite universally, and 
it is not necessary that we should recapitulate the facts they contain. 
What we desire to do is to give our readers a clear idea of the conditions 
under which the assault took place, and to explain why, on that occasion, 
10 the Allies met with such opposite results at different points of the attack. 
According to Gen. Niel, the French had pushed their trenches at all 
points quite close to the Russian works. Opposite the Little Redan of the 
Careening bay (Bastion No. 1), and the Malakoff (Bastion No. 2), the 
head of the sap was no more than twenty-five yards distant from the 
15 Russian ditch. At the Flagstaff, (Bastion No. 4,) the distance was thirty; 
at the Central, (Bastion No. 5,) forty yards. On all these points, there- 
fore, the storming columns were close to the works to be stormed. The 
English, on the other hand, had given up sapping as soon as they had 
arrived at 240 yards from the Great Redan (Bastion No. 3). This was due 
20 to the spirit of routine still predominant in the English army. As soon as 
they had pushed their trenches to that distance, they found that on going 
any further they would be enfiladed from the Flagstaff bastion, which 
projects a good deal beyond the other Russian works. Now, there is a 
general rule in the theory of sieges not to trace any portion of the trench- 
25 es so that its prolongation will meet any point occupied by the enemy, 
as this would lay it open to enfilading fire. 
This is of course right enough when one can do without such faulty 
tracing. But here, where this enfilading fire could not be avoided (the 

Friedrich Engels 

general plan of the siege and the nature of the ground precluding the idea 
of taking the Flagstaff bastion separately beforehand), it was evidently 
better to make faulty trenches than none at all. The theoretical rules in 
fact provide plenty of remedies for such an unavoidable evil. Traverses 
and the compound sorts of sap are prescribed in such acase. The French 5 
engineer officers, it seems, remonstrated with their English comrades, 
telling them that, although they might lose many men in pushing their 
trenches under such adverse circumstances, yet it was better to lose them 
now in completing a work which would all but secure the success of an 
assault, than to lose them during an assault, the result of which might be 10 
very doubtful from the want of covered approaches. But the British en- 
gineers knew better. The result shows them to have been grossly in the 
wrong. 

The French general distributed his forces as follows: Against the key of 
the whole position, the Malakoff, M'Mahon's division; to its right, 15 
against the curtain connecting it with Bastion No. 1, the division of La 
Motterouge; on the extreme right, against Bastion No. 1 itself, Dulac's 
division. The Malakoff being the only point which, in case of serious 
resistance, it was necessary to force at all risks, M'Mahon had for his 
reserve a division of Guards under Mellinet. So much for the French 20 
attack on the Karabelnaya side. On the town-side, the Flagstaff bastion 
forming a sort of advanced citadel on very strong ground, and having 
interior works of considerable strength, was not to be immediately at- 
tacked in front; but the Central bastion was to be assaulted by Le Vail- 
lant's division, which, in case of success, was to be followed up by d'Au- 25 
temarre's division, ordered to turn the gorge of the Flagstaff bastion, to 
assail which in front, at that moment, Cialdini's Piedmontese brigade was 
concentrated in the trenches. The position between the Malakoff and the 
Flagstaff bastion was held by the English. They were to attack the Re- 
dan. 30 

The Malakoff was to be assailed first, and after its capture, the re- 
maining columns were to advance on their respective objects of attack. 
The Malakoff was a large redoubt on the top of the commanding hill of 
that name, closed on all sides, but having wide apertures to the rear for 
admitting reénforcements. It was connected by a curtain with the Great 35 
and Little Redans to its right and left; they, too, were closed redoubts, 
containing smaller works, intended for réduits; while the rear faces, the 
embrasures of which looked into the interior of the redoubts, formed a 
coupure. The gorges of these coupures were again connected with the 
Malakoff by a second or interior curtain, forming a second line of de- 40 
fense. The interior of the Great and Little Redans was pretty free from 

The great event of the war 

obstructions, and therefore completely commanded by the artillery of the 
coupures and réduits. But the Malakoff redoubt, on which the fire of the 
enemy had been concentrated ever since the Mamelon was taken, was 
crammed, alongside the ramparts, with hollow traverses, affording 
5 bomb-proof shelter to the gunners and troops on duty, while the interior 
was filled with large blockhouses, roofed bomb-proof, serving as bar- 
racks, and completely unfit for defense. When first the news of the taking 
of the Malakoff arrived, we stated that undoubtedly the Russians had 
committed the same error as in the construction of the Kamtchatka re- 
10 doubt on the Mamelon, viz: that in order to save themselves from the 
enemy's fire, they evidently had made the interior of the fort unfit for 
defense against an assault, by cutting it up into small compartments. Our 
opinion is now fully borne out. The labyrinth of the Malakoff, like that 
of the Mamelon, proved quite indefensible; in ten minutes it was taken, 
15 never to be recaptured. 

