Friedrich Engels

From Sevastopol

Written about 29 June 1855.
Translated from the English.

[“New-York Daily Tribune,” No. 4439 of July 12, 1855]

Contrary to the expectations of the public, the mail of the *Pacific*, which arrived yesterday morning, brings no detailed report of the defeat of the Allies at Sevastopol on the 18th of June. We have, it is true, some bare statements of the numbers of killed and wounded in this battle, which we shall briefly comment upon below. But in place of the expected dispatches we have at least General Pélissier’s detailed report on the capture of the Mamelon and the Quarries. Yet even this is not of such a kind as to demonstrate very precisely the line of military policy of the man who is now de facto commanding the 200,000 allied troops in the Crimea. We must rather trust negative than positive evidence if we wish to arrive at a conclusion on this subject. To guess what Pélissier intends to do, we must look not so much at what he does as at what he omits to do. But let us return to the capture of the Mamelon; it exhibits some features worthy of examination.

The 6th and 7th of June were devoted to a cannonade along the whole line of the allied batteries. But while on the left attack (Flagstaff Bastion to the Quarantine Bastion) this cannonade remained a mere demonstration, it was meant in earnest on the right attack (Redan to Mount Sapun). Here the Russian outworks were subjected to a particularly violent fire. When their fire seemed sufficiently silenced and their defenders sufficiently weakened, the assault was ordered on the evening of the 7th. The French had to take two distinct positions, forming two plateaus, separated from each other by a ravine; the English one plateau with a ravine on each side. The manner in which the two armies prepared for the assault was characteristic of their peculiar aptitudes and traditions. The French brought into action

four divisions, two for each particular attack. Thus two divisions were concentrated against the Green Mamelon (Kamchatka Redoubt) and two others against Mount Sapun; each attack with two brigades in separate columns in front for the assault and two brigades in reserve. Eighteen battalions had therefore to charge and eighteen to support—in all at least 28,000–30,000 men. This disposition corresponds entirely with the regulations and traditions of the French army, which in great charges always attacks in column, and sometimes in ones that are somewhat too unwieldy. The English, if formed in the same way, would have required two divisions for the share of the work falling to them; two brigades for the assault and two for the reserve. But true to their own system, they detached for the charge about 1,000 men, or about two battalions—scarcely half a French brigade. They had, no doubt, strong reserves, but nevertheless employed only one man where the French would have expended three. This is a consequence partly of the British system of attacking in line instead of in column, and partly of the great tenacity of the British soldier in defensive positions. These 1,000 British soldiers were not even all launched at once; first 200 charged and took the Russian works; then another 200 were sent out as reinforcements; the rest followed in the same manner; and then 1,000 British soldiers, once established in the Russian position, held it against six successive attacks and under the constant frontal and enfilading fire of the Russian works. When morning broke, more than half their number were dead or wounded; but the place was theirs, and some of them had here and there pursued the Russians as far as the Redan. This was a feat of arms such as no 1,000 Frenchmen could have achieved. But the passive endurance of the British soldier under fire knows hardly any limit, and when, as on that night, the hand-to-hand fighting takes the form of his favourite diversion, street boxing, he is in his own element and will lay about him at one against six with the greatest pleasure in the world.

As regards the French attack, General Pélissier gives us long enumerations of the brigades and regiments engaged in it, and he has a word of commendation for each of them; but his statements about the respective positions and lines of attack of each column are quite indistinct, while his report on the progress of the action is almost unintelligible, and a statement of the losses is altogether missing. By comparing this official bulletin with other reports we can gather that the French took the Mamelon at the first rush, followed the retreating

Russians as far as the Malakhov Bastion, penetrated here and there, were thrown back by the Russians, lost the Mamelon again, drew up in a semicircle behind it, and after a new assault finally took possession of it. On the other side of the Kilen ravine, the Volhynia Redoubt was carried off with small loss; the struggle for the Selenginsk Redoubt, which lies behind it, was more severe, but not to be compared with that for the Mamelon. In consequence of the excessive number of troops which Pélissier threw upon the points attacked and the unwieldy columns which the French must have thus formed, their loss must have been very considerable. The fact that no official report of it has been given is sufficient to prove this. We should suppose that 1,500–2,000 men are not exaggerated figures.

The Russians had got into peculiar circumstances. They could not garrison these outworks with numerous men, as this would have exposed them to certain annihilation by the enemy’s artillery even before the assault had been attempted. Thus they could hold but a minimum of defenders in these redoubts and had to rely on the commanding fire of their artillery from the Malakhov and the Redan, as well as on the action of their reserves in the fortress. They had two battalions—about 800 men—in the Mamelon. But once the redoubts were taken, they never came back into them to establish themselves properly in them. They discovered that a besieged army can very quickly lose a position, but cannot easily regain it. The Mamelon Redoubt was, moreover, so complicated in its construction—by traverses and blinds, which formed a sort of impromptu casemates—that, although well covered against artillery, its garrison was almost helpless against a storm, each compartment being scarcely sufficient to hold a cannon and a man to serve it. As soon, therefore, as the gun was dismounted, the infantry, intended for the defence of the work against an assault, had no room for a position from which it could act upon the storming columns by simultaneous massed fire. Broken up into small detachments, it succumbed to the impetuosity of the attackers and proved anew that, where it cannot fight in large masses, the Russian infantry equals neither the French in intelligence and quickness of eye nor the English in desperate bulldog courage.

