London, March 24. The Press, the organ of Disraeli, last week 
raised a storm in a teacup by maintaining that “Emperor Louis” 
was the only obstacle to the conclusion of peace and had tied 
Austria to himself by a secret “agreement” of which Austria was 
endeavouring to rid itself. Until now the Tories had maintained 
that the Anglo-French alliance was their own handiwork. Had not 
their Lord Malmesbury sealed the union with Bonaparte’? Had 
not Disraeli in Parliament showered sarcasms on Graham and 
Wood, who had wickedly calumniated the coup of December 2 
before their electors? Had not the Tories for two years, in 
speeches and in the press, been the loudest heralds of war? And 
now, suddenly, without transition, entirely without any mitigating 
circumstances, insinuations are made against the French Alliance, 
and caustic remarks about “Emperor Louis” and the homily on 
peace? The Morning Herald, the senile organ of the High Tories, 
uninitiated into the secret of the Party leaders, shook its head 
doubtfully, and murmured violent protests against the, to it, 
incomprehensible hallucinations of The Press.* The latter neverthe- 
less returns today to the fateful subject. The following announce- 
ment appears in bold letters at its top: 

“Important circumstances have transpired. When we last wrote there was a 
prospect of the Congress breaking up ‘re infecta’, and of Lord John Russell 
returning abruptly to England. [...] The altered tone adopted to Russia by Austria 
since the death of the Emperor Nicholas [...] and especially the declaration of the 

Austrian Emperor to Alexander II, have doubtless mainly contributed to this 
result. We have reason to believe that the Emperor of the French has removed the 
obstacles which existed to a general pacification, and that France will consent to the 
complete evacuation of the Crimea without any conditions as to the demolition or 
diminution of any of the fortresses of that province.” 

To elucidate the meaning of the oracle The Press refers to the 
“authentic details of its leading article’. Oddly enough, these very 
details refute the conclusion allegedly based on them and stated 
beforehand. 

According to the leading article “...the situation of affairs in Vienna is 
becoming every hour less rational and satisfactory; and it is of importance that 
enlightened opinion on both sides of the Channel should exercise its influence to 
prevent results which may become alike mortifying and deplorable. [...] Had the 
Anglo-French alliance been sincere on the part of our Ministers in 1853, we 
should, probably, never have had occasion to embark in war; but, had such an 
appeal proved necessary, its conduct, in all probability, would have been trium- 
phant and effective. Instead of acting cordially with France [...] a year was 
wasted by the British Government in obtaining what they styled ‘the adhesion of the 
great German Powers [...]. Nothing could justify a war with Russia but a 
determination, on the part of the Western Powers, materially to reduce its empire 
in the South. This is the only solution of the Eastern question. The occasion in 
1853 was favourable, it has been lost. Time, treasure, armies, reputation, have been 
alike squandered. Had we acted cordially with France in 1853 the German Powers 
must have followed in our wake. What has now happened? The Emperor of 
Austria has assured the Emperor Alexander of Russia, ‘That Austria seeks neither 
to diminish the limit of his empire, nor to inflict on his territory any dishonor’. 
There is only one meaning which can be attributed to these words. With reference 
to an allusion, which we made earlier, to the secret engagements entered into 
between France and Austria, we are assured, on high authority, that ‘while those 
engagements [...] indicate a [...] probably permanent union between the two 
empires there is nothing in those engagements that would necessarily lead to an 
invasion of Russia on the part of -Austria’. [...] The Emperor of Russia is 
prepared to submit to terms of peace, which, though they offer no solution of ‘the 
Eastern question’, are, unquestionably, an admission of baffled aggression, and, in 
some degree, an atonement for the outrage. We believe that the opportunity for 
the higher policy has been lost, and that the combination of circumstances which 
[...] might have secured the independence of Europe, will not speedily recur; but a 
peace, on the whole, advantageous to Europe, beneficial to Turkey, and not 
discreditable to the Western Powers, may still be obtained. [...] We have reason to 
fear that such a peace will not be negotiated. What is the obstacle? The Emperor 
of the French. If the Emperor of the French, notwithstanding the [...] adverse 
circumstances [...], were still of opinion that the solution of the Eastern question 
ought to be attempted, we are not prepared to say that England should falter, but 
it reaches us that the views of his Imperial Majesty are of a very different order 
[...}. Between the reduction of the Russian limits and the negotiation of the 
projected peace, the Emperor of the French has devised a mezzo termine, which is 
catia and may be fatal. There its to be a campaign of brilliant achievement, 

which is to restore the prestige, and then conclude with a peace, which will not 
affect the present territorial arrangement of Europe or Asia one whit more than 
the Austro-Russian propositions to which [...] her Majesty’s Plenipotentiary 
Extraordinary at Vienna“ was prepared to accede. We will not dwell on that part of 
this scheme which would sacrifice many thousands of human lives to the mere 
restoration of prestige... We hold that the impolicy of this project is as flagrant as 
its immorality. Suppose the campaign of prestige do not succeed? In addition to 
the obstacles presented by the Russian army in the Crimea pestilence is as likely to 
be at hand as war. [...] If the campaign of prestige fail, where will be France and 
England? On whose side will then be arrayed the great German Powers? The vista 
is no less than the decline and fall of Europe. Even if the odds were not against us, 
are we justified in running such a chance—not even in favour of a policy, but of a 
demonstration? It may be mortifying to the ruler of France that a great 
opportunity has been lost: [...] it is not less mortifying to the people of England. 
But statesmen must deal with the circumstances before them. Neither France, nor 
England, nor Russia, in 1855, are in the position they respectively occupied in the 
year 1853. Woe to the men who have betrayed the highest interests of Europe! 
May they meet the doom they deserve! The ruler of France and the Queen of 
England” are guiltless; but they must not, like bewildered gamesters, persist in 
backing their ill luck in a frenzy of disappointment, or in a paroxysm of despair’’. 

The same paper refers to Girardin’s pamphlet La Paix, in which 
the simultaneous disarming of Sevastopol and Gibraltar is extolled 
as the true solution for peace. 

“Remember,” The Press exclaims, “this pamphlet, or rather its sale, is 

authorised by the French Government, and its author is the dear and intimate 
friend, adviser and companion, of the heir presumptive to the Throne Imperial.” 

Here we shall only allude to the fact that the Derbyites, whose 
organ The Press is, are working for a coalition with the (peaceable) 
Manchester School and that the Ministry for its part is also trying 
to win round the Manchester School by the newspaper stamp Bill 
(to which we shall return’). The idea of a campaign designed to bea 
mere display of force, of a European war not to endanger the hostile 
power but to save one’s own prestige, of a war resembling a 
spectacular show, must certainly disconcert every sober Englishman. 
Query: is this not one of the idées napoléoniennes as understood and 
bound to be understood by the restored empire?