Lord Clarendon declared last night in the House of Lords that 
“he had reason to believe” that the news of the landing of 4,000 
Russians in the Dobrodja by means of transports from Odessa was 
untrue. He was not aware that the Russian fleet had _ left 
Sevastopol which point had been watched, now and then, by 
English and French steamers. With regard to the alleged inactivity 
of the fleets, he begged to say that a blockade of Sevastopol and 
Odessa could only be undertaken by the whole of the combined 
squadron, which would have been a dangerous undertaking 
during the bad season. He believed, therefore, that it had been 
politic to retain them at Beikos. The Vienna correspondent of The 
Times concurs in this view of Lord Clarendon, and moreover, 
states the true motives of his policy.* The apprehension of riots at 
Constantinople has never been more justified than since the 
negotiations for “Christian. emancipation” have become known, 
and it would have been highly “impolitic” to move the fleets from 
the Bosphorus before the arrival of a sufficient land force, Le., 
sufficient to put down the Turks. 

In the House of Commons Lord John Russell said the 
responsibility for the Greek insurrections rested with the Court of 
Athens, which had favored them at first secretly, and now openly.? 

The debates of the week offer nothing of interest, except that 
on Mr. Moore’s motion for a Select Committee to take into 

April 7, 1854.— Ed. 

Lord John Russell’s speech in the House of Commons on April 6, 1854. The 
Times, No. 21709, April 7, 1854.— Ed. 

consideration the case of the appointment of H.Stonor to the 
office of a Judge in the colony of Victoria,* the said Stonor having 
been reported by a Committee of the House to have been guilty of 
bribery at the elections in the borough of Sligo in 1853, the 
appointment of the Committee was granted. The prosecution of 
Mr. Stonor is, however, a mere pretext for renewing, on fresh 
ground, the battle between the two fractions of the broken 
Irish Brigade." To what degree the sanctimonious clique of 
Mr. Gladstone and his co-Peelites are involved and comprised in 
these Irish scandals, may be judged from the following remark 
of The Morning Post: 

“In the letters that have been produced, the gossip that has been retailed and 
the evidence which has been given before Parliamentary Committees within the last 
few weeks, there is much calculated to give strength to the suspicion that the 
Peelite section of the coalition have, for some time past, systematically employed 
agents to influence many of the Irish elections, and that they have supplied them 
largely with money for the purpose. The Duke of Newcastle is especially 
compromised.... There certainly appears to have been a conference of preferment 
upon individuals conducting election business, seemingly under his instruction.” 

The Daily News of to-day publishes the treaty between France, 
England and Turkey, which, however, merely contains the arrange- 
ments for military action. The western powers are careful not to 
bring the real conditions of their “assistance to the Sultan” into 
the form of a treaty. These are imposed by Lord Stratford de 
“Redcliffe and his minatory apparatus in loco,” and made to appear 
as the voluntary act of the Turkish Government. 

The peace mission of the Prince of Mecklenburg to Berlin had 
no other object in view but to furnish the King of Prussia‘ with 
a new pretext for keeping aloof from the Western Alliance. I am 
informed from Berlin that Russia would only acknowledge the 
Swedish declaration of neutrality after the King had bound 
himself to re-issue to the commandants of the Swedish harbors the 
old regulations, according to which no more than four foreign 
men-of-war are allowed to anchor within the range of the guns of 
any port. As this order considerably departs from the stipulations 
of neutrality agreed upon between Sweden and Denmark, new 

according to The Times, No. 21709, April 7, 1854.— Fd. 
The Morning Post, No. 25043, April 7, 1854, leader a. 

negotiations between the Scandinavian powers on the one hand, 
and the western powers on the other hand, are to be anticipated. 
It is generally believed at Stockholm that the Russians will 
abandon their occupation of Aland, and raze their fortifications on 
that island, carrying away the guns and other material of war. A 
telegraphic dispatch received to-day states that this step had 
already been carried out.* 

The Austrian corps d’observation in the south-eastern portions of 
Hungary is now on a complete war footing, and drawn up in the 
different positions allotted to it. The concentration required from 
ten to twelve days. The German papers generally assume that this 
army would be destined to take the Turkish army in the flank, in 
case of Austria joining actively with Russia, and there would be no 
difficulty in doing so. But the Austrians can only enter Turkey 
either by Mehadia, when they would have the Turkish army in 
their front, or by Belgrade, when they would find themselves in a 
line with the extended left flank of the Turks. It is much more 
probable, therefore, that if the Austrians enter Turkey with hostile 
intentions, they will march from Belgrade upon Sofia by 
Kruschevatz and Nissa; but even in that case the Turks would 
have a shorter way to Sofia, by marching from Vidin in a direct 
line southward. | 

The report of the Prussian Loan-Committee in the Second 
Chamber contains an account of the policy pursued by Prussia in 
the Eastern Question, and publishes several diplomatic documents 
which have not yet found their way into the English press. I 
propose, therefore, to give you some important extracts from that 
report. 

