[Debates on Prussia in the House of Lords]

["Neue Oder-Zeitung" No. 141 of March 24, 1855]

London, March 21. In yesterday’s sitting of the House of Lords, Lord Lyndhurst, the old colleague of Liverpool and Castlereagh, brought forward his long-announced motion “on the relation of Prussia to the Vienna Conference”. Two circumstances, he remarked, had recently lent new interest to this question: The message of the dying Emperor of Russia to the Prussian court, the manifesto of Alexander II, in which he promises to complete the policy of Peter, Catherine, Alexander and his father. How Russia itself interprets Prussian policy may be seen from the following extracts from a secret dispatch which Pozzo di Borgo addressed to Nesselrode shortly before the outbreak of the war of 1828/29. It reads, among other things:

“If Russia resorts to coercive measures against Turkey, there is every reason to believe that Prussia will in no way oppose it, but, on the contrary, Prussia’s attitude, at once free and friendly, will act as a powerful hindrance on other states and bring them to accept results corresponding to the dignity and interests of Russia. It will be necessary to draw the Berlin Cabinet into this confidence to a certain extent and to convince it that the role we assign to Prussia will contribute to increasing the happy intimacy between the two sovereigns and the two courts.”

Was it possible, Lyndhurst exclaims, to anticipate in a more prophetic spirit the direction which the Prussian court has pursued in the last 6 or 12 months? Prussia has, indeed, co-signed the protocols of December 5, January 13 and April 9. The purpose of these protocols was to bring about the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities and to obtain guarantees for the protection of the Sultan’s independence and the integrity of Turkey. Has the Prussian court acted in accordance with this purpose? On the occasion of the loan of 30 million thalers for military operations, Baron Manteuffel declared: Prussia has expressed its opinion on Russian policy in the above-mentioned protocols to the effect that a great wrong has been committed; but it does not consider itself obliged to go further and participate actively. Is this the language of a great nation? And is Prussia not expressly obliged to protect Turkey by the treaties of 1840 and 1841? Baron Manteuffel added that the independence of Germany or German interests were not involved in the dispute and that Prussia was therefore not obliged to make any sacrifices. However, Baron Manteuffel himself stated the contrary in another document. Moreover, once the Tsar seizes Constantinople, it will be superfluous to speak any further of German independence and German interests. They would then have to submit to a predominant power. After Lord Lyndhurst then also alluded to the dismissal of the Minister of War Bonin, to the recall of the envoy Bunsen from London, and to the rejection of a reply address by the Prussian Chambers to the Speech from the Throne, he comes “to the second act of this political drama”. After a considerable time had passed, Austria considered it appropriate to demand that Russia evacuate the Danubian Principalities. This demand was drawn up and sent to Berlin for signing. Counter-proposals were sent from Berlin to Vienna, utterly inadequate, but causing loss of time, insofar as they had to be communicated to the Allies for examination. Russia, meanwhile, evacuated the Principalities, but kept a part occupied for military reasons and declared that it intended to remain entirely on the defensive. Prussia then withdrew from the confederation because Russia had met all reasonable demands. From that moment, Prussia did everything to thwart Austria’s plans. To this end, largely with success, it made proposals to the Federal Diet and to the individual German states. At the same time, Russia publicly thanked two German states for their refusal to join the Allies. He (Lyndhurst) now came to the third and last act of the drama. The Allies had fixed a meeting for August 8 in Vienna to decide what was to be demanded of Russia as the basis of any preliminary negotiation. Prussia was given notice in the customary manner, and this was repeated more than once. Prussia did not expressly refuse to attend, but in fact did not appear at the Conference. As a result of its absence, the Allies, instead of drawing up a protocol, signed a note laying down the four points as the basis of future negotiations. These four points were then submitted to Russia for acceptance, which refused to accept them. Prussia, for its part, published and circulated a document in which it raised objections to the four points. It likewise continued to prevent the adhesion of the small German states to the Allies at the Federal Diet and at the individual German courts. After the conclusion of the treaty of December 2, Prussia is informed that room has been left for its adhesion. Prussia refused to join, but declared itself ready to enter into separate similar treaties with France and England. From the moment the latter accepted this proposal, it demanded, in various negotiations and various proposals, countless modifications, which were sure to be rejected by France and England. When he (Lyndhurst) speaks of Prussia, he means official Prussia. He knows that the Prussian nation is, for the great majority, anti-Russian in sentiment. It is incomprehensible how Prussia, after having refused to accede to the treaty of December 2, can demand to be admitted to the Vienna negotiations. He hopes that the allied powers will under no pretext admit a Prussian plenipotentiary. Should the opposite happen, Russia would possess two votes instead of one at the Congress of Vienna. Prussian diplomacy has remained unchanged since Frederick the Great. He recalls 1794, the period shortly before and after the Battle of Austerlitz, etc.

