FROM PARLIAMENT 

London, May 29. Gladstones kind of eloquence has never been 
given more complete and exhaustive expression than in_ his 
“speech”* on Thursday evening.? Polished blandness, empty 
profundity, unction not without poisonous ingredients, the velvet 
-paw not without the claws, scholastic distinctions both grandiose 
and petty, quaestiones and quaestiuniculae, the entire arsenal of 
probabilism ' with its casuistic scruples and unscrupulous reservations, its unhesitating motives and motivated hesitation, its humble 
pretensions of superiority, virtuous intrigue, intricate simplicity, 
Byzantium and Liverpool. Gladstone’s speech revolved not. so 
much around the question of war or peace between England and 
Russia as the examination of why Gladstone, who until a short 
while ago had been a member of a Ministry engaged in war, had 
now become the Gladstone of the peace-at-any-price party. He 
analysed, he scrutinised the limits of his own conscience in all 
directions with all manner of subtleties, and with characteristic 
modesty demanded that the British Empire move within the limits 
of the Gladstonian conscience. His speech thus had a diplomaticcum-psychological colouring which may have brought conscience 
into diplomacy, but even more definitely brought diplomacy into 
conscience. 

The war against Russia was originally a just one, but we have 
now reached the point where its continuation would be sinful. 

“ Marx uses the English word.— Ed. 
The speeches of Gladstone and Russell in the debate on Disraeli’s motion 
in the House of Commons on May 24, 1855 were published in The Times, No. 22063, 
May 25, 1855.— Ed. 
“ Minor questions.— Ed. 

Since the start of the Eastern troubles we have gradually raised 
our demands. We have followed an ascending line with our 
conditions, while Russia has been moving down from the heights 
of her intransigence. At first Russia claimed not only a spiritual, 
but also a temporal protection over the Greek Christians of 
Turkey. She was unwilling to give up any of the old treaties, and 
would agree to evacuate the Danubian provinces only under 
certain conditions. She refused to attend any congress of the 
powers at Vienna, and summoned the Turkish ambassador to 
St. Petersburg or to the Russian headquarters. That was Russia’s 
language up to February 2, 1854. What a distance between the 
demands of the Western powers at that time, and the Four 
Points'”*! And as late as August 26, 1854, Russia declared that she 
would never accept the Four Points except after a long, desperate 
and calamitous struggle. Again, what a distance between Russia’s 
language in August 1854 and her language of December 1854, 
when she promised to accept the Four Points “unreservedly”! 
These Four Points are the nodal point to which our demands can 
rise, and Russia’s concessions descend. Whatever lies beyond the 
Four Points lies outside the pale of Christian morality. Well! 
Russia has accepted the Ist point; she has accepted the 2nd point, 
and has not rejected the 4th point, for it has not been discussed. 
That only leaves the 3rd point, i.e. only a quarter, and not even 
the whole of the 3rd point but only a half of it, thus a difference 
of only one-eighth. For the 3rd point consists of two parts: No. 1, 
the guarantee of Turkish territory; No. 2, the reduction of 
Russian power in the Black Sea. Russia has stated that she is more 
or less willing to accept No. 1. So that only leaves the second half 
of the 3rd point. And even here Russia has not said that she 
objects to the limitation of her superiority at sea; she has merely 
declared her opposition to our methods of carrying it out. The 
Western powers have suggested one method, while Russia suggests 
not merely one but two alternative methods, thus here again she is 
ahead of the Western powers. As regards the method proposed by 
the Western powers, it is an affront to the honour of the Russian 
Empire. But one must not affront the honour of an empire 
without reducing its power. On the other hand, one must not 
reduce its power because one is thereby affronting its honour. 
These are different views on “method”, a difference of one-eighth 
of a point, and as it is a matter of “method” it can be regarded as 
1/32 of a point—and for that another half a million men is to be 
sacrificed? On the contrary, it must be stated that we have attained 
the aims of the war. Should we therefore continue it for pure 

prestige, for military glory? Our soldiers have covered themselves 
with glory. If England has nevertheless fallen into discredit on the 
Continent, 

“For God’s sake,” cried the honourable gentleman, “don’t let us seek to avenge 

that discredit—don’t let us wipe it out by human blood, but rather by sending 
abroad more correct information”. 

