Friedrich Engels

The War Deeds in the Baltic and Black Sea –  
English-French System of Operations

Written on 22 May 1854.  
From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 4101, 9 June 1854]

London, Tuesday, 23 May 1854.

At last we have a heroic deed of the “British tars” to report.

Admiral Napier's fleet, after an eight-hour bombardment, destroyed Fort Gustavsvärn (translated from Swedish as “Gustav's defence or fortress”, “Gustavswehr”) and took the garrison, 1,500 strong, prisoner. This is the first serious attack on imperial Russian possession and proves at least, in comparison with the sleepy and ineffectual Odessa affair, that Charles Napier is not willing to sacrifice his own reputation and that of his family, if he can help it. Fort Gustavsvärn is situated at the extreme tip of the peninsula which forms the south-western corner of Finland, near the lighthouse of Hangöudd, known to all seamen sailing up the Gulf of Finland as a landmark. The military importance of the fort is not very great; it safeguards a very small stretch of land and sea, and the attacking fleet could have left it behind without any risk. The fort itself cannot have been large, as is evident from the number of its garrison. We must, however, be excused if we postpone the tactical appreciation of the affair until we have more detailed particulars; even in the British Admiralty and the War Office there prevails a blessed ignorance of the true strength and significance of Russia's Baltic coast defences.

For the present we can only say this much: The eight-hour bombardment proves a brave, if not very skilful, defence by the Russians and announces a greater stubbornness in the defence of first-rate fortresses in this gulf than could have been foreseen. On the other hand, the 1,500 prisoners of war mean no appreciable loss for Russia (they come to about a two-day average loss from sickness on the Danube), while they must cause Napier serious embarrassment. What in all the world is he to do with them? He can neither release them on parole nor without parole, and he can take them to no nearer place than England. To transport these 1,500 men safely, he would need at least three ships of the line or twice as many steam frigates. It is precisely the consequences of his victory that would thus cripple him for two or three weeks. Finally, since he has no landing troops, how can he occupy the captured territory? I see no way without once again incapacitating his weakly manned fleet, by withdrawing sailors and marines from every ship's crew. This circumstance turns us to a subject which at present is being discussed with great vehemence in the British press, though, as usual, much too late.

Suddenly the British press has found out that a fleet, however powerful it may be, is pretty worthless if it does not have troops on board strong enough to land and complete the victory which naval guns, even in the most favourable case, can achieve only imperfectly over land fortifications. It seems as if, until the end of last month, no one in England, either in official military circles or in official circles that guide public opinion, had ever been struck by this idea. Now all available troops and transports have been directed to the Black Sea, and the entire land force that has orders for the Baltic consists of one brigade of 2,500 men, not one of whom has yet been embarked, and not even the staff has been organized as yet.

The French, for their part, lag miserably behind. Their Baltic fleet – recall the boastful report of Minister Ducos: “Your Majesty has ordered the equipment of a third fleet; Your Majesty's commands have been executed” – this magnificent armada, which was to be ready to sail by mid-March and have ten ships of the line, has never comprised more than five ships of the line, which are now creeping slowly along the Great Belt with a frigate and a number of smaller vessels; they took a full three weeks from Brest to reach it, although westerly winds were constantly blowing. The great camp at Saint Omer, which was supposed to accommodate 150,000, or in case of need even 200,000 men for a Baltic expedition, had been formed on paper three or four weeks ago; yet to this day, not a single brigade has been concentrated. And yet the French could easily spare 10,000 to 15,000 men of infantry and field artillery from their coastal garrisons, without first making a great fuss through exaggerated theatrical camp demonstrations; but where are the transports? One would have to hire British merchantmen, and these, in keeping with the speed of the French fleet, would need four to six weeks until one after another reached the seat of war; and where could the troops be landed, where could the brigades and divisions be concentrated, where could the staffs and commissariats be organized? It is in this faulty circle that the Allies move. In order to be able to land in the Baltic, they must first capture an island or peninsula where they can concentrate and organize the troops for the attack; and to create this indispensable precondition, they must first have a land force on the spot. As soon as they have a good admiral who understands enough of land warfare to command a land force, they can easily get out of this predicament; Charles Napier is undoubtedly equal to these things, for he has already done much fighting on land. But how can anything like unity of action be expected, where an Aberdeen and a Palmerston hold sway, where four different ministries meddle in the affairs of the army, where army and navy are perpetually at loggerheads, and where the French and the English forces are allied, each envious of the other's glory and success. Moreover, no combat-capable land force can now be brought to the Baltic before the end of June; and if within four months the war is not decided and peace is not concluded, all conquests will have to be abandoned; troops, guns, ships, provisions, everything will have to be withdrawn or left behind, and during the seven winter months the Russians will again be in possession of their entire Baltic territory. From this it is clear enough that no serious and decisive attacks on Baltic Russia can be considered this year; it is too late. Only if Sweden joins the Western Powers will they have a base of operations in the Baltic that permits them to conduct a winter campaign in Finland. Here, then, we have again a faulty circle, though faulty, like the previous one, only for the faint-hearted. How can Sweden be expected to join the Powers if it is not convinced of their serious intentions by their sending a land force and occupying a part of Finland? But how, on the other hand, can these forces be sent there, unless one has secured Sweden as a base of operations?

Truly, Napoleon the Great, the “butcher” of so many millions of people, with his bold, decisive and crushing mode of warfare, was a pattern of humanity compared with the irresolute “statesmanlike” directors of this Russian war, to whom nothing will finally be left but to sacrifice human lives and hard cash on a far greater scale, if they continue to proceed as they have hitherto.