At the end of January the Russian Embassador at Berlin‘ 
handed a proposition to the Prussian Government, simulta- 
neously with the propositions made by Count Orloff to the Austrian 
Court, according to which the three Courts of Prussia, Austria 
and Russia were to sign a joint protocol. In the preamble to the 
draft of this protocol it is stated that the motive of this com- 
mon engagement was the desire to draw closer the alliance of 
the three powers, in view of the dangers threatening the peace of 
Furope, and to regulate the relations both between them and with 

The Times, No. 21709, April 7, 1854.— Ed. 

the western powers under the impending juncture. This draft 
contained the following three points: 

1. The two German powers bind themselves formally, in the 
case of an active participation by England and France in the 
Russo-Turkish war, to observe the strictest neutrality; and declare 
if they should be again pressed or menaced by the western 
powers, that they are resolved to defend their neutrality, in case of 
need, with arms. 

2. The three powers will consider any attack by France or 
England on the respective territories of Austria, Prussia, or any 
other German State, as a violation of their own territory, and will 
defend each other, as circumstances may require, and in 
accordance with a common military understanding (now arranged 
between General Hess and the Prussian Minister of War* at 
Berlin). 

3. The Emperor of Russia repeats his assurance that he intends 
to bring the war to a close as soon as compatible with his dignity and 
the well-understood interests of his empire. Considering, however, that 
the ulterior development of events is likely to alter the existing 
state in Turkey, His Majesty obliges himself, if he should come to 
any understanding on that point with the naval powers, to take no 
definitive resolution without previous concert with his German 
allies. 

This draft was accompanied by a dispatch from Count 
Nesselrode, in which the Chancellor reminds Prussia and Austria 
of the importance of that triple alliance which had so long been 
the shield of Europe. In sight of the impending war his imperial 
master considered himself obliged to earnestly appeal to his 
friends and allies. Their common interest made it necessary to 
define the position which they had now to occupy under these 
grave eventualities. Pointing out the one-sided advance of the 
western powers, he called attention to their want of consideration 
for the interests of the German powers. Russia acted differently. 
She was prepared to submit alone to the burdens of war, and 
would ask neither sacrifices nor aid from her friends and allies. 
The welfare of both powers and of Germany depended on their 
union. In this way they would succeed in preventing the crisis 
from extending, and perhaps shorten it. The Russian dispatch 
next proceeds to examine the three alternative positions open to 
the German powers: Common action with Russia against the naval 

powers; alliance with the latter against Russia, or lastly, a strict 
neutrality. As to an alliance with Russia, the Czar did not require 
it; and as to an action against him, it was impossible if the German 
powers would not submit to the menace of the western powers. 
This would be the acknowledgment of a disgraceful necessity to 
the end of bringing about a deplorable future. Russia, inattackable 
in her own territory, apprehended neither military invasions nor 
the more pernicious invasions of the revolutionary spirit. If her 
allies deserted her, she knew how to restrict herself to her own 
resources, and would arrange herself so as to dispense with them 
in future. (M. de Nesselrode writes his dispatches in German 
taking care that translation into another language becomes a 
matter of downright despair. As a specimen of his German 
exercises I give you the last sentence in the original words: Wenn 
seine Alltierten es verließen, so würde es sich gesagt sein lassen, sich auf 
sich selbst zurtickziehen und sich so einrichten, threr in Zukunft entbehren 
zu konnen.) But the Czar had full confidence in the known 
sentiments of his friends and allies, and in their gallant armies, 
which had been connected long since with those of Russia by the 
baptism of blood (Bluttaufe), and by an identity of principles not to 
be denied. The third alternative only the Russian Cabinet thinks 
worthy of the German Courts, as corresponding with their interests, 
and appropriate; by continuing their parts as mediators, to realize 
the particular desires of Russia. It must, however, be understood 
that this neutrality could not be an indefinite one, or merely 
provisional, or an expectant one, because such an attitude would 
be construed as hostile by either belligerent, especially by Russia. 
That neutrality should rather be founded on the principles (of the 
Holy Alliance) which, during many trials, had secured the general 
tranquillity and the peace of the world. It was the duty of the 
German powers to give effect to this basis of their policy, if need 
be, by arms. If the one (France) of the two maritime powers 
should meditate or venture upon an attack of Germany, the other 
one (England) would instantly change her position. At all 
instances, if such an event should occur, Russia was ready to come 
forth and support them with all the forces at her command. 
This proposition was declined at Berlin, and some days later at 
Vienna too. Manteuffel then still played the independent states- 
man, and declared in a dispatch to St. Petersburg that, by the 
desire of a renewed triple alliance, Russia, which pretended not to 
require the aid of Prussia, yet asked for it, though in an indirect 
form. “With regard to the revolutionary spirit, which Russia did 
not fear, he would observe that Prussia, too, had subjected it 