And, indeed, why not “correct” the foreign newspapers? 
Further successes on the part of the allied forces—where do they 
lead to? They force Russia to resist more stubbornly. Allied 
defeats? They make the Londoners and Parisians excited and 
force them to make bolder attacks. What is the result of waging 
war for war’s sake? Originally Prussia, Austria, France and 
England were united in their demands on Russia. Prussia has 
already withdrawn. If we go on, Austria, too, will withdraw. 
England would be isolated except for France. 

If England continues the war for reasons shared by no other 
power but France, “the moral authority of its position is greatly 
weakened and undermined”. But on the other hand a peace with 
Russia, if it forfeits the prestige that 1s of this world, will strengthen 
its “moral authority”, which neither moth nor rust doth corrupt.* 
Moreover, what do the people want who do not accept Russia’s 
method of carrying out the second half of the 3rd point? Do they 
intend to dismember the Russian Empire? Impossible without 
provoking a “war of the nationalities”. Will Austria, can France 
support a war of the nationalities? If England undertakes a ‘‘war 
of nationalities” it must undertake it alone, i.e. “it will not 
undertake it at all”. So nothing is possible except to demand 
nothing that Russia has not already conceded. 

That was Gladstone’s speech in spirit, if not in letter. Russia has 
changed her language: proof that she has backed down in 
substance. For the honourable Puseyite'” the language is the only 
issue. He too has changed his language. He is now uttering 
jeremiads over the war; he is overwhelmed by the suffering of all 
mankind. He uttered apologias when he tinveighed against the 
Committee of Inquiry and found it quite in order to abandon an 
English army to all the sufferings of death from starvation and the 
plague. Of course! Then the army was being sacrificed for peace. 
The sin begins when it is sacrificed for war. He is, however, 
fortunate in demonstrating that the British government was never 
in earnest in the war against Russia, fortunate in demonstrating 
that neither the present British government nor the present 

“ Matthew 6:20.— Ed. 

French government would be able or willing to wage serious war 
on Russia, fortunate in demonstrating that the pretexts for the war 
are not worth a single bullet. But he forgets that these “pretexts” 
belong to him and his former colleagues, the “war” itself however 
was forced on them by the British people. The leadership of the 
war was for them simply a pretext for paralysing it and 
maintaining their positions. And from the history and metamorphoses of the false pretexts under which they waged war he 
successfully concludes that they could make peace under equally 
false pretexts. He finds himself at variance with his old colleagues 
only on one point. He is Out, they are In.* A false pretext good 
enough for the ex-minister is not a false pretext good enough for 
the minister, although what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the 
gander. 

Gladstone’s terrible confusion of ideas gave Russell the longawaited signal. He got up and painted Russia black where 
Gladstone had painted her white. But Gladstone was “Out” and 
Russell was “In”. After blustering forth all the familiar, and 
despite their triviality, true platitudes about Russia’s plans for 
world conquest, he came to the point, to Russell’s point. Never, he 
declared, had such a great national issue been so totally degraded 
as this had been by Disraeli. True enough: can one degrade a 
national issue, indeed a matter of world history, further than by 
identifying it with little? Johnny, with Johnny Russell? But it was in 
fact not Disraeli’s fault that Europe versus Russia at the beginning 
and end of this first stage of the war appeared as Russell versus 
Nesselrode. The little man performed some odd contortions when 
he came to the Four Points. On the one hand, he had to show that 
his peace terms were related to the Russian horrors he had just 
exposed. On the other hand, he had to show that true to his 
voluntary, unprovoked promise to Titov and Gorchakov, he had 
proposed terms “which harmonised best with the honour of Russia”’. 
Hence he proved, on the one hand, that Russia exists only nominally 
as a naval power, and so can well afford a limitation of this merely 
imaginary power. On the other hand, he proved that the navy, 
scuttled by Russia herself, is a terrible thing for Turkey and hence 
for European equilibrium, i.e. “the second half of the 3rd point” 
formed one great whole. Many a man is caught by his opponent 
between the two horns of a dilemma. Russell impaled himself on 

