The letters of our London correspondents and the European 
journals enable us at last to appreciate in all its bearings the 
prolonged struggle between the Turks and Russians, of which 
Chetatea,*”’ a small village nine miles north of Kalafat, was the 
arena. Next to the fact that the series of sanguinary actions in 
question was characterized by great bravery and that the Turks 
came off victors, the most striking feature of the whole is that it is 
without practical result, so far as the expulsion of the Russians 
from Wallachia is concerned. This comes from a mistake on the 
part of the Turks to which we have more than once had occasion 
to direct the attention of our readers. We allude to their sending a 
separate army to Kalafat, in order to shut up the road to Servia, 
while the presence of a strong and concentrated force near 
Rustchuk and Orsova* would have been the best guarantee against 
the Russians venturing into that province. Such a force would 
have menaced the communications of any Russian army marching 
westward, while a bridge and bridge-head at Oltenitza or some- 
where thereabouts, fortified like that of Kalafat, could have 
maintained a footing for them on the left bank of the Danube. 
But even without that, the Russians could not cross the Upper 
Danube and march into Servia, without leaving the Turks to cross 
the Lower Danube and march upon Bucharest. Of course, in 
saying this, we reckon the relative strength of the parties to be 
what it is in reality, and ascribe a decided superiority of numbers 

* See this volume, pp. 474, 520-21.—Ed. 

20* 

to the Turkish army of Rumelia, over the Russian army of 
Wallachia. 

Now the fact is that the Turks have used their superiority in the 
very way to nullify it and provide for being finally beaten. They 
did not concentrate their forces on the Lower Danube, but divided 
them. While 30,000 to 35,000 men occupied Widin and Kalafat, 
the rest of the army remained on the Middle and Lower Danube. 
They occupy the arc of a circle, while the Russians occupy the 
chord of this arc. Thus the latter have less space to traverse in 
order to concentrate all their troops on a given spot. Moreover, 
the shorter roads of the Russians are through a level country, 
while the longer ones of the Turks pass over hills and cross many 
mountain torrents. The Turkish position is, then, as disadvanta- 
geous as can be, and yet it has been taken in order to satisfy the old 
prejudice that there is no better way of barring a road against an 
enemy than by placing yourself across it. 

On the 20th of December Omer Pasha knew at Shumla, that the 
Russians were preparing a general attack upon Kalafat for the 
13th of January. He had twenty-two days’ time; yet such is the 
position of Kalafat with regard to the other stations of the Turkish 
army, that it does not appear that he could bring on any 
reenforcements except a few reserves from Sofia. On the other 
hand, that the Russians, without having received any considerable 
reentorcements from home—on January 3 Osten-Sacken’s ubiq- 
uitous corps was not yet at Bucharest—-should venture upon a 
concentration so far west, shows that either the state of the 
weather and of the Danube did not allow the Turks to cross the 
river lower down, or that Gorchakoff had other reasons to be 
assured of their inactivity in that quarter. The Turks at Kalafat 
were ordered to attack the Russians while yet in the act of 
concentrating themselves. The best way to do this was to repeat 
the experiment of Oltenitza.“ Why was not this done? The bridge 
at Kalafat stands, in spite of winter and floating ice, and there was 
no position lower down where a similar bridge and bridge-head 
could be erected. Or had Omer Pasha been ordered to keep on 
the right bank of the river? There is so much of a contradictory 
nature in the Turkish proceedings, bold and clever measures are 
so regularly followed by the most palpable sins of omission and 
commission, that diplomatic agency must be at the bottom of it. At 
all events, Gorchakoff would not have stirred an inch toward 

“On the progress of the engagement at Oltenitza see this volume. pp. 
0 16-22.— Ed. 

The Last Battle in Europe 581 

Kalafat, had he not been certain that the Turks would not repeat 
the Oltenitza movement. 

Altogether some 30,000 Russians must have been sent against 
Kalafat, for with a lesser force they would hardly have ventured to 
attack a fortified position, defended by a garrison of 10,000 men, 
with at least 10,000 more for purposes of reserve or sally. At least 
one half, then, of the Russian active army in Wallachia was 
concentrated there. Where and how could the other half, spread 
over a long line, have resisted a Turkish force crossing at Oltenitza, 
Silistra or Orsova? And if the communication between Widin and 
Kalafat could be kept up without difficulty, then there was a 
possibility of crossing at other points. Thus the Russians by their 
position on the chord of the arc, the periphery of which was held 
by the Turks, were enabled to bring a superior force to the field 
of battle at Chetatea, while the Turks could not reenforce their 
corps at Kalafat, though aware of the intended attack long 
beforehand. The Turks, deprived of that movement of diversion 
which would have prevented the whole battle, deprived of the 
chance of succor, were reduced to their bravery and to the hope 
of cutting up the enemy in detail before his concentration was 
completed. But even this hope was slight, for they could not move 
very far from Kalafat, and every hostile corps of inferior strength 
could retire out of the circle of their operations. Thus they fought 
for five days, generally with success, but at last had to retire again 
to their entrenchments in the villages around Kalafat, the Russian 
forces being decidedly superior in strength at the end, when new 
reenforcements arrived. The result is that the Russian attack upon 
Kalafat is most probably averted or delayed, and that Turks have 
shown that in the open field, no less than behind ramparts and 
ditches, they can fight well. The murderous character of the 
encounters may be inferred from the statement of a letter from 
Bucharest, to the effect that in the engagements one whole 
regiment of Russian rifles, and all but 465 men of a regiment of 
lancers, were completely annihilated. 

At Oltenitza the Turks were attacked in their entrenched 
positions by the Russians; at Chetatea the Russians were attacked 
in their entrenched positions by the Turks. On both occasions the 
Turks have proved victorious, but without reaping any positive 
results from their victory. The battle of Oltenitza happened just 
when the proclamation of an armistice was on its way from 
Constantinople to the Danube. And the battle of Chetatea 
curiously coincides with the news of the Divan having accepted the 
lasts proposals of peace, imposed upon them by their Western 

allies.°°! In the one instance the machinations of diplomacy are 
nullified in the clash of arms, while in the other the bloody work 
of war is simultaneously frustrated by some secret diplomatic 
agency. 

Written on January 19, 1854 Reproduced from the New-York 

, . . : Daily Tribune 
Tribune, No. 3997, February 8, 1854, as a 
leader; reprinted in the New-York Weekly 
Tribune, No. 648, February 11, 1854