The engagement of the 7th was followed by a ten-day pause, during which approach trenches were completed and connected, positions for batteries laid out, and cannon and ammunition brought up. At the same time two reconnaissances into the interior of the country were undertaken. The first, towards

Baidar, 12 miles from Balaklava, on the road to the south coast, was merely a preliminary one; the second, towards Aitodor, 6 miles across Chorgun on the Chornaya, was undertaken in the right direction. Aitodor lies on the elevated tract of land leading to the valley of the upper Belbek, where alone, as we have long since established <See present volume, pp. 231–235>, the Russian position at Inkerman can be effectively turned. But to send a reconnaissance column there and not to follow this step on the heel by occupying the tract with force and immediately beginning operations—what does that mean, except to give the enemy warning from which side he is threatened? Now it may be that the country around Aitodor proved impassable—but we doubt it; and even in that case the intention of a flank march to turn the enemy would have been too clearly indicated by this manoeuvre. If this flank march could serve merely as a feint, it would be well; but we are convinced that it must be made the main movement, and therefore it should not be pointed to before the Allies really have the intention of undertaking it.

Instead, however, of following up this weak demonstration in the field, General Pélissier tried something quite different. The 18th of June, the day of Waterloo, saw the English and French troops marching shoulder to shoulder to storm the Russian lines on the right attack. The English attacked the Redan, the French the Malakhov. Thus Waterloo was to be avenged; but unfortunately the thing went wrong. They were both beaten back after a terrible butchery. The official lists put their losses at about 5,000, but considering the known lack of veracity in the French statements we are inclined to estimate them 50 per cent higher. Since no details have become known, the tactical features of this battle must for the present be entirely left aside. What we can now take into consideration is its strategic and political nature.

Pélissier is regarded by the whole press of Europe as a man who will not be commanded by the telegraph from Paris, but who acts firmly according to his own judgment. We have had reasons to doubt this particular sort of obstinacy; and the fact of his attempting “magnanimously” to avenge Waterloo, i.e. by a joint victory of the French and the English, confirms our doubt completely. The thought of such a deed could only come from His Majesty, the Emperor of the French—the great devotee of anniversaries,

the man who cannot let the 2nd of December pass in any year without attempting some extraordinary trick; the man who declared before the Chamber of Peers that it was his special vocation to avenge Waterloo. There can be no doubt that Pélissier had the strictest order to celebrate the battle of Waterloo by a brilliant anniversary. The manner in which he carried it out is the only part of the matter for which he is responsible.

The assault on the lines of the Karabelnaya redoubt must, as we are more than ever convinced, be assessed as a gross error. But before we know the man thoroughly, we shall continue to attribute to Pélissier the favour of all those circumstances which, at this distance from the theatre of war, might allow a doubt. Now, it may be that the sanitary conditions on the Heracleatic Chersonese—a matter to which we have long drawn attention—are so bad that a hasty termination of the operations on this small piece of earth would be most desirable. The exhalations of the putrefying corpses of 25,000 men and 10,000 horses are of such a kind that they dangerously affect the health of the army during the summer. Of the other abominations accumulated there we will not speak at all. Perhaps Pélissier thinks that it is possible in a short time to drive the Russians from the south side, completely destroy the place, leave only a few men to guard it, and then take the field with a strong army. We make this supposition because we prefer to see at least some rational motives in the actions of an old soldier. But if that is the case, then he has misjudged the strength of the place. We said earlier that any attempt decisively to follow up the success of the 7th against the town itself would be frustrated <See the present volume, pp. 289/290>; our opinion has been confirmed by events. We said that the key to Sevastopol lay in the north of Inkerman, the engagement of the 18th seems to prove it.

Thus we are ready to admit that General Pélissier was guided by perfectly logical considerations when he preferred an assault on Karabelnaya to an advance in the field; yet we must at the same time admit that people on the spot are very inclined to make minor facts the premises of their conclusions, and that Pélissier seems to have been convicted by the failure on the 18th of having yielded to this weakness; for while it shows strength of character to cling tenaciously to a thing once undertaken, it also shows weakness of intellect,

to pursue that thing by devious ways, only because it has once been begun. Pélissier would be right if he tried to take Sevastopol at all costs; but he is manifestly wrong if he does not see that the shortest route to Sevastopol runs via Inkerman and that the Russian army there defends that position.

If the Allies are not very anxious to profit from their superiority, they will shortly find themselves in a very unpleasant situation. The necessity of reinforcing their forces in the Crimea has long been felt by Russia. The completion of the reserve battalions of the regular army, and the levy and organisation of the Opolchenie into 200 battalions, as well as especially the reduction of the Austrian army of observation to 180,000 men—the remainder being either sent on leave or stationed in the interior of the empire—now offer an opportunity of doing this. Consequently, a reserve army has been formed at Odessa, of which about 25,000 men are said to be stationed at Nikolayev, 12–15 days’ march from Sevastopol. Also two divisions of grenadiers are said to be on the march from Volhynia. By the middle of July, and perhaps earlier, the Russians may therefore have regained their numerical superiority, unless their troops now facing the Allies suffer decisive defeats in the interval. We are indeed informed that a further 50,000 French are marching to Toulon and Marseille for embarkation; but these certainly arrive too late and can do little more than fill the gaps which battle and sickness (now reappearing in the allied camp) cause in the ranks.

The operations in the Sea of Azov have destroyed a source of supply for the Russians; but as the Dnieper, far more than the Don, is the natural gateway for the Russian grain districts, there is no doubt that large quantities of it are in Kherson—more than the Russians in the Crimea need for their sustenance. Hence the transport to Simferopol is not very difficult. Whoever expects from the Azov expedition a serious and immediate effect on the supply of Sevastopol is greatly mistaken.

Although the scale has for some time inclined in favour of the Allies, it can now return to equilibrium or even sink against them. The Crimean campaign is still far from being decided, if the Russians act without delay.