without foreign aid.” The independent minister, who “saved” 
Prussia by putting himself at the head of the counter-revolution, 
cannot suppress his irritation at seeing Prussia, which had no 
Hungary, placed in a line with Austria. 

While Prussia thus boasts of her security, the other documents 
alluded to in the report prove that in the last days of February 
Austria submitted to Prussia the draft of a convention to be 
concluded between the four powers. Prussia declined it in a 
dispatch dated the 5th of March. But it is characteristic of this 
power that it declares at the same time that the Government of 
Frederick William IV still considered the concert of the four 
powers as the best means to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the 
complication. Austria, consequently, was forced also to drop the 
convention which would have put an end to the equivocal position 
of both German powers. 

A Prussian dispatch of March 16 contains the following 
important passage: 

“The Prussian Cabinet had noticed the measures taken by Austria with a view 
to maintain her interests on the south-eastern frontiers. It was true that Prussia, 
like all other German States, had to protect its own particular interests; but this 
should not exclude an understanding with Austria. On the contrary, Prussia was 
ready to enter into a concert, as far as the maintenance of German interests 
required. From this motive she looked forward to communications on the following 

oints: 
° “1. Whether Austria was prepared, in order to secure the tranquillity of her 
own frontier provinces, to occupy the contiguous Turkish provinces? 

“2. Whether she would take possession of the latter, and hold them as a pledge, 

till the restoration of peace? 
“3. Whether she intended to participate actively in the war?” 

It would wholly depend on the answer to these several questions 
for Prussia to come to a conclusion as to what the maintenance of 
German interests would require, and whether she could do 
anything to mitigate the pressure applied to Austria by the western 
powers (not by Russia!). 

On March 14, the Prussian Government addressed a circular 
Note to the German Courts in the one sense, and the Austrian 
Government in the opposite sense. The Prussian circulaire says the 
impending war will be of a purely local character. Austria, on the 
contrary, maintains that the struggle is likely to take a turn which 
would intimately affect her own relations. As long as circumstances 
should permit, she would not participate in the war; but she had 
to consider also the eventuality of a participation in it. The 
interests involved in this question were likewise those of the 
German States. The Imperial Cabinet, therefore, trusted that in 

such a contingency Prussia and the other German Courts would 
join their forces with those of Austria. The German Confederation 
would then be called upon to show that, beyond its present 
defensive attitude, it knew also how to fill an active part in this 
question. Austria would make a further declaration as soon as the 
war between the western powers and Russia should have been 
actually declared. If there were yet any means to prevent the 
increase of those dangers which now threatened Europe, it would 
be found in the common action of Austria and Prussia, joined by 
their German confederates. 

The last, but not least remarkable information contained in the 
report, is the melancholy answer given by M. de Manteuffel to a 
question of the Committee members, viz: That Russia had made 
no communication whatever of her partition schemes to the 
Prussian Government. 

In conclusion, we learn from this document that the juggle of 
the Vienna Conferences has not at all come to an end. On the 
contrary, it states, on the authority of the Prussian Premier, that a 
new protocol was about to be drawn up, which would establish the 
continued understanding between the four powers. 

The corn market is again rising. The cause of the late fall in 
France and England was the pressure acting upon speculators 
who, for want of sufficient capital and in a tight money market, 
were driven to forced sales which overstocked the markets. 
Another cause was the fact that the dealers, millers and bakers 
allowed their supplies to run out, in the belief that enormous 
cargoes were on the way to the European ports. I am, therefore, 
still of opinion that prices are yet far from having reached their 
maximum. It is certain that in no previous year were such 
erroneous and illusory speculations about the probable and 
possible supply of the corn market entertained as in the present 
year, illusions which are to a great extent encouraged by the cant 
of the free-trade papers. 

Written on April 7, 1854 Reproduced from the New-York