We may safely leave John Bull and Jacques Bonhomme,*” for a 
while, to their rejoicings at the “glorious victory” of the Alma and 
their anticipations of the fall of Sevastopol. The war on the 
Danube and in the Crimea, whatever importance it may have in 
the eyes of the allies and of the united Middle Class Liberalism of 
Europe, has very little weight, as far as Russia is concerned. The 
center of gravity of that country is in no wise affected by its 
possible results; while a defeat in the Crimea and forced retreat of 
the allies would cripple their land operations for a considerable 
time, and give them a moral check to recover from which would 
require their utmost exertions. 

Some authentic reports of the distribution and late movements 
of the Russian forces have lately come to hand, and it may be well 
‘to sum them up in order to show how little, comparatively 
speaking, of the Russian force is as yet engaged, and what the 
remainder is expected to perform. 

As is well known, the Russian army consists, as nearly as can be 
stated, of the following bodies: 

I. THE GRAND ACTIVE ARMY— 

2 corps of élite, Guards and Grenadiers, containing 76 battalions, 92 
squadrons, 228 guns. 
6 corps of the line, —”’—,300 battalions, 192 squadrons, 672 guns. _ 

3 Gavalry corps, —”—, 176 squadrons, 96 guns. 
Total, 376 battalions, 460 squadrons, 996 guns. 

II. SPECIAL CORPS— 
Finland corps, 12 battalions. 
Orenburg corps, 10 battalions. 
Siberian corps, 15 battalions. 

A page from Engels’ preparatory material for the article 
“The Military Power of Russia” 

The Military Power of Russia 501 

Caucasian corps, 55 battalions, 10 squadrons, 180 guns. 
Reserve Caucasian corps, 36 battalions, 2 squadrons,—guns. 
Caucasian line, 47 battalions,—squadrons,— guns. 

Total, 175 battalions, 12 squadrons, 180 guns. 

III. COSSACKS AND OTHER IRREGULARS— 
About 700 squadrons, 32 battalions, and 224 guns. 

IV. RESERVES— 

1. About 50 battalions of Interior Guards, besides invalids, penal com- 
panies, 77. 

2. Reserve of the grand army, or 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of Guards and 
Grenadiers, 5th and 6th battalions of the line, viz: three battalions for 24 
regiments, and two battalions each for 72 regiments, or in all, 216 
battalions. 

As all the reserves are called in and fully organized, so far that 
the formation of the 7th and 8th battalions of each regiment has been 
commenced out of the lately decreed levy of 300,000 men, the 
above 216 battalions may be comprised in the grand total, which 
would give 726 battalions, 472 squadrons of regular, 700 
squadrons of irregular cavalry, and considerably above a thousand 
guns. The organization of the reserves for cavalry and artillery not 
being well known out of Russia, they are not included in the 
above. 

This array, fortunately, looks more formidable than it really is. 
From it we must deduct, to arrive at the number of troops actually 
available for a European war, the Siberian corps, the Internal 
Guard, and at least one-half of the Cossacks; thus leaving available 
about 650 battalions, 472 squadrons of regular and 350 squadrons 
of irregular cavalry, with about 1,200 guns. These troops may be 
estimated, at a very low figure, at 520,000 infantry, 62,000 cavalry, 
and 30,000 Cossacks, or rather more than 600,000 together, 
spread on the long line from the Caspian along the Black Sea and 
Baltic to the White Sea. 

Since the beginning of the war with Turkey, the following 
troops have been successively engaged against the allies on the 
southern frontier of the empire: 

1. The 3d, 4th and 5th corps of the line, with some of their reserves, which are, 
however, mostly still on the march. 

2. The whole of the three Caucasian corps. 

3. The two divisions (two-thirds) of the first corps of the line, without reserves. 

4. A portion of the third cavalry corps (dragoons) in the Crimea. 

This makes a total of about 240,000 men, before entering on the 
campaign, but now reduced to 184,000 men at the outside, of 

whom 84,000 may be taken as the strength of the army in 
Bessarabia, 54,000 in the Crimea, or marching toward it, and 
46,000 in the Caucasus. 

On the Baltic there were, up to the end of August: 

d Men 
In Finland, the reserve of the 6th Corps 0.0.0.0... ese cesses eneneeeveneeeeeneees 16,800 
A RETA DISH COLDS 9 1c, caractunedevsreceahapsanep usa nlbetsewenves ea ieacaanviapean ie area te overated ean 12,000 
The Guards and their reserves .........ccccccccceccceeceeecensecncecessesecenscesceueseetersnesseetenss 66,800 
Ol the:Grenadier Lot ps. at Revell sacciac, sea tiaceescdeaceleatsxea gules desasseawasseesteaane bates 10,000 

There were in Poland, or marching for it: 