The arrangements of the French for this assault on the Malakoff were 
admirable. Everything was foreseen and provided for. A new sort of 
bridges, the description of which is not forthcoming, was used to cross 
the ditch; they were laid down in less than a minute. No sooner had the 

20 assault commenced than the sappers constructed a flying sap from the 
trenches to the ditch, cut large passages through the Russian breast- 
works, filled up the ditch opposite, and formed a practicable road into 
the interior of the Malakoff redoubt by which supports, reserves and 
even field guns could move up. As soon as the whole of the redoubt was 

25 taken, the passages in the gorge were rapidly closed, embrasures cut, 
field-guns brought up, and in a couple of hours, before the Russians 
could seriously attempt to reconquer the work, it was completely turned 
against them, and they came too late. Gunners were ready to spike the 
guns if necessary, and the detachments of infantry carried short-handled 

30 trenching-tools in their waist-belts. 

This attack was under the immediate superintendence of Marshal Pé- 
lissier and Gen. Niel. Whether the other attacks were equally well organ- 
ized we are not told; but they were generally unsuccessful, and that of 
the Central bastion especially. This assault seems to have been under- 

35 taken by Gen. de Salles with quite insufficient forces, for as soon as the 
French arrived at the Russian parapet they were compelled to seek shel- 
ter "behind it; the assault degenerated into a skirmishing fire, and was 
necessarily repulsed. What this means Gen. Simpson has taken good care 
to show us in his assault on the Redan. The attack on the Little Redan 

40 was most bloody, and the position well defended by the Russians, who 
here alone defeated five French brigades. 

Friedrich Engels 

We have on former occasions noticed the absurd system prevalent in 
the British army, of forming their storming columns so weak that they 
can but count as forlorn hopes in case they meet with anything like 
serious resistance. That blunder was conspicuous in Lord Raglan's plan 
of attack on the 18th of June; and it seems Gen. Simpson was determined 5 
even to outdo his late chief. The salient angle of the Redan had suffered 
from the English fire, and it was determined to direct the assault against 
this portion as soon as the Malakoff should be fully secured by the 
French. Accordingly, Gen. Simpson had storming parties told off from 
the second and light divisions, amounting, all in all, to about 1,800 10 
men—or the half of two brigades! The other two brigades of these divi- 
sions were to act as supports, and the third and fourth divisions were to 
form the reserves; and beside these, the Guards and Highland divisions 
were on the spot—altogether a force of 25,000 men; and out of these the 
actual assault was confided to about 1,800, supported later on by about 15 
2,000 more! Now, these 1,800 men, unlike the French, who could jump 
out of their trenches into the Russian ditch, had to perform a journey of 
250 yards across open ground, exposed to the flanking fire from the 
curtains of the Redan. They fell in heaps, but they advanced, passed the 
ditch by escalade, penetrated into the salient angle, and here they found 20 
themselves at once opposed to a tremendous fire of grape and musketry 
from the coupure and réduits in the rear of the Redan. The consequence 
was that they dispersed, seeking shelter behind the traverses, and com- 
menced firing on the Russians exactly as the French did at the Central 
bastion. This would not have done any harm, had the supports and 25 
reserves only advanced and followed up, in close attack, the advantages 
already gained. But hardly a man came, and those who came, came in 
driblets and irregularly. Three times Brigadier Wyndham, who command- 
ed, sent officers to ask for the advance of troops in regular formation, 
but none were brought. All the three officers were wounded in crossing 30 
the plain. At last he went himself, and prevailed upon Gen. Codrington 
to send another regiment; when all at once the British troops gave way, 
and abandoned the Redan. The Russian supports had come up, and 
swept the place clean out. Then Father Simpson, who still had 20,000 
men intact, resolved to attempt another assault next morning! 35 