Lord Clarendon: He would confine himself to filling in some gaps regarding the communications that have taken place between England and Prussia. After the Russian Cabinet had rejected the conditions of the Allies, a conference of the respective plenipotentiaries was convened, which could not, however, be held because the representative of the Prussian government refused to attend. Later, the Prussian envoy in London had indeed told him that his government was willing to give its plenipotentiary in Vienna the required permission. He (Clarendon), however, declared: “It is too late.” The correspondence between Prussia and Austria had served Russia. Before the signing of the treaty of December 2, Prussia had already been invited to accede, but in vain. Prussia demanded to be admitted unconditionally to the new conference, because it was a continuation of the earlier conference, which had not yet ended, and from which it had by no means withdrawn. With regard to the latter, the British government referred to the fact that on a previous occasion no conference could be held because Prussia refused to attend, although repeatedly requested. The new conference is also by no means a continuation of the old one, since when Austria in October and November asked France and England to resume them, the reply was that the time for protocols and conferences was over, but that if Austria entered into a war obligation with them, they would see whether peace was feasible. This led to the treaty of December 2. Later, they had been prepared to enter into special treaties with Prussia.

“But to allow Prussia to claim all the privileges without sharing any danger, to admit it unconditionally to a conference which may end in peace, but may also lead to a war on a larger scale, without a declaration of what its intentions or its policy are, without it entering into any direct or eventual engagement with us, without knowing whether it comes to the conference as a neutral, as an enemy, or as a friend – that is absolutely impossible.”

The special missions subsequently sent by Prussia had been received with equal friendliness in London and Paris, but had so far led to nothing. Meanwhile, he did not regard the negotiations as broken off. Only three days before, new proposals had been made. Unfortunately, however, the Vienna Conferences had been opened while Prussia remained excluded by its own act. A great power like Prussia must not remain shut up in narrow German seclusion. They had repeatedly remonstrated against this attitude. The constant answer was that peace was Prussia’s policy. Its policy was, in fact, neither “European, nor German, nor Russian”, more suited to thwarting Austria than to keeping Russia in check. Despite all this, Prussia cannot long persist in isolation as soon as great European interests are at stake. It cannot side with Russia in contradiction to the national feeling in Prussia and Germany. On the side of Russia against Austria, it is well aware that it will fall into dependence on the former. It does not wish to side with Austria. On the contrary, it has adopted an unfriendly attitude towards Austria.

“I say, therefore, that Prussia finds itself in an isolated and false position. This may be gratifying to its enemies, but it is deeply regretted by its allies and the patriots of its own population.”

Finally, he assured, no efforts would be spared to gain Prussia’s cooperation.

In the House of Commons, Lord William Graham interpellated the Prime Minister:

“whether the Austrian envoy had asked Lord Clarendon for an explanation concerning the words uttered by Sir Robert Peel at his re-election, that no settlement of the Eastern Question would be satisfactory without the restoration of Poland and Hungary?”

Lord Palmerston, instead of giving any answer to this question, first congratulated himself that Sir Robert Peel had accepted a post in his administration. As regards Hungary, Austria had long known that England would regard its separation from the Imperial State as a great European calamity, since the Imperial State as a whole body in the centre of Europe is an essential element of the balance of power. As regards Poland – (considerable laughter was here aroused by a slight pause in Palmerston’s answer and the peculiar way in which he resumed his speech) –, it was his view that the Kingdom of Poland, as now constituted and as now possessed, is a continual threat to Germany. However, stipulations for a reconstitution of Poland formed no part of the points about which negotiations are currently taking place in Vienna. Meanwhile, England and France had reserved the right to add, according to circumstances or the events of the war, to the four points on the basis of which negotiations are now being conducted, other stipulations which might seem to them essential for the future security of Europe.