Men 
The remainder of the Grenadiers and their reserves ............cccceeceseeeeeeeeeeeeees 55,000 
The tst:and 2d Corps‘and their reserves cciv.y.c.sisscesavseisndtscerrsadetencistonacvventts 120,000 
Cossacks and cavalry of different Corps 2.0.0.0... ee ceeeeeeeeeececeeeeetaneeeenesecesanens 30,000 
NATIONS FEST VCS: 55.0 cose nse daasceck ws av kh User Wey ok ta areal essasleiasG Sauk each aaa Gana 25,000 

Making all together about 575,000 men, which, with the 
Orenburg Corps (at Astrakhan), the Reserve Cavalry Corps, and 
the detachments of the White Sea and others, comes up to the 
number stated before of the grand total. Of the troops in Poland, 
about 30,000 were on the march, about 20,000 garrisoned 
Warsaw, about 100,000 occupied the right bank of the Vistula, in 
the late Kingdom of Poland, and about 80,000 remained as a 
reserve in Volhynia and Podolia, on the Bug and Dniester. Thus 
the main bulk of the Russian army, and among them the crack 
regiments of Guards and Grenadiers, was concentrated on a line 
from St. Petersburg to Chotin, or along the western frontier of the 
Empire. But these positions did not appear significant enough. 
The Grenadiers left Revel, to be replaced by a division of Guards, 
and with the other two divisions of Guards marched off to Poland, 
the latter four battalions or regiments strong, leaving only the 5th 
and 6th battalions in Petersburg. Thus the army of the West was 
increased to above 270,000 men, and the greater portion of the 
three Reserve Cavalry Corps, which have as yet not been engaged at all, 
are marched off to join them; this will bring the army of the West 
to some 300,000 men. 

The Military Power of Russia 503 

Now the positions are changed. The 100,000 men, occupying 
the south-eastern portion of the Kingdom of Poland, have crossed 
the Vistula and taken up a position along the Austrian frontier. 
The 80,000 men have advanced from Volhynia into Poland, and 
continue the line along that frontier. Guards, Grenadiers— 
possibly the cavalry corps, when they arrive—take a central 
position to the rear. During the winter more troops can be spared 
from the ice-bound Baltic. By May the new levies, forming the 7th 
and 8th or new battalions of the different regiments, or 192 
battalions in all (130,000 to 140,000 men), will be so far drilled as 
to replace them. 

There is no doubt, then, that Nicholas cares comparatively little 
what happens to the south of his Empire, so long as he can 
concentrate above 300,000 men in the splendid strategical position 
of Poland. And a splendid position it is. Driven in like a wedge 
between Prussia and Austria, it outflanks both, while it is protected 
by the strongest means of resistance which art and nature 
combined can produce. Napoleon knew the military importance of 
the country inclosed by the Vistula and its affluents. He made it 
his base of operations for the campaign of 1807, until he took 
Danzig. But he neglected permanently to fortify it, and paid 
dearly for it after the retreat of 1812. The Russians, especially 
since 1831, have done what their predecessors in power omitted to 
do. Modlin, (Novo-Georgievsk), Warsaw, Ivangorod, Brzesc 
Litewski form a system of fortifications stronger, in its strategical 
combination, than any other in the world. This system offers a 
position in which a beaten army may defy double its numbers as 
long as it has plenty to eat; and to cut off a whole country from all 
communications is a thing that has not yet been attempted. This 
whole complex system of fortresses, says a German military writer 
who knows the country, indicates even more an aggressive than a 
defensive spirit. It is planned not so much to maintain the ground 
on which it stands as to serve as a base for offensive attacks toward 
the west. 

And there are people who believe that Nicholas will sue for 
peace if Sevastopol be taken! Why, Russia has not played one-third 
of her trumps yet, and the momentary loss of Sevastopol and of 
the fleet is hardly felt at all by the giant to whom Sevastopol and 
the fleet were but a plaything. Russia knows full well that her 
decisive action does not lie along the sea shores or within reach of 
debarking troops; but on the contrary, on the broad interior of 
the Continent, where massive armies can be brought to act 
concentrated on one spot, without frittering away their forces ina 

fruitless coast defense against evanescent enemies. Russia may lose 
the Crimea, the Caucasus, Finland, St. Petersburg and all such 
appendages; but as long as her body, with Moscow for its heart, 
and fortified Poland for its sword-arm, is untouched, she need not 
give in an iota. 

The grand actions of 1854 are, we dare say, but the petty 
preludes of the battles of nations which will mark the annals of 
1855. It is not until the great Russian army of the West, and the 
Austrian army come into play, no matter whether against each 
other or with each other, that we shall see real war on a large 
scale, something like the grand wars of Napoleon. And, perhaps, 
these battles may be the preludes merely of other battles far more 
fierce, far more decisive—the battles of the European peoples 
against the now victorious and secure European despots. 

Written on October 16, 1854 Reproduced from the New-York 

: : : ; Daily Tribune 

Tribune, No. 4223, October 31; reprinted