“Marx uses the English words “Out” and “In” (the reference is to the 
opposition and the government).— Ed. 
° Marx uses the English word.— Ed. 

both horns. He gave new samples of his diplomatic talent. Nothing 
could be expected of Austria’s active alliance because a battle lost 
would bring the Russians to Vienna. This is the way he encourages 
an ally. 

“We say,” he continued, “that Russia intends to get possession of Constantinople, and to rule there, as Turkey is obviously in a state of decay; and I do not doubt 
that Russia harbours the same opinion of the intentions of England and France in the 
case of the break-up of that country.” 

All that was lacking was for him to add: “She is wrong, 
however. Not England and France, but England alone must take 
possession of Constantinople.” In this way the great diplomat 
encouraged Austria to take sides; thus he betrayed to Turkey the 
“obvious” opinion of her saviours and supporters. He _ has, 
however, improved as a parliamentary tactician on one count. In 
July 1854, when he was bragging about the seizure of the Crimea, 
he let himself be so startled by Disraeli that he ate his heroic 
words before the House divided. This tume he postponed this 
process of self-consumption—the retraction of his proclaimed 
world struggle against Russia—until after the vote had been taken. 
A great improvement! 

His speech also contained two_ historical illustrations, his 
extremely comical account of the negotiations with Emperor 
Nicholas over the Treaty of Kainardji,'” and a sketch of German 
conditions. Both deserve a mention in extract. As the reader will 
remember, Russell had conceded Russia’s protection at the outset, 
based on the Treaty of Kainardji. The British ambassador in 
Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, turned out to be more 
awkward and more sceptical. He made inquiries of the Russian 
government, the story of which Russell is naive enough to recount 
as follows: 

“Sir Hamilton Seymour asked the late Emperor of Russia to have the goodness 
to point out the part of the Treaty [...] upon which the right he claimed was founded. 
His Imperial Majesty said [...] ‘I would not point out to you the particular article in the 
treaty on which my claim ” (to protection) “is based. You may go to Count Nesselrode 
and he will show you the article.” Hamilton Seymour did go to Count Nesselrode [...]. 
Count Nesselrode replied he was not very conversant with the articles of the treaty and 
told Hamilton to go to Baron Brunnow or refer his government to him and the Baron 
would tell him what part of the treaty it is which gives the Emperor the right he 
claims.’ I believe Baron Brunnow never attempted to point out any such article in the 
treaty.” 

About Germany the noble Lord related: 

“In Germany she [Russia] is connected with many of the smaller Princes by 
marriage. Many of the Princes of Germany, I am sorry to say, live in great fear of 

what they think the revolutionary disposition of their subjects, and rely on their 
armed forces for protection. But what are those armed forces? The officers of 
those forces are seduced and corrupted by the Russian Court. That Court 
distributes rewards, orders and distinctions among them, and in some cases Russia 
regularly supplies them with money to pay their debts so that Germany which 
ought to be in a state of independence—Germany which should stand forward for 
the protection of Europe against Russian domination—has for years been 
corrupted, and has been undermined in its vital strength and independence, by 
Russian arts and Russian means.” 

And in order to precede Germany like a column of fire and 
rouse it to the “categorical imperative”,’”’ duty, Russell declared 
himself at the Vienna Conference the champion of the “honour and 
dignity of Russia” and let Germany hear the proud language of the 
free and independent Englishman. 

Marked with the sign X