Turning to the Black Sea, we see that the combined fleets before Sevastopol are amusing themselves with a small harmless shooting practice at a long distance against a few paltry outworks of that fortress. This harmless game was, as we are told, kept up by the majority of the ships for four days, and since the Russians had only twelve ships of the line ready for sea, they did not show themselves outside the harbour during this entire period, to the great astonishment of Admiral Hamelin (see his reports of 1 and 5 May). This valorous sailor is certainly old enough to remember the time when French squadrons were not only blockaded by far weaker English ones, but even attacked in their harbours; and it would really be asking a little too much for the weaker Russian squadron to leave Sevastopol to be destroyed and sunk by twice the number of ships, and thus to sacrifice itself in expiation of the “abominable crime of Sinope”.

Meanwhile, two ships of the line (screw steamers) and seven steam frigates are on their way to Circassia. They were to reconnoitre the coasts of the Crimea closely and then destroy the forts on the Circassian coast. However, only three steam frigates were to take part in this attack, while the other four had orders to return to the fleet as soon as the Crimea had been thoroughly reconnoitred. Now, as far as we know, the three forts which the Russians still hold on the Circassian coast – Anapa, Suchum Kale and Redut Kale – are of considerable strength and built on heights commanding the open sea (except Redut Kale), and it is doubtful whether the forces dispatched will suffice to carry out their designs, the more so as they are not accompanied by landing troops. The squadron, which is commanded by Rear Admiral Lyons, is at the same time to get into communication with the Circassians, especially with their leader Schamyl. What Lyons is to negotiate with Schamyl is not known; but one thing is certain, he cannot bring him what he most urgently needs, namely arms and ammunition; for warships on active service have no free space to take on cargo. Two paltry merchant brigs or schooners laden with such valuable goods would render far better service than the moral but utterly worthless support of five warships. We learn at the same time that the Turkish fleet is sailing towards the same objective, carrying with it the things necessary to arm the Circassians. Thus, the two allied fleets have the same assignment – but neither knows of the other. The devil take it, that is unity of plan and action! In the end, one will take the other for Russians, and it will be a splendid spectacle for the Circassians if the two squadrons fire upon each other!

The allied land troops are fraternising in their own way at Gallipoli and Scutari, by consuming enormous quantities of the heavy, sweet wine of the region. Those who by chance remain sober are busy building fieldworks, situated and constructed in such a manner that they will never be attacked and never be defended. If any further proof were needed that neither the British nor the French government had any intention of doing serious harm to friend Nicholas, it is furnished, even to the blindest, by the way in which the troops spend their time. In order to have a pretext for keeping their troops away from the theatre of war, the allied commanders are making them erect a continuous line of fieldworks across the isthmus of the Thracian Chersonese. Everybody, and especially every French engineer, knows that continuous defensive lines in field fortifications are to be rejected under almost all circumstances; it was reserved, however, for the Anglo-French army of Gallipoli to lay out continuous entrenchments on a terrain two-thirds of which is commanded by heights lying on the side from which the enemy is expected. But since, despite every effort to advance as slowly as possible, some kind of progress must still be made even at this snail’s pace, we learn that 15,000 French are to go to Varna – in what capacity? – as the garrison of the fortress – to do what there? – to die of ague and epidemics.

Now, if this conduct of war is to have any meaning, the commanders ought to know that the Turks precisely do not understand the art of manoeuvring in the open field, in which the Anglo-French troops are masters; that, on the other hand, the Turks master the defence of ramparts, redoubts, and even breaches against storming troops so consummately that neither English nor French can measure themselves against them in this. Therefore, and because Varna with a Turkish garrison accomplished what no fortress had ever achieved before, namely, held out for twenty-nine days after three practicable breaches had been made in the walls, therefore the semi-disciplined Turks are taken away from Varna and sent against the Russians in the open field, while the well-drilled French, excellently suited for the attack but not sufficiently tenacious for prolonged defence, are sent to Varna to guard the walls.

Other reports indicate that all these movements are only diversionary manoeuvres. It is said that great things are in preparation. There is no intention, they say, of letting the allied troops operate in the Baltic, but rather, with the help of the fleets, they are to perform brilliant feats of heroism in the rear of the Russians. They are to land at Odessa, cut off the enemy’s retreat, and join up with the Austrians in Transylvania in his rear. In addition, they are to send detachments to Circassia. Finally, they are to provide 15,000 to 20,000 men for the attack on Sevastopol from the land side, while the fleets are to force the harbour. A mere glance at the course of the war so far and at the diplomatic negotiations that preceded it will no doubt very soon settle these rumours for us. They came from Constantinople right after the arrival of Marshal Leroy, commonly called Saint-Arnaud. Anyone who knows the past history of this worthy gentleman (I shall send it to you in the next few days) will recognise in this boastfulness the man who bragged his way up to his high rank, although he was cashiered three times as an army officer.

To sum up the military situation briefly: England, and France especially, are being driven “inevitably, albeit reluctantly” to deploy the greater part of their forces in the Orient and in the Baltic, that is, on two advanced wings of a military position whose nearest centre is none other than France. Russia sacrifices her coasts, her fleet, and a part of her troops in order to induce the Western powers to commit themselves completely to this measure, which contradicts all strategy. As soon as this is done, as soon as the requisite number of French troops has been dispatched to far-distant countries, Austria and Prussia will declare for Russia and march on Paris with superior forces. If this plan succeeds, Louis Napoleon will have no troops left to withstand the blow. But there is one power that can “set itself in motion” at every sudden event, and that can also “set in motion” Louis Bonaparte and his venal lackeys, as it has set many a ruler in motion before. This power is capable of defying all these invasions; it has already proved this against a united Europe. And this power, the revolution, rest assured, will not be found wanting on the day when its action is required.

Karl Marx