This feeble attack of the English on the Redan stamps their Crimean 
generals with the indelible mark of incapacity. They appear to have an 
innate tendency to surpass each other in blundering. Balaklava and In- 
kermann were great feats in that respect; but the 18th of June and the 8th 
of September, outstrip them by far. So carelessly was the assault ar- 40 
ranged that while the English held the salient of the Redan, not even the 

The great event of the war 

guns found in it were spiked, and therefore these very guns plied the 
English on their retreat as lustily with grape and case-shot as they had 
done during their advance. As to attempts at forcing a proper lodgment, 
neither Simpson nor the newspaper correspondents mention any such 
thing. In fact the first precautions appear to have been neglected. 

The attacks on the Redan, Central bastion and Little Redan were, it is 
true, mere demonstrations to a certain degree. But the attack on the 
Redan still had an importance of its own. That was a position by which 
the conquest of the Malakoff became immediately decisive, because if the 
10 Malakoff commands the Redan by its hight, the Redan commands the 

access to the Malakoff, and when once taken, would have taken in flank 

all Russian columns marching to recapture that hill. The conquest of the 

Malakoff induced the Russians to quit the whole of the south side; the 

conquest of the Redan would have obliged them to evacuate at least the 
15 Karabelnaya in haste, and before they could organize that well-arranged 

system of destruction by fire and explosion under shelter of which they 
made good their retreat. The English, then, have actually failed to do 
what their allies had a right to expect from them, and on a very impor- 
tant point, too. And not only have the generals failed, but the soldiers, 
20 too, were not what they had formerly been. Mostly young lads recently 
arrived in the Crimea, they were too eager to look out for shelter, and to 
fire instead of attacking with the bayonet. They lacked discipline and 
order; the different regiments got mixed, the officers lost all control, and 
thus the machine was out of train in a few minutes. Yet it must be 
25 acknowledged that, for all that, they held out in the Redan for nearly two 
hours in dogged, passive resistance while no support was coming up; but 
then we are not accustomed to see the British infantry sink down to the 
level of the Russians, and seek their only glory in passive bravery. 
The palm of the day belongs to Generals Bosquet and M'Mahon. 
30 Bosquet commanded the whole of the French assault on the right, and 
M'Mahon had the division which took and held the Malakoff. This was 
one of those rare days in which the French really out-did the English in 
the point of bravery. In every other point they had shown their superior- 
ity over them long before. Are we, then, to conclude that the English 
35 army has degenerated, and that its infantry cannot boast any longer of 
being, in close order, the first infantry of the world? It would be pre- 
mature to say so; but certainly, of all men in the world, the British 
generals in the Crimea are the best fitted to ruin the physical and moral 
character of the army; and on the other hand, the raw material for sol- 
40 diers which has now been for some time introduced into the ranks, is far 
inferior to what it used to be. The British people had better look to this; 

Nn 

Friedrich Engels 

two defeats in three months form a novel feature in British military his- 
tory. 

Of the Russians we can only say that they fought with their accus- 
tomed passive bravery, and in the assault made to retake the Malakoff 
even displayed great active courage. What their tactical arrangements 5 
were, we have no means of judging until their report is published. One 
thing is certain, namely, that the Malakoff was completely taken by sur- 
prise. The garrison were enjoying their dinner, and not any portion of 
them, except the artillery at the guns, appear to have been under arms 
and ready to meet an attack. 10 

If we now look at what has been done since the taking of the south 
side, we find from Gorchakoff s reports that 20,000 allied troops (of 
what nation is not said) have gone to Eupatoria, and that at the same 
time strong reconnoitering parties are pushed against the Russian left in 
the valley of Baidar, where the Russian advanced troops were compelled 15 
to retire toward Urkusta, in the direction of the valley of the upper 
Chulin, another tributary to the Chernaya. The corps of 30,000 men, 
now at Eupatoria, are rather weak, and could not venture to any great 
distance from the place. But others may follow. At all events, field op- 
erations have commenced, and another fortnight must decide whether the 20 
Russians can hold their ground, or whether they must leave the whole of 
the Crimea a prey to the Allies.