The English journals indulge in liberal bursts of derision at the 
fact that the Czar has rewarded Gen. Osten-Sacken for his share 
in the late fight between the allied fleets and the fortifications that 
defend the port of Odessa. This fight they claim as altogether a 
victory of their own, pronouncing the opposite exultations of their 
enemy as but a new specimen of Muscovite braggadocio and 
imperial lying. Now, while we have no special sympathy with the 
Czar or with Osten-Sacken, though the latter is no doubt a clever 
and resolute man (he is the brother of the General of the same 
name '*! commanding an army corps in the Principalities), it may 
perhaps be worth while to look a little more carefully into the 
merits of this victory at Odessa, and ascertain, if possible, on which 
side the braggadocio and humbug really figure, especially as this is 
the first and only battle between the allies and the Russians of 
which we have yet received any report. 

As appears by the official documents on both sides, the object of 
the allied fleet in appearing before Odessa was to summon the 
Governor” to deliver up, as reparation for the round shot fired 
at a British flag of truce, all British, French and Russian vessels in 
the harbor. Now they must have known that he would not make 
any reply to such a summons, and must therefore have been 
prepared to take by force what they had asked for in vain, and if 
they failed in this object they suffered a genuine defeat, whatever 
damage they may have done to the enemy. 

What, then, were the odds? The very decree of the Russian 
Government, which appointed Osten-Sacken to the command of 
the vast territory he governs, situated immediately in the rear of 

A Famous Victory 193 

the army of the Danube, and the fact of his selecting for his 
residence the town of Odessa, shows the importance naturally and 
justly attributed by the Russians to this point. Odessa is the place, 
of all others, where a hostile landing might do them the most 
harm. There the enemy would find not only all the resources of a 
large town, but those, too, of the granary of all Europe; and there 
they would be nearest to the line of communication and retreat of 
the Russian army in Turkey. Under these circumstances, the two 
Admirals* must have known that they would find the place 
defended by a numerous garrison, and that any attempt at 
landing, with what sailors and marines they might have to spare 
for that purpose, would at once be repelled. But without landing 
and taking possession of the harbor, if not the town, at least for a 
moment, they could not expect to liberate the British and French 
ships now confined there. Their only remaining chance for 
accomplishing their object would have been to bombard the town 
itself most furiously, so as to make it unsafe for any body of 
troops to remain in it, and then to attempt a rescue of the ships. 
But it is doubtful whether that purpose could have been effected 
by a bombardment upon a large town with very wide streets and 
extensive squares, where comparatively little room is occupied by 
combustible buildings. The Admirals, then, must have known that 
if their demand on Osten-Sacken was refused, they had no means 
of enforcing it. They thought, however, that after the firing on a 
flag of truce, something must be undertaken against Odessa, and 
so they went on their errand. 

The approaches to Odessa, on the seaside, were defended by six 
batteries, which must have been armed with some forty or fifty 
guns of 24 and 48 pounds caliber. Of these batteries only two or 
three were engaged, the attacking force keeping out of range of 
the remainder. Against these batteries eight steam frigates 
carrying about 100 guns were brought to act; but as from the 
nature of the maneuver, the guns of only one side of the ships 
could be used, the superiority in the number of the guns on the 
part of the allies was considerably diminished. In respect of the 
caliber, they must have been about equal, for if a 24-pound gun is 
inferior to a long 32-pounder, a 48-pounder of heavy metal must 
certainly be equal to 56- or 68-pound shell guns, which cannot 
stand full charges of powder. Finally, the vulnerable nature of 
ships, as compared with breastworks, and the insecurity of aim 
produced by the ship’s motion, are such that even a still greater 

* Dundas and Hamelin.— Ed. 

humerical superiority in the artillery of a fleet over that of 
strand-batteries will leave some odds in favor of the latter. Witness 
the affair at Eckernférde'* in Schleswig (1849), where two 
batteries with 20 guns between them destroyed an 84-gun ship, 
disabled and captured a 44-gun frigate, and beat off two heavily 
armed steamers. 

The fight, as long as it was confined to artillery and to the eight 
steamers, may therefore be considered a pretty equal one, even 
allowing for the superiority of range and accuracy which, during 
the struggle, the Anglo-French guns were found to possess. The 
consequence was that the work of destruction went on very slowly. 
Two Russian guns dismounted were the only result of several 
hours firing. At length the allies came up closer and changed their 
tactics. They abandoned the system of firing against the stone 
walls of the batteries in order to send shells and rockets into the 
Russian shipping and the military establishments in and around 
the ‘harbor. This told. The object aimed at was large enough to 
make every shell hit some vulnerable part, and the whole was soon 
on fire. The powder-magazine behind that battery on the 
mole-head, which had offered the most effective resistance and 
had been principally attacked, blew up; this and the spreading of 
the fire all around forced its garrison at length to retire. The 
Russian artillerymen had shown on this point, as usual, very little 
skill but very great bravery. Their guns and shot must have been 
very defective and their powder extremely weak. 

This was the only result of the whole action. Four Russian guns 
had been silenced in the battery on the mole-head; all the other 
batteries hardly received any damage at all. The explosion of the 
powder-magazine cannot have been very severe; from its situation 
close behind the battery, it is evident that it was the special 
magazine of this battery containing merely the ammunition for a 
single day, say 60 or 100 rounds for each of the four guns; now, if 
we deduct the probable number of rounds already used in the 
course of the day, there can hardly have remained more than 300 
weight of powder. What the damage done to other establishments 
may amount to, we have no means of judging; the allies, of 
course, could not ascertain it, while the Russians put it down at the 
very lowest figure.'“* From the Russian report, however, it would 
appear that the vessels burnt were not men-of-war, as the 
Anglo-French reports state them to have been; probably they 
were, besides some merchantmen, transports and government 
passenger steamers. We have, besides, never received any previous 
information that any Russian men-of-war were at Odessa. 

A Famous Victory 195 

Two French and one or two English merchantmen succeeded 
during the action in escaping from the harbor; seven British 
merchantmen remain confined there to the present day. Thus the 
“gallant” Admirals have not succeeded in enforcing their demand, 
and as they had to retreat without obtaining any positive result, 
without even silencing more than one out of six batteries, they 
may consider themselves fairly beaten off. They lost very few men; 
but several ships’ hulls were damaged and the French steamer 
Vauban was once set on fire by a red-hot ball, and had to retire for 
a while from the action. 

This is the sum of what the British press calls “Glorious news 
from Odessa,” and which in British eyes has wiped out all the 
former shortcomings of Admiral Dundas. Nay, this action has so 
much raised the public expectations in England that we are 
seriously told, the Admirals, having now ascertained the excessive 
superiority of the range of their guns over the Russian ones, have 
positively resolved to try a bombardment of Sevastopol; indeed, 
they did go there and fire a few shots. But this is the purest 
humbug, for whoever has once looked upon a plan of Sevastopol, 
knows that an attack, bombardment or not, upon that town and 
harbor, unless it be a mere sham-fight outside the bay, must take 
place in narrow waters and within range even of field guns. 

We may properly add to this simple exposé, that the 
gasconade ot our English friends about this action,—1in which they 
suffered a complete repulse and totally failed of their object— 
does not vary much from the general tone of their previous 
discussions and statements concerning the war. Whatever be the 
result of the struggle, impartial history must, we think, place upon 
her record that its early stages were marked by quite as much 
humbug, prevarication, deception, diplomatic bad faith, military 
bragging and lying on the side of England as on that of Russia. 

Written on May 15, 1854 Reproduced from the newspaper 

Tribune, No. 4098, June 6, 1854 as a leader