London, January 29. Our judgment of the English Parliament* 
has been corroborated today by the English press. 

“The Parliament of England,” says The Morning Advertiser, “has met, and ... 
separated on the first night, in laughter more unseemly than the jesting of an idiot 
over his father’s burial.” 

The Times, too, cannot help remarking: 

“There are few, we apprehend, who will rise from the perusal of Friday night’s 
debate without a melancholy feeling, which they may not perhaps be able at once 
to define or analyse, but which, when examined, resolves itself into a conviction 
that our legislature, called together on a most urgent occasion to a consideration of 
the gravest nature, postpones primary to secondary objects, and gives up to party 
and personal considerations those hours which ought now to be exclusively devoted 
to the desperate situation of our army in the Crimea.”* 

In this situation, The Times proceeds to recommend making 
Palmerston prime minister because he is “too old” to be Secretary 
for War. It was The Times that recommended undertaking the 
Crimean expedition at such a time of the year and with such 
forces that almost certainly ensured failure, according to the 
testimony of Sir Howard Douglas, the greatest military critic of 
England. 

Let us add a brief postscript to the account of Friday’s sitting. 
Although Roebuck was forced by his old chronic ailment to break 
> The Morning Advertiser, No. 19846, January 29, 1855, leader.— Ed. 
©“ The Times, No. 21963, January 29, 1855, leader.— Ed. 
off his speech after ten minutes and abruptly propose his motion, 
he did have time to formulate the fatal question: We have sent out 
54,000 well-equipped troops to the East. Of these 14,000 still exist. 
What has become of the 40,000 who are missing? And what was 
the answer of the Secretary at War, Sidney Herbert, the great 
patron of the English Pietists, the Tractarians***? He said the 
system was no good.* But when the separation of the War Office 
from the Colonial Office was carried out a few months ago, who 
resisted every thorough-going reform of the system?” Sidney 
Herbert and his colleagues. Sidney Herbert, not content with 
hiding behind “the system”, accuses the commanders of the 
brigades and regiments of total incompetence. Anyone who knows 
the system also knows that these commanders have nothing to do 
with administration, nor, consequently, with the maladministration 
which it is admitted has now sacrificed a model army. But the 
pious Herbert is not satisfied with confessing the sins of other 
people. The English soldiers, he claims, are inept. They are unable 
to take care of themselves. They are indeed gallant but stupid. 

“At fighting they are respectable, 
When it comes to thinking—miserable.”* 

He, Sidney Herbert, and his colleagues are all misunderstood 
geniuses. Is it any wonder that Herbert’s sermon appealed to that 
eccentric Drummond and put the question in his mouth whether it 
were not time to suspend the constitution and appoint a dictator 
for England.* Vernon Smith, the former Whig Minister, eventually 
gave the general confusion a classic expression, declaring that he 
knew not what the intention of the motion was, nor what he 
should do himself, nor whether a new ministry was in the making, 
nor if the old one had ever existed, and therefore he would not 
vote for the motion.‘ The Times believes, however, that the motion 
will be passed this evening.’ On January 26, 1810, as we recall, 
resistance was mounted in the English Parliament against Lord 
Porchester’s proposal to establish a committee of inquiry into the 
No, 21962, January 27, 1855.— Ed. 
H. Drummond’s speech in the House of Commons on January 26, 1855. The 
Times, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.— Ed. 
No, 21962, January 27, 1855.— Ed. 
The Times, No. 21963, January 29, 1855, leader.— Ed. 
Walcheren Expedition.’ Similar resistance occurred on January 26, 
1855. On January 29, 1810 the motion was passed, and England is a 
country of historical precedents. 

The mere acceptance of peace negotiations allowed Russia to 
withdraw as many troops from the observation army on the 
Austrian border as can be replaced in two months or ten weeks, 
i.e. at least 60,000-80,000. We now know that the entire former 
(Russian) Danube army has ceased to exist as such, as the 4th 
Corps has been in the Crimea since the end of October, the 3rd 
arrived there in the final days of December and the rest of the 5th 
Corps, together with the cavalry and reserves, are at present 
marching thither. The new distribution of these troops, who have 
to be replaced on the Bug and Dniester by troops from the 
Western Army (stationed in Poland, Volhynia and Podolia), and 
the fact that in addition parts of the 2nd Corps and the reserve 
cavalry are likewise heading for the Crimea, are sufficient 
explanation, even disregarding all the other secondary diplomatic 
aims involved, why Russia did not hesitate a moment to resume 
negotiation on the so-called “basis”. A period of two to three 
months is of decisive importance for her, because her army, 
spread out on the long line from Kalish to Ismail, is without 
reinforcements no longer capable of resisting the growing 
numbers of the Austrian army confronting it. In order to prove 
this in more detail we present here a survey, emanating from the 
best possible sources—and overestimating, rather than  under- 
estimating, the strength of the Russian forces—of the strength and 
position of the large Russian army on active service, which is to 
operate against the South and West of Europe. Initially it 
consisted of six army corps, each of 48 battalions, two corps of 
picked troops (Guards and Grenadiers), each 36 battalions strong, 
together with a relatively large number of cavalry, regular and 
irregular, and artillery. The Russian Government then called up 
reserves in order to form the 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of picked 
troops, and the 5th and 6th battalions of the other army corps. By 
raising more new troops it soon afterwards added a 7th battalion 
and 8th to each regiment, thus doubling the number of battalions 
in the line corps and more than doubling them for the picked 
troops. 

