Karl Marx

[Declaration of the Prussian Cabinet –

Napoleon’s Plans –

Prussia’s Policy]

Written on February 17, 1854.

From the English.

[“New-York Daily Tribune” No. 4022, March 9, 1854, Leading Article]

We have received from a thoroughly reliable source in London the following news, which, should it be confirmed, is of the greatest importance, and which has appeared in the European newspapers only in part, and even then in a one-sided and distorted form:

I. On February 3, the following declaration of the Prussian Cabinet was sent to Paris and London:

“1. Since the statements of Count Orlov leave no room for doubt that any further attempt at mediation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet would be futile, Prussia hereby withdraws its mediation, for which no further occasion exists.

2. Since the formal and binding neutrality proposals of Count Orlov have met with absolute rejection, which was communicated to him in a note, Prussia is resolved, even without Austria’s cooperation, for its part to observe the strictest neutrality, to which it will know how to lend emphasis by adequate armament as soon as suitable circumstances arise.

3. Whether Prussia will, jointly with Austria, propose a general armament of the German Confederation depends on the conduct of the maritime powers towards Germany.”

II. Louis Napoleon has sent a plenipotentiary (Monsieur Brenier) with the following message to the King of Piedmont <Victor Emmanuel II> and Signor Cavour in Turin: At the proper time insurrectionary movements are to break out in Parma, Piacenza, Guastalla, and Modena. Sardinia should then occupy those territories, whose reigning princes are to be driven out. Napoleon guarantees the King the union of the first three duchies and possibly also of Modena with Sardinia; for these territories the County of Savoy is to be ceded to France. It may be said that England has, though reluctantly and with a heavy heart, virtually declared its agreement with this plan. Monsieur Brenier then continued his journey through Italy until he reached Naples, where his arrival caused a “most painful impression”. He has instructions to prepare an Italian insurrection, since Napoleon is seriously convinced that he is the man not only to set Italy on fire, but also to draw exactly the line which the flame must not cross. He proposes to concentrate the following armies:

1. 100,000 men on the Savoyard frontier,

2. 60,000 men at Metz,

3. 80,000 men at Strasbourg.

III. Prussia has no objection to the concentration of a French army of 100,000 men on the frontier of Savoy, but regards the concentration of an army at Metz and a second at Strasbourg as a threat directed immediately against itself. It already sees Baden, Hesse, Württemberg, etc. in full insurrection and some 100,000 peasants from the south of Germany marching upon its own frontiers. It has therefore protested against these two measures, and Section 3 of the Prussian declaration indeed refers to this possible situation. Prussia will, in any case, mobilise its army towards the end of March, or perhaps even earlier. It intends, depending on circumstances, to call up 200,000 to 300,000 men. Should Napoleon, however, persist in his resolve to station the two armies at Metz and Strasbourg, the Prussian government has already decided to increase its army to 500,000 men. In the Berlin Cabinet, where the King and most of his ministers have taken the side of the Russian party and Manteuffel alone, supported by the Prince of Prussia, carried through the declaration of neutrality (Manteuffel originally proposed a formal alliance with England), fear and confusion are said to reign. A formal cabinet resolution <in the original German> already exists, according to which, under certain circumstances, all the better-known democrats of the monarchy, and above all of Rhenish Prussia, are to be arrested in a single night and transported to the eastern fortresses, so as to prevent them from favouring Napoleon’s subversive plans (!!) <in the original German> or from generating popular movements in general. It is intended to proceed to this measure immediately if Italian disturbances should break out, or if Napoleon concentrates the two armies at Metz and Strasbourg. This resolution, we are assured, was adopted unanimously, though not all eventualities were determined in which the Cabinet might consider it appropriate to carry it into effect.