These forces may be approximately estimated as follows: Guards 
and Grenadiers—the first four battalions of each regiment=96 
battalions of 900 men=86,400 men, ditto the last four battalions of 
each regiment, ditto of 700 men=67,200 men. The Ist and 2nd 
Corps (not yet engaged)—the first four battalions of each 
regiment=96 battalions of 900 men=86,400 men. The last four 
battalions of each regiment=96 battalions of 700 men=67,200 
men. The 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps—the first four battalions of 
each regiment=192 battalions of 500 men=96,000 men; the last 
four battalions of each regiment=192 battalions of 700 
men= 134,400 men. The Finland Corps— 14,400 men. [Total]=784 
battalions comprising 552,000 men. Cavalry (regular)—80,000 
men. Cavalry (irregular)—46,000 men. Artillery—80,000 men. 
Total 758,000 men. Casualties have hitherto affected only the 96 
active battalions of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps. 

After deducting the lst Division of the 5th Corps, which is at 
the Caucasus, there remain 750,000 men, that are now distributed 
as follows: On the shores of the Baltic Sea the Baltic Army under 
General Sievers, consisting of the Finnish Corps and the reserves 
of the Guards, Grenadiers and the 6th Corps, together with 
cavalry, etc., approximately 135,000 men, of which a proportion 
are raw recruits and recently organised battalions. In Poland and 
on the Galician border, from Kalish to Kamenez, the Guards, the 
Grenadiers, the Ist Corps, the 2nd Division of the 6th Corps, 
some of the reserves of the Grenadiers and of the Ist Corps, plus 
cavalry and artillery, approximately 235,000 men. The crack 
troops of the Russian Army are commanded by Gorchakov. In 
Bessarabia and between the Dniester and the Bug, there are two 
divisions of the 2nd Corps and a part of the reserves, approxi- 
mately 60,000 men. These formed a part of the army of the West. 
But when the Danube army was sent to the Crimea they were 
detached from the Western army in order to take the place of the 
Danube army and, under the command of General Panyutin, they 
are now confronting the Austrian army in the Principalities. 
Intended for the defence of the Crimea: the 3rd and 4th Corps, 
two divisions of the 6th Corps and reserves, as well as one division 
of both the 2nd and 5th Army Corps on the march, together with 
cavalry they amount to some 170,000 men under Menshikov. The 
rest of the reserves and newly formed battalions, particularly of 
the lst, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps, are being reorganised as the 
great reserve army under General Cheodayev. This reserve army, 
numbering about 150,000 is concentrated in the interior of Russia. 
How many of them are marching towards Poland or southward is 
unknown. 

Thus while at the end of last summer Russia could muster less 
than 500,000 men on the western borders of her empire, from 
Finland to the Crimea, she now has 600,000 men, besides a 
reserve army of 150,000. Nevertheless she is weaker vis-a-vis 
Austria than at that time. Then, in August and September, there 
were 270,000 Russians in Poland and Podolia, while the army on 
the Pruth, Dniester and Danube amounted to roughly 80,000 
men, making a total of 350,000 men capable of operating together 
against Austria. Now—there remain only 295,000 men, while 
Austria has 320,000 directly confronting them and can support 
them with another 70,000-80,000 in Bohemia and Moravia. 
Therefore Russia cannot risk an offensive operation at the present 
moment. In an open country like Poland, without any big river 
lines between the two armies, this is synonymous with the necessity 
of retiring to a tenable position. If Austria attacked now the 
Russian army would have to split up into two halves, one 
withdrawing towards Warsaw, the other towards Kiev, separated 
by the inaccessible marshlands of Polesye, which extend from the 
Bug to the Dnieper. Therefore at the present moment it is essential 
for Russia to gain time. Hence her “diplomatic considerations”.